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Prologue: 
Weimar Society 
in Retrospect 
GUNTER W. REMMLING 
The social system of Heimar Germany has always been controversial. 
From the start 1leimar society was c;laracterized by a peculiar 
fluidity: between 1913 and 1933, the German Reich, commonly 
referred to as the \Veimar Republic, v1as a virtual laboratory of 
sociocultural experimentation. In the streets of German ·towns 
and cities, political armies competed for followers--a orocess 
punctuated by assassinations and advertised by street battles 
embroiling monarchists, imperial militarists, nihilistic war 
veterans, Communists, Socialists, anarchists, and National 
Socialists. Parliamentary activity involved about twenty-five 
political parties whose shifting alliances produced twenty 
governmental cabinets with an average lifespan of less than 
nine months. The political circus performed in an economic crazy 
house: the hungry post\var years skidded into an inflationary 
period during which the German mark--valued before the war at 
4.2 per dollar--plummeted to the value of 4.2 billioa to the 
dollar. At this point, in November 1923, individuals paid a 
billion marks to send a letter abroad and the German Republic 
verged on complete financial bankruptcy and political 
disintegration. 
An era of political and econouic reconstruction began in 1924; 
by 1929 Germany had become the leading industrial power on the 
European continent. The Great DeDression, announced by the 
crash of the New York Stock Sxchange in October 1929, brought 
the ~eimar Republic to the brink of disaster: by the end of 
1932, nearly half of the German labor force was unemployed. 
Hany jobless men provoked arrest, seeking shelter and food in 
prison, others swelled the ranks of the Red Front and, ominously, 
those of l!itler's Storm Troops. In his propaganda the budding 
dictator exploited the additional economic problern of 
reparations payments to the ~estern Allies which the Young 
Garnmittee had finally set in such a way that the actual payments, 
including interest, were to total approximately 29 billion 
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dollars from 1923 to 1938. 
The Weimar Republic was also a whirling carousel of personal 
experimentation with differing life-styles. Guitar-playing, 
poetry-reading, free-loving youngsters roamed the country giving 
expression to the antibourgeois sentiments of the youth movement; 
nudist colanies flourished; in Berlin nightclubs phallic symbols 
became part of interior decoration, naked girls swang from the 
ceiling, and the staged performance of the sexual act was 
incorporated in the routine of show business; prostitutes and 
transvestites took their place in the street scene along with 
proselytizers for exotic cults. 
The controversial character of \Jeimar Germany found its most 
intense expression in political conflict. Rightists and ~azis 
attacked the Weimar Republic as the product of sinister 
machinations; as a no-man's-land conjured up by the traitorous 
hands of a cowardly and servile gang: "the November criminals." 
Leftists and Communists worked against the new German Reich, which 
they denounced as an unholy alliance against the workers--the 
founders of the Republic, they claimed, had betrayed the 
proletarian revolution. 
Many sober and respected citizens experienced ~leimar Germany as 
a necessary evil and turned ~nft~ep_~~likaner--rational 
republicans. 
The Social Democrats and many liberals worked hard to launch and 
navigate the new ship of state. Some progressive intellectuals 
and artists hailed the \veimar Republic as a new golden age, and 
their enthusiasm was not unfounded. In Weimar Germany, 
intellectual and artistic innovations transformed science, 
philosophy, literature, music, painting, the theater, movies, 
and architecture into irnages expressing the dawn of a new 
consciousness. After the collapse of the Republic, political 
refugees carried the productive spirit of lleimar culture into 
the four corners of the world, merging it with the creative 
mainstream that aroused the awareness of people in the twentieth 
century. The creative process of Weimar culture is rich in 
conspicuous examples such as expressionist painting, atonal 
music, Brechtian theater, Einsteinian physics, and revolutionized 
visual experiences commonly associated with the Bauhaus. But 
while cosmopolitan audiences cheereJ successive opening nights, 
exhibitions, and first editions, conservatives and, increasingly, 
Nazis, reassured the provincial masses with warmed-over portians 
of traditional beer-and-sauerkraut culture (see Tilton). 
Special political interests as well as past and present controversy 
have shrouded \veimar Germany in the swirling mis ts of his tory 
and often the contemporary interpreter feels reminded of the 
blurred outlines of that "ghostly freighter" Lotte Lenya used 
to sing about in The Thre~~~~~Opera. 
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But one stark fact rises clearly above the shifting fogs which 
glide across the historical landscape: Weimar Germany became 
the demoniacal creator of the monster Nazism. 
Nazi mass murder and other manifestations of genocide in the 
twentieth century have given a special urgency to analyses 
which pursue anti-Semitism and those frightening changes in 
political climate that led to the ash-darkened sky over Holocaust 
Germany (see Kren and Rappoport). Weimar society bubbled to 
the surface in the crucible of war and revolution. The German 
revolution followed in the wake of the military catastrophes 
triggered by the Allied offensives of July and August 1918. By 
October, Kaiser William II and the German High Command were 
sufficiently unnerved to allow the formation of a parliamentary 
government and to prompt its chancellor, the liberal Prince Max 
of Baden, to request President Woodrow Wilson to take steps for 
the restoration of peace. The half-hearted maneuverings of the 
German leaders and the Allied desire for Germany's total defeat 
prolonged the privations of the war, and in late October and early 
November sailors of the imperial fleet at Kiel mutinied to prevent 
a suicidal engagement with the English. By November 4, all 
German battleships flew the red flag and disgorged armed sailors 
who spread the revolution from ports to other cities. The 
soldiers who were sent against the mutineers refused to take 
action, and many of them joined the revolt (see Tobin). On 
the morning of November 9, Berlin was in revolutionary turmoil: 
crowds of workers and soldiers had transformed the Reichstag 
into an armed camp; Karl Liebknecht, the Spartaeist leader, 
prepared to proclaim a soviet republic from the balcony of the 
imperial castle; Philipp Scheidemann, a leader of the Majority 
Socialists, countered this move by proclaiming the German 
Republic from a window of the Reichstag; Prince Max handed over the 
office of chancellor to the Social Democrat Friedrich Ebert. On 
the following day, William II fled across the German border to 
Holland, and at 5:00 A.M. on the morning of November 11, 1918, 
four reluctant German delegates signed the armistice. 
On the day of the kaiser's departure, the Berlin convention of 
the Workers' and Soldiers' Soviets voted to support Ebert's 
11social republic. 11 On November 10, as well, Ebert was informed 
by General Wilhelm Grtlner that he could count on the collaboration 
of the Supreme Military Command. A disgusted Liebknecht denied 
his support, but the Independent Socialists joined with the 
Majority Socialists to create a cabinet. The provisional German 
government, which commenced its activities as the 11Council of 
People 1 s Representatives, 11 lost the cooperation ·Of the 
Independent Socialists after Ebert had ordered troops to Berlin 
on December 24 for an unsuccessful attempt to clear the palace of 
revolutionary 11people 1 s sailors. 11 
Ebert's Majority Socialists began to long for a return to law 
and order by means of a national assembly, elected not only by 
Socialists, but by the entire population; elections for a 
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constituent assembly were fixed for January 19, 1919 . When Ebert 
tried to dismiss the president of Berlin's police, the Independent 
Socialist Emil Eichhorn, the Communists joined the Independent 
Socialists in the manifesto of January 5, 1919, calling upon the 
German proletariat to stage a great mass demonstration agairrst 
the government of Ebert and Scheidemann. These developments 
unleashed the Spartacus Rebellion, which transformed the German 
capital and other cities into battle zones where radical 
Independent Socialists and Communists fought agairrst the supporters 
of the Ebert government . Ebert appointed the former basket 
weaver and trade union leader Gustav Noske as Supreme Commander 
of a volunteer corps . Led by bloodthirsty career officers of the 
old imperial army, Noske's troops entered the center of Berlin 
on January 11. The Spartaeist strongholds succumbed to heavy 
fire, and by January 15, the volunteers of "bloodhound" Noske 
had cleared the last snipers from Berlin. The same day the 
Spratacist leaders Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, and Wilhelm 
Pieck were arrested and beaten by staff members of the Garde-
Kavallerie-Schlltzendivision. Liebknecht was murdered b-y----
KapitHnleutnant von Pflugk-Hartung; Luxemburg was gunned down by 
Leutnant Vogel; Pieck survived to participate in the affairs of 
the Weimar Republic as a Communist delegate. He returned to 
Germany from his Hoscow exile in 1945 and became president of 
the German Democratic Republic in 1949. 
The murder of Rosa Luxemburg is of special importance: German 
anti-Semites hated her not only as a professional revolutionary, 
but above all as a representative of the East European J ews who 
occupied a special place in anti-Semitic demonology (see Aschheim). 
The elections for a national constituent assembly were held, as 
scheduled, on January 19, and on February 6 the national assembly 
met at Weimar, the city of Goethe. On February 11, Ebert was 
elected president of the Reich that was commonly called the 
Weimar Republic. The next day Scheidemann formed a coalition 
government made up of Social Democrats, the Catholic Center, and 
the Democrats. After approving Scheidemann's cabinet, the assembly 
began drafting a new constitution, which was adopted on July 31 
and signed on August 11, 1919 . 
Ebert's alliance with the High Command of the old army had cleared 
the way for a democratic republic; but in fighting the extreme 
Left, the new government bent so far to the Right that it became 
an accomplice to the defeat of the social revolution . The Weimar 
coalition neither achieved public control over Germany's 
reactionary, monopolistic industrialists, nor did it succeed in 
breaking up the huge landed estates that were the power bases 
of feudal-minded agrarian overlords. From the beginning, therefore, 
the democratic leaders of Weimar Germany had sealed their own 
doom: their actions preserved the economic arrangements and 
military values of imperial Germany, leaving excessive power in 
the hands of cartel bosses and Junkers, who hated the Republic 
and worked for the return ·of an authoritarian regime . Many 
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workers, disappointed by the failure of social reform, 
strengtherred the left-wing opposition of Independent Socialists 
and Communists who attacked the Social Democratic party and the 
Republic from the other corner of the ring. In growing numbers, 
discouraged bourgeois liberals withdrew into a world of fantasy, 
where they dreamed of vague and irrational verities. Their 
ill-defined concerns with the German horneland and German youth 
tied many Weimar liberals to exponents of neoconservatism, anti-
Semitism, and the radical right (see Pois) , Bourgeois feminism 
as well failed to challenge the class structure of German society 
and became an ally of groups working for the preservation of 
inequality and social injustice (see Bridenthal). 
The year 1920 marks both the beginning of full-scale Rightist 
Counter-revolution and the last successful demonstration of 
working-class solidarity , In March 1920, a rightist conspiracy, 
headed by the self-proclaimed "Reich Chancellor" Wolfgang Kapp 
and supported by the rebellious troops of the Ehrhardt Brigade, 
a Freikorps unit, assumed power in Berlin for a few days , The 
Kapp Putsch was defeated by the refusal of the higher civil 
servants to collaborate with the rebel government and by the 
crippling blow of a general strike called by the Social Democratic 
party and carried out by all labor unions. 
German labor failed to reap the benefits of its success in the 
Kapp Putsch; the Socialist parties refused to cooperate with 
the victorious trade-union leaders, who called for the 
establishment of a labor government as the unified expression of 
the will of the entire working class. The rebuffed trade unians 
accepted the return of the ineffectual Weimar coalition, and 
thus began their disastraus policy of compromising with the 
ruling groups , While the workers' leaders permitted organized 
labor to skid to a secondary power position, General Hans von 
Seeckt, chief of the army command, used all his cunning to build 
the army into a state within the state. From then on it was not 
the life-giving strength of productive labor (see Grossmann), 
but the death-oriented power of the army that was to exercise 
the decisive force in the Republic. 
At the end of June 1920, the Social Democrats lost their dominant 
position in Germany; the Weimar coalition was replaced by the new 
combination of the Center, the Democrats, and the German People's 
party , The parlimentary delegation of the German People's party 
was led by Gustav Stresemann, who contributed signally to the 
further development of Weimar Germany as a bourgeois-capitalist 
democracy. From August 1923 to November 1923, Stresemann held 
the offices of chancellor and foreign minister; afterwards--
until his death in 1929--he acted as foreign minister. 
Stresemann began his political career in the Republic under 
difficult circumstances , The population was ernbittered by the 
severe demands of the Treaty of Versailles, which had become 
effective in January 1920. Public dissatisfaction was deepened 
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by Allied insistence on reparations payments, more than six 
billion gold marks annually for forty-two years, and by the French 
and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr on January 11, 1923, in 
retaliation against technical German defaults on reparation 
obligations in the delivery of timber. People were unnerved by 
the steady deterioration of the value of German currency and 
the subsequent inflation which culminated on November 20, 1923. 
Stresemann's patient negotiations and careful policies of 
stabilization averted the warst consequences of these developments; 
he called off the passive resistance against French occupation 
forces and ordered the resumption of work and reparation payments o 
On November 20, 1923, a new currency, covered by a mortgage on 
Germany's entire agricultural and industrial resources, ended 
the inflation; in 1924, the Dawes Plan reduced annual reparation 
payments and provided the German government with an international 
loan of 200 million dollars. Strengthened by the Dawes Plan, 
the German economy began its remarkable recovery. 
During these years of crisis and slow recovery, the rightist 
opponents of the Republic missed no opportunity to strengthen 
their position; free from the responsibilities of government, 
they peddled cheap and unrealistic slogans designed to incite 
chauvinistic emotions among the voters. Undaunted by the 
miserable Kapp Putsch, right-wing conspiracies, such as 
Organization Consul, elevated murder to an expression of patriotism; 
many republican leaders fell victim to Fememord. On August 26, 
1921, Matthias Erzherger (see Hunt), Catholic Center politician 
and chief signer of the armistice, was gunned down in the Black 
Forest; on June 24, 1922, Walter Rathenau, Jewish industrialist 
and foreign minister, was attacked with guns and hand grenades in 
suburban Berlin-Gr~newald o Rathenau's death motivated Chancellor 
Josef Wirth to give a Reichstag speech in which he announced that 
the "enemy stands on the right." Despite mass demonstrations and 
measures such as the Law for the Protection of the Republic, 
assassination remained a favored mode of Rightist policies o 
Ominously, the courts of law developed a tendency to show 
incredible leniency toward rightist terrorists, while severely 
punishing even minor infractions on the part of leftist 
individuals o Indicative of this tendency was Hitler's brief and 
comfortable stay at Landsberg prison--a virtual sabbatical for 
subversives--which was the only consequence of his Beer-Hall 
Putsch of 1923. 
The professional army of Weimar Germany did not fail to turn 
republican problems and achievements to the advantage of anti-
republican militarists. The economically significant treaty of 
friendship that was signed between the Soviet Union and Germany 
on April 16, 1922, at Rapallo provided the chance for military 
activities in Russia, which the Treaty of Versailles had 
withheld from the volunteer army that the Allies had limited to 
100,000 men. In 1920 the army delighted in putting down the 
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workers' revolt in the Ruhr; in 1923, the army again made itself 
"useful" by suppressing attempted Cornrnunist coups in the working-
class strongholds of Saxony and Thuringia. 
For the Germans the year 1925 brought prosperity and further 
international reconciliation; on the front of internal politics 
the year spelled disaster. The Dawes Plan of 1924 bad initiated a 
flow of foreign investments and short-term loans to Germany o 
This stimulated a wave of modernization affecting large portians 
of the country's industrial apparatus. Rising production and 
wages were accompanied by decreasing unemployment and by the 
end of 1928 Gerrnany bad become the leading industrial power in 
Contineutal Europe. 
The internal political disaster began on February 28, 1925, when 
Friedrich Ebert, president of the Republic, died at the age of 
fifty-four. On Harch 29, 1925, the Germans went to the polls to 
elect a new president, but, as could be expected, not one of the 
seven candidates achieved the required majority on the first 
ballot. For the second round of voting, the republican groups 
supported Wilhelm Marx of the Center party as the single 
candidate of the Volksblock; the German Nationalists rallied 
the forces of the Right around the retired Field Marshal Paul 
von Hindenburg, and their major. s~okesman, Admiral Alfred von 
Tirpitz, persuaded the seventy-seven-year-old Junker to run; the 
Cornrnunists renominated their own candidate, party chairman Ernst 
ThHlmann. By the slim margin of 904,151 votes, the elections 
of April 26, 1925, gave Hindenburg the simple plurality which the 
law required for a second-ballot victory. The self~professed 
monarebist Hindenburg received 14.6 million votes, while 13.7 
million votes went to Marx, supporter of the Republic. ThHlmann 
received the crucial 1.9 million votes which withdrew strength 
from the republican forces and ironically helped the Rightist 
cause by making possible the election of a man who personified 
Prussian militarism, German nationalism, and agrarian Junker 
conservatism. Kurt Tucholsky, one of the company of left-wing 
intellectuals associated with the radical, but independent 
Berlin journal WeltbUhne, rernarked after the election of 
Hindenburg that the Germans now bad a "republic until further 
notice." 
This "notice" was not given until 1930, and for five years 
parliamentary principles continued to govern the political life 
of the German Reich. The period from 1925 to 1928 was not only a 
time of prosperi ty, it was also the core of the "Stresernann 
era," which some like to identify as those "golden twenties." 
While Stresernann acted as foreign minister he signed three major 
treaties on behalf of Germany, contributing to the development 
of an era of international good will. The L9carno Pact, signed on 
October 16, 1925, guaranteed the status quo of Gerrnany's western 
frontiers, reaffirming in particular the German renunciation of 
Alsace-Lorraine. In response, the Allies began to wi.thclraw their 
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military units from the Cologne zone of the occupied Rhineland; 
on September 3, 1926, Germany was admitted to the League of 
Nations with a permanent seat on the council. On April 24, 1926, 
Stresemann signed the Berlin Pact, extending the original Rapallo 
agreement with the Soviet Union; the new Russo-German agreement 
calmed Soviet fears with regard to German complicity in an 
anti-Soviet bloc, but renewed suspicion of Germany in most other 
European nations. On August 27, 192ß, Stresemann signed the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact to outlaw war and was warmly received by the 
Parisians. 
The sincerity of Stresemann's intentions has been questioned by 
historians, and the problern of his political morality may never 
be satisfactorily resolved. His policies of international 
reconciliation, however, combined with economic prosperity to 
create a period of relative stabilization. In the 1928 elections 
to the Reichstag, voting practices indicated strong popular 
support for the original design of the Republic: approximately 
65 percent of the ballot went to political parties that were 
loyal to the Weimar constitution; the Communists received 11 
percent of the votes; right-wing parties picked up less than 
25 percent, and among them the Nazi party received no more than 
3 percent of the valid votes. 
The Social Democrats, who had received 30 percent of the ballot, 
supported Stresemann's foreign policy, but opposed the strong 
influence that industrialists and businessmen exerted on the 
government. Especially ominous was the consolidation of 
monopoly capitalism, which gave far-reaching power to such 
gigantic trusts as I. G. Farben, Siemens, and Vereinigte Stahlwerke. 
The right-wing Nationalists, who had received 14 percent of the 
vote in 1923, fought violently and vociferously against 
international reconcil~ation. The Communists remained suspicious 
of Stresemann's policies and attacked what they considered his 
plotting agains t the Sovie t Union; tvhen Germany entered the 
League of Nations, they denounced this move as an anti-Soviet 
alliance between German capitalists and an international 
"consortium of imperialist bandits." 
In 1929 Germany's prosperous economic development came to a 
grinding halt. The Great Depression brought the German Reich 
close to economic collapse: by the end of 1932, almost half of 
Germany's labor forcewas jobless • .In the Reichstag elections 
of May 1928, the Nazis had received a mere 3 percent of valid 
votes, but in July 1932, 37 percent of the ballot went to the Nazi 
party. Hitler's propaganda campaign--financed by big industrialists 
and bankers (see Kllhnl)--exploited the additional economic 
problern of reparations payments to the Western Allies, totaling 
about 29 billion dollars payable until 193ß. 
The depression brought the beginning of the end for parliamentary 
government: on March 27, 1930, Weimar Germany's last Great 
Coalition broke up with the resignation of the !1llller cabinet. 
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The government of Social Democrarie Chancellor Hermann HUller 
collapsed because of its inability to settle a dispute between 
the Social Democrars and the People's party concerning the 
elimination of a serious deficit in the unemployment fund. The 
business-oriented People's party called for a cut in unemployment 
benefits, while the Social Democrars demanded new taxes on 
business. The crisis provided Hindenburg and General Kurt von 
Schleicher, head of the ministerial office in the ministry of 
defense, with the long-awaited opportunity for authoritarian 
government. 
On March 23, 1930, President Hindenburg asked Heinrich BrUning, 
parliamentary leader of the Catholic Center party, to form a 
cabinet without firm party ties; two days later he appointed 
BrUning chancellor. The new government was weighted to the right 
and included no Social Democrars (see Breitman). BrUning's 
deflationary policy and program of economic retrenchment found 
insufficient parliamentary support, and his unpopular measures 
were carried out by means of the president's ernergency powers 
under Article 48 of the Weimar constitution . From the beginning 
Social Democrat Rudolf Breitscheid implored the government not 
to use Article 43: its employment, he warned, could only lead 
into the darkness of dictatorship. 
These developments encouraged Hindenburg to drop all democratic 
pretenses and to show hirnself for what he was--a treacherous, 
reactionary Junker . The eighty-four-year-old president withdrew 
his support from Brlining, forcing his resignation on May 30; 
then Hindenburg sided openly with the large landowners and 
industrial magnates against the Social Democrarie working 
masses that had supported him against the presidential candidates, 
Hitler and Th~lmann, thereby making possible the old field 
marshal's reelection on April 10, 1932. llindenburg's betrayal of 
the democratic forces sealed the fate of the doomed Republic, 
which became subject to the dangeraus crosscurrents of partisan 
interests represented by generals, cartel bosses, and East-
Elbian landlords, who shared an appreciation of the Nazis as an 
ill-mannered, but highly useful force counterbalancing the 
Socialist and Communist hordes. General von Schleicher confided 
in a letter: "Indeed, if the Nazis did not exist , we should 
have had to invent them." Under Schleicher's influence Hindenburg 
appointed Franz von Papen as chancellor on May 31, 1932; this 
ambitious Catholic aristocrat confronted the people with his 
"cabinet of barons," a government consisting of military leaders, 
industrialists, and Junkers .· Papen's nonparty government had no 
popular Support, but survived until November 1932, propped up by 
the president and the army (see H~rster-Philipps). 
In 1932 German jails were crowded with close to nine thousand 
Leftist political prisoners. In the basements of their 
headquarters, the Nazis tortured their enemies to death; in the 
streets, Communists and Nazis fought pitched battles. Following 
the advice of his minister of defense, General von Schleicher, 
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Papen lif.ted the ban that BrUning's government had imposed on the 
Nazi SA (Sturmabteilung) and SS (Schutzstaffeln). Hitler was 
given a free hand, and the Reichstag elections of July 31, 1932, 
resulted in a triumph for "Adolf Legalite," whose party became 
the largest in the country, polling over 13,700,000 votes with 
230 seats in the Reichstag (see Stachura). 
The Weimar Republic came to an end in the Byzantine power games 
which Papen, Schleicher, and Hitler played against a deadlocked 
parliament (see Petzina). The November elections of 1932 reduced 
the Nazi seats in the Reichstag to 196; only the Communists 
registered significant gains, polling close to six million votes 
with one hundred seats. The Social Democrats retained 121 seats, 
but deep-rooted programmatic differences between the two Marxist 
parties, as well as mutual blindness to the lethal nature of 
Nazi power, prevented the formation of a leftist coalition 
government (see Geary). These differences would not interest the 
SS concentration camp guards, who would later murder Communists 
and Socialists side by side. 
Alarmed by the increase in the Communist vote and Hitler's drive 
for power, Schleicher forced Papen's resignation and took over 
the office of chancellor. On December 3, 1932, Schleicher's 
government began to operate in the hope of dividing the opposition 
on both the right and the left. Schleicher planned to reduce the 
Nazi threat by bringing Gregor Strasser's "left wing" into his 
regime; he also intended to pacify the Social Democrats by 
inviting the participation of trade-union leaders. aitler 
immediately reacted by removing Strasser from the office of party 
secretary; later, in the Nazi blood purge of June 1934, he had 
Gregor Strasser murdered, along with Schleicher (see Nagle). 
The leaders of ti1e Social Democratic party opposed any form of 
cooperation with Schleicher, and by January 6, 1933, they had 
succeeded in cutting all connections between organized labor and 
the chancellor. 
On January 23, 1933, Schleicher admitted to Hindenburg that his 
strategy of forming a parliamentary majority had failed; he 
asked the president for an order dissolving the Reichstag linked 
with an indefinite and, therefore, unconstitutional postpanerneut 
of the prescribed new elections. Hindenburg refused Schleicher's 
request, trusting in the success of secret negotiations involving 
Papen, rightist leaders, and the detested, but unavoidable Hitler. 
On January 23, Schleicher and his entire cabinet resigned and 
Hindenburg asked Papen to "clarify" the political situation. 
The nineteen Weimar governments were not noted for longevity: 
the average life span of a cabinet was less than nine months. 
With a duration of twenty-one months the Great Coalition of 1928 
had survived the langest; with a duration of fifty-four days 
Schleicher's government was short-lived even by the standards 
of the Republic. 
Papen wasted no time; with the Support of Oskar von Hindenburg 
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and Otto Meissner he persuaded President Hindenburg to do what 
the old field marshal had so far considered inconceivable, namely, 
to appoint the "Austrian corporal," Adolf Hitler, chancellor of 
Germany. Hitler and the members of his proposed cabinet, which 
included von Papen as vice-chancellor, received their commissions 
from Hindenburg on the morning of January 30, 1933. On the 
evening of this demonie Monday, a confused eighty-five-year-old 
German president and an ecstatic Hitler gazed down on the stream 
of Nazi battalions, marehing with flaming torches through the 
Wilhelmstrasse. 
\leimar society was dead. Germany sank into a darkness from the 
depth of which there soon emerged a ceaseless stream of political 
refugees. 
The proscription of creative activity formed part of the 
immediate program of Nazi oppression. Shortly after their 
assumption of power, the Nazis erdered the Berlin newspaper Die 
Nachtausgabe to publish a "first !ist" of forbidden authors. The 
black !ist, which appeared on April 23, 1933, outlawed all major 
writers including such \Veimar luminaries .as Bertolt Brecht, l1ax 
Brod, Alfred DHblin, Lion Feuchtwanger, Egon Erwin Kisch, 
Heinrich Mann, Themas Mann, Theodor Plievier, Erich Maria Remarque, 
Arthur Schnitzler, Ernst Toller, Xurt Tucholsky, Arnold Zweig, 
and Stefan Zweig . This first !ist was followed by others, and 
soon literate Germans realized that nearly eight hundred writers 
had disappeared from their cultural environment. 
The Nazi attack against German culture proceeded on all fronts 
of intellectual-artistic creativity and banned all significant 
thinkers, composers, sculptors, and painters. Soon intellectuals, 
artists, and writers disappeared in Nazi concentration camps where 
they were beaten to death along with activist workers and 
political enemies of the German dictatorship. 
But like the later exhibitions of Entartete Kunst, which were 
meant to demonstrate the evils of "degenerate art," the black-
listing of authors alerted the world to the astounding creative 
vitality of Weimar culture. People began to realize to what 
extent the artistic-intellectual community of Weimar Germany had 
contributed to the transformation of science, philosophy, 
literature, music, painting, the theater, motion pictures, 
and architecture into configurations of images expressing the 
dawn of a new consciousness. The Nazi policy of proscription 
could not fail to backfire, since it included creative movements 
of international renown, such as expressionism, Piscator's 
documentary theater, Einsteinian physics, Dadaist photomontage, 
the new portraiture, the Dessau Bauhaus, the typographic 
revolution, functional design, cqnstructivism, photo~journalism, 
Brecht's epic theatre, agitprop, Proletkult, and New Music 
(see Meyer). 
Weimar Germany's creative avant-garde went abroad. The innovators 
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kept on working in Paris, London, New York, Chicago, and 
throughout the world. 
In Germany the new rulers slapped their own art scene tagether 
(see Burns). Nazi public art, mass-produced by and for the 
media, consisted of sculpture, and architecture that glorified 
oppression, armament production, combat, and death. The dictator, 
who had once painted postcards during his residence in a Viennese 
asylum for vagrants, left the imprint of his taste on paintings. 
Nazi exhibits showed archaic provincial genre works. The 
creators of Auschwitz had an insatiable appetite for nondescript 
nudes, insipid country scenes, and group portraits of simple 
people. These hyper-German productions of tenth-rate painters 
came complete with absurd and pompaus titles to endow them with 
"blood and soil" profundities. Nazi art had a dual function. 
The practitioners of this art were ordered to justify degrading 
and oppressive social relatio.nships. Nazi artists also had to 
spread a tattered veil over the real processes taking place 
in Holocaust Germany: police terror, torture, murder, 
moronicization of the masses, war planning, genocide, and the 
repression and destruction of the Jews. 
2 
Introduction 
MICHAEL N. DOBKOWSKI AND 
ISIDOR WALLIMANN 
There had been considerable work done on the lleimar period and 
the rise of fascism from a variety of perspectives, including 
political, cultural, and psychohistorical. Although valuable 
and iraportant, many of these perspectives have underemphasized 
what we consider to be key elements in an understanding of the 
rise of fascism and the collapse of liberal bourgeois democracy 
in the lleimar Republic as a prelude to the Holocaust, namely, 
factors directly resulting from the socioeconomic (structural) 
problems and contradictions of Weimar society. This book attempts 
to highlight these factors. In particular, the focus of the essays 
collected in this volume has shifted from the political and 
constitutional structures of the Republic to the social and 
economic determinants of this underlying weakness. Rather than 
examining the lleimar Republic j us t as a failed democracy, the 
emphasis herein has moved towards examining lleimar Germany as a 
developed capitalist society with structural problems which 
served to undermine the political system that took shape after 
the defeat in the First World War. The picture that emerges 
from these essays is that of a republic fatally flawed at the 
outset by a failure to effect structural changes which would have 
secured a democratic order--of a republic that consequently 
was undermined because the bourgeois elements which should have 
defended it would not do so, and the working-class and minority 
group elements which tried to defend it, could not do so. 
Several of the essays dealing with these structural factors are 
written from a Marxist perspective, a perspective that has been 
relatively little noticed among American scholars writing on the 
lleimar period. For that reason, we have included essays from 
two ivest German scholars who operate within this tradition. 
We have also included essays on ideology and culture because 
they demonstrate that ideology generally reflects the structural 
dimensions and contradictions of Weimar society. "All myths," 
as Aschheim points out, "if they are to function, must have 
some basis, however, tenuous, in social reality." 
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Petzina's socioeconomic historical analysis provides the reader 
at the outset with a factual background against which certain 
political and ideological developments during the Weimar 
Republic can be seen. Given the fact that the National Socialist 
German \lorkers Party' s (NSDAP) mass support came primarily from 
the old and new "middle class," it is important to note that 
there had been continuous economic pressure to migrate out of 
agriculture, that monopolization and concentration of industry 
had been increasing, and that the percentage of self-employed 
individuals had been decreasing. It is also important to note 
that post-\lorld \lar I inflation was most damaging to members 
of the old "middle class" and that, relatively speaking, the 
income of the self-employed rose more slowly than that of the 
non-self-employed and that the civil servants failed to regain 
their pri vileged pre-\lorld War I income level. \lhen the NSDAP 
rase to power during the Great Depression, its supporters did 
not come, for the most part, from the ranks of the poor or 
unemployed workers suffering most from the depression, but came 
instead from the ranks of those whose status and economic standing 
had become threatened. In many ways, however, their support of 
the Hazi movement was in vain since, despite the NSDAP's promise 
to economically save the middle class, relatively more individuals 
lost their self-employed status during Nazi rule than did during 
the lleimar Republic. 
Internationally speaking, Germany, despite having an industrial 
potential second only to that of the United States, lagged behind 
other nations in its ability to increase industrial output 
relative to pre-World War I levels • . The years of the Weimar 
Republic were characterized by economic stagnation, while rnany 
other countries were increasing their industrial output during 
the same period. However, Petzina maintains that this anomalaus 
Situation was not caused by war reparation payments, which in 
his view had, if anything, a stimulating effect since they were 
tied to a loan program. All things considered, more capital 
was flowing into Gerrnany during this time than was flowing out 
of Gerrnany. 
Petzina focuses on socioeconomic develo;nnents dur:i_np, the lleimar 
Republic and how they affected various segments of the population. 
With this approach, he points to the structural processes and 
bottlenecks that tended to induce certain groups to Support the 
NSDAP. Tilton also uses this type of analysis in his essay, 
which deals specifically with reasons for the NSDAP's strong 
rural appeal. Both Petzina's and Tilton's macrostructural 
analysis is supplemented by Nagle's study investigating the 
socioeconomic background of NSDAP deputies to the Reichstag, thus 
providing a more detailed insight into the nature of the NSDAP's 
mass support. 
Kllhnl recognizes the domestic political conditions particular to 
Weimar Gerrnany that were conducive to the rise of fascism. 
However, he particularly focuses on Germany's competitive standing 
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relative to other industrialized countries at a time of imperialist 
expansion. According to him, fascism in Germany was just as much 
a response to a particular international situation as it was a 
response to domestic conditions. Klihnl maintains that even 
though Germany had achieved an industrial potential surpassing 
that of France and Britain, it had no basis for further exoansion. 
Thus, the First \lorld War, as well as \vorld War II, represented 
Germany's attempts to breakout of this situation, in part by 
allying itself with other similarly "disadvantaged" nat:i.ons like 
Italy and Japan. Germany strove for and demanded a new distribution 
of the world's territories, markets, and resources. 
Klihnl's position is based on the observation that any capitalist 
economy depends on possibilities for expansion. Germany was 
no exception. It too relied upon a capital accumulation rate 
that would allow it to maintain or improve its position relative 
to other capitalist countries. Since it could not do so 
satisfactorily, major segments of big business, (including 
banks and landowners) as well as segments of the military and 
the top civil servants, had never accepted the defeat during 
World \Jar II. They were bent on pursuing a strongly expansionary 
course. Within this scheme, the parliamentary democracy of the 
\veimar Republic, a result of the worker movement' s November 
Revolution of 1913, would have to be abolished in favor of an 
authoritarian regime. Under this rubric, an expansionary course 
could be pursued more effectively. Authoritarianism, furthermore, 
served as a means to maintain or speed up capital accumulation 
by robbing the working class of parliamentary mechanisms to 
articulate demands and effectuate social and economic changes, and 
by increasing possibilities to stifle workers' extraparliamentary 
attempts to achieve social change. Fascism then, a particular 
form of an authoritarian regime, is, in Klihnl's view, only 
possible with the full backing of the ruling class, which 
directly depends on capital accumulation if it is to maintain its 
economic and political position as a ruling class. 
While Klihnl gives us a theoretical framework within which the 
persistent push for expansion, increased capital accumulation, 
and an authoritarian regime can be understood, I!Urster-Philipps 
documents in detail the ways in which the \Jeimar Republic was 
undermined and replaced by authoritarian regimes. She shows how 
already at an early stage of the \"eimar Republic, big business, 
the military, and certain parties were again aiming for an 
expansionary course and an authoritarian government. 
Although it may be true that fascism generally has not been 
observed to exist without the consent and backing of the ruling 
class, Germany during the 1930s being no exception, it 
nevertheless must be investigated how it was possible for the 
NSDAP to gain mass support in addition to ruling class backing. 
We know that Nazi supporters were primarily not recruited from 
the ranks of the working class or the poor and unemployed but 
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from the Mittelstand, whose status and economic position had 
become threatened. Numerous other similar structural circumstances, 
however, did not result in a faseist mass movement, raising the 
question as to whether or not the Nazi party had a specific 
strategy enabling it to exploit the structurally caused anxiety 
to its fullest. Did the NSDAP resort to a special technique 
which allowed it to mobilize the masses behind its program? 
Kllhnl suggests that this was the case. He maintains that the 
NSDAP's mass supportwas not due to the party's ideology, which 
in many ways was not unlike that of other right~wing, national-
istic, and militantly anti-Communist parties. According to 
him, the NSDAP's success in mobilizing the masses lay in the 
employment of strategies, like mass rallies and meetings, which 
were known to be successful in the worker movement. 
Although the NSDAP was highly successful in mobilizing the 
Mittelstand and gaining its support, it largely failed to convince 
the working class. Except for the cases which Stachura shows to 
be exceptions, the NSDAP (upon assuming power) was confronted 
with a working-class Opposition that had to be broken with terror 
and violence on the one hand and with techniques of seduction 
and intensive Supervision on the other. According to Stachura, 
it is not the case that the NSDAP was uninterested in receiving 
a strong working-class support. Subjectively speaking, its 
position was not an antiworking class position, although 
objectively speaking its policies were not in the interest of 
the working class. Stachura points out that, to a great extent, 
the NSDAP's failure must be seen in its inability to circumscribe 
what it meant by socialism and to arrive at a concrete socialist 
program that, although different from previously existing 
programs, would at least be plausible and wirr the support of 
workers organized in trade unions, the Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) and the German Communist Party (KPD). Instead, the Nazi 
party's radical rhetoric about socialism remairred nothing 
but rhetoric. Stachura maintains that, as a rule, the party 
showed little interest in going beyond this level of discourse. 
If, however, the Nazis failed to get a strong working-class 
endorsement, why ,.;as the working class unable to prevent the 
NSDAP from coming to power? Tobirr explores the nature of the 
circumstances surrounding the November Revolution of 1913 on 
the basis of which certain political trends can be detected 
that tended to weaken the German working-class movement in the 
lang run. She suggests that the failure of the SPD leadership 
to respond to the rank-and-file demands for democratization of 
the military, bureaucracy, and industry led to widespread 
disaffection and political defection to the Independent Social 
Democratic Party (USPD) and the KPD. Thus, at the beginning 
of the Weimar Republic, the working class was split in ways not 
necessarily conducive to most effectively resisting 
authoritarianism and the faseist movement. Indeed, as Geary 
shows in his essay, resistance agairrst fascism was weakened 
as the split between the KPD and SP~ continued and was repeatedly 
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reaffimed. However, this was not the only reason why working-
class resistance to the faseist onslaught was quite weak. Geary 
mentions tl1at the SPD tended to underestimate the Nazi movement. 
Breitman explores this issue further. He shows how the SPD 
largely failed to deal with the faseist movement both in theory 
and in practice and that the party's perception of the nature of 
German fascism was, despite the availability of some competent 
left-wing analyses, seriously flawed. 
Parallels can be found between the workinß-class movement and 
Catholic political organizations insofar as both were very 
resiliant to faseist appeals, and both were equally ineffective 
in preventing the fascists from assuming power. Once the fascists 
were in control, these organizations tended to become rather 
passive onlookers. Hunt investigates the role Catholicism played 
during the Heimar Republic. Ile demonstrates that the Catholic 
population before and during the :Jeimar Republic was structurally 
in a marginal position, even while slowly becoming more integrated. 
Thus, the Catholics had a serious dilemma. Hanting to become 
fully integrated, they could not afford to strongly oppose the 
persistent trend towards right-wing authoritarianism and fascism. 
The Jev1ish community of Weimar Gemany found itself in a similar 
bind. Split between the newly immißrated East European Jews 
and Gennarr Jews, it failed to decisively combat, as Aschheim shows, 
the anti-Semitic tendencies directed agairrst the Ostjuden. 
Rather, while often internalizing these negative attitudes towards 
Ostjuden themselves, Jews tended to remain ambivalent and 
ineffective in fißhting what, as Aschheim suggests, was the 
radical right's prelude to an all-out attack on the entire 
Jewish population. 
Similarly, a further subject of concern is the role some women 
played in supporting the Nazi movement, even when it appeared 
to be so overtly misogynist. Bridenthal's study sheds some light 
on the dynamics that may have been involved in women's attitudes 
towards the NSDAP by analyzinß the long-lasting tug of war 
between the middle-class Housewives Union and the Central Union 
of Domestic Employees concerning the contractual regulation of 
domestic work. She points to the circumstances under which the 
Ilousewives Union abandoned its officially nonpolitical stand and 
expressed its gratitude to Hitler in 1933 for his interest in a 
domestic service year. This was not, however, without cost. It 
simultaneously also symbolized the submission of many women to 
Nazi notions and policies concerninß the role and rights of 
women in society. That these notions and policies were in stark 
cantrast to developments during the Ueimar Republic is shown by 
Grossmann's study of the sex reform movement and the faseist 
response to it in August 1933. She also speaks to the problern 
of the internal fractionalization of the left, eventually 
effecting the sex reform movement itself. 
To this point we have been speaking of the structural aspects of 
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Weimar society and how they contributed to the demise of the 
republic and the rise of National Socialism on the one hand, and 
the failure of the various subgroups--be they political, labor, 
religious, or gender--to meet the challenge, on the other. In 
the process, we have alluded to the ideological notions held at 
the time. At least in some respects, as Burns, Meyer, and Pois 
illustrate, the ideology generally reflected the structural 
dimensions of Heimar society, although the correspondence may 
not have been a perfect one. 
Burns, Meyer, and Pois discuss National Socialism as a cultural 
phenomenon, not in the liberal or bourgeois sense of culture as 
having to do solely with literature, art, film, or music in 
isolation from the social, economic, and political developments 
in Genaany, but rather culture as an att itude, as a reflec tion 
and result of the fissures, crises, and fears in society that are 
structurally detenlined. They argue that National Socialism and 
the culture that supported it and that it produced was a culture 
fueled by a sense of crisis and by an elaborate mythology--a 
mythology by which people define ther.1selves and their place in 
the world. ßut this mythology connects to reality because it 
functions within a social and economic context. Thus there is 
a dialectic between people's vision of their place in the 
universe as expressed by literature, music, and film and reflections 
on t;1e health and func tion of the arts generally and the reali ty 
with which they live. These authors remind us of the role of 
culture as a barometer of attitudes and social reality and thus 
contribute to a i1arxist approach t:1at is based on a dialectic. 
National Socialism, having a great talent for mass organization, 
they argue, combined politics and aesthetics. Politics and 
aesthetics are always combined as long as people think in 
stereotypes, as long as ideas of beauty and ugliness, be they 
visual, auditory or literary, are so all-embracing in people's 
lives that they become political categories. People in Nazi 
Germany had very definite ideas of what was beautiful and what 
was ugly and, of course, racism made an alliance wit~ beauty 
and defined ugliness in its own terms. So in faseist politics, 
aesthetics played a very important function because politics was 
defined in a totalistic context as subsuming attitudes toward 
life. 
Nazism put forward a myth--t:1e myth of "bourgeois return," of a 
restoration of a happy and healthy world, of a simpler, purer, 
more authentic culture, of a new man, the myth of race in 
Germany--and t:1en it tried to actualize this myth. It used this 
kind of appeal to the vlllkish populist past, but at the same 
time it promised a future outside the problems of industrialization, 
outside the problems of inflation--in other words, outside the 
problems of the day, including unemployment--all the problems 
which actually existed. It said that by recapturing a vlllkish 
past, Germans will determine a future which is a German future 
when every German will get back his individual dignity and sense 
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of worth. The notion of a genuine social revolution as we have 
seen, was anathema to many Germans, yet they were profoundly 
dissatisfied with their world. This tension was exploited by 
the Nazis. They played upon this bourgeois fantasy to create a 
bourgeois revolution, a revolution of attitude which actually 
threatened none of the vested interests of the middle class. 
Instead, v!:llkish thought concentrated upon another enemy within. 
That is why the Jews and the Jewish question are central. The 
Jew stood for modernity in all its destructiveness. It can be 
argued (as George Hasse and Pois do) that the attitude toward 
the Jew provided much of the cement for this thought and gave it 
a dyna~ic it might otherwise have lacked. The Jew, or rather 
the stereotype that v!:llkish thoug:1t made of him, is therefore 
central to any analysis and understanding of this ideology. 
This was appreciated by Theodore W. Adorno, as well, in several 
works including his sociological analysis of music, described 
by Meyer. Adorno's extended examination of Richard Wagner, 
lieyer notes, for example, is crucial for the study of pre-Nazi 
fascisra and anti-Semitisra in view o::' the iinportance of \/agner 
as perhaps the outs tanding cul tural hero of the Nazis who 
captured, in their view, the spirit of v!:llkish Germany in his 
music. 
However, v!:llkish anti-Semitic ideology is insufficient by itself 
to explain Germany's anti-Jewish passion. In most contemporary 
analyses of German anti-Semitism in the Weimar and early Nazi 
periods, there has been a disturbing separation of the phenomenon 
from an analysis of capitalist development, thereby locating the 
German-Jewish problern in a structural vacuum, independent from 
other economic or social tendencies. There has been much valuable 
work done on the role of image, ideology, and myth in the 
development of German anti-Semitism. There has not, however, 
been sufficient reflection on socioeconomic factors independent 
of ethnic, religious, or national characteristics. We know, 
for example, from sociological literature, that there is a well-
established tendency as economic competition increases, whether 
it be real or imagined, for ethnic antagonisms to increase if 
competition takes place between discernible groups. This is 
true for wage-labor, certain economic dependency relationships, 
or business competition. Hax I/eber pointed to the antagonisms 
which can result if a particular group is identified with a 
particular eocnomic activity or position such as debtor or 
creditor. Similarly, ethnic antagonism has been observed 
between retailers and consumers when the two tended to belang to 
different ethnic groups.l Were suc:1 mechanisms, for instance, 
also present in the German-Jewish situation? Was the Jewish 
community in any way discernible as a competitor of other non-
Jewish segments of the German society, and could as such be 
targeted for political exploitation by a rising Nazi movement? 
By 1910, for example, 54.4 percent of Prussian Jewry resided 
in cities of 100,000 or ~ore and by 1925 half of German Jewry 
lived in t;1e seven major cities of that country in cantrast to 
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13 percent of the general population. In 1933, on the eve of the 
Holocaust, 70.7 percent of German Jewry, including foreign 
Jews, lived in cities of 100,000 or more. The comparable figure 
for the general population was 30 percent. The urban setting in 
which an urbane, cosmopolitan culture could thrive was thus 
highly visible. Peter Gay, who examined that spirit in the Berlin 
of the Weimar Republic, characterized it as alienated from soul 
and tradition, "rootless, restless," disrespectful of authority, 
and distant from the vßlkish ideals.2 It was against this 
culture that the Nazi ideologue Hans Rosenberg and others would 
rail. IJhat the Nazis despised was what they saw as a contrived, 
artificial, non-German culture developed by a minority group 
whom they considered merely guests in Germany. 
There is a danger in overestimating the impact of a small number 
of Jewish thinkers, writers, and artists who became trend 
setters. llndoubtedly, most Jews who moved to cities continued 
to live parochial, circumscribed and fairly anonymaus lives. 
Yet one can note in their hunger for secular education, for 
example, a portent of potential intergroup conflict. For the 
period of 1859-1860, when Jews were about 1 percent of the 
population of Prussia, they composed 6.3 percent of all secondary 
students. By 1906 a remarkable 53.9 percent of the potential 
Jewish secondary-school population were receiving such an 
education, compared to 7.9 percent of the general population. 
By 1921 the comparable figures had risen to 60.5 percent and 
9.7 percent, respectively. The figures for university education 
are even more remarkable. Despite restrictions in Jewish 
enrollment, they again emerge as enthusiastic consumers of 
secular education, especially in the fields of law, medicine, 
philosophy, and the arts. In these faculties Jewish enrollment 
was five times as high as that of the general population. 
Moreover, despite strong opposition to having Jews hold teaching 
posts in tl1e university, 9.4 percent of university positions, 
primarily in the lower ranks, were held by Jews in 1374. By 
the year 1390, the figure had risen to 12 percent, and by 1920, 
to 14 percent. Jews made up approximately 1 percent of the 
Germanpopulation during this entire period. By 1331, Berlin's 
Jews were already 7.9 percent of the city's lawyers, 11.7 percent 
of its doctors, and 3.6 percent of its journalists. The figures 
would rise to even more astounding proportians in decades to come. 
Table 2.1 summarizes the general outline of the Jewish socio-
economic position in Germany. 
Table 2.1 
SOCIAL AHD OCCUPATIONAL POSITION IN 1933 
Social Position of 
Full-time Employed 
Self-employed 
Employed members of 
the family 
Civil servants and 
soldiers 
White collar employees 
~Jorkers (incl. cottage 
laborers) 
Domestic help 
Totals 
All full-time 
employed in Germany 
(in percentages) 
16.4 
16.4 
4.G 
12.5 
46.3 
3.ß 
100.0 
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Full-time 
employed Jews 
(in percentages) 
46 . 0 
9.6 
1.0 
33.5 
3.7 
1.2 
100.0 
Source: Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, Vol. 453/2, p. 14, 
quoted from Esra Bennathan, "Die demographische und 
wirtschaftliche Struktur der Juden," in Entscheidungsjahr 
1932, ed. ~verner Mosse (Tlibingen: J. C. B. l1ohr, 1966). 
There clearly is, then, sufficient evidence to suggest that 
split-labor market antagonisms and/or middleman minority 
antagonisms may be a factor in explaining the ferocity of Nazi 
anti-Semitism. This is a fruitful avenue for further investigation. 
In a related but somewhat distinct area, it might be useful, as 
l~rtin Jay, Anson Rabinbach, Paul Piccone, and Russell Berman, 
in their various ways argue, to reexamine the implications of 
the Frankfurt School interpretations of anti-Semitism, particularly 
the relevant sections in Max Ilorkheimer and Theodor ~. Adorno's 
Dialectic of Enlightenment,3 The averarehing theory they 
presented was grounded in an analysis that stressed the ambiguous 
implications of the age-old domination of nature in Western 
culture and the resulting idealization of instrumental reason. 
The administered society, epitomized by the Nazi techno-
bureaucratic state in its gradual erosion of all lingering 
individuality and autonomaus structures of civil society, 
generated severe internal crises that were met with even greater 
repression. 
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Horkheimer and Adorno's analysis is clearly indebted to the 
insights of Karl !1arx. "Bourgeois anti-Semitism," t:1ey wrote, 
"has a specific economic reason: the concealment of domination 
in production," or what Cary !1cWilliams has called in another 
context, "a mask for privilege."4 Like Franz :-<eumann, who was 
particularly critical of state capitalism in Behemoth, they 
recognized the function of the Jews as scapegoats for anti-
capitalist sentiments. "They were the representatives--in 
harmony with their particular religion--of municipal, bourgeois 
and finally, industrial conditions. "5 If this analysis is 
correct, then the sociological insights mentioned above concerning 
split-labor market antagonisms and middleman-minority group 
antagonisms would be even more germane. 
Beyond this more traditional l~rxist approach with its echoes 
of Marx's essay, "On the Jewish Question," and of Ferdinand 
August Bebel's celebrated remark that anti-Semitism is "the 
socialism of fools," Horkheimer and Adorno provided an analysis 
of the postbourgeois anti-Semitism that spoke directly to the 
problern of fascism. They argued that fascism represented a 
more brutal form of repression than classical liberal capitalism 
with its reliance on the mediation of the marketplace. lvhen 
there is no longer any need for economic domination, as was 
the case in the world of Auschwitz, "the Jews are marked out 
as the absolute object of domination pure and simple."6 Fascism 
is an order of unlimited force led by people who "long for total 
possession and unlimited power, at any price."7 In fact, it is 
only in total power, in the ability to control life and death, 
that fascists can reach the orgasmic peak of domination. These 
yearnings are displaced by claiming that it is the Jews who 
actually strive for total control. 
The long-range tendency towards this type of domination, which 
went through a classical capitalist stage before reaching its 
conclusions in fascism, had to be understood in more fundamental, 
more structural terms than the scapegoat theory, or the religious 
prejudice theory, or the ideological theory, or even the racist 
theory would allow. For "anti-Semitism is a deeply imprinted 
schema, a ritual of civilization."8 It is thus to the fundamental 
dialectic of civilization (or Enlightenment, as they called it) 
that Horkheimer and Adorno turned for their structural analysis, 
and it is here that their insights may prove most suggestive 
for our purposes. 
The essence of that explanation was equating "civilization" with 
the domination of nature, a domination whose implications were 
only then becoming fully manifest. (Their essay was written 
at least a year before the magnitude of the Nazi genocide was 
fully known.) The implicit link between totality and domination 
is the central theme of the work. "Those who spasmodically 
dominate nature," they wrote, "see in a tormented nature a 
provocative image of pm•erless happiness. The thought of 
happiness without power is unbearable because it would then be 
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true happiness." 9 The Jews are singled out for special attack 
and treatment because they are confused with nature itself, and 
thus seen as having "happiness without power, wages without work, 
a harne witi1out frontiers, religion without myth. "10 Society 
like nature, abhors a vacuum, Hannah Arendt has reminded us.i1 
Horkheimer and Adorno thus believe that the projection of power 
and otherness onto the Jew is not mere appearance, but historically 
connected to the perceptual system of civilization. In this sense, 
the "object" is not simply interchangeable (a point which 
contradicts the usual Marxistclaim to the contrary), but is 
crucial for the development of the logic of anti-Semitic 
domination. 
Throughout this work, Horkheimer and Adorno play with the 
tension between nationalist anti-Semitism in which the Jew 
represents a projection outward of the desire for total domination 
reflected in the image of the Jew as an international manipulator 
of culture and civilization, the kind of image Henry Ford would 
exploit in the United 3tates, and bourgeois anti-Semitism, 
which identified the Jew as an abstraction to be absorbed into 
society until all traces of his negative essence disappears, 
the T. S. Eliot or Henry Adamsversions of anti-Semitism. Again 
we have the ancient canard--the Jew as simultaneaus symbol of 
the triumph of Enlightenment (as modernity, urbanity, 
intellectualism, civilization) and its absolute opposite (as 
the powerful conspiratorial other).12 In the bourgeois sense, 
anti-Semitism is the rage directed against the nonidentical, 
the "eternal stranger" of Leo Pinsker, that characterizes the 
totalistic dominating impulse of \Jestern civilization. Same 
Jews, in their refusal to be assimilated, thus represent an 
obstacle to the total integration of the "administered world" 
or "one-dimensional society" as Herbert Marcuse was to call it. 
Nationalism, on the other hand, constitutes the image of the Jew 
as the nonorganic Other, the focus of repressed desires for 
violence and control. The Jew in this context is both the 
outsider and the insider whose essential character is ambiguous, 
hence dangeraus and to be feared. Thus, for both the Enlightenment 
and its opponents, the Jew is a paradox. Consequently, two 
very distinct ideological images of the Jew appeared in Western 
anti-Semitism, each focusing on two very real social groups: 
the ghetto Eastern European Jews, who are fundamentally 
unassimilable (an image also held by German Jews, as Steven 
Aschheim ably demonstrates); and the assimilated Jew (Disraeli, 
Rothschild, Rathenau), who represent power, infiltration, and 
control. Once again, we should investigate the role that real 
market-labor conditions had on intensifying these images. 
The anti-Semitic ideology projects the Jew as the collective 
other, representing power (capitalism, Marxism, liberalism, 
Zionism) or putrifaction (miscegenation, filth, pronography, 
sexuality). This tendency may suggest that anti-Semitism has 
deeper roots than the other forms of racial prejudice that were 
prevalent in European society, as Pois intimates. Given the 
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historical roots of anti-Semitism in Christianity and the specific 
historical role of the Jews as a pariah class in Western culture 
as articulated by Harrnah Arendt, plus their role as a competing 
economic class, anti-Semitism may have a history distinct from 
national chauvinism or racial hatred. 
This anti-Semitic tendency reached deeply into the fiber of 
National Socialism. National Socialism represents an equally 
fantastic joining of two irreconcilables. Nationalism pretended 
to unite all classes; socialism is based on the class struggle. 
Nationalism tended towards imperialist expansionism, while 
socialism cla"imed to be universalistic. Nationalism deeply 
respected existing power relations; socialism sought to overthrow 
them. National Socialism pretended to be a mass movement 
characterized by reformist aspirations and struggles agairrst a 
class society on behalf of the workers. Its inherent illogic 
is such, however, that it was held tagether as an outlook and 
movement by fastering aggressive national expansion as the basis 
for creating the material for a vtllkish socialism that claims to 
provide economic benefits for the workers and the poor while in 
reality it deeply respects existing economic structures; and 
by a virulent anti-Semitism as the main defining element of the 
Germanie fantasy-community that leaves class boundaries 
untouched. 
The Nazi drive for community was the assertion, even if made 
aggressively and brutally, of an abiding need for human 
connectedness greater than that provided by the depersonalized 
world of corporate capitalism. In Dialectic of Enlightenment 
Horkheimer and Adorno emphasized that self-denial and 
renunciations were inherent in the ~estern program of the 
domination of nature. Fascism and, indeed, anti-Semitism are 
seen as one pole of the dialectic of Western civilization 
itself: as domination progressed, so did the mad revolt of 
brutalized nature, culminating in the anti-Semitism of twentieth-
century totalitarianism. If Auschwitz expressed the barbarism 
chosen by those unwilling or unable to join the modern world, 
Auschwitz also represented the explosion of the repressed side 
of our long journey away from barbarism and toward civilization. 
These brief remarks should be sufficient to dernarrstrate that 
the general historical materialist tradition may be helpful 
in understanding the complicated and problematical phenomena 
of anti-Semitism in the \veimar and early Nazi periods. But it 
should also be evident that the specific logic of anti-Semitism 
also contributes to our understanding of the unique character 
of the Holocaust, which cannot be explained satisfactorily by 
discussions of the ideological function of anti-Semitism; by 
the logic of faseist domination per se; by the role of religious 
prejudice; by the desire to eliminate surplus populations; by 
the desire to eliminate an economically competing group. As 
bureaucratically organized, technological, mass death for the 
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sole purpose of destroying a "defined" racially inferior group 
that paradoxically was also seen as intent on domination, the 
Holocaust may be consistent only with the view that the Jew is a 
powerful, corrupting Other. Although a historical materialist 
approach, which emphasizes structural considerations in the 
socioeconomic realms of society, is intriguing and should be 
explored as well as an explanation for the Holocaust, there 
still are serious questions that need to be posed: Why 
extermination and not servitude? Why the secrecy surrounding 
the apparatus of destruction? Why the bizarre identification 
and preoccupation with the victim? Did the Nazis need the Jews 
to be fully themselves? Were the Nazis afraid of being free 
in Jean Paul Sartre's sense? Did the Jews have to be destroyed 
because they became the metaphoric equivalent of that stubborn 
remnarrt of society preserving negation and the nonidentical; 
that portion of society that refused to be one-dimensionalized? 
Here again, llorkheimer and Adorno introduce a complicated 
discussion of the role of mimetic behavior in civilization and 
its distortion in Nazism's mimicry of its Jewish victims. 
"Anti-Semitism is based on false projection," they wrote. 
"Mimesis imitates the environment but 'false projection' makes 
the environment like itself."l3 This type of false projection 
politicized paranoia. To many who fell victim to its appeal, 
fascism may have provided a mass delusional system that was 
mistaken for reality. l!ow this reality turned into a nightmare 
is a question of even greater perplexity. 
It is becoming increasingly obvious, as Kren and Rappoport have 
ably argued, that the Holocaust is a watershed event, one of 
those which changes or should change our notions of reality, 
language, meaning, our basic epistemological categories. No 
assessment of twentieth-century civilization can ignore the 
fact that science and technology, celebrated as the guarantors 
of progress, then climaxed in the factories of death and that 
the unlimited, value-free use of knowledge and science had paved 
the way for the mass murder of a faceless, mindless bureaucracy. 
The Holocaust was an advance warning of the demonie potential 
in modern culture. For Germany was one of the most advanced 
Western countries--at the center of the academic, cultural, 
scientific, and technological enterprise. Auschwitz may be 
what happens when you divorce morality from politics; when 
you exploit knowledge for nonethical, nonhumanitarian goals, 
when you allow technology and bureaucracy to run amuck. 
It is no accident that the term Final Solution was finally 
chosen to indicate a program of mass muder. It is an operational 
rather than an ideological term. The Jews were the problern 
and Auschwitz was the solution. 
It is not enough to say that those who committed these horrible 
crimes or who condoned them through active indifference were, 
in some fashion, outside their own culture and civilization. The 
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facts won't allow such an evasion. \Je must, therefore , formulate 
as precisely as we can, and press home a much more disturbing 
question: \Jere there powerful elements inside humanism, wi thin 
civilization, wi thin the political, economic, and social 
structure, that not only failed to impede barbarism but helped 
produce it? Is the notion of "civilization" itself flawed 
or tragically implicated, as Horkheimer and Adorno suggest, in the 
coming of the Holocaust ? Did the separation of thought and 
praxis, in some way incapacitate people's more immediate 
political reflexes ? Has the Holocaust the result of the inevitable 
crisis in capitalism predicted by Marx? Is it conceivable that 
civilization repress es Eros, thus strengtherring Thanatos, the 
destructive energy? According to Freud, the more intense the 
repression of primary erotic drives in a society, the greater 
a mobilization of surplus aggressiveness agairrst the repression . 
Again, according to Freud, repression is bound to increase with 
the progress of civilization, and at the same time, aggressive 
energy is going to be released. 
George Steiner, who has written unusually we ll about the proximity 
of political barbarism to Western traditions of learning, draws 
attention to the fact that mass murder had little trouble 
flourishing side by side with activities previously regarded 
as guarantees of human conduct; namely, fine literature, music, 
and the arts. He wonders what the connections are between the 
mental-psychological habits of high literacy and the tempta tions 
of the inhuman. \Jhile we are not in a position to answer 
Steiner's question, its challenge remains constant--Nazi poster 
and magazine art provide popular illustrations of the ways in 
which the disciplines of learning, religion, and artistic effort 
could be put to the service of brutal power. Meye r has shown 
how music was used for similar purposes. Philosopher and 
existentialist Martin Heidegger's inaugural address as rector 
of Freiburg University, aligning the labors of the scholar with 
those of the soldier, is a muted and more refined example of 
this complicity. Professor Heidegger's denial of schalarship 
funds to Jewish students at the university and, contrastingly, 
the preference he gave to those who fought in the SA or SS are 
more active and unsettling examples of the same thing. Yet 
Heidegger was hardly alone. Thousands of such actions can be 
cited, directly implicating intellectuals, students, artists, 
scientists, jurists, and churchmen in the day-to-day programs 
of the Nazi movement. Corruption ran deeply through German 
culture. Thus we misunderstand modern political power if we 
focus too heavily on the high-ranking individual. Hitler, 
Himmler, Heydrich, Eichmann--their roles were necessary, but 
nonewas sufficient to produce Auschwitz. We must look for the 
answer in more structural considerations, not in individuals. 
The passage of time, as Kren and Rappoport note, has made it 
increasingly evident that a heretofore unbreachable moral and 
political barrier in the history of iJestern civilization was 
successfully overcome by the Nazis in i~orld ilar II, and that 
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henceforth the systematic, bureaucratically administered 
extermination of millians of citizens or subject peoples will 
forever be one of the capacities and temptations of government. 
A barrier has been overcome in what for millennia had been 
regarded as the permissible limits of political action. The 
Nazi Holocaust may just be the logical conclusion of the political 
institution we call "state," a conclusion that even the most 
critical anarchist could not have foreseen. It may be the 
logical conclusion of a rampant capitalism that turns everything 
and everyone into commodities, some to be processed, exploited, 
sold, and even disposed of once every drop of profit has been 
squeezed out of their beings, disposed of on the dump heap of 
history to be burned, literally like refuse, their by-products 
used for fertilizer and soap. 
The Holocaust was an expression of some of the most significant 
political, moral, religious, and demographic tendencies of 
Western civilization in the twentieth century. There were, 
however, unique elements in the Holocaust. It was the first 
attempt by a modern, legally constituted government to pursue a 
policy of bureaucratically organized genocide both within and 
beyond its own frontiers. As such, it must be distinguished 
from the use of violence by a state against another state or even 
against its own people for the purpose of .securing compliance 
with its policies. It is fundamentally different from American 
nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for example. The 
American assaults, although unbelievably deadly, ceased as 
soon as the Japanese surrendered, and never had total annihilation 
as an objective. German mass violence against Jews, gypsies, 
and other racially defined "inferior" groups, was intensified 
after the victims had surrendered. Never before have people 
been so expendable. 
The Nazi elite, as Richard Ruhenstein has argued in The Cunning 
of History, acted upon the assumption that the Jews and gypsies 
were a surplus people, a surplus commodity, not needed for slave 
labor since there were potentially tens of millians of Eastern 
Europeans available for labor exploitation, a surplus people 
whom nobody wanted and whom they could dispose of as they 
pleased. Given the moral universe of the twentieth century, 
the most rational and least costly solution of the problern of 
disposing of a surplus population, may, tragically, be 
extermination. It is understood that people can act rationally 
and be absolutely immoral. Again, given a certain utilitarian 
and instrumentalist mind set committed to efficiency, 
practicality, order, control, and predictability, extermination 
may be the problem-solving strategy least likely to have 
unanticipated repercussions for its planners, assuming, of course, 
you win the war. This was certainly true during World War II, 
when the world, by and large, did little to convince the Nazis 
that it was seriously opposed to the Nazi policies. Joseph 
Goebbels, minister of propaganda, who read world public opinion 
carefully, noted in his diary that free-world inaction is proof 
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that the Germans were in fact doing the world's dirty work for 
it. Heinrich Ilimmler frequently reminded his commanders that 
the world would someday be thankful for what Germany had the 
iron will to achieve. So from a purely bureaucratic 
perspective, the extermination of Jews, gypsies, and other 
racially defined inferior groups made eminent sense. 
Extermination was the logical conclusion of racism. 
Yet, will was insufficient; beyond the desire there had to be 
the capacity. Usually when we focus upon the possibility of mass 
death in the twentieth century, we focus upon technological 
advances in weaponry. Far too little attention has been given to 
the advances in social organization that allowed for the effective 
use of the new weapons. In order to understand how the moral 
barrier was crossed that made massacre in the millians possible, 
it is necessary to consider the importance of bureaucracy in 
modern political and social organizations. The German 
sociologist Max Weber was especially cognizant of its significance. 
In fact, \leber' s analysis of bureaucracy is one of the central 
points in his general sociology. His key concept of rationalization 
as a distinctive feature of modern society, especia1ly as linked 
to his notion of a demystification of the world, finds one of its 
concrete manifestations in bureaucracy and bureaucratization. 
Rationalization and demystification are in turn linked to 
\leber' s emphasis on power in all social relationships. Wri ting 
in 1916 lang before the Nazi party came to power, Weber observed: 
~lhen fully developed, bureaucracy stands under the 
principle of without scorn and bias. Its specific 
nature which is welcomed by capitalism developes the 
more perfectly the more bureaucracy is dehumanized, the 
more completely it succeeds in eliminating from 
official business love, hatred, and all purely 
personal, irrational and emotional elements which 
escape calculation. This is the specific nature of 
bureaucracy and it is appraised as its special 
virtue.l4 
Weber, of course, could not predict that the police and civil 
service bureaucracies could be used as a death machine to eliminate 
millians who had beendefinedas superfluous. Even Weber seems 
to have stopped short of foreseeing state-sponsored massacres 
as one of the dehumanizing capacities of bureaucracy. In the 
Nazi state, or more specifically, in the SS offices in Berlin, 
an inconspicuous series of offices in an even more inconspicuous 
building, this occurred. Bureauerats like Adolph Eichmann 
manipulated numbers on paper, shuffled these papers to other 
bureaucrats, and a few hundred miles away tens of thousands 
of people were condemned to brutal death. They never had to and 
often never did see the results of their paper-shuffling genocide. 
Bureaucratic mass murder reached its fullest development when 
gas chambers with a capacity for killing t wo thousand people 
at a time were installed at Auschwitz. As Hannah Arendt has 
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observed, the very size of the chambers emphasized the complete 
depersonalization of the killing ~rocess. 
So there seems to be a connection between bureaucracy and mass 
death. In the case of Jews and gypsies, they were defined as 
inferior and "legally" deprived of their citizenship. People 
without political rights are superfluous people. They have 
lost all rights to life and human dignity. The Nazis, as 
Arendt has indicated, understood that people have no rights 
unless they are guaranteed by a state with the power to defend 
such rights. They were perfectly consistent in demanding that 
the deportees be made stateless before exterminating them, Once 
the Germans had collected the stateless, rightless, politically 
superfluous people, they exercised a domination over them more 
total than was ever before exercised by one people over another. 
In the past, political or social domination was limited by the 
ruler's or the slaveholder's need to permit at least a minimal 
level of subsistence because of the economic value of the subject 
peoples. Now, the SS felt they had a potential supply of 
millians of superfluous people. Those they did not immediately 
exterminate, they worked under the most brutal conditions, 
usually for about four months, and then they were annihilated. 
So the Nazis could create a society of total domination because 
they had a bureaucratic administration capable of governing 
with utter indifference to the human needs of the inmates and a 
supply of inmates capable of continuous replenishment, an 
invaluable natural resource, 
The Final Solution utilized the industrial processes and the 
managerial techniques that enabled European civilization 
to prosper. Those mountains of shoes, human hair, eyeglasses, 
and suitcases that have been imprinted on our mind's eye, were 
by-products of a modern manufacturing process. They were 
destined to be reintegrated into the consumer economy. In 
keeping with the most advanced management techniques, an accurate 
record of production was maintained, so many units (lives) 
processed per day and week; and constant improvement of 
efficiency was encouraged. Rudolf I!oess, the camp commandant of 
Auschwitz, recalled his achievement in this area: "The Camp 
Commandant at Treblinka told me that he had liquidated 80,000 
in the course of one-half year, he used monoxide gas and I did 
not think his methods were very efficient. So when I set up 
the extermination building at Auschwitz, I used Cyclon B 
/sie? .••. Another improvement we made over Treblinka was that 
;e built our gas chambers to accommodate 2,000 people at one 
time, whereas at Treblinka their ten gas chambers only 
accommodated 200 people each."15 For I!oess the concentration 
camp was a mundane extension of normal operational procedures. 
No sector of German society was immune, certainly not the 
corporate community. I.G. Farben, Germany's massive chemical 
combine, was the most important German corporate user of slave 
labor at Auschwitz. The corporation's activities at Auschwitz 
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are an important part of the story of the camp as a society of 
total domination. It invested 700 million Reichsmarks in its 
Buna synthetic rubber plant at Auschwitz. About 35,000 slaves 
were used, and at least 25,000 such workers died there. The 
diet fed to I. G. Farben inmates, which included the infamous 
"Buna soup," resulted in an average weight loss for each 
individual of about six to eight and one half pounds a week. 
At the end of one month, the change in the prisoner's appearance 
was marked; at the end of four months, they were either dead or 
so unfit for work that they were released to the gas chambers 
at Birkenau. The more unfortunate (if this can be imagined) 
inmates served as human guinea pigs for medical experiments 
conducted by the Bayer division of I.G. Farben. Similar examples 
could be drawn from among the greatest German industrial concerns 
who also used concentration camp inmates--Krupp, AEG, Telefunken, 
Siemens, BMW, and Rheinrnetall, to name only the most important. 
These companies made tremendous profits, paying dividends to 
thousands of investors. I.G. Farben made particularly handsome 
profits from its subsidiary, Degesh, which manufactured 
Zyklon-B, the gas used in the gas chambers. It was a highly 
profitable business, which paid 100 to 200 percent dividends in 
1942, 1943, and 1944.16 
Karl l1arx and Friedrich Engels have observed that the triumph of 
the capitalist class who owned the means of production had "left 
remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-
interest, than callous cash payment."l7 Marx and Engels were 
pointin8 to the same kind of "dehumanized" rationalization as 
had Weber.lß According to Marx, the bourgeoise had reduced 
industrial labor to a commodity, like every other article of 
commerce. As soon as profit and productivity became the sole 
criteria by which a business enterprise was to be measured, it 
was in the factory owner's interest to work his employees as 
long as he could and pay them as little as he could get away 
with.l9 Harx saw how these abuses operated in mid-nineteenth 
century England. l!owever, for exploitation to be truly systematic, 
there needs to be a large pool of unorganized people who have 
no choice but to work or die--or more accurately put, to work 
and die. The industrial and corporate use of slave labor in 
the concentration camps and ghettos took this structural 
propensity of capitalism to its final conclusion. Human life was 
cheap, exploitable, and expendable. 
This may be what happens when corporate profits and bureaucratic 
efficiency are the only values left. Hass murder was both a 
highly complex and successful business venture. The men who 
carried out the business part of the enterprise were not uniformed 
thugs or criminals. They were highly competent, respectable, 
corporate executives who were only doing what they had been 
trained to do--run large corporations profitably. As long as 
their institutions functioned efficiently, they apparently had 
few qualms concerning the uses to which they were put. 
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It is also interesting to note what became of the directors of 
these companies. Most of them served very nominal jail terms, 
usually from one to four years. John McCloy, the U.S. high 
commissioner, wanted to begin a new relationship with Germany, 
and so in 1951, through a general act of clemency, he released 
all the German industrialists then incarcerated. They resumed 
their corporate elitist positions. These men showed no remorse, 
defending their decisions as necessary in time of war. One 
industrialist, Friedrich Flick, who annually contributed 100,000 
Reichsmarks to the SS, who personally listened to reports from 
the Einsatzgruppen, whose firms used Jewish slave labor, had 
glibly declared at Nuremberg: "Nobody of the large circle of 
persans who know my fellow defendants and myself will be willing 
to believe that we committed crimes agairrst humanity , and nothing 
will convince us that we arewar criminals." Flick never paid 
a penny in compensation to his victims, and when he died in 1972 
at the age of 39, he left almost one billion dollars to his son.20 
Why were people who were responsible for the death of thousands 
and implicated in the death of millians essentially let free 
while SS guards received stiff sentences ? A society whose 
prosperity depends upon economic virtuosi capable of applying 
calculating rationality to large-scale corporate enterprise can 
ill-afford the lass of highly trained managers. It seems that 
it just may be possible to argue that the horrors committed 
by the Nazis in their society of total domination, such as 
medical experiments and corporate utilization of death-camp 
slave labor, merely carried to an extreme operational attitudes 
and procedures that dominate the workings of bureaucracy and 
modern capitalist corporate enterprise. 
The administered society, in constantly eroding all lingering 
individuality and autonomaus structures of civil society, 
generated internal crises whose successful management required 
the radical reversal of its main strategy. JUrgen Habermas 
describes these as the economic, rationality, motivational, and 
legitimation crises. It seems that successful administration 
requires at least a minimal lingering negativity to regulate its 
rationalizing agencies. However, when the controller totally 
determines the controlled, as was the case in the Nazi period, 
the necessary dialectical tension between the two which operates 
before total control as a mediating factor and which imparts 
to both parties a will which could be asserted tends to 
disappear, and conflict that would otherwise be resolved within 
a structure is transformed into the annihilation of one party, 
At that point, the point of the Holocaust, logical systems 
change, predictable Standards of behavior are breached, meaning 
and values and knowledge itself are challenged, and the 
system collapses into absolute negativity, into l'univers 
concentrationnaire, whose only morality is that everything is 
possible. The Holocaust was an attempt to own life by controlling 
the process of death. It was hell literally brought on earth 
as the human world of all the peoples of Europe was literally 
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turned upside down in the Nazi social organization and became 
the "kingdom of death." Death now ruled as the syrnbol of 
ultimate power. The artist Naphtali Bezem very appropriately 
portrayed this inverted Nazi world in the Yad Vashem Hemorial 
in Israel with the figure of a woman holding two flaming 
candlesticks upside down with the flames burning her breasts, 
Precisely because of this absurdity, the meaning of the Holocaust 
is impenetrable. Language is inadequate to express the 
inexpressible. "The Holocaust is so agonizing," writes Steven 
Schwarzchild, "precisely because it is the ultimate paradox. It 
imposes silence even while it demands speech." But the moral 
imperative dernands an encounter. For to be human, to exercise 
one's humanity, is to pose questions 'and suggest meaning, 
even in the face of the absurd, of nothingness. It is to this 
quest, the quest to understand, that this volume is dedicated. 
In surnrnary, we believe that these essays suggest the connection 
between the structural problems and contradictions of Weimar 
society and their relationship to the rise of fascism; the 
ineffectual opposition of anti-faseist seßments of the population 
in the face of this crisis, an ineff ectuality which in itself 
has structural dimensions; and the way in which cultural 
symbols, notions, and ideas also reflec t structural tensions. 
We believe, then, that the essays contained in this collection 
and our reflections upon them, indicate that there is a connection 
between socioeconomic tensions, processes of objectification, 
and the level of anti-Semitism that may have contributed to the 
Holocaust or made it possible. These essays are, of course, 
not meant to provide a comprehensive history of lleimar German y . 
However, given the limitation of space, it is hoped this book 
will offer a fresh perspective on key problems in the social 
and economic history of the Weimar Republic. As a developed 
capitalist society that proved structurally unstable--socially, 
economically, and politically--and as a political culture which 
offered fertile ground for the growth of National Socialism, 
Heimar Germany continues to demand our attention. And the 
conclusions to be drawn from its history should offer some 
insights into and warnings about the society in which we live. 
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Problems in the 
Social and Economic 
Development of the 
Weimar Republic 
DIETMAR PETZINA 
Translated by Irene Stumberger, Michael N. Dobkowski, 
and Isidor Wallimann 
Many historical accounts narrowly interpret the Weimar Republic 
as a mere prelude to German Fascism. The questions concerning 
the independent developments and the new social start following 
1918 are fe1.rer than those regarding the realm of social problems 
that seem to have unavoidably led to the political breakdown of 
the first German Republic. Indeed, such an evaluation of the 
first German Republic is understandable since not only its 
beginning but also its end were marked by serious political and 
economic crises as well as social conflicts. On the other hand, 
this interpretation fails to sufficiently acknowledge the 
unmistakably positive beginnings of the 1920s. There was an 
astounding revival of art and culture, and German Sozialpolitik 
(the German government's laws and policies affecting the welfare 
of the people in social, economic, and cultural terms) was the 
leading role model internationally, at least until 1929, and 
despite the continuation of authoritarian traditions in German 
society, there also existed a widespread democratic trend, 
whose violent end was by no means predetermined. 
The following explications do not claim to be a new interpretation 
of social behavior and economic processes in the 1920s. Nor 
do they limit themselves solely to socioeconomic reasons for the 
collapse of the political system. Rather, they focus upon this 
epoch's prospects for development which distinguishes the Weimar 
Republic so notably from the Kaiserreich (German empire). 
Many of these possibilities were permanently crushed by 
National Socialism, and others forged the way for the new 
beginning of the Second Republic following 1945. The self-image 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, her people, and the 
institutions they rebuilt were greatly influenced by the manifold 
Weimar experiences. Therefore, the Weimar Republic does not 
only form the prelude to National Socialism and the Holocaust; 
it also forms the prelude for the new democratic beginning 
after the Second \lorld War. 
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To attempt to give an all-encompassing account of economic and 
social developments in the Weimar Republic is not the purpose 
of this chapter. The intent is simply to extract a few questions 
from the profusion of problems in order that a framework for the 
analysis of political and ideological aspects can be formed. 
These questions are as follows: 
1. Which economic liabilities resulting from the First World 
War especially burderred the Weimar Republic? 
2. IJhat changes was German society subjected to? Did these 
developments correspond to general Hestern capitalistic 
patterns or was there something particular to Germany's 
development that created a special potential for conflict? 
3. I!ow did the \leimar governments react to social and economic 
challenges, that is, to what extent were the administrations 
prepared and capable of stabilizing the economic foundation 
of the Republic? 
4. Finally, why did German society react politically in 
such a different and disastraus manner during the 
worldwide economic crisis as opposed to similar 
industrial societies in Europe and America? 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STABILIZATION 
Contrary to the appearance of drastic change and revolution, 
social conditions were not fundamentally altered by World War I. 
Certainly, widespread popular consensus attributed the blame for 
the war and defeat to the ruling elites of the empire. 
Nevertheless, no overthrow of influence, power, and prestige 
patterns resulted. Surely, the nobility that once dominated 
society lost its social and political privileges. Yet even 
before 1914, there had been disputes about the aristocracy, 
and now, just as before, the nobility held many of the republic's 
important positions in diplomacy and in the military. There 
was also little change in the traditional dominance of the 
conservative elites in government, the judicial system, and in 
the universities. The contradiction between the democratic 
will to change, on the one hand, and the authoritarian-
conservative stubbornness in key centers of power, on the other, 
became a constitutive element of the Weimar Republic. 
Of course, this continuity did not imply a solidification of the 
ruling strata. Rather, it went hand in hand with a noteworthy 
shifting of influence within the bourgeoisie and between the 
industrial bourgeoisie and the quasi-feudal elites. As a 
result of the world war, class differences revealed themselves 
more distinctly than in preindustrial times and thereby 
strengtherred the role of the industrial bourgeoisie.l More so 
than before 1914, control of the means of production determined 
one's material standing, working conditions, the level of 
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workers' lifestyles, and the privileges and welfare of those 
with possessions. Despite the demarcation of class lines, which 
had been brought about by the war, social conflicts were not 
primarily discharged agairrst entrepreneurs. The military state 's 
bureaucratic interventionism turned the workers ' protest and 
the displeasure of many entrepreneurs upon the government 
authorities. The goal of state intervention between 1915 and 
1913 was to guarantee mobilization of the war economy, and 
government agencies had to force great sacrifices from the workers . 
On the other hand, the government was neither prepared nor in a 
position to compensate for these financial burdens with 
concessions in the political arena, such as trade-union 
participation in war-related economic decisions and the setting 
of priorities. Hence, among the masses, Opposition to and 
disappointment with the state and agairrst the political system 
as a whole grew without the masses simultaneously coming to a 
questioning of the entrepreneurs' position. These experiences 
were very much in, the foreground when the "Produzentenkartell" 
(producer cartel) was founded in 1913, consisting of organized 
labor and entrepreneurs. Thus , the coalition of capital and 
labor set the political direction for the new state. 
In comparison to the economic development before World War I and 
after the Second \lorld War, the German economy in the period 
between world wars presents a picture of stagnation .2 In the 
1920s the industrial production and the gross national product 
per capita barely exceeded the level before 1914. A statistical 
average contributes little to a description of the economic 
development and its consequences for the social and political 
history of the period. Ilistorically more significant was the 
hectic sequence of critical disturbances and short periods of 
economic growth that can be identified between the world wars, 
inflation, the 1924 stabilization crisis, the crisis of 1926, and 
the Great Depression. Just as the trend in economic growth 
changed, so did the prewar pattern of economic cycles . Before 
World \Jar I, highs and lows in the economy corresponded to 
rhythmical changes, which according to the experience over 
several decades usually led to a higher level of production. 
The economic development between world wars differs from the 
pattern of classical economic cycles. It gave reason for a 
widespread pessimistic outlook upon future social development. 
The interpretation of these crises as a sign of a secular 
breakdown of growth seemed to be confirmed by the Great 
Depression that had been regarded as a transition to a new epoch 
by many contemporaries. This notion is certainly understandable 
if one considers that in the period from 1919 to 1933, nine years 
can be described as times of crises. Economic and subsequently 
social structural changes (the shifting career structure, for 
example) must have unfurled an explosive force far greater in 
this period of stagnating economic growth than it would .have 
in times of accelerated development. It is advisable to examine 
economic problems individually before turning to the social 
structural changes and the role of the state . 
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The Weimar Republic can be divided into three time periods: 
The period of postwar crisis and inflation (1919-1923), the 
following phase of stabilization from 1924-28/29, and finally 
the phase of the Great Depression. Of course, this sort of 
periodization overemphasizes the persistent twenty-year-long 
crisis-character of the \Jeimar Republic, making the years of 
economic upswing an exception and lumps the "anomalous" years 
until 1924 tagether with the other years.3 It must be said 
that the commonly held crisis theory can certainly be verified 
if one only considers the inflation and its economic and social 
consequences. But if the criteria of employment and unemployment, 
industrial production, and gross national product are also 
considered, there arises a distinct cantrast to the traditional 
points of view. For example, the rate of unemployment from 
1920 to 1922 was under 3 percent, thereby nearly reaching the 
prewar full employment level. Only in 1923, at the height of 
galloping inflation, did unemployment rise above 20 percent, 
while the comparable figure rarely fell below 10 percent during 
the entire period of stabilization after 1924. From 1920 to 1922, 
the real Gross National Product may likely have reached 80 percent 
of the prewar level, and the growth of industrial production 
totaled 100 percent between 1919 and 1922. Despite the uncertainty 
of all data for the period of inflation, the fact of a distinct 
industrial postwar boom cannot be overlooked. At the same time, 
in 1921, other important industrial countries suffered serious 
production losses, emphasizing to an even greater extent the 
recovery of the German economy from 1920 to 1922. 
However, the rapid recovery should not be overrated in view of 
the very heavy decline in production at the end of the war. 
During the war, Germany's industrial production fell to 57 
percent of its prewar level and entailed disproportions in the 
production structure that could only be corrected at the cost 
of a continued decline in production. 
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Table 3.1 
Index of Irrdustrial Production, 1913-1938 (1923=100) 
1913 93 1926 78 
1914 81 1927 93 
1915 66 1928 100 
1916 63 1929 100 
1917 61 1930 37 
1913 56 1931 70 
1919 37 1932 58 
1920 54 1933 66 
1921 65 1934 83 
1922 70 1935 96 
1923 46 1936 107 
1924 69 1937 117 
1925 81 1938 125 
Source: \lagenfUhr, Industriewirtschaft, pp. 23 and 64; Industrie 
im Kriege, pp. 166 and 191; Bevl:llkerung und \Hrtschaft, 
s. 176; Stat. Jb. f. d. Dt. Reich 1941-42, p. 192. 
Until 1922, the upswing (disregarding the greatly lowered 
production level in comparison to 1913) alleviated problems that 
immediately followed the war. Above all, it allowed for an 
easier integration of the returning soldiers into the economic 
process--although at the cost of a lower productive standard 
whose extent and consequences were initially covered up by the 
inflation. 
A second divergence from the worldwide economic development 
appeared when inflation unavoidably l ed to an economic breakdown 
while in England, France, and the United States, there was an 
upswing after the cyclical depression in 1921. At the end of 
the first five - year period following the war, and at the same 
time as the beginning of the "normal upswing," the power of 
the German economy had clearly diminished internationally. 
According to calculations by the League of Nations, the world 
industrial production index stood at 121 (1913=100) in 1925, 
while Germany's production volume had not yet reached its prewar 
level. 
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Table 3 .2 
An International Comparison of Germany's Industrial Production 
in 1925 (1913=100) 
Japan 222 France 114 
Italy 157 Sweden 113 
USA 143 Austria 95 
Australia 141 Germany 95 
Czechoslovakia 136 Great Britain 36 
India 132 Russia 70 
Canada 117 Po land 63 
Source: League of Nations, Industrialisation and Foreign Trade, 
Geneva (1946), p. 134. 
Although economic development from 1925 until 1929--the Weimar 
Republic's period of stability--compared well with prewar levels, 
Germany still lagged behind the relative development of the 
majority of other industrial countries at the end of the 1920s. 
The industrial production of France surpassed its prewar level 
by 38 percent, that of the United States by 70 percent, and 
the world average rose approximately 47 percent. In contrast, 
German production rose by a modest 13 percent, based on its 1920 
level. Germany was thus among the losers of the industrial race 
after the war, even though she placed second to the United States 
in total potential. Measured by total economic performance, 
the upswing from the middle of 1926 had already passed its peak 
by 1928. Just before then, however, from the summer of 1926 to 
the autumn of 1927, there was a short , hectic rise in economic 
activity that caused a 50 percent gain in industrial production 
and even a 70 percent rise in the production of capital goods 
within a year . Already by the third quarter of 1927, the peak 
of economic activity had been passed--a sign of the instability of 
the cyclical upswing . Early indications of the world economic 
crisis surfaced by 1929. In that year, capital investments 
and industrial production were below the previous year, and by 
1932 the national income declincd by as much as 43 percent in 
relation to 1929. The data of various individual economic 
sectors confirm, if with varying degrees of intensity, the 
development of the national economic output . In 1932-1933, the 
production index of German industry fell to half of its 1923 
standing and to one-third in capital goods production, which are 
particularly sensitive to crises . During the world economic 
crisis , there was not only a decline of the industrial investment 
volume, but also an absolute decrease in the existing capital 
stock. Over a span of years, signs of a crisis emerged every>vhere, 
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a cr~s~s which was without precedent in the history of industrial 
capitalism. The extremely quick rise in unemployment was the 
most severe social indicator of t~e crisis. At the peak of 
unemployment in 1932, statistics indicated that six million 
people were unenployed in Germany. The actual number was 
probably considerably oigher, since many who had been unem~loyed 
for years no langer received state aid and therefore weren't 
included in the statistics. It is most likely that every third 
worker was unemployed in 1932. The quota of unemployed in 
industrial trade unions clearly rose above 40 percent. A review 
of unemployment in selected countries points to the special 
problems which confronted Gennan society in its crisis. 
Table 3. 3 
Unemployment in Selected Countries, 1919-1939 (Percent of labor 
force une1nployed) 
Year 
1919 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1923 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1933 
Germanya 
3.7 
3.3 
2.G 
1.5 
10.2 
13.1 
6.3 
13.0 
3.3 
8.6 
13.3 
22.7 
34.3 
43.8 
36.2 
20.5 
16.2 
12.0 
6.9 
3.2 
Great Britainb 
5.2 
3.2 
17.0 
14.3 
11.7 
10.3 
11.3 
12.5 
9.7 
10.3 
10.4 
16.1 
21.3 
22.1 
19.9 
16.7 
15.5 
13.1 
10.3 
12.9 
3.4 
5.8 
16.9 
10.9 
4.6 
8.0 
5.9 
2.3 
5.9 
6.4 
4.7 
13.0 
23.3 
34.0 
35.3 
30.6 
23.4 
23.9 
20.0 
26.4 
Swedend 
5.5 
5.4 
26.6 
22.9 
12.5 
10.1 
11.0 
12.2 
12.0 
10.6 
10.2 
11.9 
16.8 
22.4 
23.3 
13.0 
15.0 
12.7 
10.8 
10.9 
e France 
5.0 
2.0 
2.0 
3.0 
3.0 
3.0 
11.0 
4.0 
1.0 
2.9 
6.5 
15.4 
14.1 
13.8 
14.5 
10.4 
7.4 
7.3 
Source: Stanley Lebergott, Annual Estimates of Employment in the 
United States 1900-1950, 'lalter Galenson, Arnold Zellner, 
"International Comr>arison of Unemployment Rates," in 
The !1easurement and ßehavior of Unemployment, ed. by NßER 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967). 
44 Towards the Holocaust 
a) Only trade union members until 1932. 
b) Unemployed determined on the basis of unemployment insurance. 
c) Unemployed as percent of the non-agrarian work force. 
d) Trade union statistics. 
e) Unemployed covering non-self-employed wage and salary earners 
in mining, construction, and industry. 
The statistical indicators, particularly the data on unemployment, 
suggest that next to the United States, Germany was hit the 
hardest by the Great Depression. Between 1930 and 1934, the 
average rate of unemployment fluctuated araund 30 percent in 
both countries. Nevertheless, this crisis pattern was also 
typical for other industrial nations although characterized by 
less intensity or by a certain time lag. In Germany and in the 
United States, the economic world crisis reached an exceptional 
magnitude due to mutually enforcing causes after an economic 
boom lasting several years covered up the unstable character 
of the countries' economic systems following the war. On the 
whole, the United States experienced a more stable development 
than Germany. This can be recognized by the low rate of 
unemployment from 1924 to 1929 amounting to merely 5.6 percent 
in the United States as opposed to 11 percent in Germany. 
ECONOMIC SECTOR SIIIFTS DURING THE \lEH1AR REPUBLIC 
Disregarding the inhibitors of growth and the cyclical 
irregularities, shifts typical for the industrialization process 
continued during the Heimar Republic. They were to the 
advantage of industry and the tertiary sector and to the 
disadvantage of agriculture. 
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Table 3.4 
Warking Population according to Economic Sectors, 19J7-1939 
(percent of labor force) 
Year Agriculture 
and Forestry 
1907 35.2 
1925 30.5 
1933 23.9 
1939 25.9 
Industry 
and Trade 
40.1 
42.1 
40.4 
42.2 
Tertiary Sector 
Total Trade 
and 
Public 
and 
Commerce Private 
Services 
24.3 12.4 6.2 
27.4 16.4 6.6 
30.7 13.5 3.3 
31.9 17.5 10.5 
Domestic 
Help 
6.2 
4.4 
3.9 
3.9 
Source: Stat. d. Dt. Reiches Val. 203, p. 2 f. (1907); Val. 757, 
H. 24, p. 2 f. (Saargebiet 1939); Stat. Jb. f. d. Dt. 
Reich 1941/42, p. 33 (1925-39). 
By approximately 1890, the industrial sector--measured by the 
number of people enployed and their productivity--had already 
noved agriculture to the second position in the national economic 
structure. Thereafter, agriculture continuously lost economic 
importance althou3h no corresponding decrease of influence in 
socie ty and eovernr.1ent occurred. Even so, this process still 
emphasized the rapid decline in the social impact of the agrarian 
socioeconomic sphere and life-style on the total social development 
of Germany between the world wars. From 1907 to 1925, at least 
1.5 million people left their jobs in agriculture. The sample 
years , chosen on the basis of occu~ational census data, do not 
reveal the entire process of sectoral change. The displacement 
of agriculture and its social manifestation--the migration 
from the country to the towns--exnerienced periods of acceleration 
as well as deceleration. 
The First \Jorld \.lar, the agricultural business cycles, and the 
absence of an industrial pull during the Great Depression held 
up the migration out of agriculture, while the relative industrial 
prosperity of the latter half of the 1920s strengtherred it. It 
is noteworthy that the agrarian migration reached a climax during 
the reign of National Socialism even thoup,h its ideology allotted 
the farmers a privileged position. In view of the long-term 
pattern of change in the sectoral structure, this is by no means 
surprising. While the number of people engaged in agriculture 
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continued to decrease during the economic world crisis, the 
corresponding increase in the industrial sector was i1alted for 
the first time. A development that had persisted throug:wut the 
First llorld \lar and the great inflation was thus thrust back to 
prewar conditions at the end of t~e Great Depression. This 
slowdown of industrialization, even if just tem~orary, i1luminated 
the social irregularities caused by the economic crisis. At 
the same time, the overproportional increase of people emp1oyed in 
trade and commerce is also an expression of a crisis phenomenon. 
The rush into trade professions was frequently the desperate 
attempt of the unemployed to find jobs at any cost. 
The characteristic process of development for an industrial 
society--increasing wage and salary employment and decreasing 
self-employment--continued throug:1 the 1920s. Every fifth person 
employed in 1907 was self-employed; only every eighth by 1925. 
Of course, this over1ooks different processes that took place 
within economic sectors. Independent craftsmen, whose decline 
had been predicted by contemporaries before the First \lor1d \lar, 
were actually able to expand operations between the wars. The 
number of people employed in craft trades rose from 2.5 mi1lion 
to 4.9 million between 1395 and 1939.4 The social consequences 
of this development were significant. Craftsmen found their 
place within industrial capitalism after fighting the threatening 
dominance of industry for decades. Accordingly, the trades gave 
up their anticapitalistic position and started to align with 
industry on social-politica1 questions. In turn, industry 
realized that consideration of petty bourgeois segments wou1d 
be in the interest of their own stabi1ity. 
On the other side, the number of self-employed farmers had already 
been decreasing before the First ilorld \lar. This development 
acce1erated even farther in the 193t)s. 'lhile the number of 
independent farmers decreased to about 300,000 from 1907 to 1925, 
this category stabilized from 1925 to 1933, only to again fall 
by 200,000 during the period of National Socialism. The Great 
Depression's motto, "Selbstl:lndigkeit aus Hot" (Independence out 
of Necessity), was responsible for this slowdown in the 
shrinking process during the Weimar Republic. Remarkab1y, despite 
the fascists' claim upon "Rettung des Mittelstandes" (Saving 
the i1idd1e Class), a relatively !arger portion of the middle 
class had to give up üteir self-employment after 1933 than during 
the \1eimar Republic. 
\lith the decline in se1f-emp1oyment brought about by the 
accelerated concentration of factories and the means of production, 
there was a corresponding predictable rise in number of blue-
collar workers, white-collar workers, and civi1 servants. 
Here, however, the crucial social-structural changes took place 
in relation to the proportional growth of these groups. Only 
the industrial working class remained re1atively stable. Their 
share of the total labor force fell from 55 percent to 50 percent 
between 1907 and 1925 and remained at that level during the 1930s. 
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In contrast, the size of the white-collar employee class changed 
dramatically. In 1833, white-collar workers numbered 300,000; in 
1925, there were approximately 3.5 million. They fell into the 
fields of commerce, transportation, banking, and insurance. 
The increase of white-collar employees in industry was not quite 
as steep; only every eighth employee belonged to the "new middle 
class," whereas in the tertiary sector more than half of the wage 
laborers could be considered white-collar employees. A better-
than-average representation was held by those white-collar employees 
in new industries--which had already expanded heavily before the 
First llorld l'iar and were also the leading sectors of industrial 
growth in the lleimar Republic. T:1e emergence of scientific 
methods in production, swelling bureaucratization, and the 
growing share of tertiary production represented in the gross 
national product triggered and fastered this movement. The 
difference between white-collar and blue-collar employees cannot 
be clearly established economically and is of little practical 
significance. Yet these differences were fundamental for 
undeTstanding social roles and political behavior. The efforts 
to cut oneself off from classes beloH in the interest of securing 
one's own personal status, created an antiproletariet self-image 
that seemed to be especially susceptible to faseist slogans 
during the Great Depression.5 In this way, large numbers of 
white-collar employees, along with the old Hittelstand, made 
up the mass basis of the National Socialist regime. 
Theodor Geiger's6 data clarifies how great the potential for 
radical movement was by showing--with data based on a population 
and business census--how German society was stratified in 1925. 
He estimated that at least half of the population belonged to 
grou~s that felt their status was threatened from "oben" 
(above) and "unten" (below), by big business and the proletariat, 
in the event of a crisis. 
Table 3.5 
Stratifications of German Society, 1925 
Strata Percentage 
Capitalists 0.92 
Old Hittelstand 17.77 
llew Mittelstand 17.95 
Proletarianized 12.65 
Proletariat so. 71 
Groups 
Large entrepreneurs, large 
landholders, wealthy retirees 
Self- employed individuals in 
medium and small businesses in 
trade, craftsmanship, and 
agriculture 
Civil servants, white-collar 
employees, academics 
Old l1ittelstand which has lost 
previous socioeconomic position; 
small farmers, cottage laborers, 
craftsmen working without 
employees in tertiary sector 
\lorkers in indus try and 
agriculture 
Mentality 
Shocked by the "crisis in 
caoitalist thousht" 
Tendency to revert to the 
"culture of early capitalist 
society"; defensive posture in 
order to maintain one's own 
social status 
"their social positions are 
historically new"; ideologically 
unsteady 
Tendency to resign, but during 
times of crisis tendency to 
"harsh rebelliousness" 
!1oderately Marxist 
Source: Th . Geiger, Die soziale Schichtung des deutschen Volkes, Stuttgart 1932, pp. 73, 77, 82-105, 
quoted from \Verner Abelshauser, Sozialer \Jandel zwischen den Weltkriegen, unpublished 
manuscript (Bochum, Ruhr-UniversitMt, 1930). 
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ECONOl1IC CONTINUITIES AND GROWTH DU:\ING TI!E \JEI!1AR REPUBLIC 
It has become clear tllat the economic structures and problems 
characteristic of the two decades after the First \lorld War 
are basically so different from those of the period before 1914 
that every comparison of these two periods of German history 
becomes problematic. For the contemporaries of the 1920s and 
early 1930s, prewar conditions may have seemed like a golden age, 
particularly in the realm of economics, where continuing expansion 
until \lorld \lar I mitigated the struggle between classes over 
the distribution of the national product. In contrast, the 
decades between the wars were characterized by Stagnation, serious 
economic crises, inflation, and self-aggravating social conflicts. 
It is not surprising, then, that a majority of the German people 
often viewed t:1e \leimar Republic as a dismal reflection of the 
prosperaus times before the war. 
Of course, identifying the source of the difficulties exclusively 
as the military defeat and its effects was only half the truth. 
It is true that the world war placed too heavy a demand on 
national resources and simultaneously destroyed the international 
currency, finance, and trade system with serious consequences 
for Germany; it is also likely that, during the war, traditions 
of state and administrative bureaucracy arose which blocked a 
swift, private, capitalistic reconstruction as well as a clear 
Socialist alternative. It is also indisputable that the war 
frequently strengthened tendencies that had already been formed 
before the war and thus influenced the future economic development 
of the \Jeimar Republic. 
The continuation of earlier trends is applicable to the 
monopolization of the economy and the changes that were thereby 
brought about in the economic system. The military bureaucracy 
hastened this process with the help of the war industry, the 
establishment of state production controls, and the regulation 
of resources and goods, but it did not initiate it. In Germany, 
a collapse of the liberal-capitalistic competition mechanisms 
and a changeover to a system organized by syndicates, big business 
associations, and state bureaucracy had been already noticed by 
the 1390s. Therefore, it would be a reversal of cause and effect 
if one merely wished to view the monopolization of the 1920s as 
a result of the war. 
Furti1er continuities exist. Although the ruin of the liberal 
world-trade systeia after 1918 was a direct consequence of the war, 
there were signs as early as the 1330s of a neomercantilist 
protection of trade. Such tendencies appeared in all of the 
European countries after the turn of the century. The government's 
influence uron the economy, i1owever, intensified durinp, t:1e 
course of the war. Out of the humble beginnings of the War 
Hutrition and Resources Administration, a bureaucratized war 
economy developed as of 1916 and subjected every phase of 
production and distribution to public regulation. But even here, 
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at least in the very important raw material industries, prices and 
sales usually ceased to be determined by market mechanisms and 
were increasingly submitted to cartel agreements in the various 
spheres of production. 
Finally, in Germany, governmental influence was traditionally 
more significant than in other large industrial countries. 
Decades before ti1e First World war, the government obtained 
significant shares of heavy industry and developed into one of 
the largest bankers. The Gemeindesozialismus (socialism of the 
communities) promoted an expansive public assistance program even 
before the turn of the century. In addition, Germany's individual 
social security system for old ase, illness, and invalids had 
already been carried over from the Bismarck era' s quasi-governmental 
institutions. The example of governmental intervention therefore 
demonstrates that many social and economic political problems 
after 1913 only can be understood if the interventionist 
mechanisms created since the lß90s and the corporatist penetration 
of the economy are taken into consideration. This, however, 
does not mean that the significance of the war should be under-
estimated because without it, these tendencies would probably 
have just appeared in weakened form and after a time, dissipated. 
The immediate economic problems of the new Republic were without 
question direct results of tne war. They partially resulted from 
the stipulations of the peace treaty and partially from the 
economic waste of the war years. Accordinß to the peace treaty, 
Germany had to surrender one-tenth of its territory and 
po!'ulation. Although East Prussia and parts of \lest Prussia 
were less economically important agricultural regions, the lass 
of Alsace-Lorraine, East-Upper Silesia and the Saarland were a 
heavy burden on the economic balance. It vJas in these areas 
that a large part of German industry's valuable natural resources 
were located--for example, one-fourth of the coal production. 
The turning over of tl1e merchant marine without compensation and 
the lass of German assets abroad caused similar difficulties 
since their revenues before the war were important elements of 
Germany's positive balance of trade and payments. The lasses 
of these assets directly affected only the large banks and the 
relevant industries, but even the social democratic government 
could not remain indifferent to the wide-reaching consequences. 
After 1913, the revenues from services and foreign capital were 
no langer available for leveling a trade balance that had already 
been negative before the war. Yet, more than ever, the German 
economy needed a positive balance of payments because of political 
burdens. This was above all true because, with their reparation 
demands, the victorious allies, at least immediately after the 
war, had counted upon bindering Germany for several generations. 
The allies actually carried through nore realistic policies 
within a few years, due above all to pressure from the United 
States, which was persistently interested in an economic exchange 
with Germany. l<otwithstanding the importance of the question of 
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reparation for the \veimar Republic' s foreign and domes tic policy, 
the economic politics and the economic development of Germany 
we re on the whole less affected by it than was feared in the first 
few years following the war. The original astronomically high 
reparation claim of 132 billion marl~s (which was double the 
nation's prewar income) did not harm the German economy, since 
there was no point in time when it 1.;as required to carry the full 
burden. Between 1924 and 1932 , 28 billion marks were transferred 
abroad, but simultaneously, the same amount of foreign capital 
flowed back into Germany, particularly froTI the United States. 
As paradoxical as it may seem, the reparation problern worked 
like an economic stimulant, thanks mostly to the lending policies 
to which it was tied. Glose analysis unmasks as mythical the 
connection betwee n economic instability and payments abroad, 
claimed by all German parties at the time. Still, this economic 
relativity does not diminish the oolitical weight of the 
reparations. Reparation payments served as a ?ermanent leverage 
for right-radical agitation up until the 1930s and had considerable 
political and psychological significance. 
The second major economic problern of the 1920s developed out of 
the inflation. The German public also siraplified the causes of 
inflation by seeing its origins solely in the reparations 
requirements. Actually, the inflationwas a liability resulting 
from the war, specifically from the method of financing the 
war. In 191G, Germany's debts amounted to 150 billion marks--
approximately twice the sum of the national income in 1913. To 
pay this debt and the interest upon it would have required greater 
means than the entire national expenditures before the war. To 
have avoided the development from war-time inflation to galloping 
depreciation of the currency, the imbalance between the 
circulation of money and the real production possibilities should 
have been corrected. That, however, would have meant cutting 
the nation's debt drastically by splitting the value of the currency 
and by not allowing the national budget to be a continuing 
source of inflation. 
Each of these alternatives was unpopular, and actually, all of 
the European countries that had participated in the war were 
harassed by inflation after the war. Of course, the clearest 
sign of this was the devaluation of the German currency, since 
the government di<i nothing until 1922 to limit the potential 
of inflation. On the contrary, the government contributed to 
the process of inflation through the increasing budget deficit and 
through the large-scale printing of money. The government's 
revenues amounted to 13.2 billion l1arks from 1920 to 1922, 
whereas expenditures came to 33.3 billion, based upon the value 
of ti1e gold mark before the First 'Jorld War. This immense 
deficit economy not only promoted t:1e devaluation of the 
currency, but caused t ·,1e postwar booTI a t the same time. In 
this fashion, the state remairred capable of engaging in 
Sozialpolitik, wiüch was significant in view of the revolutionary 
pressures at harne. The accompanying full employment policy 
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helped to create jobs, thus easing the worker's integration into 
the new system, particularly since the government spent twice 
as much as in 1913 despite a gr eatly diminished r,ross national 
product. 7 
Those hurt by this inflationary policy (which did not end until 
the complete collapse of the currency in 1923) were, above all, 
the old middle class. Employees and industrialists profited 
from the inflation in their own way, whether through full 
employ~ent or through large profits. Thus, a silent coalition 
of interests arose (consisting of government, bie business, and 
trade unions) against which small businesses and mvners of money 
wealth were powerless. Until 1923, their v1ealth and claims on 
government and business were worthless paper. It is difficult 
to determine who was really harmed, since even within the 
Mittelstand, there were groups who, as debtors, profited from 
the inflation. Farmers and owners of tenement buildings 
belonged to such groups. Then there is, finally, the insoluble 
question of to w:1om the "inflation gains" on the part of the 
state can be attributed, since plausible estimates are not 
available of how public expenditures during the inflation 
affected the various classes. In any case, the temporary 
advantage for the governments was politically insured; it could 
credit itself with the liquidation of state debt and the avoidance 
of unemployment. The owners of tangibles, generally including 
entrepreneurs, also benefited. Yet in the long run, damages 
to the German democracy far surpassed the advantages to 
individual groups. The economic ruin of a part of the l1ittelstand 
increased their susceptibility to right-wing political radicalism. 
The radicalization of the Mittelstand was also encouraged by 
the economic concentration promoted by inflation and the 
connected loss of status suffered by small manufacturers, 
traders, and craftsmen. 
All groups benefited from the prosperity phase following the 
stabilization crisis of 1923-24. However, they did so to 
markedly different degrees. The civil servants could not regain 
their privileged prewar position. For workers and white-collar 
employees, however, the real wages and salaries increased 
relatively si§nificantly, that is, 26 percent and 16 percent 
respectively. Considering the impoverishment of the population 
during the war and inflation periods, this did not mean that 
mass prosperity had set in, as was the case in the United States. 
Nevertheless, the population enjoyed a relatively low level of 
unemployment and experienced political and social stability on 
the domestic front. During the five years from 1924 to 1929, 
important CJrogress in the Sozialpolitik, improvements in living 
conditions, and an expansion of the public infrastructure could 
be achieved. The distribution of income within German society 
shifted in favor of workers and employees at the expense of 
those who derived their income from Money wealth or CJroperty. 9 
The share of wage and salary incomes increased from 70.9 percent 
of the GHP in 1910-13 to 37.3 percent of the G~<P in 1925-29. 
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Only after the fascists rase to power did this percentage--
during a period of growth in the military industrial complex 
(1935-33)--fall again to 73 percent of the GNP. 
The develo,ment in private income confirms this trend favoring 
wage and salary earners. Between 1913 and 1923, private 
incomes increased from 66.1 billion to 72.7 billion marks. 
Simultaneously, the income of the self-employed segments 
decreased from 2.::i billion to 18 billion marks, and the income 
derived from wealth and rent decreased fron 10 billion to 3.6 
billion marks. In contrast, wages, salaries, pensions, and 
various supportin3 transfer payments jumped from 33.6 to 51 
billion marks. 
After Uorld llar I, the most severe lasses were experienced by 
those who derived income from money wealth. Inflation erased 
the rentier category just as it erased a large portion of the 
self-employed and dependent Mittelstand's wealth. In this 
manner, income derived from wages rase in the 1920s faster than 
the income of the self-employed. In 1925, the average income of 
the non-self-employed amounted to 43 percent of that of the 
self-employed, as compared to 40 percent in 1913.10 All in all, 
the non-self-employed could count themselves among the modest 
beneficiaries of an economic development in which their real 
income reached tne prewar level sametime between 1925 and 1929. 
In part, this was also due to increased state transfer payments, 
whic:1 to a larger extent went to the non-self-employed than to 
groups with a higher income. Avera3e figures, however, hide 
the redistribution of income within the wage-and-salary-earner 
category, which consisted primarily in a decrease of the spread 
in inequali ty .11 Before the First ~lorld llar, the income gap 
between the skilled and unskilled workers was markedly larger 
than in 1913. The same pattern also held for civil servants 
and white-collar employees. 
The farmers' income trend deviated from that of the wage and 
salary earners. The years of relative prosperity were accompanied 
by a worldwide depression in agriculture so that, by 1923, the 
income gap between the farmers and the rest of the population 
amounted to 44 percent.12 During t:1e last prewar year, however, 
this gap was only half as large. Decreasing yields per acre 
during the war, an international price collapse for agricultural 
products, and, finally, the stagnation in the consumption of 
agricultural products led to a noticeable worsening of the farmers' 
social position. Although most of the famers could pay back 
their debts during the inflation period, only a few years later 
they became just as indebted as before. ßy the end of the 1920s, 
therefore, the farmers proved to be a source of political 
radicalism, particularly in Germany's Protestant north and east. 
Also, this turning away from the republic, as reflected in voting 
behavior, could not be prevented by the voluminous support and 
subsidy programs, of which agriculture was the main beneficiary. 
On t:1e contrary, Brllning, the last not openly antidemocratic 
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Chancellor of the republic, failed despite his active agricultural 
policy in the fall of 1932 because of a coalition of dissatisfied 
entrepreneurs and large landholders. The fruits of this crisis, 
here as elsewhere, were reaped by the National Socialists. 
CONCLUSION 
Through its policies , the state influenced the course of 
development in the economy and society for some years. llowever, 
i t did not provide the German population with a fundamentally 
new, anticapitalist perspective. Similarly , the Social Democrats 
showed little inclination in 1919-20 to put into effect the 
prewar demands (which were part of their pa rty program) for state 
planning and the socialization of the means of ~roduction. 
The question must even be asked whether or not they would have 
been ab le to do so since, in parliament they depended on the 
cooperatiorr of the left-liberal bourgeoisie. In place of 
fundamental reforms, capitalist market mechanisms began to assert 
themselves again throughout the economy after a short transition 
period. Facing the extra-parliamentary worker and soldiers ' 
council movement, the parliamentary left--given the relative 
strength of the council movement--sllied away from a conflict with 
traditional powers . It believed itself to be dependent on the 
cooperation of the conservatively minded state bureaucracy, The 
parliamentary left was also afraid that fundamental socialistic 
changes in the economic system would prevent rather than 
facili tate, so lut ions for the Republic ' s already grave economic 
problems. It therefore was logical that, of the socialization 
promises of 1919, only the rudiments remained, concerning 
primarily state influenced car tels in coal and potassium 
production. llowever, these arrangements had little in common 
with socialism, since large enterprises ap,ain enjoyed the most 
influence. 
It would nevertheless be unjustified to blame the Social Democratic 
chancellors of the fi rst postwar years for merely restoring 
traditional capitalism. A shift of power in favor of the state 
and away from private capital did occur, since the various 
governments gained influence in many , mostly indirect, ways. 
The increased volume of government spending alone strengtherred 
the role of the state as a redistributing agent of the GNP. Thus, 
Ueimar coalition governments were at least in a position t o 
correct some of the undesired social effects of the private 
market system. This ne'~ interventionism also caused a 
strengtherring of the federal government's institutions at the 
expense of the competencies of various states and communities. 
It therefore promoted a trend that countered the historically 
fastered German federali sm. 
The most remarkable area of the state's new activities--and at 
the same time ex~ressive of the most positive political changes 
as compared to the Kaiserreich--was that of Sozialpolitik, 
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Because of its Qultidimensionality, it became in many ways a 
model for the new post-World I/ar I German welfare state 
interventionism. 7hree areas of this Sozialpolitik were 
particularly exemplary: The continued development in (1) labor 
law, (2) housing and public health, and finally, (3) the extension 
of co~unal services . The introduction of the eight-hour day 
(which was one of the first 'l!easu::es tal~en after the revolution) 
became symbolic of a number of labor-law changes through which 
relations bet1veen classes were to become newly r-egulated. Of 
particular importance for the social reality of the 1920s was 
the introduction of the collective labor law, mainly because 
it included an official recognition of collective bargaining. 
In part, however, these laws, sup~lemented by the law regulating 
the intro duction of worker representation on the factory level 
(Betriebsdlte) of privately owned firms, bad only tended to 
confirm what bad become social reality. The relationship between 
labor unians and entrepreneurs had already begun to change by 
the First World War. This found its expression in the founding 
of a central cooperative body ( Zeotrale Arbeitsgemeinschaft), 
which included unians a'nd business associations. llithin this 
frame~Vork, new industry- wide labor contrac t s and new limited 
forms of cooperation were agreed uoon. Although this body 
rapidly lost its practical significance after 1921, its political-
psychological significance was nevertheless imoortant at the 
beginning of the Republic. On the one hand, it pointed the way 
for the collective labor law that later became a part of the 
1\leimar Sozialpolitik; on the other hand, it demonstrated labor's 
and business 1 s 1vill to independen tly deal wi th labor market 
issues, particularly since the state had not yet become fully 
stabilized. The cooperation between the se organized social forces 
had been ques tioned frorn the very be g inning, ini tially within 
labor unians and later, after consolidation of their own power 
posi tion had taken place, among entrepreneurs. l1any union members 
saw in this cooperation oerely the continuance of the truce 
maintained during the war and believed that the entrepreneurs ' 
concess ions reflected their fear of a revolutionary change in 
society . Indeed, this cooperation 1vas initially more advantageaus 
for the entrepreneurs than for the workers since it implied that 
capitalist power relationships were in principle accepted by 
the unions. In the face of the g rowing self-consciousness 
evident among union raak and file members--which in part was 
due to the drastic increase in union membershiTJ--the union 
leadership, after 1920, had t o distinctly emphasize the gap 
between itself and the entrepreneurs. This was not easily 
possible wi thin the Zentrale Arbeitsgemeinschaft . ~<o small 
Qatter, union membership increased from 3 million in 1913--
after a low of 1. :Z million during the Har--to 9. 2 million in 
1920 . The unions' coo~eration with the class enemy, coupled 
with this expansion in membership, allowed them to strongly 
influence le g islation concerning work and collective bargaining. 
At least at the beginning of the Republic, they could also affect 
the state ' s Sozialpolitik . This was short-lived , however, 
since unio:1 power peaked b y 1921-22. During the period of 
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inflation, membership decreased by .30 percent and, after 1924, 
the unians Here only one interest group amonß others. They enjoyeo 
more influence than they had had before 1914, but it \vas a 
meager acconplishment if measured by the hopes and expectations 
held by a majority of the workers in 1913. 
The Weimar state "'as relatively late in beginning to influence 
the producer cartel of entrepreneurs and unions. The constitution 
had provided a many-faceted role for the state in the area of 
Sozialpali tik. 
The governments, however, limited themselves initially to 
securing, on the labor market, the social compromises made by 
the parties. Even the already mentioned lvorker factory 
representation law (Betriebsr~tegesetz) of 1920 was only the 
continuation of a policy ini tiated during liorld Uar I. Only when, 
during the period of inflation, the unions' and entrepreneurs' 
ability to compromise declined, was the state practically 
forced to increasingly influence the nature of collective 
bargaining agreements and wage policies by resorting to forced 
arbitration. Virtually all important collective bargaining 
agreements between 1924 and 1932 were the result of such forced 
arbitration. This indicates that the 1913 agreed-upon free play 
of forces on the labor market did not function. For their 
part, unians evaluated the state's intervention positively until 
the Great Depression. IHth wage disputes, state arbitration 
tended to be more in favor of workers than of entrepreneurs, 
which induced the entrepreneurs to fundamentally question this 
system in 1923.13 Only during the Great Depression and at a 
time of rigorously pursued deflationary and economic cleansing 
policies was state arbitration used against the workers. These 
different experiences during the various phases of the Weimar 
Republic explain why in 1945 neither entrepreneurs nor unians 
were willing to institutionalize state arbitration. 
A quantitative expression of the state's Sozialpolitik was the 
quadrupling of public Axpenditures for social purposes since 1913. 
This occurred despite a stagnating GNP.l4 During the sametime 
span, 1913-30, total public expenditures doubled and the 
expenditures for education increased by 60 percent. In contrast, 
defense expenditures decreased to less than one-third of its 
prewar level. An example of this new form of Sozialpolitik was 
the state's public housing program. Before the war, only about 
every tenth apartment had been cofinanced by the state. Between 
1919 and 1930 this increased to 30 percent. These measures 
markedly improved the problern of shortages in apartments, but 
did not fully overcome it. 
The decade from 1919 to 1929, it can be concluded, brought about 
a qualitatively new welfare-state interventionism, which could 
have corrected the market's distribution processes but only 
indirectly influenced the capitalist economic structure. 
Attempts an the part of the German left to fundamentally change 
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the system; for example, through socialization of means of 
production or through workers and soldier councils, remained 
without practical consequences and fell apart almost from the 
outset. Despite all the Opposition against Sozialpolitik and 
hidden socialization (Kalte Sozialisierung) the entrepreneurs 
would certainly have been able to live with this sociopolitical 
class struggle compromise, and farsighted industrialists promoted 
it. State redistribution efforts seldom hindered free-market 
activity; often it supplemented or even promoted it. l!owever, 
even this welfare-state reformism broke apart during the Great 
Depression because of the consensus destroying tactics employed 
by big business and big agriculture interests who believed, 
in 1930, that the time for a turn around had come. Their cry 
against deficit spending, politically realized by the vigorously 
pursued deflationary policy at the expense of employees under 
Chancellors Brllning, Papen, and Schleicher, liquidated all 
important welfare-state measures even before 1933. As regards to 
Sozialpolitik, therefore, l!itler did not represent a new 
beginning. On the contrary, he systematically pursued those 
conservative ideologies that had become guide posts of German 
political thinking by 1931-32. 
It would be incorrect, however, to conclude from the increase 
in conservative and authoritarian tendencies, the inevitability 
of fascism. Until the September elections of 1930, the NSDAP--
although making lots of noise--was an insignificant splinter 
group on the right of the German party spectrurn. Only the very 
critical combination of economic crisis, unemployment, 
conservative-authoritarian undermining of the constitutional 
welfare state, and the radical-nationalist agitation gave the 
NSDAP a chance to quantitatively become an important movement. 
Despite its power monopoly, however, it even failed in 1933 to 
gain an absolute majority. Its mass basis did not consist of 
those who suffered most from the Great Depression--the workers--
but of the broad spectrum of Hittelstand groups in the city and 
the country who became economically threatened and felt socially 
insecure. They were supplemented by socially uprooted, unemployed, 
young students without much of a professional future and former 
soldiers lacking bonds to the civilized order of everyday 
democratic life. During times of economic crisis, the diffuse 
anticapitalism of the German population did not stabilize the 
Republic. Instead it destroyed it because it lacked a 
progressive change-oriented perspective. It is the ironic 
tragedy of the Ueimar Republic that the National Socialists' 
anticapitalist slogans became democracy's death song. In its 
place came a system which not only stood for fanatical racism 
and the Holocaust, but which also robbed the rnajority of Germans 
of the modest fruits gained by the century-long struggle for a 
constitutional and democratic welfare state. 
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The Social Origins 
of Nazism: 
The Rural Dimensions 
TIMOTHY A. TILTON 
The Nazis attracted disproportionately large support in rural 
areas. Their greatest electoral successes came in such rural 
districts as Schleswig-Holstein (the only electoral district to 
give the Nazis an absolute majority before the party came to 
power), Lower Saxony, Pomerania, and Hecklenbur:_~. Within these 
provinces, the Nazis drew their strongest support in rural areas; 
in Schleswig-Holstein, for example, rural communities cast 63.3 
percent of their votes for the NSDAP in July 1932, while urban 
centers cast 44.3 percent for the ~SDAP.l The percentage of 
peasants and farmers joining the party sometimes lagged behind 
the voting results, but the intensity of rural support for Hitler 
was strong. The Strategie Bombing Surve~ reported that rural 
areas nanifested the highest war morale. Above all, it was the 
party's breakthrough in the countryside from 1928 to 1932 that 
gave it political importance. 
How can one explain the susceptibility of the countryside to 
l<azi appeals? First, one must discern which rural voters backed 
the NSDAP. Then, by a~alyzing the party's development, its 
appeals, its organization, and its opposition, one can hope to 
understand why tnese voters enlisted under the i-lazi banner. 
Both of these steps are essential: Only by comprehending which 
individual voters lent their support is it possible to appreciate 
the causes of the Nazis' success. To bring intellectual order 
to the plethora of sociological and psychological explanations 
of nazism, it is essential to penetrate to the motivation of 
these individual voters. Who the rural ~azi supporters were and 
why they gave their support constitute the focus of this chapter. 
Hitler's early plans for the seizure of power envisioned a coup 
similar to that of Uussolini's in Italy. By building support 
in the cities a~d by developing an armed force, the Nazis could 
seize control of the dominant means of production, transportation, 
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communication, administration, and violence. The turn from this 
strategy to a more rural and electoral orientation took place 
between 1924 and 1923. Two factors conditioned this change of 
emphasis: First, Hitler's dismal failure in the Beer-Ilall Putsch 
of 1923, his subsequent imprisonment, and the restrictions upon 
his political activity convinced him that the NSDAP must pursue 
a strategy that would at least appear legal and parliamentary. 
Second, the party's unimpressive showing in urban areas in the 
1923 Reichstag elections and its surprising success in such 
rural regions as Schleswig-Holstein, parts of nanover, and 
Franconia prompted a redirection of effort. 
A week after the 1923 elections, tne party newspaper carried an 
article demonstrating how the party's rural successes produced 
a shift in strategy: 
The election results in the country show that with 
less expenditure of effort, money and time greater 
successes can be achieved there than in the large 
towns. National Socialist mass meetings in small 
towns and market communities are important events and 
form the topic of daily conversation for weeks afterwards, 
while in the large towns meetings even with 3,000 and 
4,000 people sink into insignificance and pass away.3 
From this point the NSDAP, in Orlow' s 1vorris, "deliberately set 
out to become the political party that gave the most blatant 
expression to the fears and prejudices of the middle- and 
particularly the lower-middle-classes in the rural and small-town 
regions of Germany. 1• 
These efforts bare fruit in the 1929 local elections and then 
dramatically in the 1930 Reichstag election when the NSDAP 
became the second largest party in the state, attracting 6.4 
million voters and electing 107 Reichstag deputies. The party's 
greatest support came from agricultural and middle-class 
(especially lower-middle-class) regions in Protestant northern 
Germany. In Catnolic districts and urban working-class districts, 
the party fared much poorer. In 1931 and 1932 the NSDAP seized 
control of major agricultural interest organizations, gaining 
power from the grass roots up. In the July 1932 Reichstag 
elections, the party registered impressive gains virtually 
everywhere, but again its greatest strength lay in the rural 
north; it lagged in southern Germany and industrial areas. The 
November elections and subsequent local elections produced NSDAP 
setbacks everywhere, but the l1arch 1933 elections (held after 
the Nazis controlled the state machinery) produced enormaus 
Nazi majorities in rural areas, although the Nazis still failed 
to achieve a majority of the votes in the nation as a whole. 
These global data demonstrate the ~azis' appeal for the Protestant 
rural middle class, but for a more discriminating view one needs 
to consult regional studies. 
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Rudolf Heberle's pioneering research continues to be the most 
valuable of a growing collection of excellent regional and local 
investigations. l!eberle's sensitive analysis of electoral 
patterns in Schleswig-Holstein begins with a sketch of the three 
major geographic areas of the province: The lush west coast 
marshes with a risk-filled econamy based on cattle-grazing and 
cabbage-growing and a society marked by sharp class differences 
between the wealthy farmers and the comparatively small stratum 
of farm workers; the eastern hill area with a social and 
economic structure characterized largely by estate agriculture; 
and the rolling, sandy Geest, a backward region of small peasant 
farmers and Dorfgemeinschaft (village community). The Nazis 
succeeded best in the Geest: 
Table 4.1 
NSDAP Vote (percent of total vote) 
Uarsh Geest Hill Area 
1923 7.9 15.9 2 .0 
1930 41.2 45.9 24.3 
1932 (July) 61.6 78.7 57.1 
Source: Rudolph l!eberle, From Democracy to Nazism (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1945), p. 99. 
In the marshes and the hill area the rural working class voted 
steadily and dominantly for the Socialists or Communists, whereas 
the smaller rural proletariat of the Geest shed its allegiance to 
the Social Democrarie Party (SPD) to vote first for the German 
National People's Party (DNVP) and then for the Nazis. 
Heberle's analysis of the variation in voting patterns within 
Schleswig-Holstein strongly suggests that an abundance of family 
farmers and the relative absence of a distinct upper and 
especially of a lower class, as on the Geest, promoted Nazi 
gains. His correlations between voting and occupational status 
confirm this finding. The correlation between Nazi voting in 
July 1932 and the presence of small farmers is an eye-catching 
+.35. Nazi success also correlates highly with the percentage 
of independent proprietors, but negatively with the presence of 
wage earners. A typical Nazi supporter voted for the liberal 
parties immediately after the war, then for the German Nationalists 
in the mid-1920s, and finally for the Nazis. In short, the Nazis 
drew their adherents from family farmers who had previously 
supported liberal parties. 
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Gerhard Stoltenberg, the prominent CDU politician, has 
supplemented Heberle's analysis in two useful ways. First, he 
shows how the DNVP pursued a radical and antirepublican 
nationalism that attracted a broad rural following in the mid-
twenties: It proved particularly compelling for the estate 
owners of the eastern hill area, who remairred faithful to the 
DNVP into 1933. The DNVP's success in mid-decade indicates that 
the rural population had abandoned its allegiance to the Republic 
before the Hazi upsurge. 
Stoltenberg also shows how the liberal and rightist parties 
failed to establish local organizational roots. In local 
elections the bourgeois parties yielded to local alliances 
claiming to be above parties. These minor "apolitical" local 
groupings evinced the rural property holders' and artisans' 
distrust of the urban middle-class parties and of the parliamentary 
system as a whole.s All this evidence indicates that the rural 
population, particularly the farmers, craftsmen, and merchants, 
did not switch abruptly from a staunch liberalism to nazism, 
but rather that they had never shown great enthusiasm for the 
Weimar Republic.6 
The political situation in Lower Saxony (the Prussian provinces 
of Hanover, Oldenburg /excluding Birkenfeld and LUbeck/, 
Brunswick, and SchaumbÜrg-Lippe /excluding Bremen/) and its 
evolution closely resembled developments in Schleswig-Holstein. 
In both areas the NSDAP's first supporters were radical rightists 
with ties to older Freikorps, vHlkisch, or rightist organizations. 
Prior to 1930, party members came largely from the 11ittelstand--
peasants, artisans, shopkeepers, small businessmen, and white-
collar workers; they tended to be young and many had served in 
World \lar I. In Lower Saxony ,. Jeremy Noakes reports, two-thirds 
of the membership "was under forty, with slightly more falling in 
the twenty-one to thirty age group than the thirty-one to forty 
group; 37 percent of the members were ex-servicemen.7 Their 
devotion to the party was fanatical. 
In 1930 the NSDAP vote in Lower Saxony increased to 23 percent 
from 4.5 percent in 1923. The new HSDAP voters came from among 
previous nonvoters and defectors from the bourgeois parties. 
The party's strongholds lay in North Oldenburg and East Friesland 
and Kreise like Diepholz and Hoya--remote agricultural areas with 
poor Geest or moor conditions. The Nazis fell below average 
in two areas, first in Catholic areas in South Oldenburg and 
OsnabrUck, where "religious loyalties were strong enough to 
withstand even the severest economic crisis," and second in 
LUneburg, where deeply conser;~tive peasants remairred suspicious 
of the Nazis and retained their traditional loyalty to the Guelph 
party.ß 
The July 1932 Reichstag elections demonstrated a further 
radicalization of the Lower Saxon electorate. The Nazis garnered 
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45.2 percent of the ballots. The Nazis' strongest bastions lay in 
remote, backward areas, where modern communications and social 
and economic organization penetrated only slowly, and traditional 
rural communities persisted.9 
The Bavariru1 countryside, with its predominantly Catholic 
population, affered sterner resistance to llazi inroads. The 
Nazis were slow in recruiting the Catholic peasantry. Available 
evidence indicates that the small-town bourgeoisie formed the 
backhone of the party in Bavaria, but the peasantry was 
distinctly underrepresented. As late as 1928, Bavaria remained the 
center of !~azi support in the coun try as a whole; the party 
received 6.3 percent of the vote in Bavaria, but only 2.6 
percent nationwide. Nonetheless, Geoffrey Pridham observes, 
"the tlSDAP had failed • • • to ma;,e nuch impact on the country 
areas, which in the predominantly rural state of Bavaria was 
crucial."lO Only in some Protestant areas of Franconia did the 
Nazis attract a sizeable rural following: Disenchanted Catholic 
peasants supported the local ßaverischer Bauern--und 
Hittelstandsbund (ßBHB). 
As elsewhere, in Bavaria the 1930 Reichstag elections marked a 
substantial llazi advance, even though the provincial vote fell 
slightly below the national average, and the party's center of 
electoral gravity shifted north and east.ll 
The Nazis drew support from previous DNVP and BBHB voters who had 
become disillusioned by their parties' participation in government 
coalitions; rather than continue with parties tainted by their 
collusion with tne Weimar system, these voters opted for the 
undiluted radicalism of the HSDAP. The ::lazis also seem to have 
benefited from the rise in voter participation: In Bavaria as 
elsewhere "the overwhelming majority of new voters seem to have 
supported the NSDAP."12 
The Nazi rural propaganda campaign produced results after 1930. 
As Pridham states, "the stampede of peasant voters to the NSDAP 
finally came in the Reichstag Election of July 1932, although 
this did not happen in the former Bßlill stranghold of Lower 
Bavaria until the election of Harch 1933."13 ßy capturing 
disillusioned BBHB voters in even greater numbers, enlisting 
almost all the Deutsche Landvolk supporters, and attracting many 
new voters, the ~arty registered enormaus advances in rural 
areas. In the September 193J elections, the towns of Franconia 
had voted 24.4 percent for the NSDAP, the rural areas 22 .7 
percent. In July 1932, the towns produced 39.J percent, the 
countryside a striking 59.8 percent Nazi votes. With some local 
exceptions like tlte city of Passau, Catholic areas proved far 
more resistant to Nazi appeals than Protestant districts; not 
until the March 1933 elections, when the llazis' control of the 
state allowed them distinctly new opportunities for propaganda 
and coercion, did the NSDAP finally win strong backing from 
Bavaria's rural Catholics. 
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This regional evidence allows one to conclude that the rural 
population uf the 1/eim<>.-c Republic, never staunchly supportive 
of its institutions, began abandonine the Republic in the aftermath 
of the inflation crisis of 1923-1924. It turned first to right-
wing parties like the DHVP and to local coalitions and then to 
the Nazis. The rural middle class, the small farmers, artisans, 
shopkeepers, and businessmen, formed the core of the Nazi 
electorate; in many regions they enlisted or intimidated farm 
workers and domestic servants into supporting the Nazi cause. 
Everywhere the Nazis succeeded in bringing new voters to the 
polls, people who had previously abstained from elections. 
Catholics resisted the Hazi appeal more steadfastly than did 
Protestants, but even in Bavaria most of them eventually voted 
for the NSDAP. 
The facts regarding the Nazis' ascendancy in the German 
countryside and the major sources of their support are relatively 
undisputed; explanations for their ascent are, however, 
distinctly rnore controversial. To many contemporary Germans and 
to a segment of the academic community, the economic depression 
offers a satisfactory explanation of the Hazi upsurge.l4 To 
others, the economic suffering of the rural poryulation was more 
imagined than real; for them the rise of rural nazism represents 
either an irrational reaction to economic and social fears or 
a conscious commitment to extreme right-wing nationalism. Given 
the enormaus number of individuals who voted for the ~-SDAP and 
the potential complexity of motivation in each individual case, 
it is unlikely that any single explanation will suffice; a 
variety of explanations must be advanced to account for the 
various grounds for NSDAP support. This commitment to a more 
synthetic and integrated explanation does not imply, however, 
that all explanations are equally valid; to understand the causes 
of the Nazis' rural victories requires more detailed scrutiny 
of the factors contributing to their advance. 
Economic hardship certainly promoted the rise of the NSDAP. The 
ravages of the great inflation left many farmers with substantial 
debts. This was complicated by the general structural crisis 
of German agriculture (engendered by the pampering of German 
farmers behind high tariff barriers) combined with cyclical 
agricultural crises and declining urban consumption in the late 
1920s, German farmers suf fered genuine distress. Farm prices 
descended precipitously, incomes dropped, indebtedness and rural 
underemployment grew, and the rate of foreclosures rose sharply.lS 
Farmers' sons, who had hoped for urban jobs or stable rural 
living, saw their hopes dashed; the growing number of restive 
young men in the countryside was a conspicuous sign and result 
of the general economic slump, but the depres sion alone did not 
make them Nazis. 
The economic determinist explanation of rural nazism, as Petzina 
has already indicated, s uffers from numerous flaws. First, many 
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strong Nazi supporters sustained little economic lass. Bodo Uhse 
recalled that many of the rebellious Schleswig-Ilolstein farmers 
were "not exactly the poorest;" they "sat like lords on proud 
and splendid estates." And Rudolf aeberle suggests that 
"increasing economic insecurity rat:1er than an actual suffering 
from the agricultural depression" accounts for the turn to 
nazism in Schleswig-Ilolstein's marshes.l6 
The fit between agricultural distress and Nazi success is far 
from perfect. As noted earlier, the Hazis advanced far more 
slowly in Catholic than in Protestant areas even when economic 
conditions were similar. Organized rural farm workers, who 
endured privations at least as severe as those of other rural 
groups, largely retained their traditional allegiance to the 
Social Democrats, or if they defected, they veered to the 
Communist left rather than the Nazi right. Regional aberrations 
also occurred; Angeln in Schleswig-l!olstein did not feel the 
impact of the economic crisis until late 1932, yet in July 
the Nazis had already gained 70.3 ~ercent of the rural vote.l7 
Perhaps the most compelling evidence that economic misery alone 
cannot constitute a sufficient explanation of nazism's rural 
appeal comes from international comparisons. Denmark, Norway, 
and Sweden--to cite just three nearby European cases--all 
underwent agricultural depressions in the same period, but rather 
than yielding to nazism, rural Scandinavians proved largely 
immune to faseist appeals, retained their allegiance to democratic 
parties, and in many cases supported Social Democratic 
initiatives.lß The Scandinavian experience does not demonstrate 
that the depression was unimportant, but only that economic 
events do not produce political results in a rigid and mechanical 
fashion; people interpret the significance of economic events 
in the light of their experience and intellectual tradition. 
In Germany and in Scandinavia what proved decisive was not the 
severity of the depression, but rural people's reaction to it, 
their interpretation of its causes, and their choice of remedies. 
As Barrington Moore, Jr., has written, 
The partial failure of a set of institutions to live 
up to what is expected of them provides an atmosphere 
receptive to demands for a more or less extensive overhaul 
of the status quo. At this juncture the future course 
of events depends heavily upon the models of a better 
world that become available to various strategic groups 
in the population.l9 
Thus, a more adequate explanation of the drift towards nazism 
requires a consideration of traditional rural ideology, the 
nature of the political system in rural areas, and the 
character of Nazi organization and propaganda. 
The German rural population never warmed to Weimar democracy. In 
Schleswig-i!olstein, Lower Saxony, Bavaria, and other areas 
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incorporated by Prussia into the new Germany, the rural people 
longed for the simplicity of local government in a preindustrial 
setting. They disliked r.~odern bureaucratic government with its 
distant structure of authority, regulations, and higher taxes. 
In particular, they disliked the Weimar Republic; at the time 
of the Kapp Putsch, farm organizations expressed support for 
Kapp's regime. As the 1920s unfolded, the rural people came to 
see the \Veimar system as the tool of the Social Democrats who 
used it to harass religious education, channel benefits to urban 
workers rather than farmers, and permit what they regarded as 
decadent cultural phenomena. 
A host of extremist right-wing and nationalist organizations, 
playing upon these attitudes and the belligerent nationalism of 
the countryside, stoked the fires of discontent. Ludendorff's 
Tannenburg League, the Stahlhelm, the Freikorps brigades, Werwolf, 
and Landvolk movement, the Schleswig-llolstein Bond, and the 
various vHlkisch organizations propagandized widely among the 
rural population; even more respectable organizations like the 
Landbund and the DNVP kept up .a steady barrage of antirepublican 
propaganda. The constant virulent attacks upon the Versailles 
treaty, the great inflation, and the Republic's social, cultural, 
and military policy helped create a climate in which rational 
political debate ceased to be effective and in which tendencies 
to political irrationality could flourish. 
The reigning climate of opinion predisposed rural folk to 
interpret the depression in the categories of radical reaction, 
but their deep-seated distrust of urban outsiders made them 
suspicious of Hazi overtures. The !-lazis overcame this reluctance 
by recruiting prominent local figures as their spokesmen; 
especially in the early phases.20 Using the right man gave the 
Nazis immediate respectability; where such figures did not exist, 
the Nazis' legitimacy as a political alternative grew with their 
electoral successes and their association with more established 
conservative movements as in the Young Plan referendum. 
Even if the antidemocratic, antisocialist, nationalist, and 
militarist content of traditional ideology biased rural people, 
drew them toward Nazi-like understandings of their Situations, 
and lured them away from support of the Republic, the llazis 
still had to assemble them under the swastika. This process 
occurred late and rapidly. In l923 rural protest rallies 
raised largely economic demands. In Lower Saxony, for example, 
disgruntled rural groups called for protection against imports, 
lower and simpler taxes, cuts in public expenditure and bureaucracy, 
and the provision of long-term credit at low rates of interest . 
Not merely farmers, but all those dependent upon agricultural 
prosperity participated in a united demonstration of rural 
dissatisfaction. They firrnly believed in the justice of their 
cause and remained confident that the state would assist them. 
Once their expectations of assistance were shattered and the 
traditional rural interest groups and parties were discredited 
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by their failure to obtain aid, the rural population's patience 
with traditional arrangements was at an end. They were ready 
to heed appeals for more radical measures. 
The failure of the traditional rural parties and lobbying 
organizations merits further consideration, for the turn to 
nazism occurred in two stages . First there was a withdrawal from 
the liberal parties and farm interest organizations and then 
adherence to nazism. The very structure of the \leimar political 
economy obstructed the possibilities for governmental aid to 
farmers. The Social Democrats, the staunehest supporters of 
the Republic, hesitated to extend help to agriculture because 
they feared that lügher food prices or higher taxes would 
alienate their urban working-class supporters. Furthermore, 
they were slow to recognize that the family farmers of western 
and southern Germany differed significantly from the Junkers; 
not until 1923 did the Social Democrats promulgate a more 
attractive agricultural program. This situation allowed the 
Nazis to argue tl1.at farruers, as a permanent minority in an 
industrial democracy, could never gain satisfaction of their 
just demands and that only in the coming Third Reich would they 
receive their due. 
The Weimar party system further facilitated the Nazis' triumph 
in two significant ways. First, the liberal bourgeois parties 
failed to organize in rural areas; they renained 
Honoratiorenparteien, loose groupings assembled around local 
notaoles. llhen their program and performance no longer appealed 
and their local leaders endorsed nazism, there were no 
organizational loyalties, no local offices, no party services 
to slow the tide of voters away from their ranks. The local 
bourgeois electoral alliances for communal and provincial 
elections likewise offered easy pickings for Nazi infiltration 
and demolition. Second, · the variety of bourgeois parties meant 
that electoral results alone seldom determined the participants 
in national coalitions; instead deals among politicians in Berlin 
created governments. There was no umbrella party like the 
contemporary CDU to amalgamate bourgeois interests.21 
In contrast, the energy and organization of the NSDAP were 
essential conditions of its success. The Hazis pioneered a 
new style of politics. They essentially militarized politics; 
an electoral campaign was like a military operation. It 
penetrated into every village and sought out every potential 
recruit. It saturated areas with propaganda and followed up 
with personal canvassing. Meetings were planned like batt1es; 
the logistics of moving troops (SA and SS) were carefully 
attended to. 
The !lazis also pioneered a new style of internal organization. 
To a degree then novel in German politics, the Hazis constituted 
a Volkspartei, a party appealing to all classes and groups. In 
its ranks it enlisted not only its middle-class core, but 
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workers, professionals, business executives, and the lumpen 
proletariat; Catholics, Protestants, and the irreligious; urban 
and rural elements. This uneasy coalition held together through 
the hope of success, Hitler's charisma, and the tlazi exploitation 
of traditional anti-Semitism among German peasants. To many, 
the l-lazis represented the last prospect of social order, 
national resurrection, and economic salvation. llitler personified 
these hopes and ~ersonal loyalty to him time and again overwhelmed 
internal opposition >and tension. Anti-Semitism offered an 
effective target for the conflicting animosities of Hitler's 
followers; workers need not clash with capitalists nor farmers 
with urban consumers if Jews rather than structural arrangements 
created the conflicts. Rather than fall into internal dissension, 
all classes could unite against the one "foreign" element in the 
community. 
The Nazis sought to organize not merely a political party, but 
an entire society. In 1930 Darre·; the party' s agricultural 
advisor, laid out a strategy to gain control of the traditional 
rural .interest organizations through infiltration at the grass 
roots and established a special organization, the Agrarpolitischer 
Apparat, to execute this task. The Nazis swiftly seized control 
of the Landbund, the Chambers of Agriculture, and the rural 
artisans' organizations, in effect carrying out a Gleichschaltung 
of agriculture before Hitler came to power.22 
Elsewhere Nazi propaganda appeals proved extraordinarily effective 
with the rural population. To separate the content of these 
appeals from the style of Nazi propaganda is artificial, for 
the intensity and emotionality of the effort often outweighed 
any substantive content; nonetheless it is essential if one is 
to form a judgment about the motivations of Nazi voters. 
The centerpiece of Nazi agrarian propaganda was the Agrarian 
Program of !1arch 7, 1930. Based largely on the ideas of 
R. \lalther Darre', the agrarian program began with a statement 
of the centrality of agriculture and the peasantry for Germany's 
future. It argued that the ~resent international situation and 
the current German state made a restoration of agriculture 
impossible; taxation, tariff policies, and the exorbitant profits 
of Jewish middlemen and fertilizer dealers condemned farmers to 
penury. The program then proposed a series of measures to ensure 
farmers against the loss of their farms. It concluded by 
emphasizing the ~aralysis of the existing interest organizations 
and stressing that only the Nazi movement could save the farmers 
and the country. 
The Nazis courted the rural ~opulation with specific proposals, 
but these proposals alone cannot explain their success. In 
addition, they denounced Marxism, they attacked the liberalism 
of their major rural opponents, condemning their emphasis on 
individualism, profit, and internationalism. They held out the 
prospect of an organic German community in which farmers enjoyed 
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high status and esteem. 
They also employed anti-Semitic appeals. The sparse and 
anecdotal evidence available prevents precise judgments, but 
it is clear that anti-Semitic attitudes were prevalent among 
the rural population, although they seldom attained the virulence 
typical of leading Nazi propagandists. The Nazis regularly used 
anti-Semitism to appeal to economic self-interest; they castigated 
the machinations of Jewish cattle dealers, shopkeepers, and 
bankers as the source of all economic woes. They aroused 
traditionalist feeling by censuring the encroachment of Jewish 
entrepreneurs upon long-standing economic organizations; as 
Noakes nicely says: "The Jews, who in the countryside tended 
to represent the forces of the market in the flesh and who were 
rightly seen as pioneers of modern ideas and forms in culture, 
were made scapegoats for the dislike of modern developments in 
general. "23 Finally, the Nazis spoke to the mos t irrational 
elements of the personality, weaving lurid fantasies about 
the depravity of Jews. 
Just how effective these anti-Semitic ideologies were in 
attracting support is difficult to judge. Noakes maintains 
that in Lower Saxony "anti-Semitism appears to have been a major 
theme between 1925 and 1930, particularly during the Mittelstand 
campaign of 1923-30. After 1930, however, while remaining ·an 
important theme, it was used more as a background to a~peals 
to economic interest and general political propaganda. 4 
Pridham contends that in Bavaria 
anti-Semitism did not form specifically one of the 
major themes of party propaganda in the early 1930s, 
but it often provided a leitmotiv for the major 
propaganda themes since the NSDAP's appeal on economic 
and political issues was frequently couched in anti-
Semitic terms. The majority of Nazi voters in the 
elections of 1930-32 were probably little influenced 
directly by the racialist ideology of the NSDAP, as they 
were primarily voting for a change in circumstances,25 
Similarly, in Schleswig-Holstein the majority of Nazi voters, 
while susceptible to anti-Semitic propaganda, do not seem to 
have anticipated the steps to which the Nazis would go. What 
is striking is the voters' unwillingness to be shocked by the 
violence and indecency of the Nazis' anti-Semitism and their 
willingness to accept the Nazi explanation of the Jewish origin 
of their economic and political troubles. 
This brief survey indicates that rural Germans succumbed to 
the ~SDAP for a variety of reasons. Both collectively and as 
individuals, they succumbed to appeals based on economic self-
interest, fears of loss of status, antipathy to modern institutions 
and culture, the desire for a national revival, intimidation, 
anti-Semitism, and a host of irrational drives. The greater the 
72 Towards the Holocaust 
economic and political uncertainty, the greater was their 
susceptibility to irrational appeals and their tolerance for 
Nazi violence. Finally, many simply yielded to the apparent 
irresistibility of the J.lazi advance. 
The Nazis triumphed, then, not because of the depression alone, 
but because rural people interpreted their difficulties in the 
categories of nationalist reaction. Uodern liberalism had made 
little ideological or organizational impact upon their 
traditional way of life and mental outlook. Steeped in 
conservative, provincial, and anti-!1arxist prejudices, they 
chose, particularly in Protestant areas, to blame their economic 
problems on the deviousness of international bankers, Jews, 
and Socialists rather then recognizing theM as the result of 
severe sttuctural and cyclical crises and poor harvests caused by 
bad weather. The reactionary nationalists, who had never 
reconciled themselves to a defeated and democratic republic, 
overwhelmed the poorly organized liberal forces. The sheer 
energy and organization of the Nazi party allowed it to overcome 
the few remaining scruples. 
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Composition and 
Evolution of the 
Nazi Elite 
JOHN NAGLE 
A continuinß topic of debate on the nature of fascism is its 
class composition within capitalist society. From the analysis 
of the class nature of fascism follow theories on the connection 
between fascism and capitalism and often speculation on the 
likelihood of fascism as a general stage of capitalist development 
or a possible capitalist alternative to liberal democracy. The 
analysis presented here adds some further bits of evidence to 
this discussion without pretense of being either comprehensive 
or, as it turns out, particularly conclusive. 
SOCIAL C0!1POSITIOH--EVIDENCE AND FIHDINGS 
Previous studies of the Nazi movement have examined social 
composition of its voters, its membership, and its leadership 
at various levels.l Several points of emphasis have emerged 
from this literature which may be summarized in thesis form 
as follows: 
1. The Nazi movement was drawn predominantly from the lower 
middle class, those elements of society positioned 
between the capitalist/big business and landowning class, 
and the wage-working industrial proletariat. 
2. The Nazi movement was drawn predominantly from those 
elements of capitalist society that were most antimodern 
and reactionary and threatened by the development of modern 
industry and increasing employment uncertainty. This 
would include small farmers, small shopkeepers and 
artisans, and some lumpen (unskilled, unemployed, or 
semi-employed) segments of the working class. 
3. The Nazi movement was a mass vehicle of a broad range of 
middle-class elements, a coalition capable of gaining the 
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confidence of several established elites as an effective 
weapon for suppressing the organized working class. 
4. The industrial working class remained largely immune or 
impervious to the appeals of the Nazi movement. They 
remained with the SPD or the KPD. The social base of 
traditional conservatism, among the business class, !arge 
landowners, and ~easantry, also were relatively less 
attracted to the NSDAP. They remained with Alfred 
Hugenberg's DNVP, Hitler's eventual coalition partner. 
Practicing Catholics from various strata, stayed with 
the Catholic Center Party and were less attracted to 
the NSDAP. 
Earlier studies have amassed a good deal of evidence to develop 
these theses on the basic character of the NSDAP. Analyses of 
voting behavior by Lipset, Heberle, and Bracher, among others, 
have developed, on the basis of aggregate voter percentages, 
voter turnout, and some partial voter surveys, the growth of the 
voter appeal of the NSDAP from 1923 (2.6 percent of the vote) 
to the second election of 1932 (33.1 percent).2 Some analyses 
have included vote totals from the first Reichstag election of 
1933, held under circumstances of already sharply rising 
intimidation or coercion, and a few have even studied percentages 
of invalid ballots or nonvoters in the one-party "elections" 
and plebiscites held after 1933. The rapid growth of the NSDAP 
into a mass middle-class electoral vehicle and the collapse of 
the middle-class DVP, DDP, and ~lirtschaftspartei (as well as 
several other regional and minor middle-class parties) have been 
well documented. The relative weakness of the Nazis in the biggest 
cities and the apparent gains by the NSDAP from previous nonvoters 
in the elections of Harch 1933 (but not ~articularly from nonvoters 
in earlier elections) stand as additional basic findings of 
electoral research. 
A limitation on such studies, of course, is that they cannot be 
used, except for sketchy analyses of nonvoting and invalid 
ballots, after the suppression of all other parties in 1933. In 
studies of the Nazi regime, election data can provide findings 
on the social or class support of the Nazi movement primarily 
up to the "legal revolution" of 1933. Conclusions drawn from 
election data about the class nature of the Nazi regime need to 
be supplemented with data drawn from the period after 1933, as the 
Nazi movement in power selectively dropped earlier election 
campaign programs,purged its social-fascist and "disreputable" 
(Rl:lhm and the SA) factions, and developed a working partnership 
in coalition with big business administrative and military 
elites. 3 
Some continuity has been gained from membership and leadership 
analyses of the NSDAP both before and after achievement of 
political power. Hans Gerth has reported on the occupational 
background of NSDAP members in 1933 and 1935.4 Daniel Lerner 
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developed his theme of "marginality" as the common attribute of 
the Nazi elite from samples drawn from the 1934 Fllhrerlexicon 
(a who's who in the early Third Reich).5 Uax Knight compared 
the thirty-three cabinet members who served under Hitler from 
1933 to 1945 with cabinet members from the earlier monarchy 
(1890-1913) and Weimar (1919-1932) years. 6 ~lolfgang Zapf used 
a composite of top-level political, administrative, economic, 
and cultural elites drawn from the years 1925, 1940, and 1955 
for developing his circulation model of German elites from 
lleimar to Third Reich to the postwar Bundesrepublik. 7 The present 
author has compared social and generational backgrounds of Nazi 
Reichstag deputies with backgrounds of deputies from other 
parties in lleimar and Reichstag/Bundestag deputy backgrounds 
sequentially for the period of modern German history (1871-1972).3 
Each of these studies of the NSDAP elite offers further oppor-
tunities to gauge the social composition of the Nazi movement, 
although not every study has produced lasting insights. Lerner's 
study, part of the !arger RADIR project at the lloover Institute, 
compared subsamples of Nazi "propagandists," "administrators," 
and "coercers" with a randomly drawn control group. Lerner looked 
for the frequency of certain middle-income skill groups 
(engineers, lawyers, managers), whose skills were theorized as 
necessary for any modern political system, revolutionary or 
nonrevolutionary. He also posited the rise of the "alienated 
intellectual" (teachers, journalists, artists) especially among 
those classified as "propagandists" and the "plebeians" (of 
lower-middle-class origins) among the "administrators."9 The 
Lerner study was preoccupied, however, with developing the concept 
of "social marginality" as the common underlying factor of the 
Nazi elite (and, as part of the RADIR project, of revolutionary 
elites in general). 
11arginal status was defined as deviation from "predominant 
a ttributes in his society. "10 By this defini tion, the Nazi elite 
was heavily laden with "marginal men." This concept of 
marginality has come under considerable challenge, however.ll 
The primary question is whether political leaders who came from 
Catholic backgrounds, or were born in the Rhineland, or had only 
lower or incomplete higher education, or were enlisted men during 
military service, or had farming occupations were necessarily 
to be identified as "marginal." By this standard, all leaders 
of the Catholic Center Party, most of the SPD leadership, and 
the great majority of trade union leaders would have to be 
categorized as marginal also. This would, however, lump these 
very diverse but definitely nonrevolutionary elites into the 
same conceptual container as the I~azi leaders. What Ler.ner 
more accurately described was how the 1934 Nazi elite differed 
in many characteristics from earlier German elites. The 
Fllhrerlexicon, although it deleted about one hundred biographical 
sketches of people purged in the June 1934 RBhm putsch, 
represents a compilation of the prominent personalities (not 
all Nazis) at an early stage of the Third Reich. 
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Hax Knight's comparison of cabinet level elites in the monarchy, 
Weimar, and the Third Reich, shows a good deal of continuity 
in occupational backgrounds, with the addition of a strong 
business, banking, and insurance executives component, and 
greatly reduced proportians of lawyers and journalists in the 
Third Reich as opposed to the Weimar period. Teachers, engineers, 
and military men also figured more prominently in Ilitler's 
cabinet. Overall, however, higher civil service backgrounds 
continued to predominate as they had both in Weimar and in the 
Kaiserreich. In terms of social orieins, cabinet ministers 
under Hitler came more frequently from business (18 percent), 
civil service (12 percent), landowner (12 percent), and military 
(12 percent) families than from other categories. In some 
respects, the social composition of the Nazi cabinet represented 
an expansion of gains made by business strata during the Weimar 
Republic, a partial return to top posts for members of the 
aristocracy (through the military and civil service)~ and a loss 
of the moremodest gains made by the working class.l The 
cabinet-level elite for the entire Third Reich era is a relatively 
small group of individuals (N=33), clearly a coalition of Nazi 
party leaders and coopted business, civil service, and military 
elites. Hithi-n the first Ilitler cabinet, there were, for 
example, six Nazi party leaders, and nine members who were not 
leaders in the party, although most acquired party membership 
durinß the Gleichschaltung of 1933. 
Wolfgang Zapf's survey of elite circulation includes coverage 
of fourteen different elite categories, including many 
individuals especially among church, business, and some 
administrative and military elites who in 1940 were outside the 
Nazi leadership, although often acquiring party membership after 
1933 for career considerations. Zapf's findings on those elite 
groupings most closely identified with the Nazi movement itself 
are in most cases consistent with other studies: The prominent 
Nazi elites (circa 1940) were more likely to come from lower-
middle-class backgrounds, have some,vhat lower educational 
qualification, have been born in southern Germany, and be younßer 
by comparison to the same \Jeimar-era subeli tes (circa 1925). 
lfuen Zapf combines all elite groupings together, however, for the 
years 1925 and 1940, some surprises emerge. The average age of 
the total German elite in 1925 (55.3) is little different from 
that of 1940 (53.6). \.Vithin the political elite, furthermore, 
cabinet ministers in 1940 were in fact older (59.0) than those 
of 1925 (52.3). Most surprising, party leaders appear by Zapf's 
reckoning to also have been older on average (43.3 years compared 
to 46.0 years in 1925).13 Zapf also finds that the proportion 
of those from aristocratic origins fell from 16 percent of the 
total German elite in 1925 to 12 percent in 1940 and only 3 
percent by 1955.14 If one looks at the social origins (measured 
by father's occupation) of the German elite separated into the 
major subgroupings used by Zapf, the Nazi regime seems to have 
made the greatest social impact among the political elite, 
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somewhat less among the economic elite, and least impact among 
the administrative elite. 
Table 5.1 
Political, Administrative, and Economic Elite Social Origins, 
1925, 1940, and 1955 
Political Elite 
1925 (N=57) 
1940 (N=64) 
1955 (N=57) 
Social Origins (percentages) 
A 
9 
8 
7 
UM 
44 
33 
39 
LM 
33 
55 
39 
UL 
12 
3 
12 
LL 
2 
2 
4 
(Tables do not equal 100 percent due to rounding) 
Administrative Elite 
1925 (N=65) 29 65 6 0 0 
1940 (N=62) 27 58 15 0 0 
1955 (N=56) 16 66 18 0 0 
Economic Elite 
1925 (N=39) 15 77 8 0 0 
1940 (N=25) 12 60 28 0 0 
1955 (N=36) 14 64 22 0 0 
Source: recalculated from Zapf (1965:180). 
A - Aristocracy 
UM - Upper l1iddle 
LM - Lower l1iddle 
UL - Upper Lower 
LL - Lower Lower 
80 Towards the Holocaust 
The political elite is also the only major subgrouping whose 
social origins are significantly different from both 1925 
Weimar and 1955 Bann elites. Among the political elite, we 
see the rise of the lower-middle-class "plebeians" to high office, 
the squeez·ing out of the small percentages of elites of working-
class origins, and some modest decline in representation of 
upper-middle-class elites. Zapf's data thus can be interpreted 
as strengthening the hypothesis advanced lang ago by Franz 
Neumann (1941) that the Third Reich was a coalition of some 
earlier business, civil service, and military elites with a 
movement that arose from broader middle and especially lower 
middle class origins. Zapf himself, utilizing a "totalitarian" 
concept of the Nazi period contrasted with the pluralist democratic 
ideals of Weimar and Bann, does not reach this conclusion, and 
he earlier had summarized but rejected Neumann's earlier elite 
analysis and conceptualization of the Third Reich.l5 Zapf thus 
concludes that 
all organizations are tightly bound to the party 
through the means of a "cadre policy," that is, the 
transferral of key positions to loyal party cadre. 
Herobership and renown in the party become on the one 
hand the only decisive path of social mobility, on 
the other hand a decisive means of social contro1. 16 
This conclusion and similar findings by like-minded observers 
neglect evidence that runs in the other direction, namely, that 
other nonparty elites, sharing a policy consensus with the NSDAP 
top leadership over a range of issues, maintained their standing 
intact while accepting Nazi party membership. For example, 
Seabury has pointed out that of ninety-two top officials in 
the German Foreign Office in 1937, thirty-three were indeed 
NSDAP members, but only seven had joined the party before 
entering the foreign service, In 1940, eight of nine senior 
division heads in the Foreign Office were still career officials 
who had joined the NSDAP after the achievement of power,l7 
NSDAP REICHSTAG ELITES--EVALUATION 
tfy own work has concentrated on the Nazi elite composition at 
the level of Reichstag deputy, both over time and in comparison 
to other party elites. The Reichstag membership level allows for 
analysis of NSDAP elite composition both before and after 1933. 
The Nazis did not abolish the Reichstag; rather they continued to 
use it, not as an effective parliament, but as an assembly of 
those who held important posts in other areas and as a public 
sounding board for Hitler's oratory. After the Suppression (or 
self-dissolution) of all other parties in 1933, single-slate 
"elections" were held in November 1933 and again in 1936 and 
1933 with an expanded Reichstag membership elected each time. 
(A small number of Hitler's parliamentary coalition partners 
of 1933, such as Alfred Hugenberg of the DNVP and Franz von Papen 
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of the Catholic Center (Z) converted to Nazi membership and 
retained their seats in the Reichstag as NSDAP deputies.) 
As a political institution, the Reichstag, of course, declined 
rapidly to insignificance after the Nazi takeover. Nonetheless, 
judging from the individual biographic sketches of deputies in 
sequential Reichstag handbooks through the 1930s, one notes 
the continuity with which the NSDAP filled Reichstag seats with 
party leaders of roughly similar standing after 1933 as before 
1933. For the specific purpose of examining the evolution of 
the NSDAP elite at this level from the last years of Weimar 
through the transformative stages of the Third Reich, this 
elite grouping provides a useful basis. 
Between 1919 and 1938, in both Weimar and the Third Reich, over 
twenty-four hundred individuals held seats in the Reichstag. 
For each deputy, we have information (from parliamentary handbooks, 
who's who registers, and other scholarly works) on year of birth, 
birthplace, education, occupation(s), military service, religion, 
and party affiliation. We will concentrate here on occupational 
background. This informationwill be summarized for two purposes: 
to compare on a global basis the social composition of NSDAP 
deputies with deputies of other parties; and to trace the social 
composition of NSDAP deputies from the period just before the 
achievement of power through the 1930s in the development of 
the Third Reich. To give some idea of how much the Nazi party 
elite differed from other party elites in social composition, 
we can compare the nonparty occupations of all NSDAP deputies 
(N=llOl) with those of the two major blocs: the "bourgeois bloc" 
in Weimar, principally the right-wing nationalist DNVP, the 
moderate conservative DNP, the liberal democrat DDP, the Catholic 
center Z, and the middle-class business iN (N=730); and the "left 
bloc," including the moderate Social Democrat SPD, the more 
radical but short-lived independent Social Democrat USPD, and 
the communist I~D (N=583). This type of global comparison 
has its shortcomings, but it may serve to indicate where the 
NSDAP deviated from other established social sources of political 
elite recruitment. It also compares the HSDAP to the two major 
tendencies (bourgeois and working-class) within the Weimar system. 
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Table 5.2 
An Occupational Camparisan of NSDAP, "Left," and "Bourgeois" 
Party Deputies (in percent) 
Occupation NSDAP Left Bouq~eois 
worker 13.9 24.0 1.2 
white collar 16.5 4.1 0.3 
military/police 7.4 0.2 1.8 
big business owner 5.4 0.9 7.1 
farm owner 12.3 0.5 19.6 
small business 5.8 1.9 5.3 
clergy 0.1 0.2 3.6 
higher government 2.9 4.3 16.7 
government employee 5.5 0 1.2 
housewives 0 2.7 0.3 
labor unionists 0.2 17.3 7.9 
party managers 2.4 13.2 0.4 
interest group leaders 1.0 0.7 5.1 
business managers 3.8 0.5 4.1 
writers 3.5 20.4 3.7 
publishers 1.0 0.9 1.5 
professors 0.6 0.7 4.4 
lawyers 2.9 2.2 6,3 
judges 0.1 0 1.9 
teachers 3.6 1.9 1.8 
doctors 1.3 0.5 0.5 
engineers 6.1 0.2 2.6 
unemployed 0.5 0.5 0 
other, not 
classified 2.3 1.2 O.ß 
N=llOl N=533 N=730 
If we disaggregate the 36 percent of all Nazi deputies in the 
general classification of workers/employees, we find that 14.1 
percent were blue-collar workers or unionists (very few unionists), 
while 16.5 percent were white-collar employees in the private 
sector and 5,5 percent were government employees (but not 
including higher, gehobene, officials). This is in strong 
cantrast both to the left bloc recruitment of workers/unionists 
(41.3 percent), white-collar employees (only 4.1 percent) and 
government employees (nil), and to bourgeois bloc representation 
(9.1 percent, 0 . 3 percent, and 1.2 percent respectively) in 
these categories. This indicates the heavy influx of lower-
middle-class, white-collar employees into the Naz i movement elite. 
Nevertheless, the still relatively prominent proportion (13.9 
percent) of all NSDAP deputies from blue-collar occupational 
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backgrounds, combined with the virtual absence of any unionists 
among the Nazi Reichstag elite, reflects the partial success 
of German fascism in incorporating anti-unionist worker sentiment 
within its broad and often contradictory mass base. The 
percentages of unemployed (0.5 percent) and "not classified" 
(2.3 percent), while small, also contain, on closer inspection, 
a number of "lumpenproletarian" types, men without any clear 
work or vocation, unsettled in society since the front-line 
days of \vorld \lar I, rabble adventurers who had found both 
comraderie and a mission within the NSDAP. 
Additionally, it should be noted that Nazi deputy recruitment 
from small businessmen and artisans (5.3 percent) is only 
fractionally higher than among the bourgeois parties (5.3 percent) 
and that NSDAP deputy recruitment from farmer occupations 
(12.3 percent) is lower than among the bourgeois bloc parties 
(19.6 percent), although the Hazi group of farmer deputies is 
quite probably more weighted with small holders than !arger 
landowners.lß Representation of industrialists and big businessmen 
is not much less than among the bourgeois parties (5.4 percent to 
7.1 percent). 
Also notable among NSDAP deputies is the relative frequency of 
teachers, engineers, and doctors (11.5 percent taken together) 
relative to the t~Yo other bloc profiles (only 2.6 percent on 
the left, and 4.9 percent among the bourgeois parties). 
Most striking on the low side is the total absence of housewives 
(and warnen in any category) and the almost total absence of 
unionis ts among i~azi deputies. NSDAP deputies also come less 
often from lügher civil service positions than from either left 
or bourgeois blocs. 
The category of writers and party functionaries, prominent among 
left party deputies, also contrasts sharply with the NSDAP 
profile. lfany of these wri ters and party leaders for the SPD 
and KPD were originally of working-class origins and advanced 
through the union or the party into positions of journalism for 
the left-union press or functionary positions in the party 
organization. Other left writers, of higher educational 
background and often higher social beginnings as well, represent 
the left intelligentsia. Both of these types are much less in 
evidence among the NSDAP Reichstag grouping. 
There is in this global comparison an additional finding when 
we disaggregate the single largest (that is, white-collar 
employee) occupational grouping back to its originally coded 
occupations; the overwhelming bulk of these fall into two 
categories, sales personnel (kaufmHnnische Angestellte--9.5 
percent), still a relatively broad category encompassing a range 
of job roles, and bank employees (Bankangestellte--2.3 percent), 
a relatively narrow sector of the white-collar ~•ork force. 
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Interestingly enough, the NSDAP was essentially the only party 
to recruit any number of its Reichstag deputies from among lower-
level bank employees (several bourgeois parties did of course 
include bank owners or bank directors among their deputy 
factions), Out of 55 Reichstag deputies from 1371 to 1933 
(of a total 4,565 deputies) who at some time in their careers 
were ordinary bank employees, 47 were NSDAP deputies, The 
selection of bank employees as Nazi deputies appears in sizable 
numbers first between the two elections of 1933, when the 
National Socialist dictatorship was being installed. The 
question arises as to whether this particular group of Nazi 
deputies represents part öf the general migration of the lower 
middle class, especially the membership of such white-collar 
employee associations as the liberal GDA and the right-
nationalist DHV, to the Nazis during this period, or whether it 
represents an infusion of contact men to safeguard banking 
interests at a crucial point in the transformation of the NSDAP 
program, which had often sharply attacked finance and banking 
circles, into state policy. The :<SDAP would later abandon 
this position in favor of an alliance with (non-Jewish) 
private banking circles. There is a third synthesis of these 
two possibilities: that the professional associations of white-
collar employees, including considerable numbers of bank 
employees, acted to save themselves by going over to the Nazis 
in return for some representation within Nazi ranks and that 
some activist bank employees especially went over to the NSDAP 
with the blessings of private banking circles. 
Those occupational backgrounds among NSDAP deputies with 
significantly higher representation than found in either left 
or bourgeois blocs (including white-collar employees, lower 
civil servants, military/police, teachers, doctors, and engineers--
a total of 40.9 percent of all NSDAP deputies) were all quite 
modern vocations that were not being automated or squeezed out 
of existence between big business and big labor. \Jith the 
exception of doctors (only 1.3 percent) these occupations are 
middle-status positions, whereas the highest-status professions 
(professor, lawyer, judge, top civil servant) are significantly 
underrepresented compared to the bourgeois bloc parties. 
This global comparison has the limitation of concealing any 
significant changes in occupational composition over time, 
either in the \leimar period or for the Nazi party throughout the 
1930s. Longitudinal analysis of several individual parties 
through the \leimar period illus trates some noteworthy trends. 
The KPD, for example, underwent a radical "proletarianization" 
between 1924 and 1930 during which the percentage of I~D 
deputies from worker/unionist occupations rose from 41 to 79 
percent. On the other hand, nearly all of the bourgeois parties, 
in the immediate aftermath of the failed 1913 revolution, quickly 
recruited some working-class dejmties into their Reichstag 
factions. In 1919, 23 percent of Catholic Center deputies, 
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15 percent of conservative DVP deputies, and even 14 percent 
of right-wing nationa1ist DNVP deputies were from worker or 
unionist occupational backgrounds. By 1923, however, at the most 
calm period in l~eimar' s generally stormy history, these figures 
had declined considerably (to 19 ~ercent for the Center, 7 
percent for the DVP, and 7 percent for the DNVP). Shifts in 
deputy recruitment are relatable in these instances to changes 
in the orientation of each party within the changing ~·leimar 
system: the KPD transformed itself from a break-away grouping 
of former Social Democrats into the first mass-based communist 
party in l~estern Europe, and the Catholic Center, the DVP, and 
the DNVP reduced their worker/unionist elements after the 
leftist revolutionary upsurge of 1913-1919 had been effectively 
suppressed. 
An examination of the evolution in the Nazi Reichstag elite 
during the 1930s also reveals some interesting shifts. A first 
Table 5.3 
Trends in Nazi Reichstag Deputy Background, 1932-1938 (Rounded 
to nearest percent for selected occupations) 
Occupation 
All 
NSDAP 
1932 II 
All new 
NSDAP 
1933-33 
New 
NSDAP 
1933 I 
Hew New 
NSDAP NSDAP 
1933 II 1936 
New 
NSDAP 
1933a 
blue col1ar 
small business 
farmers 
white col1ar 
lower civil 
service 
engineers, doctors 
and teachers 
military/police 
14 13 
3 7 
16 12 
lJ 19 
5 6 
ll 12 
8 6 
14 16 ll 
6 7 6 
19 14 5 
ll 16 29 
3 6 7 
13 ll ll 
3 5 3 
aFigures for 1938 exclude 70 Austrian Nazi deputies, who were 
included in the 1933 Grassreichstag after the annexation of 
Austria. The Austrian Hazi movement had a different social 
base and should be studied as a se~arate entity. 
3 
9 
7 
23 
3 
14 
3 
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conparison between Nazi deputies in the last (1932 II) pre-Uitler 
Reichstag and Hazi deputies who '"ere first elevated to deputy 
status after the Hazis achieved state power shmvs a considerable 
rise in the representation of whi~e-collar employees and a 
decline in the representation of farners. By separating Nazi 
deputies according to their first inclusion in the Reichstag 
membership, these trends appear even more shar'?ly. 
The decline in the representation of farmers be3an not immediately 
after the :~SDAP achievement of state power, but with the 1936 
and 1933 Reichstag "elections." For the firs t three years of 
the Third Reich, the Hazis did try to implement, against the 
wishes of big business and the military leadership, a program 
for the strengthening of the small farm/rural sector of German 
society. i1uch Nazi propaganda was anti-urban in orientation, 
criticizing ci ty life as rootless, cosmopolitan, impersonal, and 
a purveyor of immorality. The racist notion of Aryan biological 
superiority was generally combined \vith idealization of rural 
village life. tlal ther Darre~ the leading NSDAP ar;rarian 
propagandist and later JUnister of Agriculture, expressed this 
connection in his 1923 The Peasantry as the Life Source of the 
Nordic Race and iüs 1934 New Nobility from ßlood and Soil. 
At least until the first Four-Year Plan of 1936, the party 
leaders attempted to put this "Blood and Soil" (Blut und Boden) 
ideology into practice. A ruralization '?rogram was initiated, 
which was aimed at eventually transforming Germany once again 
into a predominantly nonurban society. Sale of public lands 
to build Ul) the class of small independent smallholders, ti1e 
founding of new rural settlements, and the development of a general 
plan of land use \lere main elements of this program. 
Nevertheless, the actual results of this program were quite 
limited, and as the priority of rearmament and aggressive foreign 
expansionism became more prominent, the party gradually down-
played its ruralization efforts. Unlike the quick victory of big 
business over the more radical party elements on the banking 
issue in 1933, the party only gradually divested itself, in 
practice not in rhetoric, from its romantic-racist idealization 
of village-peasant life, and then only under strong pressure 
from its big business and military coalition partners.l9 
Even with the shriveling of its ruralization program and the 
decline in farmer representation in the Nazi elite, "'SDAP deputies 
continued to come predominantly from rural and village origins. 
The percentage of ~ NSDAP deputies born in rural/small town 
areas was 65 percent in the first 1933 Reichstag, 67 percent in 
the second 1933 Reichstag, 53 percent in 1936, and even 75 
percent in 1933. Nevertheless, the gradual shift from ruralism 
to even greater efforts at industrialization, necessary for 
rearmament and foreign expansion in search of Lebensraum, are 
mirrored in the decline of smallholder representation in Nazi 
Reichstag deputies, especially in 1936 and 1933. 
Protection of small business owners was another element of 
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Nazi pre-1933 propaganda: 
••. the anticapitalism of the Hazified middle 
groups was primarily a revolt against big business, 
whether in manufacture, trade, or finance. The 
demands were of a counter-revolutionary nature; 
the anticapitalists wanted to replace big business 
by small and to transform modern, large-scale 
industries into a primarily handicraft economy. 
If realized, anticapitalism would have spelled the 
end of big business, and Germany would have 
returned to a preindustrial economy.20 
There is little doubt that the NSDAP owed much of its electoral 
success among those small self-employed artisans, business 
owners, and shopkeepers to its promises to battle big business 
in their behalf. An important faction of the Nazi leadership 
supported small business demands for closings of chain stores 
and consumer cooperatives and that !arge firms be forced to 
divest themselves of subsidiaries that competed with small, 
independent firms. This was reflected in a modest but increasing 
contingent of Nazi deputies from small business backgrounds. This 
representation of small business owners at this level of the Nazi 
elite, both before and after 1933, is about at the same level 
as among the bourgeois bloc parties in \Jeimar, and it could 
hardly be said that this contingent of the Nazi elite comnosition 
constituted a radical departure from the 11eimar system. Unlike 
the agrarian smallholder contingent, which clearly declined as 
the ruralization program was phased out, the small business 
elite recruitment remained relatively constant, even though the 
"anticapitalist" faction of the party (and its program for 
protecting small business and dismantling big cartels) was 
politically defeated relatively early (mid-1933) in the power 
struggle with big business interests and the less radical 
mainstream of the NSDAP elite. The levels of both farmer and 
small business representation among new deputies by the latter 
1930s (7 and 9 percent respectively) would seem to indicate 
modest, certainly not dominant, elements of Nazi elite 
recruitment, not qualitatively greater, and for smallholders 
perhaps even less than among lveimar 1 s bourgeois parties. 
On the other hand, those occupations which were overrepresented 
in our global comparison with both left and bourgeois bloc 
deputies (white-collar employe~lower civil servants, engineers, 
teachers, doctors, military/police) increased from 34 percent of all 
NSDAP deputies in 1932 to 55 percent in 1936 and 43 percent in 
1933. Thus the elite recruitment from broad middle-class 
occupations not identifiable as antimodern or premodern 
continued and expanded after the aclüevement of state power. 
Nazi Reichstag membership recruited during and after 1933 
(a total of some 330 deputies) still represented a diverse 
coalition of social strata, including older lower-middle-class and 
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anti-unionis t worl~er elements. The Nazi movement in power, 
however, showed some signs in the 1930s of reorienting its 
leadership recruitment toward those strata more consistent with, 
or at least not opposed to, the interests of its political 
alliance with big business, administrative elites, and military 
elites. 
SUMMARY AND SYUTiiESIS 
These findings with respect to the social composition of the 
Nazi Reichstag-level elite add some new nuances to earlier 
studies summarized at the outset. The Reichstag deputy 
analysis is in agreement with the thesis that the Nazi movement 
was a mass movement of the lower middle class, if lower middle 
class is quite broadly defined to include engineers and military 
officers, as well as bank emplo.yees, small farmers, and lower-
to middle-level government employees. Certainly, upper-middle-
cläss professions, especially lawyers and higher government 
officials, are less in evidence among the Nazi Reichstag deputies. 
Yet this thesis neglects the braoder character of the Nazi 
appeal within the entire middle class and to important anti-
unionist and antileftist elements of the blue-collar working class. 
Our findings are also in substantial agreement with the "anti-
modern" thesis for the pre-1933 period. There is evidence in 
our data that the NSDAP attracted support from and mobilized 
into political action smallholders, small businessmen, and 
declasse sections of the proletariat. In the period after 1933, 
the Nazi movement reversed its small business anticapitalism, 
shelved its anti-urban ruralization program, and bloodily purged 
its "disre.;mtable" SA street fighters. These policy reversals, 
in the process of cementing an antidemocratic and antileft 
coalition with existing business, military, and administrative 
elites, are partially reflected in changes in the party elite 
social composition, particularly in the decline of smallholder 
representation. Hore important, however, is the considerable 
expansion of recruitment from a range of middle-class occupations, 
which were quite modern and functionally necessary to a modern 
urban industrial society. These findings are more in accord 
with the "broad middle class" thesis, including both older and 
newer middle-class elements, but tending towards the more modern 
strata after the achievement of state power. This thesis tends 
to neglect the extent to which this broad faseist movement also 
includes some elements of the blue-collar working class itself. 
This caveat must be added to the fourth (immunity of the industrial 
working class) thesis, which is nevertheless correct in relative 
terms. 
It is important to note, for all theses, the gradual but clear 
evolution of the llSDAP leadership; the NSDAP, as a vehicle for 
mass mobilization against the left and against the \veimar system 
that legitimated leftist political and union activity, did not 
remain frozen in its social composition after 1933, but it 
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continued to change as the developmental stage toward achievement 
of power had been surpassed, and the new party-in-power discarded 
selected elements of its pre-1933 ~rogram. 
Liberal democracies in prosperaus and peaceful times tend 
towards demobilization systems with respect to elite recruitment. 21 
That is, both bourgeois parties and left parties (including 
today's Eurocommunists) tend to recruit more elites from higher 
social strata. \Jorking-class and ordinary middle-class 
representation in the pool of elite eligibility declines. The 
\Jeimar system did not enjoy an environment most favorable to 
stable capitalist democracy. The NSDAP, not initially favored 
by the respectable elites of \Jeimar society, was able to prove 
its ability to mobilize a broad mass base, primarily middle-
class but including also lower-class elements, \vas able to 
convince established elites that it would certainly act forcefully 
and decisively to destroy the organized working class and the 
lleimar democracy that allowed its ~olitical rights, and was 
able, in 1932-33, to convince these established elites that it 
would not, in all probability, act to destroy the economic or 
social position of big business, the military, or the higher 
civil service. The Nazi political elite is, in this view, a 
mobilization elite of unusual comnosition compared with both 
bourgeois bloc and left parties, an alternative political elite 
for capitalism in crisis. 
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The Rise of Fascism 
in Germany 
and Its Causes 
REINHARD KÜHNL 
Translated by Michael N. Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann 
INTRODUCTION 
Uhy are we concerned with events that have taken place lang ago? 
vlhy are we engaged in the science of writing history? A very 
influential point of view claims that historical events do not 
repeat themselves and that nothing can be learned from history. 
If this were the case, the study of history would be mere 
indulgence in the drama and diversity of historical events, and 
one might just as well spend the time reading a thrilling 
adventure story. 
UNESCO, on the other hand, has a more sophisticated definition 
of science. According to it, science endeavors "to recognize 
and control relationships of causality" and "to benefit from 
the understanding of processes and phenomena occurring in nature 
and society"--for the welfare of humankind. 1 Science, then, 
is anything but a purposeless activity. Rather, it is a form 
within which human beings deal with objective reality in order 
to subject this reality to reason and to purposely ernploy it 
according to human needs. Science is here understood to be a 
form of useful human labor, a part of human beings' practical 
life acti vity. This unders tanding corresponds to that of Bert 
Brecht, who says in "Galilei" that the purpose of science is to 
"ease the drudgery of human existence." 
The science of history is therefore concerned with events of 
the past mainly because we wish to appropriate the experience 
of earlier generations in order to learn how we can better manage 
our o'vn current and future problems. Just as individuals can 
learn from previous life experience (although the events, of 
course, never repeat thernselves in exactly the same manner), so 
humankind can learn from the experience of its history. History 
is not only of interest because of its practical value in 
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mastering concrete problems. It is of value also because--and 
this is closely related to waat has just been said--it allows us 
to a~propriate the results of previous generations' creative 
activity (for example, in literature and architecture and in the 
production of tools and scientific theories) in order to enrich 
our mental and spiritual existence and to stimulate our own 
creative potential. Ilowever, the ~ractical reason for engaging 
in the science of history is certainly more important. 
On account of its potential and real consequences for humanity, 
fascism, in particular, requires urgent scientific examination. 
In the areas of terror and mass annihilation, it has developed a 
potency hitherto unknown in human history. Furthermore, it has 
enmeshed the world in a war in which 50 million people lost 
their lives, 30 million emerged as cripples, and in which--
particularly in Europe--large areas were left with little but 
ruins. Although in the summer of 1945 the major faseist powers 
(Germany, Italy, and Japan) were crushed by the cornmon effort 
of peoples of the world, fascism as a possibility and threat has 
not been defeated once and for all. Fascist tendencies exist 
in almest all developed capitalist states and threaten to become 
strenger and moreaggressive especially during periods of crises. 
And in areas peripheral to the capitalist world, parliamentary-
democratic systems have been liquidated by radically anti-
democratic forces and replaced with dictatorial terror systems 
in a number of countries (Greece 1967, Chile 1973, Argentina 
1975-76, Turkey 19ß0, and other countries in Latin America and 
Southeast Asia). Admittedly, these forces and systems contain 
partial faseist elements. However, they can all be classified in 
that group of right-wing radically antidemocratic forces that 
were also responsible for the destruction of the Vleimar Republic 
after 1930. It is, therefore, of pressin3 concern to closely 
investigate the problern of fascism. In doing so, however, it 
is insufficient to give only a factual account of events. This 
would be a prescientific mode of analysis that would not correspond 
to the UNESCO definition of science, since it would not be 
concerned with relationships of causality and would not attempt 
to determine the conditions that could have led to the success 
of fascism. Given the frightening potential for destruction 
that has been concentrated in today's military technology, the 
prevention of such systems of domination has become a matter 
of survival for the whole of humanity. 
German fascism was that form of faseist domination which to date 
has brought about the greatest amount of terrorist potency and 
mass annihilation. This investigation is concerned with its 
causes and perpetuating forces. This study can only be sketchy 
and it will therefore only be possible to refer to a limited 
amount of empirical material. It must, however, be pointed out, 
that there exists a huge amount of available documentary evidence 
and that, on the basis of this material, fundamental questions 
can be answered clearly and conclusively.2 (The truth, 
unfortunately, does not penetrate society easily, for the forces 
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which supported and carried out German fascisrn have done everything 
possible to prevent the discovery of its real connections. 
These forces have prornoted instead the dissernination of a host 
of rnyths; and since they were again very influential during the 
cold war, they had considerable success in doing so). 
In cornbination, there were a nurnber of factors that rnade German 
fascisrn victorious. Three factors, however, were of particular 
irnportance: 
1. the behavior of the ruling strata of big business, 
rnilitary and the bureaucracy 
2. the growth of the faseist rnovernent, and 
3. the failure on the part of anti-faseist forces. 
In the following sections, only the first two factors will be 
dealt with in sorne detail, since they were of prirnary irnportance 
in the active prornotion of the fascisation process. 
THE RULING CLASS 
Research on fascisrn has established a far-reaching consensus 
that fascisrn in Gerrnany or elsewhere could not seize political 
power on its own.3 On the contrary, it depended on the support 
of the leadership strata frorn industry, banking, the rnilitary, 
and the state bureaucracy, that is, from the forces known as 
"social elites" or "societal leadership strata" (by bourgeois 
historians and social scientists) or as the "ruling class" 
by Harxist scholars.4 The decisive role of these forces in 
establishing the faseist dictatorship, as well as in the planning 
and execution of its policies, was well dernonstrated as early 
as the international rnilitary tribunal of 1945-46. And because 
of the role these forces played, leadirig representatives of 
the econorny and the rnilitary, in addition to leaders of the 
faseist party, were accused of war crimes. Research which has 
been done since has repeatedly confirmed this judgrnent.5 The 
question rnust therefore be asked as to what goals and interests 
determined the behavior of the ruling class and how did they 
assert thernselves? 
It is irnportant to note that the behavior of the German ruling 
clas's, although different from other European ruling classes in 
sorne irnportant respects, nevertheless reflected tendencies that 
generally characterized capittalistic countries during this 
period. By the second half of the nineteenth century, capitalisrn 
in the advanced countries had becorne powerful enough so that it 
began to hurst national boundaries in order to conquer new rnarkets 
and areas with natural resources and to find new spheres for 
investrnent and cneap labor. To realize this expansion, the 
state made its political and rnilitary rneans available. This 
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increased international capitalist competition, this transition 
to an imperialist strategy, quickly lead to a nartitioning of the 
world, particularly in Africa and Asia, which had not yet been 
colonially occupied. Ideologically, the transition to imperialism 
was also reflected in the emergence of racist ideologies and 
their proliferation among the masses. These ideologies 
distinguished between superior and inferior races, thereby 
reducing the capitalist countries' domination over colored 
peoples to nature's will. 
In comparison with the general development of capitalist 
countries, the German Reich had two characteristics that in 
combination have generally come to be knmvn as the "extreme 
aggressiveness of German imperialism." This aggressiveness 
found its expression in the monumental plans for conquest 
implemented during the First and Second ~.Jorld \1ars. 
The first characteristic consisted of the fact that, in cantrast 
to other advanced countries, German capitalistic development 
was delayed. This was mainly the case because Germany--as Italy--
became economically peripheral after America and the seaway to 
India were discovered, resulting in a shift to overseas trade 
and Stagnation in the development of German cities and the German 
bourgeoisie. The delayed capitalist development was also caused 
by the fact that the large feudal landlords' pm,rer remained 
unbroken as the revolt of peasants and plebeian city dwellers 
was crushed in 1525-29. Lastly, the delay was due to the Thirty 
Years War (1613~1643), which mainly took place on German territory, 
decimating the population by one-third, causing tremendous 
destruction, and thus throwing the country far back economically. 
The peace treaty resulted in splintering Germany into some two 
thousand "independent" political units, further bindering 
economic develop~ent.6 
Only in the course of the nineteenth century, particularly after 
1871 when a unified Reich (Reichseinheit) was created, could 
the country catch up and.could capitalism fully develop. It 
soon became apparent that huge resources were available, 
which made rapid development possible. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, the German Reich was leading Europe in 
industrial production. At this point, however, German 
capitalism's expansion began to encounter stubborn barriers, 
since the imperialistic partitioning of the world had already 
taken place. German capitalism's main problern was the discrepancy 
between a strong potential and drive for expansion on the one 
hand and the lack of real possibilities for expansion on the 
other hand. The data in Table 6.1 illustrates this tension.7 
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Table 6.1 
Population, Irrdustrial Output, and Distribution of Colonial Lands 
Population (in millions) 
1870 
1910 
Germany 
41 
65 
Britain 
31 
45 
France 
37 
40 
Share of the IJorld' s Irrdustrial Output (in percenta&es) 
1870 
1913 
Germany 
13 
16 
Britain 
32 
14 
The Distribution of Colonial Lands in 19111 
Germany 
France 
Britain 
2 Area (million km ) 
2.9 
10.6 
33.5 
France 
10 
6 
Inhabitants (millions) 
12.3 
55.5 
393.5 
Because of this discrepancy, German capitalism developed its 
demand for a new partitioning of the world, which it was also 
willing to realize with force. The difference between the 
German Reich and other capitalistic states, then, was not 
between being imperialistic or peace loving, but between being 
disadvantaged, hun&ry, and bent on change (and therefore being 
aggressive) on the one hand, and being relatively saturated (and 
therefore defensive) and bent on maintainin& the status quo on 
the other. This aggressiveness of German imperialism was the 
main structural cause of the First './orld llar. And the Second 
\lorld ~lar was essentially a new at tempt with even more effective 
means (and in alliance with other sir'lilarly disadvantaged 
imperialistic powers like Italy and Japan) to realize a new 
partitioning of the world, even if the first attempt bad failed 
in 1913. 
The second characteristic of the German Reich consisted in the 
fact that the bour&eois revolution Has not victorious and that 
its ideas of enli&htenment and human rights did nöt get realized. 
That the revolution did not take place was due to the economic 
backwardness described above, as a result of which the bour&eoisie 
remained politically weak. The !arge landholders' social power 
and the political power of the authoritarian ruler-state 
remained unbroken until the beginning of the twentieth century. 
(Thus it also sustained the ideological dominance of the Prussian 
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military caste, its codex of virtues--discipline, duty, obedience 
and authority, woich finally was also accepted by the 
bourgeoisie.) The bourgeoisie renounced its political ideals 
of freedom and tolerance in favor of great economic advantages, 
which _it was granted by the emperor and his state. These included a 
standardized economic realm after the creation of a unified 
Reich (Reichseinheit) in 1G71, the political and military 
support for its expansionary goals, and the suppression of its 
rnain enemy--the worker movement--which grew ra>Jidly in the lß60s 
and threatened not only the maximization of profit but also 
bourgeois property relations. 
As a result of this uninterrupted tradition of the ruler-state 
and of Prussian militarism, the transition to an imperialist 
policy and ideology could occur with relative ease and could 
assurne particularly vicious forms.3 German ca?italism's unique 
position and direction of ex~ansion implied, however, that other 
European people had to be defined as inferior in relation to 
the German master race. This was especially true for the Slavic 
peoples who inhabited the Eastern sphere--the main direction 
of the expansionary thrust--and who were defined as "subhuman." 
In moderated form, this applied also to 11est European peoples, 
who were competitors in the fight for domination in Europe. They 
were thus defined as traders (in comparison to German "heroes") 
and as "petty merchants" (in comparison to German "warriors"). All 
this took place before 1913, that is, lang before the rise of 
fascism. Social and natural scientists (particularly those 
writing in the social Darwinist tradition) and writers (such as 
Nietzsche) supplied the theoretical legitimation for this 
tendency. 
The radical form of the rnaster-race ideology and the extremely 
brutal way in which it was politically realized in the First 
ilorld IJar, and even more obviously in the Second IJorld War was, 
of course, also tied to the tremendous importance given to the 
conquering of non-German territories. If the goal was to 
suppress all peoples from eastern France to deep into Russia 
(First llorld lvar) and even from the Atlantic to the Urals (Second 
llorld llar)--and in the case of the Slavic peoples to transform 
them into work-slaves for the German economy--no means other 
than those ranging from the most extreme brutality to rnass 
annihilation could realize the stated goal. Only these means 
were "adequate." 
From this position, the ruling class systematically pursued two 
main goals--although with different means, depending on the 
circurnstances given.:.-from the Kaiserreich through the IJeimar 
Republic to the faseist rule. Domestically, it worked to 
solidify or re-establish an authoritarian form of domination 
in order to guarantee capitalist private property relations and 
the expansionary power of capital arid to hold back thcise political 
forces that pushed for a democratization of society and hindered 
the pursuit of the conquest policy. Externally, it worked to 
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prepare and to realize the above-mentioned expansionary policy, 
which required the concentration of all economic, political, 
and ideological resources for military and war purposes. 
The first attempt to realize this policy failed in November 1913 
when the German Reich was defeated and the ruling class 
simultaneously lost the emperor and his state apparatus as its 
instrument of power. During the )~ovember revolution, the 
worker movement succeeded in topplinp, the Prussian military 
monarchy and replaced it with a parliamentary-democratic state, 
However, it did not succeed in appropriating the ruling class's 
basis of power. The economy, the life-blood of the whole 
society, remained just as much in the hands of the ruling class 
as did the military, the judicial system, the bureaucracies, 
and a significant portion of the ideological pm~er apparatus, 
ranging from the press to the universities and churches,9 
Because of this, the imperialist forces, although weakened by 
the military defeat and the November revolution, had not lost 
the source of their power. After a defensive phase, during which 
social and political concessions had to be made to the worker 
movement, and after a consolidation of economic, political, 
ideological, and military power was accomplished, they remained 
strong enough to pursue the two goals already established before 
1913. These goals consisted in undermining and reducing the 
social and democratic rights instituted in 1918 and in moving 
toward an authoritarian state, as well as in commencing a 
renewed expansionist policy. The latter was perceived tobe 
particularly necessary since, after the mid-1920s, German 
capitalism was again confronted with the same dilemma it faced 
before Uorld \var I and which was then a major cause of its extreme 
aggressiveness. Again, the dilemma consisted in German capitalism's 
enormous potential for expansion--it had once more become 
Europe's leading industrial producer--and the very limited real 
possibilities for expansion, which had become even more limited 
as a result of the loss of colonies and the conditions imposed 
by the Versailles treaty. 
An investigation of the documentary material shows that, after 
1913, decisive segments of big business and big banking, the 
military, large landowners, and leading civil servants had always 
aimed for the realization of both goals. They were neither 
willing to accept the military defeat nor the parliamentary 
democratic form of government, particularly not with the democratic 
and social rights guaranteed to the working class. Differences 
between the various factions were mainly limited to strategy and 
method. Until 1929, the differences turned around the question 
of whether or not t~e democratic constitution should be abolished 
in one sweep (which after the Kapp Putsch of 1920 found only a 
minority of supporters) or through "legal ways," ("Reichsreform" 
a slow undermining of the constitution). A further point of 
contention was whether or not the worker movement should be 
suppressed with open means of terror (a strategy favored by a 
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majority of new industries, includinr; firms in the chemical and 
electrical sector) or integrated with certain social concessions 
while suppressing only radical (revolutionary) segments of the 
working class. As to foreign policy, the differences concerned 
the extent to which the shackles of the Versailles treaty--
which inhibited expansion--could be thrown off by negotiations 
with llestern powers in combination with illegal rearmament or 
whether freedom frorn the Versailles lirnitations could only be 
achieved by open confrontation. 
Once the Great Depression· of 1929 had set in, there soon was an 
understanding that parliarnentary democracy would have to go and 
be replaced by a rnore effective, authoritarian systern. Several 
factors favored such a developrnent. First, the bourgeois parties 
of the center and the moderate right--through whose help the 
ruling class had hitherto been able to realize its interests 
in parliarnent and the governrnent--lost the great bulk of its 
supporters and the votes received by these parties fell frorn 
40 rnillion to 10 raillion frorn 1929-1932. Thus, it was extremely 
urgent and necessary that the ruling class realize its long-held 
plans to establish a firm dornination, which was no langer 
dependent on elections and parliarnentary rnajorities. Second, 
the depression lirnited the nurober of social concessions that 
could be rnade to the working population and induced capital to 
irnpose the burden of the crisis on the rnasses ( through lowering 
real wages and social expenditures) in order to rnaintain capital's 
international capacity to invest, expand, and cornpete. Because 
of these developrnents, a dorninating force was necessary, which 
could assett itself even agairrst the needs and dernands of the 
rnasses. Third, the crisis represented an opportunity to actively 
exploit the fears and uncertainties of the population by denouncing 
parliarnentary dernocracy as weak and unfit to solve cornplicated 
problerns and by propagating the strong state as the solution 
to present difficulties. As a consequence, a ~~hole set of 
dictatorship notions were developed and entertained. They airned 
not only at burderring the population with the crisis in the short 
run (and preparing the political ground for doing so), but at 
finding the proper form of governrnent caoable of also rneeting 
the irnperialist, expansionist, long-terrn interests. In its 
internal deba tes, the ruling class ~,ras now only concerned with 
the form the authoritarian state should take and with the extent 
to which repression agairrst the left was necessary. The rnajority, 
particularly firrns in the chernical and electrical sectors, were 
in favor of an authoritarian presidential regirne like the one 
which was in power frorn 1930 to January 1933. This regirne based 
itself primarily on the state power apparatus and the ernergency 
powers of the president and was relatively independent of elections, 
parties, and parliaraentary rnaj orities. llowever.., it left 
parliarnentary forras and procedures intact insofar as all parties 
and unians could voice their opinions and :nd opportunities for 
rnobilization. On the other hand, strong forces located in heavy 
industry and arnong large landowners pushed for a radical chanr;e 
in the form of governraent, for an open dictatorship, and for a 
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complete suppression of the democratic and socialist forces. Since 
the military coup of 1920 showed that an isolated military 
intervention wit;1out mass support was of little promise (the coup 
was defeated by a general strike), the problern of obtaining 
the necessary mass support assumed decisive im~ortance. In 
this regard, several dictatorship models were developed of which 
the Schleicher government at the end of 193210 (involving an 
alliance of defense associations from the nationalist Stahlhelm 
to the faseist SA and the right wing of the unions and the SPD) 
and that of the 1933 llitler government were the most important. 
In discussions among big business and the military (as well 
as among the producers of ideology in right-wing mass media and 
theoreticians of state law), faseist Italy (which assumed power 
in 1922) served as a role model. l!owever, the final decision 
opting for the Hitler dictatorshiry model was only made after all 
other models had proven to be insufficient or unrealizable. 
The presidential regime proved to be inadequate because it could 
neither solve the economic crisis nor prevent the left from 
engaging in a class struggle; because it could neither acquire 
a basis in mass support nor create the necessary preconditions 
for a new expansionary policy. After facing the Great Depression, 
the breakdown of '"orld trade, and t:1e grmving protectionism of 
various countries that increased tariffs and introduced import 
barriers, an expansionary policy became particularly important. 
llowever, a military dictatorship and the Schleicher government plan 
for mass support also proved to be unrealizable (because in 
the final analysis the unions, SPD, and NSDAP could not be split). 
After the election results of November 6, 1932--the last free 
elections held during the Weimar Republic--agreement among the 
various factions came about more quickly. First, it was evident 
that the bourgeois parties that carried the Papen presidential 
regime remained without mass basis (despite big business's strong 
financial support). Second, the anticapitalist tendencies in the 
country increased again (the KPD's vote increased from 14.6 
percent to 16.9 percent and was now almost as strong as the SPD, 
which carried 20.4 percent of the votes). Third, the NSDAP had 
peaked and was on the decline (it lost 2 million votes; its 
share dropped from 37.4 percent to 33.1 percent). As a result, 
the ruling class feared that its last dictatorship model, based 
on the Nazi party, might become unrealizable. The Nazi party, 
therefore, had to be quickly brought to power in order to 
stabilize it and its power base and in order to create an 
accomplished fact. Von Schroeder, the banker in whose house 
the decisive negotiations with Hitler took place in January 1933, 
spoke to this issue when he was called as witness by the U.S. 
accusatory body in 1945: "iJhen the IISDAP suffered its first 
defeat on i~ovember 6, 1932, the German economy' s support was 
particularly urgent." 11 In this way, the dictatorship model, 
which since 1929-30 had been favored by only a minority of 
factions, came to be realized in January 1933. The Hitler model 
provided the following key advantages: First, on the key questions 
of the destruction of democracy and the worker movement, 
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establishing a dictatorship, and embarking on an expansionary 
foreign policy, the party's leadership fully agreed with the 
ruling class. Second, the Nazi leadership had proven itself 
capable of gaining mass support for such policies--a capability 
that big business and the military did not have and which the 
right-wing bourgeois ~arties ltad lost i:J. tlte conrse of the 
Great Depression. 
TUE FASCIST !1ASS !10VE!1ENT 
It is clear from what has been said thus far that the rise and 
victory of fascism cannot be understood to be the result of an 
autonomaus movement as has been proposed over and over by many 
adherents of "middle class theories" (Mittelstandstheorien). 12 
On the other hand, the strength of the faseist movement was of 
great importance in liquidating democracy. It is therefore 
necessary to investigate the causes and initiatives that led 
to this movement's success. 
Immediately after World \Jar I, faseist movements arose in 
several countries. They mobilized parts of those groups that 
became fanatic adherents to national1st and militarist ideologies 
during the war and those who, as a result of the war, had become 
derailed in their professional and civil life. The war's 
brutality had turned them into uncivilized, crude (verroht) 
individuals whose integration into society was made even more 
difficult in the post-war crisis. They were often members of 
armed groups such as free-corps citizen defense leagues and 
defense associations. These groups were generally .used by the 
ruling class to terrorize and destroy the revolutionary worker 
movement, which, encouraged by the victorious Russian October 
revolution, had mushroomed in many countries after the war. In 
Italy, this development led to the creation of .a faseist 
dictatorship in 1922. In Germany, it led to a considerable 
increase of support for the NSDAP and similar groups as well 
as to coup attempts in 1920 and 1923 in which parts of the 
Reichswehr and its leadership were implicated (in preparations, 
mutinies, and in refusing to oppose the groups involved in the 
coups). In 1923 the same Reichswehr, however, destroyed the 
last attempts by the left to overcome capitalism and to fight 
for a socialist social order. In Harnburg it fought against the 
communist uprising, and in Saxony and Thuringia it liquidated 
the legally formed worker government. With the help of such 
acts, the bourgeois republic was stabilized. These events, 
tagether with the beginning of economic stabilization in 1924 
(with the help of U.S. dollar loans) alleviated reasons to join 
faseist and radical right-wing groups. The ruling class also 
found fewer reasons to support and employ such movements; as a 
result, they lost significant pol::_tical streng th and iPtportance. 
With the coming of the. Great Depression in 1929, a fundamental 
change took place. Mass unemployment and wage cuts threw 
significant portians of the non-self-employed work force into 
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socia1 misery (in 1932, on1y 33 percent were still fully employed, 
over 44 percent were unemployed, and over 22 percent were on a 
shortened work week), and the pro1etarianization of the self-
employed increased. People were gripped by fear and uncertainty; 
they lost their confidence in parties that sat in parliament 
and obviously had no solution and in par1iamentary democracy, 
which obviously :noved incapable of putting an end to misery. 
\Jith increased intensity, they searched for a way out, for a 
real alternative. The forces on the politica1 stage began to 
move. Hithin four years, the bourgeois parties of the center 
and the right lost almost three-fourths of its voters. At the 
same time, the NSDAP grew from a s~linter party (2.6 percent of 
the vote) to the strongest party (37. 4 percent). Large changes 
occurred also within the worker movement. The SPD lost almost 
one-third of its voters to the KPD, which almost reached the 
size of the SDP. Table 6.2 illustrates the changes between 
1923 and 1932.13 
Table 6.2 
Changes in Voting Patterns from 1923 to 1932 
1928 Ju1y 1932 
t1illion Percent 11illion Percent 
Uorker parties 
SPD and KPD 12.4 40.4 13.24 36.2 
Bourgeois parties 
of the center and 
the right 11.9 33.7 3.53 9.6 
Catholic parties 
Center party 
and Bavarian 
People's party 4.7 15.2 5.3 15.7 
The or~g~n of the mass support now concentrated in the faseist 
party can easi1y be discerned. It came mainly from those who had 
abandoned the bourgeois parties and from those who had hitherto 
not taken part in e1ections but who were activated by the crisis. 
(Voter participation increased from 75 percent in 1923 to 82 
percent in July 1932.) The worker parties not only did not lose 
any supporters during this time, they actually gained almost 
one mil1ion votes. This indicates, as has been shown by 
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historical investigations, that llSDAP voters came from the 
llittelschicht (small merchants, craftsmen, farmers) and from 
those non-self-employed who--based on their origin, the ty;Je of 
work, and ::>rivileges that they had, as o;Jposed to the workers--
considered themselves as part of the "!1it telstand." They, for 
the most nart, were salaried white-collar employees and civil 
servants.l4 \·lhat drove these masses to the faseist rarty? \lhy 
did they particularly believe that the HSDAP would have the 
solution to their problems? In order to answer this question, 
it is important to consider the ideologies and propaganda that 
helped the ilazi party mobilize the masses. Essentially, the 
ideologies were the same as those that had been disseminared by 
German imperialism since the end of the nineteenth century in 
order to legitimi~e its expansion and the suppression of democracy 
and the labor mover.1ent at home and to mobilize for these goals 
!arge segments of the ;:>opulation, the t1ittelsc;üchten in 
particular. The ideologies included nationalism, racism, anti-
Semitism, militarism, authoritarianism, and--with the growth of 
the worker movement--anti-l1arxism, coupled wi th promises of a 
"German socialism." It was precisely this mass consciousness, 
deeply engrained for decades (in 1913 first largely discredited, 
but, with the grmving political and ideological power of the 
ruling class after the suppression of socialist endeavors, soon 
again massively disseminated), which was taken up by many 
radical right-wing, nationalist and vl:llkisch groups that emerged 
after 1913 and of which the :.JSDAP was the most successful.lS 
The ~.JSDAP' s success was not due to its ideological tenets (as 
compared to other nationalist, right-wing, conservative, and 
militantly anti-communist competitors), but due to the ways in 
which they were nropagated. In cantrast to other competitors, 
these ideas were not propagated through elitist and self-
affirming honorary circles, appeals to top leadershi::> circles, 
and a demonstrated disgust for the masses (as was customary with 
most right-wing conservative forces from the Herrenklub to the 
Tatkreis) but by taking over the methods of mass mobilization 
(such as mass parades and mass gatherings), which had proved 
successful in the worker movement. By presentinp, itself as 
the party of the "small man," as anti-bourgeois and even 
"revolutionary," and through its extreme simplification and 
vulgarization of traditional right-wing conservative ideology, and 
its aggressive posture, the organized terror that the NSDAP 
displayed in meeting halls and street battles conveyed to its 
supporters a sense of power and ability to assert itself. 
The NSDAP built its agitation essentially around four ideological 
complexes on the basis of which it promised the desperately 
searching masses a brighter future: 
1. The "annihilation of Marxism," the ;lSDAP announced, was 
absolutely essential to enable Germany to recover and rise to 
its former stature. Under "annihilation of the l!arxist pest," it 
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meant the destruction of the ideas and organization of the worker 
movement. llased on the thesis, pronagated for decades by the 
dominant ideology, that the t1arxist workers' movement was 
composed of enemies of the state and the people and was controlled 
by rabble rousers, that is, destructive elements, it concluded 
that these elements were to be anni:lilated without hesitation. 
This thesis appealed to entrepreneurs and small, labor-intensive 
businesses. For entrepreneurs, the organization of wage and 
salaried employees represented an increase in costs which meant 
that--especially durin3 the crisis--big capital's international 
competitiveness was persistently threatened. For small businesses, 
the workers' movement represented a direct threat to their social 
existence. Although the latter's real problems mainly originated 
in the ovenvhelming economic power of big capital, in their 
consciousness, however, the culprits were those who demanded 
lügher wap;es, be tter welfare provisions for the workers and 
white-collar employees and who, in general, demanded the 
abolition of an economy based on private property, which also 
was the small entrepreneur's basis of social existence. In 
addition, the thesis that !1arxism must be annihilated appealed 
to those who, fooled by the nationalist demagoguery propagated 
since the Icaiserreich, had ex:->erienced the First tJorld War as 
Germany's wrestling for a "place in the sun," who therefore 
considered the November revolution as a crime against the 
German peoole, and who believed the worker movement to be 
responsible for the ;,ovember crimes "and the resulting downfall 
of Germany." 
2. The secend ideological complex, the "disgrace of Versailles," 
combined well with the first. Germany would have a secure 
future only when the "disgrace of Versailles" was eliminated, 
the shackles of the Versailles treaty thrown off, the political 
and military discrimination of Germany eliminated, and its 
leading role guaranteed, to which it was entitled on account of 
its economic output, population size, and racial quality. The 
existing social misery was not believed to have been caused 
by the social sys tem but by the ac tions of other countries 
tal;ing advantage of Germany. The solution to the survival 
problems of those people affected by the Great Depression was 
therefore not seen to lie in a change of the domestic social 
system but in the struggle of the "whole German people" against 
the foreign enemy and finally in the conquest of new "living 
space," new resource areas, markets for goods, and labor power. 
This conquest was to be at the expense of other countries; in 
short, it was suggested that imperialism was the key to solving 
domestic social problems. 
These ideological complexes drew on a tradition of thought 
pursued by German imperialism up to 1913 and were, despite the 
defeat of 1913, still seen to be a long-range goal. Although 
the faseist party justified this goal more heavily from a racist 
point of view, the substance of the imperialist ideology behind 
it remained unchanged. In this manner, faseist agitation drew 
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upon the fears and hopes of those masses touched by the cr1s1s, 
and by distracting from the crisis's real causes, it lessened 
the chances for social protest, while channellinp, the masses in 
a direction corresponding to the ruling class's expansionary 
goals. 
3. Fascist agitation ~roposed in its third ideological complex 
that the saving of Germany necessitated a strong state; a 
dictatorship that would cleanse the nation of its rabble 
rousers and the "l1arxist pest" and that would be in a position 
to firmly engage in power politics abroad. Democracy was said 
to be slow ~oving, incapable of acting, and unnatural, because 
it did not distinguish between talents and achievement differences 
among ~eople and could not solve the great problems relating to 
the securing of the future. This uart of the faseist solution 
also corresponded to the interests of imperialist forces. In 
addition, it drew upon Germany's lonp,-standing authoritarian 
tradition and on the particularly Mittelschicht view that 
rescue must come from the top and til.at, especially in times of 
crisis, only a strong state authority is capable of ~roviding 
security. 
4. All the faseist ideological complexes discussed thus far 
saw the solution to pressing social problel'lS in a Germany of 
world- power status. The realization of these ~romises and 
predictions lay in the distant future. Creatinp, the precondition 
for their realization, however, was an immediate domestic task. 
It involved the creation of a dictatorship and the smashing of 
democracy and the worker movement, lvithout, however, affering 
any direct tangible social improvements. Anticapitalism and 
anti-Semitism served as the ideological complex designed to 
raise hopes--as well as to compensate for other weaknesses--
that fascism would bring about immediate improvements. Anti-
capitalism and anti-Semitism, although of quite different origin, 
-were thus closely connected functionally. 
Fascisn's antica;:oitalism--presentinp, itself also as German 
socialism or national socialism--was proof that the idea of 
socialis~ attracted the r.1asses and that, particularly after 
l'Jl3 and again during the Great Deuression, significant segments 
of ti1e l1ittelschichten were also influenced by it. The desire 
for a fundamental change, for a real alternative to the status 
quo, through which one's o-wn ~ressinr; existential problems could 
be solved, 1ms very widespread. The faseist IJarty, therefore, 
presented itself as the radical alternative in comparison to the 
established Reichstag ~arties, which were all seen to be im~otent. 
I!owever, the faseist party did not only g-ive the imnression that 
it would radically change the existing situation and create 
something totally new. It gave its sympathizers concrete !10f'es 
of being able to recover economically at the expense of the 
hitherto privileged, big bosses, the "fat bourgeoisie." The 
small entrer>reneurs were led to believe that their social IJOSition 
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would become secured at the expense of big business and that 
they 1.rould be freed from debts and high interes t rates. 
Unei.l;Jloyed vhite-collar employees (Angestellte) and the mass of 
SA SU!>porters Here attracted by promises that, at the expense 
of well-situated employees, they would receive secure government 
positions ( as employees or soldiers). These expectations--
counled \lith the vague idea of Volkseemeinschaft (sharing unity 
of the people), in which all were to overcome the domestic and 
foreign enemy in solidarity--constituted national socialism and 
not, as one might think, the demand fo~ abolishing private 
ownership of the means of production.lu 
llopes for "average people's" socioeconomic security at the 
expense of the hitherto privileged, hl'wever, were of potential 
danger for the rulers, particularly since some segments of the 
party's following and functionaries took the anticapitalist 
dimension ~uite seriously. Therefore, the party had to do 
something if it was not to risk losing big business's and the 
military's confidence. The most effective solution was to direct 
anticapi talist sentiments toward Je\Ys, who \Yere r.1ade the symbol 
of capitalist exploitation. The distinction between Jewish 
"amassing" capital and German "productive" capital eliminated all 
faseist anticapitalist elements that could have irritated the 
ruling class. Already in 1923, point 17 of the 1920 program 
planning the "collectivization of land for common purposes 
without compensation" was supplemented uith the follm.ring: 
"Since the ilSDAP was in agreement with the private ownership 
of the means of production, it is selfunderstood" that the 
concern here was with "land which 1Yas ac~uired illegally or 
which was not used for the \Yelfare of the people •••• 
This concerns primarily the Je1Yish firms speculating in land."l7 
In the summer of 193J, the elimination from the party of the 
circle around Otto Strasser to~k place. It had resisted this 
Hazi trend on various ~oints.lu \Vith some sup!Jorters and 
functionaries, the anticapitalist hopes persisted. After 1933, 
they threatened to forcefully split the !)arty (they were a 
Sprengkraft) and 1.rere therefore silenced through a mass murder 
of tlle SA leadership, called the Rl:lhm affair, in the sununer of 
1934.19 
Anticapitalism was thereby made harmless by reducing it to anti-
Semitism. This, however, was not t:1e sole function of anti-
Semitism. It created--based on ex~erience--scapegoats and 
diverted social dissatisfaction to1Yard Je\Ys and away from its 
real causes. The creation of· scapegoats and the possibility of 
not having to articulate one's real aggressions but being able 
to release them instead in concrete action are common 
characteristics of all reactionary and faseist forces. 1n1ich 
religious, ethnic, or national minorities are to be treated 
thusly depends upon tlle concrete conditions in a particular 
country. The groups can vary from ~1onwhites to foreign workers, 
to others. In Germany, anti-Semitism could take on this function 
because it had been deeply entrenched in mass consciousness and 
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had already been used under the emperor to divert social 
dissatisfaction. In addition, special economic groups saw a 
certain advantage for themselves in eliminating Jewish 
competitors, particularly in petty commerce, ~rofessions such 
as medicine and law, and in academia. Hithaut any doubt, there 
is a connection between this self-interest and the 
disproportionately high nurober among these professionals wi1o 
supported fascism. 
Certainly, faseist ideology contains a variety of gaps and 
contradictions. l!owever, an internal unity cannot be disputed. 
Particularly, the sys teinatically used biological paradigm of 
the world and of human beings--whici1 legitimized the economic, 
political, and domestic domination of a minority and the 
subjugation and plundering of other peoples--formed a kind of 
common thread throughout all of t:1e ideological complexes. 
That the combination of these ideological complexes had such an 
enormaus appeal, turning the :-ISDAP from the 1923 splinter group 
into the strongest German party in l'J32, can, however, only be 
explained in conjunction with the prevailing general conditions. 
They consisted in the fact that all ideological complexes had 
been develo~ed for decades, had been used to legitimize 
imperialistic policies under the emperor, and had been pro')agated 
again soon after 1913. Therefore, when the Great Depression 
set in and the desperate and fearful population \laS searching 
for a solution, the ground had already been ~repared, since these 
tenets were deeply engrained in mass consciousness. Secondly, it 
must be mentioned that the faseist party, in its agitation and 
even in its terrorist activities against the left, was hardly 
hindered and often was protected and encouraged. Antifascist 
activities, on the other hand, were often blocked and punished. 
In cases of conflicts between faseist groups and organizations 
of the worker movement, police and the judicial system generally 
punished comnunists, social democrats, and labor union members, 
leaving the fascists untouched. This induced a strong feeling 
of power and readiness to use terror among faseist supporters. 
Both conditions favoring fascism structurally were the result 
of til.e failure in 1913 to expell the ruling class from its 
instrumental positions in the realm of economic and political 
power (the judicial system, the civil service apparatus, the 
military, and the police), so that soon it solidified its 
ideological power again. 
A third condition favoring fascism consisted in the weakness of 
antifaseist forces. The masses, who desperately searched fora 
solution during the Great Depression, were--despite the conditions 
advantageaus to fascism just described--not pre-disposed toward 
fascism. The outcome of their search depended significantly on 
the democratic forces' (particularly those of the worker 
movement) success in developing a convincing alternative and 
presenting themselves as a force that was determined to fight 
ro r a solution to their problems. As is commonly known, the 
l•·lt rail.ed because neither the communists nor the social 
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democrats really had an adequate analysis of the depression 
from which a political strategy could be dcveloped. Ilowever, it 
mainly failed because the worker movement remairred split, even 
in the face of the rising faseist t:1reat. In order to show 
the causes of this failure, it would be necessary to investigate 
the nistory of the German worker movement since the Kaiserreich, 
which cannot be done here.20 llowever, reference should be 
made to the documents in which both branches of the worker 
movement analyzed the mistakes and reasons for their defeat. 
In particular, they are the documents of the Seventh \Vorld 
Congress of the Communist International of 1935 and the Prague 
llanifesto of the Social Democratic Emigration Council of 1.934. In 
both documents, the worker parties arrived at a fairly realistic 
analysis of the causes of their defeat. 
The worker movement realized the practical consequences of the 
devastating defeat of 1933 in the spring of 1934 in France and 
in 1936 in Spain. Common action contained the faseist onslaught 
in France and in Spain; it would no doubt have defeated France's 
coup, had it not been for the powerful military intervention on 
the nart of the German and Italian faseist superrowers--favored 
by thc \Jes tern powers' declared "neutrality." Finally, the 
consequences were drawn in the European ~eople's fight against 
faseist domination during the Second \lorld \lar lvhich, from 
Greece to France and from Italy to Yugoslavia, was larr;ely 
based on tl1e idea of a people's alliance. It follows that the 
ruling class on the one hand and the faseist movement on the 
other can be detemined as the main forces which pur!_)osefully 
worked toward the liquidation of democracy and which had 
actively promoted the fascisization process. Politically, 
however, they beca~1e allied only little by little. Although 
llitler had aimed at an alliance with the established elites 
since the refounding of the NSDAP and offered his services to 
big business over and over21 in regard to battling Marxism and 
facilitating the resurrection of Germany, he initially encountered 
little interest and received little financial support.22 This 
changed when the Great Depression set in; when the masses 
deserted the bourgeois parties; when the NSDAP proved itself 
capable of gathering the fearful and desperate and begari to use 
them in its terror agairrst the left; and when the urge in the 
ruling class was to move to authoritarian methods of domination. 
The ruling-class faction that favored an alliance with the 
faseist party grew rapidly and became dominant when, at the end 
of 1932, the other dictatorship models proved to be insufficient 
or unrealizable. From then on, all significant factions of the 
ruling class favored the transferral of political power to the 
leader of the HSDAP. The alliance which IYas then formed remairred 
fundamental to the structure of domination and the policy of 
German fascism until its breakdown. It was based on the common 
interests and goals of the ruling class on the one hand and of' 
the faseist leadershin on the other: The destruction of democracy 
and the worker movement at home and the realization of a new 
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expansionary policy by rearming with the goal of going to war 
against foreign countries. As early as February 2 and 20, 1933, 
the outlines of the program were drawn up in conferences with 
military and business leaders. 23 Systematically, and using the 
utmost brutality, the program was realized: The worker movement 
was smashed and its functionaries jailed, tortured, and murdered 
by the tens of thousands. (The concentration camps were built 
for jailed members of the worker movement. Only later, after 
the beginning of World \lar II, did Jews increasingly become the 
main victims of faseist terror.)24 In the worknlace, the 
dictatorship of capital was again fully restored: The entrepreneur 
was named the "leader of the work~lace," workers and ••hite-collar 
employees were deprived of all possibilities to articulate their 
interests, and every move to the contrary was punished as a 
crime against the state. The almost one-hundred-year-old 
struggle of the worker movement was liquidated. Fascism 
realized what it had announced: The extemination of t1arxism, 
the securing of peace at the workplace, the elimination of the 
class struggle, the creation of a shared unity of the people 
(Volksgemeinschaft; and with power, political preconditions 
were established in order to concentrate all efforts toward 
re-armament and war). This manner of shaping society and the 
relations between classes is the substance and essential meaning 
of faseist domination. It has been the method used by all 
regimes of faseist or similar nature--from Italy to Germany, 
from Portugal to Spain, from Austria (1934) to Greece (1967) 
and Chile (1973). Given faseist domination, it is obvious who 
the victims are. I!owever, it is equally clear \Yho the 
beneficiaries are. 
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Conservative Concepts 
of Dictatorship in the 
Final Phase of the 
Weimar Republic: 
The Government of 
Franz von Papen 
ULRIKE HÖRSTER-PHILIPPS 
Translated by ]ulia Watson with the assistance of 
Michael N. Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann 
In historical evaluations of the last cabinets of the Heimar 
Republic before the takeover of Hitlerian Fascism, there are two 
fundamentally different interpretations.l The first is a type 
of interpretation that tends to include most conservative 
positions and sees the politics of conservative politicians 
before 1933 as striving to tarne the faseist movement and party. 
The second interpretation, derived mostly from the liberal or 
socialist camp, regards the function of the last cabinets of 
the \Jeimar years as fascism's "stirrup-holder" or as paving 
the way for fascism. 
The latter view is particularly prevalent with respect to the 
second-to-the-last cabinet of the Republic, the government of 
Franz von Papen. For the most part, Papen's political contacts, 
the political strategy of his cabinet, and its relationship to 
the conservative party spectrum and the conservative dictatorshin 
models of the \Jeimar Republic have so far been largely ignored. 2 
After Germany's military defeat in the First \Vorld War and after 
constituting the Republic, two problern areas dominated political 
discussion and political struggle in the \Jeimar years. On 
the one hand, the Treaty of Versailles forced Germany to 
surrender considerable territory, make reparation payments, and 
limit weapons. On the other hand, the Republic as a form of 
government guaranteed citizens the fundamental rights of a 
bourgeois democracy, recognized the rights of unians to form 
coalitions, to strike, and to bargain collectively, and 
introduced the parliamentary system as the foundation for 
shaping the processes of building political opinion and will. 
After 1913, in numerous discussions, leading representatives of 
the political, economic, and military spheres debated how the 
entire Treaty of Versailles, or at least certain of its 
stipulations, could be undermined or modified; they also 
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discussed how the parliamentary system could be adapted to 
their own interests. 
Political discussion of these two questions intensified with 
the outbreak of the world economic crisis. Just before the 
Brllninß government (1930-32) took office, a political program 
was introduced that implied a massive withdrawal of democratic 
rights and a reduction in parliamentary ~owers. The majority 
of big industrial leaders and bankers initially welcomed the 
Brllninß government. The fall of the Ilermann-l1Uller government 
of 1930 had deprived the Social Democrats of governmental control 
and freed the way for a presidential cabinet3 which could govern, 
on the basis of Article 48, with far less dependence on 
parliament.4 Early on, however, the Brllning government was 
criticized for its dependency on the Social Democrats' 
toleration.5 
After the spectacular electoral success of the I<SDAP in the 
Reichstag election of September 1931), demands that ti1e so-called 
"national opposition" be represented in the government grew 
increasingly vocal. (The national opposition included the 
rightist radicals .and fascistic forces from the German National 
Peop le' s Party Li'iNV;E7 of Bugenberg, on up to the NSDAP.) The 
national Opposition culminated in the Harzburg Front of 1931. 
The circle of industrialists that had established contact with 
the NSDAP and supported llitler financially and politically grew 
significantly broader.6 
Including the rightist forces in the Brllning government was 
impossible. But only with the support of rightist forces could 
the goals and interests be implemented that were cornrnon to 
broad circles of big industry, bank capital, and big agriculture, 
namely, a big business-oriented economic policy, 7 the revision 
of the Treaty of Versailles, and the replacement of parliamentary 
rule by an authoritarian state,3 which alone could offer 
guarantees for economic and international expansion and for the 
planned rearmament. 
Papen's cabinet seemed to offer the best possibility for 
implementing these goals. Its members, most of noble origin, 
came from the conservative rightist camp. Papen, who had been 
a member of the Catholic Center party and its delegate to the 
Prussian parliament from 1921-1924 and 1928-1932, was politically 
closer totheGerman National People's party (DNVP).9 Minister 
of the interior, Baron von Gayl, a member of the DNVP and a 
representative of East Prussia in the state council, held to 
the reactionary Ilugenberg line.lO Reichswehr (Army) !1inister 
Schleicher, generally considered the inspiration for the Papen 
cabinet, personified the rearrnament plans of the Reichswehr 
leadership.ll Nearly all the ministers belonged totheGerman 
Gentlemen's Club (Deutscher Herrenklub), a fact which earned the 
cabinet the nickname, "Ilerrenklub-Kabirtett" (The Gentlemen's 
Club Cabinet).12 
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The Gentlemen's Club has unjustifiably been portrayed in 
writin§s as a harmless debating circle similar to an English 
club.l The purpQse for founding the Herrenklub in 1924, 
however, was to gather tagether a "conservative elite," which 
drew from the leadership of l)Olitics, the military, big 
industry, and big agriculture. This elite sought to unify 
conservative political positions in order to increase its ability 
to realize right-wing, conservative policies.l4 The mentality 
of the Herrenklub was characteristic::ally chauvinistic and anti-
republican. The draft of its charter reads: 
In its name the Herrenklub refers to our people's 
his torical mission towards t:1e Eas t '"hich is 
symbolic of the idea of an enlarged Germany. The 
German Herrenklub intends to lay a foundation, as a 
club, for convening persans with a Christian and 
nationalistic orientation who have leading or 
decisive political influence.l5 
The German Herrenklub was closely related to a political 
movement and deserved special attention as another aspect of 
the development of the conservatives' models of dictatorship: 
namely, the young conservative movement. 
The young conservatives arose as a reaction to the First \lorld 
\Jar and the November Revolution. After the collapse of the 
Kaiser's empire in 1913, conservatives of the old stamp remained 
true to the political views of the pre-\~orld War II days. But 
the new conservatives criticized qmditions during ~Hlhelm's 
empire and held it responsible for Germany's defeat in the war.l6 
During the \Jeimar Republic the young conservatives published an 
almost inexhaustible wealth of materials. Although these 
publications differed from one another in numerous ways, all 
shared three ideological core elements; the desire to create 
a unified and internally strong German Reich; 17 the demand for 
a new European order in which Germany would play a leading role, 13 
and the claim that an internally and externally strong German 
Reich would embody the true and specifically German form of 
socialism. 19 
Franz von Papen never doubted that he should be re~arded as 
being in the tradition of the young conservatives. 0 Leading 
ideologues of young conservatives such as Heinrich von Gleichen, 
Arthur l1oeller van den ßruck, and Max Hildebert ßoehm were 
numbered among the founding members of the German Herrenklub, 
which was led by Heinrich von Gleichen and Hans Bode von 
Alvensleben.21 
In cantrast to the NSDAP and to the Hugenberg wing of the DHVP 
(which had generally pulled back from the German Herrenklub 
after 1924), the Young Conservatives' and the Herrenklub 
members' internal policy steered toward a gradual reduction of 
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democratic and parliamentary rights through legal means. By 
continually making alterations in the constitution, they hoped 
to reach their long-term goal, a definitive revision of the 
l~eimar Reich constitution. As way stations to this goal, 
they aimed at strengthening the position of the Reich president 
and Reich government against the parliament. After 1930, these 
means were put into practice by applying Article 43. The 
Federation for Renewing the Reich (Bund zur Erneuerung des Reiches, 
BER) had been presided over by the former Reich chancellor and 
later Reichbank president, Hans Luther,22 from its founding in 
1923 until 1930. The BER's drafts for a constitution most 
nearly matched the Herrenklub's political thinking concetning 
the constitution.2 
Among the numerous political models for a constitution that 
emanated from this circle areund the Herrenklub and BER, 
the propos~ls of one man particularly stand out: Edgar Julius 
Jung. He had a close relationship with Papen and htis work in 
certain ways epitomized the Young Conservatives' models of 
die tatcrship. 
Jung, a lawyer by profession who was active in various rightist 
radical groups and organizations since the First llorld War, was 
made Papen's private secretary and the ghostwriter of his 
speeches in 1932. In 1927 he had published a book entitled 
The Domination of the Inferior, 24 in which he maintained that 
the lveimar Republic had brought the inferior to power, while 
letting the potential of Germany's intellectual and moral elite 
go unused. According to him, it was time to put an end to 
liberalism and individualism and to create a new Reich in which 
an educated and cultivated leadership elite, drawn from the 
bourgeoisie, would hold all power . Specifically, Jung voted 
for a change in electoral rights to increase the minimum voting 
age for unmarried persons, to revoke electoral rights for women, 
and to give additional votes to fathers with several children. 
He also supported the creation of a two-chamber system: the 
first chamber was to consist of a leadership elite from the 
economic, military, and political spheres, with the Reich 
president selecting 75 percent of membership; the secend 
chamber was to be composed of the elected representatives of 
the Reichstag, who could not influence legislation or cabinet 
formation, since the Reich president would appoint the cabinet 
and maintain his own office for life. Jung also proposed 
privileging the ministerial bureaucracy.25 
Although they had certain unrealistic features (especially 
concerning elections), Jung's constitutional proposals became 
the foundation for the constitutional program of the Reich 
government during the Papen chancellorship--a point to be 
developed later. Already before 1932 these proposals had gained 
recognition and support in certain corporate circles because of 
their antiparliamentary and antidemocratic character. In 
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particular, Paul Reusch, an industrialist in the Ruhr and general 
director of the GutehoffnungshUtte in Oberhausen, a subsidiary 
of the Haniel Corporation, was interested in Jung and helped 
finance the publication of his book.26 Indeed, Karl Haniel; 
Albert VHgler, the chairman of the board of United Steel Works, 
Europe's largest mining and steel manufacturing concern; and 
Fritz Springerum of the Hoesch Company of Dortmund were numbered 
among the circle of Jung's supporters. 27 
To this policy of a strong state--in which the broad mass of 
the citizenry (the inferiors) were to be excluded from the 
development of a political will and in which an institutionally 
protected elite would govern--was closely linked to the plan 
for a new European order under German leadership. Jung 
emphasized the necessity of creating large economic spaces 
because "the German of the second quarter of the twentieth 
century (needed) economic sEaces, export territories, and 
secure nutritional bases."2 
The plan to create a middle-European economic domain was no 
intellectual plaything for the Young Conservatives; rather it 
grew out of the interests of German corporations and reflected 
a development that had taken hold since the mid-twenties. Cartel 
agreemerits in Europe, particularly with France, created the 
economic foundation for business ties and cooperation among 
various large European corporations. 29 By establishing the 
"t1iddle European Business Day" in 1931, leading representatives 
of chemical, electrical, and heavy iridustries created an 
institution that was designed--by reducing tariff barriers, 
developing trade relationships to southeast Europe, and 
cooperating economically with France--to create a European 
economic empire.30 Carl Duisberg, chairman of the board of the 
IG-Farben conglomerate, the largest chemical concern in Europe, 
and also chairman of the Reich Association of German Industry, 
the top industrial association, introduced this strategy for 
economic expansion to German companies: "Only a closed 
economic bloc from Bordeaux to Odessa can give Europe the economic 
backhone it needs to maintain its importance in the world."31 
It was less openly mentioned that not only peaceful means, but 
also military actions might conceiveably have to be employed 
in order to reach this goal; but this point of view is both 
evident in the definition of the goal itself and became clear 
in the increasingly overt demands for rearmament. 
Papen offered leading capitalist representatives a guarantee 
that he would support their economic and political plans. Since 
1928 he had been a member of the German-French study committee, 
a coalition for encouraging economic and cultural cooperation 
between Germany and France. The committee had been called to 
life by Emile t1ayrisch, an industrial magnate from Luxembourg 
who was general director of the Arbed Corporation, the second 
largest m~n~ng and steel manufacturing concern in Europe, and 
simultaneously president of the International Crude Steel 
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Association (Steel Cartel). Fvom the German side, the committee 
received influential representatives from big industry and 
banking.3 2 
The naming of Papen's cabinet on lfay 31, 1932, was heralded by 
big industry and banking representatives. During the Reichstag 
election of July 1932--as with that of November 1932--the 
parties supporting Papen, DNVP, and DVP (Deutsche Volkspartei) 
received massive financial support from heavy industry circles 
in Rhine-Westphalia. Industrial magnates such as Vl:lgler of the 
United Steelworks and Springorum of Hoesch; who in preceding 
years had helped to support Hitler and the NSDAP and to make 
them acceptable, were among the initiators of election funds 
for Papen. 33 
This fact has often been used to support the conclusion that 
the industrialists named--and with them most of heavy industry 
in the Ruhr--had no interest in establishing a faseist system of 
domination; rather, they were more concerned with saving 
co·nservatism from National Socialism, or at least with "taming" 
the NSDAP. 
But the following points should be observed: First, the NSDAP 
was politically and financially supported by these powers long 
before 1932.34 llitler had several opportunities to speak before 
leading representatives of industry. After his famous speech 
to the DUsseldorf Industry Club on January 27, 1932, he received 
increased support from industrialists in the Ruhr district--
and also from Vl:lgler.35 
Second, in the summer of 1932, the goal of the industrial group 
around Vl:lgler was aimed neither at neutralizing the NSDAP 
politically nor opposing its antidemocratic, anti-union, and 
chauvinistic demands; on the contrary, they wanted to include 
the NSDAP in the government.36 
Essentially there were no differences among the various 
industrial groups on the views that the parliamentary system 
should be removed and an expansive foreign policy should be 
introduced. There was, however, disagreement on the methods 
and persons to be employed and when the transition to a 
dictatorship should be accomplished. Fritz Thyssen, the steel 
industrialist, and the former Reich bank president, lljalmar 
Schacht, wielded all their influence in order to affect transfer 
öf the chancellorship to llitler.37 
In contrast, the Ruhr representatives of heavy industry around 
Vl:lgler were not yet prepared to .transfer full power to llitler. 
They quite openly considered the time premature for various 
reasons: For one, a too precipitous and direct course toward 
an open dictatorship would invite resistance from the workers' 
movement. Despite the deep split in the 1vorkers' movement 
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between its social democratic and Communist winßs, the possibility 
of a collective action in the case of a transfer of ~ower to 
Hitler during the summe.r of 1932 was not to be dismissed, In 
addition, Prussia--the largest and economically most significant 
state (Land) witi1in the German Reich, and the one that commanded 
a strong, social-democratically oriented police force--was 
still ruled by a coalition government comprised of SPD and center 
representatives. To a~point Hitler as Reich chancellor would 
have resulted in the protests of the Prussian government. 
Furthermore, Ilitler would have never been able to risk deposing 
the Prussian government, as Papen in fact did. 
Internationally, there were important decisions to be made at 
the Conference of Lausanne. Since this group would ultimately 
decide the fate of German reparations payments, it was unwise 
for them to make uncautious moves domestically. In the face of 
skepticism from without, particularly from France, the Lausanne 
negotiations would never have been completed successfully had 
Ilitler been chancellor. 
In addition, the economic program of the HSDAP was unclear. 
Although the NS-leadership had left no doubt that they intended 
to cornply with the wishes and interests of big industrialists, 
on questions of important details they lacked clear plans for 
enacting economic measures, Precisely for this reason, the 
so-called "ICeppler-Circle" was formed in the spring of 1932 in 
which representatives of industry and the HSDAP worked out an 
economic policy together. 33 These lvere the all-important reasons 
for supporting the Papen cabinet in the summer of 1932 rather 
than the NSDAP. 
Papen's period of government can be divided into several stages, 
each of which has a relatively clear major political content and 
demonstrates specific characteristics pointing to the successive 
developTI!ent toward an authoritarian, elitist system of domination. 
The first phase, from Papen's inauguration up to the Reichstag 
election on July 31, was characterized by the unwavering, drastic 
reduction in social and democratic rights, On June 4, the very 
day the government was declared, the Reichstag was dissolved to 
permit Papen to govern "undisturbed" by parliamentary Opposition. 
The first emergency decrees of the government, issued that same 
June, contained a massive reduction in state expenditures for 
social welfare (cuts in pensions, in benefits to the unemployed 
and war veterans, and so on).39 
Because of the "ordinance against political excesses" (extremism) 
of June 14, the SA and SS, the paramilitary forces of the NSDAP, 
were readmitted. 40 IDüle the (lazi paramilitary organizations 
could freely engage in political agitation, administrative, 
judicial, and police measures for taking action against republican 
and socialist forces were intentionally strengthened,41 On 
July 20, 1932, the Papen government delivered the greatest blow 
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to the democratic process when, on threadbare pretexts, it 
deposed the SPD and center government in Prussia. 4Z \lith this 
coup-like move against a democratically legitimated government, 
one of the last and most important republican bastions was 
eliminated. A Reich commissioner installad by the Reich 
government took over governmental business, and the Prussian 
police force was placed under the command of the Reich. 
Hereafter hardly any resistance was to be expected in Prussia 
against the planned refashioning of the Reich into an 
authoritarian, faseist state. For faseist forces, Prussia was 
a test case in which the resistance of the workers' movement 
to the destruction of the \leimar Republic could be measured. 43 
The Reichstag election on July 31, 1932, closes the first stage 
and introduces a second stage in which the attempt to include 
the NSDAP in the government was the primary goal. With 37.4 
percent of the votes and 230 Reichstag seats, the NSDAP became 
the stronges t party, wiüle the parties that had supported Papen, 
the ·DVP and DNVP combined could claim only 44 seats. Even before 
the election the newspaper Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (DAZ) 
which was aligned with heavy industry, called for a coalition 
of the DNVP and NSDAP under the Papen chancellorship.44 
Inunediately after the election, discussions among cabinet members 
began on how the HSDAP could be made a participant in the 
governraent.45 But the negotiations, which Reich president 
Hindenberg conducted with Hitler on August 13, were a failure. 
Hitler--pressured by Thyssen and Schacht--refused to accept a 
secondary role; rather he insisted on the office of chancellor. 
This deraand had to this point been rejected by the most important 
forces in heavy industry. 
After the failure of negotiations with the NSDAP, the third phase 
of Papen's government commenced. In this stage the focus was 
on developine and actualizing an independent governmental policy. 
The main components of this policy were its economic and 
constitutional reform programs. 
The economic program, hammered out in lengthy and intensive 
discussions from the end of July until the beginning of September 
1932, was shaped with the participation of big business.46 Its 
most important elenents were tax bonuses and hiring benefits 
for entrepreneurs47 and the virtual elimination of the tariff 
system.4G By introducing the voluntary labor service and direct 
(but ineffective) ueasures for providing work, unemployment 
was to be lowered. 
This economic program paid not the slightest attention to the 
distressed economic situation of large groups of the population. 
Rather, it 1ms oriented exclusively toward the demands of big 
business. Such a program could have been insured only when 
the democratic rights guaranteed by the Weimar constitution were 
restricted even further and the government in power was made 
largely independent of !Jarliament and institutionally guaranteed 
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such independence. 
The plans to change the constitution, which Uinister of the 
Interior Gayl developed in agreement with the cabinet, aimed 
at liquidating "parliamentarism" and establishing a dictatorship.49 
The plans depended heavily on the concept of the state developed 
by Jung and other Young Conservative authors. Gayl proposed a 
change in the electoral law. "Independent family providers" 
(men and women), as well as war veterans, would receive an 
additional vote, while the age limit for the right to elect and 
to be elected would be raised to twenty-five years of age. The 
proportional election system, in which ti1e electorate could 
vote for a party and for individuals, was to be changed to a 
system in which the electorate could only vote for individuals. 
This suggestion, carried to its logical conclusion, would result 
in doing away with the party system. 
Article 54 of the Ueimar constitution, which gave parliament 
the right to depose the government by a vote of no confidence, 
was to be limited at once and eventually eliminated altogether. 
The government was to be freed from the influence of elected 
officials by introducing the kind of two-chamber system Jung 
bad proposed. Finally, new laws changing the relationship of 
Reich to the states ("Reich reform") would strenp,then the power 
of the central government against the states. 
If the constitutional plans of the Papen cabinet had been put 
into effect, they would have replaced the parliamentary system 
with a form of state and government in which every effective 
democratic control was removed and an elite leadership group 
exercised all authority (Herrschaft). Actualizing these plans 
would have meant transforming the Weimar state into an elite, 
authoritarian state with fascistic features, in which all 
opposition could be shut out. 
In cantrast to the NSDAP, the Papen government put little value 
on mobilizing the masses in favor of its politics. As a result 
of its policy, directed against the basic needs of broad 
segments of the -population, and of its inability to agitate the 
masses, Papen suffered a catastrophic election defeat during the 
Reichstag election on l~ovember 6. 
But the NSDAP, too--and this was actually the decisive fact of 
the election--lost more than two million votes. It thereby 
became clear that the NSDAP had passed the peak of its influence 
on the masses. It was also evident that the low point of the 
worldwide economic depression had been overcome. A new upswing 
in the business cycle was about to begin in which op-portunities 
for demanding sacrifices from the working population, in the 
name of economic crisis, would be substantially reduced. No 
one wanted to return to a parliamentary system. On the contrary, 
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the cr~s~s was an opportunity that could be used to get rid of 
that system.SO At this juncture, nitler's being placed into 
power signified the last opportunity for the right-wing 
forces from big business, banking, and the military to 
decisively destroy parliamentary democracy. Uith hel!J from 
the faseist dictatorship, they intended to accomplish their 
long-held, chief interests: destruction of the labor movement 
and removal of the rights of wage and salary earners, economic 
expansion, reconquest of the lands lost during the First ~Iorld 
\lar, creation of an integrated European market under German 
leadership, and rearmament. In this situation, the important 
heads of big business and banking were unanimous in demandinr; 
that llitler be installed as Reich chancellor.Sl 
True, after the Papen government there was a brief intermezzo--
namely, the Schleicher government--but the rail switches for the 
faseist dictatorship had already been set. 
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The NSDAP and the 
German Working Class, 
1925-1933 
PETER D. STACHURA 
Throughout the pre-1933 period, the National Socialist party 
(NSDAP) projected an image of being a broadly-based Volksbewegung 
whose aim was to restore the fortunes of all Germans regardless 
of status or class. The party's ideological and propagandistic 
appeal was modelled to attract to the swastika as many sections 
of \~eimar society as possible. This approach made sense, after 
all, if the NSDAP were to exoand its electoral constituency 
to the point where it could establish a popular mandate for 
power. Following the unsuccessful 11unich putsch in 1923, 
Hitler renounced violent, revolutionary tactics in favor of a 
long-term parliamentary strategy that would allow him to assume 
governmental responsibility within the letter of the law. In 
the end, of course, the NSDAP did win power legally even if it 
constantly violated the spirit of the law. While failing to 
attain an overall majority in Reichstag elections in July and 
November 1932, the NSDAP, despite showing incipient signs of 
having passed its peak, was ultimately brought into the 
government, thanks to the last-minute interventionist power 
politics of industrial and agrarian elitist groups representing 
propertied, nationalist, and Protestant Germany.l 
Contrary to Joseph Goebbels's assertion in early 1933 that the 
!1achtergreifung signified "a revolution of a workers' movement,"2 
empirical historical inquiry has established that by 1933 the 
NSDAP drew its electoral support overwhelmingly from the small-
town and rural Protestant Mittelstand, comprising men and women 
in roughly equal numbers, in northern, central, and eastern 
Germany.3 Although by 1930-31 the lower 11ittelstand, particularly 
of the "old" or traditional type, predominated among the 
party's voters and members, the upper Hittelstand were beginning 
to flock into the ranks in ever-increasing numbers in 1932,4 
thus making the NSDAP more of a catch-all movement of middle-class 
protest, a movement of bourgeois integration. Two identifiable 
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groups were manifestly immune to Nazi blandishments: the 
Catholics, who continued to vote solidly for the confessional 
Center Party and Bavarian People's party, and the organized 
industrial working class, who steadfastly maintained their 
allegiance to the Social Democratic (SPD) and Communist (KPD) 
parties. Changes in voting patterns among the organized workers 
usually involved a switch by unemployed, unskilled or semi-
skilled urban voters from the SPD to the more radical KPD.s 
Despite some success among workers in cernain urban and industrial 
areas in \les tphalia, the Rhineland-Ruhr, Saxony, Thuringia, the 
Pfalz, and ßerlin-Brandenburg, the NSDAP remained a party of 
middle-class interests, and in terms of its membership, industrial 
workers were also significantly underrepresented, especially 
in the leadership cadres.6 In both proportionate and absolute 
terms, the working-class element in the NSDAP's constituency 
from 1925 to 1933 was small, and its claims to be a genuine 
popular movement had, therefore, no basis in reality. This 
is the scenario against which any discussion of the party's 
relationship to the German proletariat must take place. This 
chapter analyzes this relationship with a view to obtaining a 
clear perspective on the principal reasons for the NSDAP's 
failure to ••in much support among this particular group in 
lleimar society. 
Those industrial \VOrkers who did find their way to Hitler were 
invariably located, for one reason or another, outside the 
mainstream of working-class, organizational, and ideological 
development and, in some instances, were drawn from the 
lumpen proletariat. A small labor aristocracy of skilled workers, 
depandent craftsmen, and workers with responsibility, such as 
foremen, were as likely to end up voting for Hitler as not, 
regardless of whether they were urban- or rural-based. They 
were joined by another set of workers who did live in small towns 
or the countryside and who, if employed, \vere not subject to 
the supervisory control of a trade union or other kind of 
workers' group. !1ost of them were employed in a semiskilled 
or nonskilled capacity in small businesses and family concerns, 
such as handicrafts, where the influence of the master/owner 
and his family was often decisive. In such circumstances, 
workers were expected to conform to the values laid down by 
their superiors. In the period of spiralling unemployment 
during the early 1930s, workers caught in this situation could 
be reasonably expected to be more careful than usual not to 
offend their employers for fear of dismissal. Similar types of 
workers--weakly or not at all unionized--were also to be found 
in public transport, especial~y the railways and trams; in 
postal services; in the gas, water and electricity industries; 
and among agricultural laborers in socially depressed parts of 
eastern Germany. These workers lacked, therefore, a developed 
proletariart consciousness, Which prevented them from identifying 
with the traditional working-class movement. Their scholastic 
and political education was of a very low standard, and they 
quite often had no previous record of voting for either the 
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SPD or KPD. 7 The younger members of this group, whether employed 
or not, were particularly susceptible to National Socialist 
emphasis on nationalism, egalitarianism, and the appeal to the 
"dignity of labor," while the dynamic and pseudo-idealistic style 
of the party struck a responsive chord in young, immature minds.3 
At the same time, the style and vigor with which NSDAP 
propaganda was conducted cannot be underestimated as a factor 
in attracting workers in a depressed social and economic 
environmen t. 
Another, albeit indeterminate, group of pro-Hitler workers 
were those fearful of losing their secure, if modest, economic 
and social status in an era of uncertainty and vast unemp1oyment 
and being relegated to the lumpen proletariat.9 Unskilled 
or semi-skilled workers out of a job usually shunned the NSDAP, 
but the younger, long-term unemployed in both rural and urban 
areas were more favorably disposed towards National Socialism.10 
Also, workers who were generally traditionally minded, patriotic, 
and even anti-Semitic, rejected the international flavor of the 
working-class movement and saw in the NSDAP the best opp0rtunity 
of reestablishing the workers and their organizations within a 
more "acceptable," that is, nationalist, framework. Brewery 
workers provide an example of this category.ll Finally, the 
NSDAP managed to win over small sections of organized industrial 
workers in a few well-defined regions within the major industrial 
centers of the country. In virtually all of these regions, 
unusual industrial and social conditions prevailed, resulting 
in a reversal öf normal voting inclinations. Chemnitz-Zwickau, 
where small-scale textile manufacturing and a domestic system 
predominated, is a well-known example of this type of environment. 
Here, the NSDAP polled well above its normal, low average in 
industrial areas: for example, 47 percent in the Reichstag 
election in July 1932.12 
It is impossible to precisely quantify the different sections 
of the pro-HSDAP working class until a more detailed investigation 
is made of local and regional electoral responses, but taken as 
a whole, the aggregate was not significant. The political 
motivation of any social group, especially one which in part 
behaves contrary to accepted class patterns, is a complex 
phenomenon, involving not only class and occupational status, 
but other variables such as peculiar local and domestic 
influences, emotional attachments, age, education, and personal 
sensitivities.l3 
The mass of organized workers was sufficiently disciplined, 
socially and politically, to resist National Socialism. From 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the working class 
had developed in an atmosphere of ostracism and outright 
persecution, a sense of group and class identity which, if 
anything, had been further solidified by the experience of the 
First "llorld \lar, the November Revolution, and the economic and 
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political vicissitudes of the Weimar years. In a society as 
class-conscious as the Republic, where voting preferences were 
rnainly deterrnined by class, social, and confessional allegiances, 
the organized proletariatwas bound to shrug off the NSDAP's 
advances more easily than most. Like the Catholics, the workers 
constituted more then a mere segment of the po~ulation. They 
possessed a distinguishable and mature subculture situated 
firrnly within a variegated organizational structure. This 
situation engendered feelings of class unity, solidarity, and 
loyalty which, in turn, were reinforced by the effective 
political representation of working-class interests at the very 
highest levels of government through the SPD, KPD, and the 
socialist trade unions. The Catholic working class likewise 
had their representatives in politics and in the factories. 
The influence of the SPD and Catholic parties also extended into 
regional government. Prussia was controlled by the SPD for 
most of the \veimar period, and in Bavaria, the Bavarian People' s 
party reigned supreme. · These parties achieved material benefits 
for their working-class supporters--higher wages, better 
conditions of work, and improved welfare facilities. The 
integrity and vitality of working-class life was thus protected 
on many sides, at least until the onset of the depression in the 
early 1930s. 
The depression undoubtedly weakened the trade-union movement 
at a time also when the SPD appeared to be politically paralyzed 
at the national level and when the two major proletarian parties 
were mutually hostile. As a result of wage cuts, short-term 
employment, reduced consurner spending, inadequate unemployment 
insurance, rising cost of living, intense competition for jobs, 
and, of course, unprecedented levels of unemployment, the trade 
unions suffered severely and in 1933 were in no condition to 
resist National Socialist onslaughts.14 However, while tragically 
split at the very moment of faseist resurgence, because of the 
KPD's ultra-leftist strategy, which identified the SPD as 
"social fascists," the working class rernained loyal to their 
interests and organizations. There was no question of disillusion-
ment with socialism among the vast majority of workers. The 
boundaries of the National Socialist appeal were thus marked only 
a few degrees inside the proletarian constituency. Racist 
anti-Semitism, chauvinism, militarism, imperialism, and other 
salient features of Hitler's doctrine were simply incompatible, 
ideologically and historically, with the traditions and ethos 
of the German working class. On the other hand, it is wrong 
to argue, as the Oxford his torian Timothy \l. !1ason has done, 15 
that the NSDAP was a conscious crusade against the working class. 16 
Similarly, Trotsky's cornrnent that Hitler's triumph was "the 
greatest defeat of the proletariat in the history of the world"17 
falls into the same category of gross exaggeration. The interests 
of the NSDAP and the German workers may have been, objectively 
speaking, diametrically opposed, but it is quite another matter 
to depict the Party as an actively antiworkers movement above 
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all else. The NSDAP has to be understood instead as the spearhead 
of a broader restorationist, racial-chauvinistic movement in 
German society directed at the many facets of modernism: 
industrialization, democracy, liberalism, Uarxism, urbanization, 
and parliamentarianism. From a National Socialist standpoint, 
the working class was but one social manifestation of modern 
civilization. The social and politico-ideological dynamics of 
National Socialism were multivarious and complex, and cannot be 
reduced, therefore, to simplistic, one-sided explanations. 
There is a large body of literature dealing with the theoretical 
and empirical relationship between capitalism/big business and 
fascism,lß This is a controversial area of debate among 
historians, and it is not our purpose here to attempt a balancing 
act between conflicting interpretations. Rather, in deliberately 
rejecting a deterministic approach to the problem, this chapter 
examines a number of empirical ~easons for the tenuous 
relationship between the NSDAP and the German working class. 
There were important deficiencies in the party's appeal to 
organized workers, which largely account for its relative 
inability to attract their support. 
In the first instance, the failure of the NSDAP to offer a 
coherent and convincing interpretation of its "socialism" was 
a grave handicap. The party produced a plethora of radical-
sounding phrases and slogans--often imitations of the SPD or 
l~D originals--which were put across with considerable vehemence 
but little sincerity, particularly during election campaigns 
and in large cities and urban areas.l9 Taking a lead from the 
proworker orientation of the NSDAP's northern wing in 1925-26, 20 
a social revolutionary approach dominated the party's propaganda 
until the Reichstag election in May 1923 as it sought to 
establish in competition with the Socialists and Communists~ 
a secure foothold among industrial workers in major cities,Ll 
When the results of the 1928 election made clear the almost total 
ineffectiveness of this urban plan, the NSDAP's emphasis in 
ideology and propaganda was fundamentally altered in favor of a 
new middle-class, nationalist-conservative strategy,22 Between 
1929 and 1933, when the traditional bourgeois party system 
disintegrated amidst socioeconomic and psychological tensions 
induced by the depression,23 the NSDAP was able to build up its 
following among the broad range of the Protestant middle classes 
on the basis of its new orientation, in which social revolutionary 
themes were drastically toned down compared with previous years. 
Even then, the party's socialism remairred vague and eclectic; in 
essence, it was an expression of petty bourgeois reactionary 
anticapitalism which, saturated with ultrachauvinism and racist 
anti-Semitism, had nothing in common with the traditions of 
Uarxist socialism. The NSDAP' s anticapitalism 1vas a counter-
revolutionary, antimodernist ideology in the fullest sense. 
Nazi socialism was rooted in late nineteenth century neoconservatism 
of the kind preached by Adolf Stoecker and Friedrich Naumann and 
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revived in the early 1920s by Oswald Spengler and others. 
Spengler's concept of Prussian socialism, which articulated 
the German intelligentsia's disdain of materialism and monetary 
values, was most notably taken up within the NSDAP by Gregor 
Strasser, who repeatedly stressed the need to combat these "evil" 
influences of modern civilization: "It is the most distressing 
feature of this capitalistic economic system that all values are 
measured by rnoney, by means, by property! The decline of the 
Volk is the inevitable result of the turn to this measure of value 
because selection by property is the mortal enemy of race, of 
blood, of life."24 The early diary of Joseph Goebbels25 and 
the speeches and lvritings of Gregor Strasser during the mid-1920s 
contain the most vivid examples of the party's radical rhetoric. 
In 1926, for example, Strasser thundered in a fashion that would 
not have disgraced a SPD or KPD spokesman: "lle are socialists, 
we are enemies, deadly enemies of the present economic system, 
with its exploitation of the economically weak, with its unjust 
means of reward, with its immoral evaluation of people according 
to their possessions. and money instead of according to their 
responsibilities and achievernents, and we are resolved to destroy 
this system in all circumstances."26 
This was social denagoguery at its very worst and at its most 
vacuous. Indeed, Strasser blithely remarked the same year that 
"rational thought corrodes the foundations of life itself."27 
This was not an encouraging view for those seeking an intelligible 
expose'of his "socialism." Strasser demanded of others the same 
emotional-mystical commitment to the cause which he had: "And 
we know with a certainty which proceeds from the blood • • • 
that our path is right. u23 
His message was revelatory rather than explanatory, and in this 
nonintellectual attitude Strasser was at one, of course, with 
other party leaders.29 Just as the socialist parts of the 
party' s official program of 1920 were left without adequate 
explanation throughout the pre-1933 period, so the radical 
pronouncements of leading NSDAP officials remained mere 
invective, a device of dishonest propaganda, and a futile 
stratagern to deceive German workers into following Ilitler. 
Against the deep class-consciousness and socialist education of 
the proletariat, the USDAP's social revoluti onary animuswas 
inevitably seen to be the pathetic fraud it was. Only members 
of right-wing paramilitary groups, nationalist-minded intellectuals 
and students, discontented white-collar workers, the self-
employed, small and independent producers, and traders and 
craftsr.1en supported this pe·culiar "German socialism." All of 
them, fearing proletarianization in an increasingly complex 
and impersonal industrial world, clung hopefully and tenaciously 
to their social and economic status in the face of expanding 
capitalism and organized labor. 
Hitler, unlike Goebbels and Strasser, never made any real 
attempt to hide his contempt for the masses, especially the 
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workers whom, he stated in Mein KaQpf, were tobe won over to 
the NSDAP and the nationalist idea only because of the strength 
of their nurnbers. The FUhrer undoubtedly appreciated the 
importance of the llovember Revolution in rclation to the working 
class. He explained the Revolution in ter!'ls of domestic 
political problems rather than military shortconings, stressing 
in particular the pernicious influence of lfarxists and Jews 
on the German proletariat in 1917-19. If Germany were once 
again to emerge as a world-class power, llitler reasoned, the home 
front had to be made safe and stabile by integratina the 
industrial work force into the national cornrnunity.3Ö He was not 
interested in the social welfare or wider interests of the 
workers; tl1ey were to be seduced and cajolcd into supporting 
the i'lSDAP by bread and circuses, as llitler informed Jtto 
Strasser.31 By emotional inclination and political instinct, 
the FUhrer remairred the archtypal petty bourgeois. He unswervingly 
upheld the principle of private property throughout his career, 
tuthlessly purged so-called socialists from the party at 
various stages after 1923, opposed for a long period the 
establishment of aNational Socialist-sponsored trade union, 32 
and ultimately came to power with the backing, among others, of 
reactionary elements of big business. For Hitler, and the HSDAP 
as a whole, socialism or anticapitalism simply amounted to an 
extension of their anti-Semitic chauvinism: "Unproductive," 
that is, Je,üsh, finance capitalism was the enemy, not "creative" 
German private capitalism. 
The blatantly opportunistic and spurious nature of the NSDAP's 
socialism largely accounts for the failure of its trade union 
affiliate, the National Socialist Factory Gell Organization 
(NSBO), to nal:e noteuorthv inroads into the ranl~s of the factory 
proletariat before 1933.3'3 The NSBO's appealwas a rather 
crude amalgam of nationalism and anticapitalism, as illustrated, 
for example, by its llib-Aktion (Hinein in die Betriebe) in 
1931. During 1932 the NSBO tried to sharpen its radical image 
by organizing and participating in strike action by factory 
employees and other groups of blue-collar workers, culminating 
in the Berlin transport workers' strike in autumn of that year.34 
This tactic vlaS unsuccessful. When the NSBO began at last to 
expand its membership in 1932 from forty thousand to· over 
three hundred thousand, this was achieved mainly on the basis 
of recruitment among artisans, craftsmen, and lewer-grade 
white-collar salaried employees in industry and the public 
services. Only after 1933 did the l~SBO begin to attract 
substantial numbers of ordinary workers and then in an 
atmosphere of violence and wholesale assaults on the working 
class and its organizations.35 
The development of the NSBO epitomizes the wider ineffectiveness 
of the mistakenly labelled "Nazi Left" among the German working 
class before 1933. The term "Nazi Left" occurs frequently in 
the historiography of early National Socialism without ever 
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being properly assessed. It is a loose and convenient 
description, designed to cover all putative socialist and 
anticapitalist circles in Hitler's movement, including the party, 
SA, Hitler Youth (l!J), HSBO, and the National Sodalist 
Students' League (NSDStB). This Nazi Left is usually assumed 
to have existed from about 1924-25 until the so-aalled "Second 
Revolution" was crushed durL1.ß the :lßhm Purge in June 1934. 
Furthermore, Gregor Strasser, who was the NSDAP's chief of 
propaganda (1926-27) and organization (1923-32), is invariably 
referred to as the leader of this Nazi Left. The whole idea of 
there having been a Nazi Left in any concrete form, whether 
led by Strasser or anyone else, can be seen to be entirely 
erroneous if the evidence is examined. 
lle have already noted, and discounted as counterfeit, the 
socialism of the NSBO. A similar conclusion may also be 
reached about the alleged socialism of the SA. Despite drawing 
most of its rank-and-file followers from the working class,36 
the SA never sought to formulate a coherent ideological posture 
consistent with the nature of its sociological makeup. A 
programmatic statement of its socialism was never made,37 Instead, 
the basis of the SA's socialism was merely a series of 
passionate, radical, and often pugilistic remarks by various 
leaders on the necessity of smashing Marxism, the Republic, and 
Jews, and of creating some sort of ill-defined egalitarian 
Volksgemeinschaft. The absence of evidence for a considered 
or genuine socialist ethos is hardly unexpected in view of the 
SA's combative and militaristic profile: It was a force designed 
to capture and dominate the streets.33 Ideology mattered little 
in these circumstances, and the socialism it is supposed to 
have possessed amounted to little more than the ability to 
organize soup kitchens, shelter, and clothing for sections of 
the working-class unemployed in Germany's !arger cities. The 
SA's radicalism is, in fact, a charitable description of its 
inordinate capacity for thuggery on a grand scale. When the 
Machtergreifung did not realize the career prospects, status, 
and power ambitions of some of its personnel, the SA, under 
the leadership of RBhm, sought a further extension of the Nazi 
Revolution, This was an exercise in power; it ~•as not meant 
to further the cause of socialism, in whatever guise. The 
principal reasons for the events of the summer of 1934, which 
saw the political emasculation of the SA, are hardly connected 
with a fight for a secend socialist revolution.39 
The only party organizations to have possessed an authentic 
attachment to a social revolutionary radicalism were, ironically, 
of comparatively little political importance, the NSDStB and 
HJ. In the mid-1920s the NSDStB was led by an earnest group 
areund Wilhelm Tempel who, in a vague fashion, tried to bridge 
the gap bebveen National Socialism and the poorer university 
students. The attempt was as unsuccessful as it was short-lived, 
however, for when Baldur von Schirach re~laced Tempel as 
Reichsflihrer, the NSDStB began to adopt a conservative-nationalist 
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outlook in keeping with the i~SDAP' s post-1928 reorientation. 40 
It was on this altered ideological and social basis that the 
HSDStB went on very rapidly to a position of strength in 
university politics. 
The HJ's engagement with socialism was of slightly longer 
duration, from its creation in 1926 until the dismissal from 
office of its founder and leader, Kurt Gruber, in October 1931. 
During that five-year period, the HJ, while emphasizing its 
nationalism and anti-Semitism, gave juvenile expression to a 
certain socialistic anticapitalism. However intellectually 
shallow this connnitment was among the under-eighteen-year-old 
members, it was at least sincere and motivated by an exuberant 
youthful idealism, which aimed at breal::i_ng up class-ridden 4 Weimar society and replacing it with a true national connnunity. 1 
This ideological inclination attracted a predominately working-
class membership. Only when von Schirach and Adrian ·von Renteln 
took over from Gruber was the l!J's socialism and proletarian 
composition diluted to some extent as the group's ap~eal was 
increasingly guided towards the nationalist concerns of bourgeois 
youth. Nonetheless, in 1933 the HJ retained enough of its 
early character and ethos to remain the only National Socialist 
organization still genuinely believing in some kind of socialism.42 
But, of course, in terrns of political influence, the HJ hardly 
counted. That influence lay above all in the hands of the NSDAP, 
and it is with reference to the party that the socialist 
credentials of the National Socialist movement before 1933 need 
to be ultimately measured. 
The ideological foundations of the "Nazi Left" are alleged to 
have been !)rovided by the Draft Program forrnulated under the 
supervision of Gregor Strasser in late 1925.43 In fact, it would 
be misleading to regard the Draft as evidence of a socialist wing 
in the NSDAP and equally wrong to see it as a !)rogram supported 
by all shades of opinion among the party's would-be radicals. 
The Draft merely amounted to a more precise and emphatic 
reaffirrnation of the anticapitalist sections of the official 
NSDAP program of 1920. Strasser's Draft accentuated the 
radicals' cornrnitment to a brand of extreme nationalism and Pan-
Gerrnan imperialism to which l!itler and the bourgeois l1unich 
section of the party could hardly have objected; at the same 
time, the Draft's anti-Semitic content, while relatively 
moderate by the Flihrer's high Standards in demanding the 
deportation of all Jews who had entered Gerrnany since August 1, 
1914, and the withdrawal of German citizenship from all 
remaining Jews, was nonetheless in the mainstream of the NSDAP's 
general attitude towards the Jewish question.44 As for the 
Draft's proposals on nationalization, worker participation in 
industrial management, profits and ownership, and agrarian 
reforrn, these were uniforrnly tentative, nebulous, and indicative 
only of the radicals' emotional ties to. a romantic version of 
anticapitalism. The Draft foresaw a sort of mixed economy in 
which all !)roperty belonged to the nation, but where individual 
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citizens would continue to own property on a lease basis. This 
was the Dra,ft's main proposal to effect a .redistribution of wealth, 
but it clearly lacked either substance or sense. In reality, 
the interests of industrial workers and agricultural laborers 
were given paltry consideration. Ideologically, therefore, the 
Draft, in spurning Marxism and formal capitalism in favor of a 
fascist-corporative structure based on a national dictatorship, 
was disappointingly unoriginal, It was simply another lucid 
example of that petty bourgeois socialism so common in right-wing 
circles in Germany during the 1920s. Even so, the Draft did 
not have the unanimous backing ~f the party's radicals. While 
the Strasser brothers and Goebbels seem to have inclined 
towards a limited egalitarian, proworkers approach, others, such 
as ex-Freikorps commander Franz von Pfeffer and the North Germans, 
Ludolf Haase and Hermann Fobke, were more elitist in outlook 
and wanted a society attuned to the concept of achievement 
(Leistungsprinzip). 45 These differences were highlighted by 
the discussion of the Draft at a meeting of the ~lorking Association 
of tlte North l.;est German Gauleiter of the NSDAP (AG) in Hanover 
in January 192646 and were not significantly reduced during 
the remainder of the 1920s. 
The Nazi Left was as disunited organizationally as it was 
ideologically in 1925-26. The AG, which was set up in September 
1925, might have furnished the basis for a permanently organized 
faction within the NSDAP had not Gregor Strasser, under severe 
pressure from Hitler following the Bamberg Conference in 
February 1926, disbanded it. ~iliile in existence, the AG was a 
loosely constructed body for discussion of ideological matters 
involving those party leaders and officials who were anxious 
to give greater weight to socialist principles. It is true 
that Strasser was on friendly, personal terms with many of the 
AG's more prominent personalit~es, but such bonds were not 
necessarily translated into political alliances. In brief, 
the NSDAP's radicals in 1925-26 did not possess a degree of 
organizational or ideological unity that would justify the 
vitiw that a Nazi Left existed as an identifiable entity within 
the Party. The term "Nazi Left" is simply a convenient way of 
referring to that small number of party members who displayed 
an indistinct · form of anticapitalist radicalism, a viewpoint 
firmly located in an anti-Marxist, petty bourgeois scale of 
values in Weimar Germany. Developments among these members 
accompanying the collapse of the AG--the formal withdrawal of 
the Draft program by Gregor Strasser in tfurch 1926,47 the 
embarrassing failure to support the SPD-KPD sponsored campaign 
for the expropriation without compensation of the former royal 
houses (FUrstenenteignung),43 and the acrimonious "defection" 
of Goebbels--add substance to the tnesis that there was no 
Nazi Left. 
Moreover, the establishment and development in northern Germany 
of the Kampfverlag under the direction of the Strassers did not 
produce a more meaningful concept of a Nazi Left. The journal, 
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NS-Briefe, was conceived by Gregor Strasser in the summer of 1925 
as a forum for discussing programmatic issues arid generally as 
a means of strengthening the cause of anticapitalist radicalism 
in the party.49 Strasser repeatedly emphasized that the journal 
was not questioning Hitler's authority, but only challenging 
some of his political ideas. This aspect was poignantly 
illustrated by the heated debate in 1927 between. Strasser and 
Alfred Rosenberg over the definition and understanding of 
"National Socialism."58 Rosenberg relegated socialism to a 
peripheral role in his interpretation, while Strasser made clear 
his fundamental disagreement with this view. However~ even 
here, Strasser could not be precise about his socialism; his 
differences with Hunichl it became apparent, were over emphasis 
rather than substance. 5 Otherwise, the tone and style of 
NS-Briefe and related publications of the Kampfverlag were 
anticapitalist and antibourgeois,52 but they adduced nothing 
more Substantive vis-a-vis soaialism than this. Indeed, the 
main function of the Strasserite press in the mid-1920s was 
to support the Party's attempts to attract industrial workers 
to its ranks: A certain sympathy for the proletariat and the 
need to bring it into the struggle for "national freedom" was a 
frequent theme in its pages.53 
\fuen the appeal to industrial workers was seen to have been a 
complete failure at the Reichstag election in 1928, the 
Kampfverlag circle and its radical supporters in the NSDAP 
were put in an agonizing dilemma: Should they abandon socialism 
and fall in behind Ilitler's new nationalist-conservative strategy 
towards the middle classes, or should they press on more 
vehemently with the old line? Gregor Strasser, for one, had 
sufficient political sagacity to draw the obvious conclusions, 
and he thereafter increasingly sought to distance hirnself from 
his brother and a few other diehards who persevered.54 But 
the publication in 1929 by Otto Strass.er of the "Fourteen Theses 
of the German Revolution" was another typically bombastic 
statement that once again failed to clear the fog which engulfed 
the radicals' socialism. If the 1923 Reichstag election dealt 
a mortal blow to the NSDAP's radicals, the withdrawal of Otto 
Strasser and his followers in 1930 has been rightly seen by 
Reinhard KUhnl as the final act of the putative Nazi Left.~5 
KUhnl, however, has reached a correct conclusion for the 
wrong reasons. 
In the first place, KU!ml is convinced of the existence of a 
recognizable Nazi left in the NSDAP from 1925 to 1930, whereas 
it has been indicated here that this probably is an erroneous 
supposition. Secondly, Otto Strasser's political importance 
has been exaggerated by KUhnl: He was always in the shadow of 
his older brother, Gregor, and only made a name for hirnself 
after he had left the NSDAP and established the Black Front 
organization. Subsequently, .Otto's many (unreliable) writings 
on the early NSDAP served to distort his own modest contribution 
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to the party. 56 !1ore importantly, Kllhnl may be unaware of the 
fundamental reason for the nonexistence of a Nazi Left by 1930; 
namely, the dramatic transformation in the political and 
ideological attitudes of the Nazi Left's alleged leader, Gregor 
Strasser. 
Strasser's identification with an emotional socialism and 
anticapitalism had diminished since he became organizational 
chief of the NSDAP in January 1923 and particularly since the 
collapse of the urban-plan strategy in the elections of that 
year. He began, instead, to evolve a broader, less sectarian 
vision of \~eimar politics. 57 This bec?~e evident in his article, 
"Der neue Ton," published in Die Faus tJ in February 1929, 
in which he called for moderation and more emphasis on discussion 
with opponents by the Party.59 At the same time, there were 
whispers in certain circles within the NSDAP about Strasser's 
changing priorities. A Party member, Friedrich, for example, 
complidned to Theo Habicht, leader of the NSDAP in ~iesbaden, 
that not only was the Party betraying socialism, but worse 
still, Strasser had given into the "fascist tactics" of Hitler: 
"Gregor Strasser was the brightest hope for a socialist NSDAP 
and now that has been most regretfully lost. n60 His refusal to 
join his brother, Otto, in Opposition to llitler in 1930, was the 
first concrete manifestation of Gregor's changing perceptions; 61 
further evidence appeared in 1930-32. 
During the early 1930s, Strasser developed a wide and diverse 
range of personaland political contacts outside the NSDAP, 
including important circles in the Rhenish-\lestphalian Goal 
Syndicate and the chemical conglomerate, I. G. Farben, 
industrialists such as Paul Silverberg, various neoconservative 
groups, among them the Tat Circle, Chancellor Heinrich BrUning, 
General Kurt von Schleicher, and trade unionists. 62 Consequently, 
Strasser enjoyed a substantial and favorable reputation among a 
significant cross section of \Veimar politics at a time when 
his achievementa as organization leader and public speaker 
consolidated his standing within the NSDAP. He had emerged as a 
powerful political figure in his own right. By 1932, despite 
several well-publicized speeches with a radical flavor--like 
that in the Reichstag in May 1932 when he gave voice to the 
"anticapitalist yearnings" of the German people63--strasser 
had come out as a firm advocate of a coalition course for the 
NSDAP as a means of establishing a broadly structured nationalist-
conservative government,64 In this process of evolution from 
abrasive party politician to conciliatory national figure, 
Strasser's earlier socialism was no langer conspicuous. Although 
he continued to enjoy a popular reputation as the NSDAP's 
leading socialist, in reality, that earlier notable component 
of his ideological armory had been superceded by other 
tendencies. Anationalist disposition now transcended his narrow 
Party allegiance, and the Nazi Left had lost its erstwhile 
principle spokesman.65 
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The total ideological and organizational vacuity of the idea of 
a coherent Nazi Left was .unmistakably revealed by the NSDAP 
crisis in December 1932, which culminated in Strasser resigning 
his party offices because of his fundamental disagreement with 
Hitler over strategy and policy. In his moment of supreme . 
personal and political crisis, Strasser discovered that though 
he may have had nurnerous friends and sympathizers in the 
National S2cialist movement, including Gauleiters and Reichstag 
deputies,6° he had few allies willing to follow him against the 
FUhrer. There was no Nazi Left to come to his aid because, 
contrary to the view of many contemporaries, including General 
von Schleicher, such a group did not exist. And it never had. 
Schleicher's plan to use the Nazi Left under Strasser's 
leadership as an essential element in a coalition government 
rested on a tragic illusion.67 
The new chancellor did not perceive that socialism had long 
ceased to be a viable political influence in any part of the 
NSDAP, and in turn, he misunderstood the nature of Strasser's 
personal development during the last years. Furtherrnore, . 
Schleicher was ignorant of the organizational character of the 
party, which effectively blocked the emergence of a Nazi Left 
or any other faction. The loyalty of the Gauleiters was 
ultimately to llitler: They depended for their position on 
his support. Despite a rapidly expanding and complex 
bureaucracy, which was directed by Strasser, Hitler was determined 
to maintain his direct and personal relationship with the 
Gauleiters. However much Strasser forrnally controlled 
organizational affairs, the special link between the Gauleiters 
and Hitler continued to function independently on the basis 
of the FUhrer's charisma and authority.v3 In Decernber 1932 that 
link held fast and virtually guaranteed the failure of the would-be 
usurper, Gregor Strasser. 
The refusal of the overwhelming majority of the German working 
class to respond positively to National Socialism before 1933 
can be explained in terrns cif the ideology, character, and strategy 
of the NSDAP, we well as by the traditional class and politico-
ideological perceptions of the workers themselves. There was 
an absence of basic empathy between the two sides. Within this 
broader context, we have argued here that the whole notion of 
a "Nazi Left" is erroneous, since there never was a coherent 
ideological and organizational frarnework for such a group, 
particularly after 1923 when the socialist orientation had 
signally failed and Gregor Strasser began to trod a different 
path in Weimar politics. The nonexistence of a Nazi Left thus 
helps account for the NSDAP's inability to attract the working 
class before 1933. Once Hitler was in pmver, the National 
Socialists had to find alternative methods of reaching a modus 
vivendi with the workers. Persuasion and electoral propaganda, 
which had made little impact in the lleimar period, were 
replaced, therefore, by outright terror and violence during the 
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course of 1933 and supplemented thereafter by a mixture of 
artful seduction (Schtlnheit der Arbeit--the "Beauty of work" 
slogan and program), tight Supervision (German Labor Front), 
and callous repression (Gestapo, SS). 
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Revolution and 
Alienation: 
The Foundations 
of Weimar 
ELIZABETH H. TOBIN 
The paradox of the German Revolution of 1918-19 is that it 
promised so much but accomplished so little. Spontaneaus 
popular demonstrations toppled national and local governments, 
creating revolutionary councils in nearly every city in Germany. 
Yet neither the provisional central aovernrnent nor local councils 
produced meaningful changes in the economy or social structure. 
The lleimar Republic replaced the Wilhelmine Empire, but the 
imperial governmental structure--bureaucracy and military--
remained largely intact. Furthermore, the process of the 
Revolution itself alienated many of its strongest supporters--
the Independent Social Democratic party (USPD), the Communists, 
and a sizable portion of the working class--from the government 
created by their revolutionary actions. Thus the Republic 
began its history with significant enemies on the left. 
This combination of revolution and alienation has led to 
considerable debate about the nature of the Revolution. 1 Most 
historians explain these events by studying the executives of 
political parties and national governments; much of the research 
on the Revolution concentrates on Berlin and Uunich.2 This 
chapter relies upon a series of local studies, which provide 
a fresh perspective on the Revolution--that of rank-and-file 
revolutionaries. ßy directing attention to revolutionary demands, 
the relations between revolutionaries and leaders, and the 
interaction of local councils with both the 11ilhelmine 
bureaucracy and the new national government, an attempt will 
be made to provide new answers to questions about the nature 
of Germany's Revolution: Did the working class genuinely seek 
revolutionary change? Why were revolutionaries unable to wrest 
power from the 1Vilhelmine governmental s tructure? How did the 
Revolution's supporters turn into the Republic's enemies? 
Historians have long argued about whether the events. of 1913-19 
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warrant the name "revolution."3 But the evidence from Germany's 
cities demonstrates that workers were indeed revolutionary. 
The Revolution was essentially a popular movement supporting 
extensive democratization of the government, limited socialization 
of industry, and the intervention of government in the society 
and economy on behalf of the working class. A striking 
similarity of workers' basic goals emerges from the diversity 
of the revolutionary process across Germany. B~cause socialist 
leaders, the provisional national and provincial governments, 
and local councils all faltered in implementing these goals, 
workers reaffirmed their demands loudly and clearly in the first 
four months of 1919. 
Yet these goals were never achieved. Other historians have 
pointed to the failure of socialist leaders, in the SPD and 
USPD and at the national and local levels, to take advantage 
of their working-class support. 4 But the actions of socialist 
leaders provide only a part of the explanation for the lack of 
fundamental change. From tl1e local perspective, the ability of 
Wilhelmine bureaucracies to retain power and to obstruct the 
activities of revolutionary councils was even more important, 
and the intervention of the new national and provincial 
governments in this conflict proved crucial. The explanation 
for the failure to implement working-class demands can be found 
in the interactions among new and old governing bodies. 
Workers protested in vain against the reassertion of bureaucratic 
power and the eclipse of revolutionary goals. Disappointment 
turned to distrust and alienation as the new government ignored 
their demands and actively repressed their protests. Thus, 
the process of the Revolution, whereby workers came to blame the 
government they had helped to create for the frustration of 
their ambitions, was itself responsible for turning many of the 
Revolution's supporters into the Republic's enemies. One of the 
long-term problems of the Weimar Republic was the fact that 
the revolutionary dynamic had alienated much of its potential 
working-class basis. 
REVOLUTION 
Evidence from cities all over Germany shows the revolutionary 
intentions of the men and women who toppled their government in 
November 1913. Revolutionary activity was not isolated to any 
particular geographic area. \/orkers and soldiers in nearly 
every city spontaneously created workers' and soldiers' 
councils, without the prompting or even the knowledge of 
socialist leaders. The pronouncements of these councils in 
early November provide a good indication of workers' goals and 
expectations; despite considerable variety in the political 
orientation of revolutionaries in different cities, councils 
consistently demanded a far-reaching democratization of German 
government and society. Furthermore, workers repeatedly 
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reaffirmed their support for these radical political goals 
in the following months. 
By November 1913 the ~lilhelmine Empire maintained control over 
its citizens through military might alone. Even where workers 
had demonstrated extreme dissatisfaction with the government 
during the war, such as in Braunschweig or Dllsseldorf, they had 
been subdued without difficulty through military intervention.S 
\vorkers feared the harsh punishments meted out by military 
tribunals and the drafting of "troublemakers" into the army. 
Thus the Revolution appeared first in the military forces. But 
once the mutiny of the armed forces had begun, it stimulated 
revolutionary actions among workers and soldiers alike. The 
initiative often came from outside, but in nearly every city, 
the spontaneous actions of workers and soldiers overthrew their 
local governments. 
Darmstadt provides an example of a city in which the military 
revolted without aid from workers. The soldiers acted alone in 
electing a council on the night of November 3; at approximately 
2 A.M., between five thousand and seven thousand soldiers marched 
to the palace with the intention of taking the Grand Duke 
prisoner.6 Even insmalland conservative Jlllich, soldiers 
stationed there rebelled on November 3 by electing a council. 7 
In towns where working-class discontent remained just below the 
surface during the war, workers acted as soon as they were 
satisfied that the military was incapacitated. In Harnburg news 
of the sailors 1 revolt in Kielsparkedan unauthorized strike 
in the shipyards and a meeting at which workers called for 
democratic reforms and the abdication of the Hohenzollerns. 8 
In DUsseldorf the arrival of sailors from Cologne on the evening 
of November ü led to workers, soldiers, and sailors alike 
roaming the streets, disarming officers, and freeing prisoners.9 
In all cases, soldiers 1 and workers 1 revolts soon combined. The 
day after mutinies in GBttingen and Nurembergi workers and 
soldiers marched together through the cities. a In Hanau 
workers provided the leadership, but soldiers also participated 
in a demonstration on November 7; representatives of the SPD and 
USPD formed the ~lorkers' Council and negotiated directly with 
the Soldiers 1 Council to form a joint revolutionary organ.ll The 
workers in Jlllich managed to create a ~vorkers 1 Council one 
day after the military 1 s actions, despite the fact that no 
working-class party had ever existed in the town. 12 
Rank-and-file revolutionaries had acted on their own initiative; 
socialist leaders were almost universally surprised at the 
outbreak of the Revolution. Even those organized political 
groups that had urged revolution were not responsible for its 
outbreak. Spartacists in Stuttgart, who helped to engineer a 
city-wide strike and the creation of a lvorkers 1 Council on 
November 4, failed to control the movement in their city because 
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their actions anticipated the military revolt. Spartaeist 
leaders were arrested in Stuttgart on November 6 and only 
released three days later, after a revolutionary eovernment had 
been established without their participation or advice.13 In 
DUsseldorf the USPD leaders did not even know about negotiations 
between the police chief and an impDovised Workers' and Soldiers' 
Council until they were nearly completed.14 
Although councils were formed as a result of demonstrations and 
demands by workers and soldiers, in most towns workers turned 
to their traditional Socialist leaders when they set up official 
revolutionary governments. In Dllsseldorf, for example, the 
late-arrivine independents were able to place themselves at the 
head of the Council. 15 Nevertheless, rank-and-file workers 
and soldiers did hold council posts in most cities. Socialist 
leaders who joined the Revolution did not immediately impose 
their own goals upon the councils; especially in the early days 
of the Revolution, council leaders simply appropriated the 
demands of the workers and soldiers who had broueht them to 
power. Thus the early statements issued by councils or made 
by council leaders reflect the desires of Germany's rank-and-
file revolutionaries. 
All councils did not agree on goals for the Revolution. The 
degree of radicalism among both workers and leaders varied 
greatly from city to city. Few councils went as far as those 
of Dresden, Leipzig, and Chemnitz, which on November 3 jointly 
welcomed the collapse of capitalism and the seizure of power 
by the revolutionary proletariat. 16 But even less radical 
councils expressed a commitment to significant chanee in the 
governing system. In Darmstadt, the SPD-controlled Workers' 
and Soldiers' Council demanded "the Republic, equal rights for 
troops and officers, participation of soldiers in the power of 
command and discipline."l7 In the town of Diez, outside of 
Frankfurt, the Soldiers' and People's Council announced that 
it would work towards "complete democratization, abolition of 
militarism."l3 The Council in Nurernberg announced that it would 
"do its utmost in order that the complete transformation of our 
governmental and political situation take place quickly and 
peacefully." 19 In Dortmund, the program issued by the Council 
on November 10 proclaimed its long-term goals to be "political 
and social revolution (UmwHlzung) in the sense of democracy and 
socialism." Dortmunders proposed a variety of revolutionary 
actions: a takeover of military power and creation of popular 
security forces, and control by the Council of all industrial 
firms, banks and transport institutions.20 
The minimal program common to nearly every council was 
"democratization" of the government, economy, society, and 
military. Soldiers seemed to have the clearest idea of what 
they meant by democratization; their demands typically included 
part or all of the "Ilamburg points" adopted by the first 
Congress of Councils, which encompassed the election of officers 
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by soldiers, the exercise of comrnand over garrisons by local 
workers' and soldiers' councils and the abolition of all insignia 
of rank. 21 \lorkers' vision of democratization was less concrete, 
but seemed always to mean the establishment of popular, democratic 
control over the institutions of the government and the economy, 
in order to make them responsive to the interests of the working 
major±ty. 
The head of the Council in G8ttingen, Sirnon St!idtler, provided a 
particularly clear Statement of the basic goals of most of 
Germany's revolutionaries. St!idtler had left the SPD for the 
USPD in November 1913; a china painter by trade, he was a 
soldier when the Revolution began. The first order of business, 
according to St!idtler, was to end the war and put a stop to 
militarism. The representatives of the monarchic "authoritarian 
state," especially the Kaiser, had to step down to make way for 
a people's state. For the time being, revolutionaries must 
cooperate with the "representatives of the overthrown order," 
because their expertise and experience were required for military 
and economic demobilization. Later, the structures of the 
authoritarian "military and administrative state" had to be 
"fundamentally altered" and replaced with democratic structures. 
He also favored elections to a constitutional assembly that would 
determine the form of Germany's parliamentary democracy. 22 
St!idtler had no specific idea of how to implement these goals; 
he certainly did not advocate the most radical path. But it is 
clear he meant his revolution to bring about fundamental change. 
St!idtler wanted not only to end the war, but to end militarism. 
He wanted not only to set up a republic, but to change the 
structures of the military and the administration. He was 
willing to cooperate wi th the \Jilhelmine bureaucrats, but only 
temporarily. Rank-and-file workers all over Germany shared 
St!idtler' s goals. Al ti10ugh some revolutionaries demanded more, 
this minimumprogram would have itself revolutionized Germany. 
Once workers had established councils and made clear their 
expectations, most drastically curtailed their direct participation 
in revolutionary activities. In almest every city, leaders of 
the socialis t parties took over the direction of the llorkers' 
Councils; rank-and-file workers who remained active took 
Subordinate positions. There is no evidence of dissatisfaction 
with this trend; it allowed workers to turn their attention to 
struggles in the workplace: increasing wages and decreasing 
hours. The months of ~ovember and December were characterized 
by strikes, demands and renewed demands for the eight-hour day, 
an increase in wages despite the decrease in hours, and better 
conditions on the shop floor. 23 Trade union leaders in 
DUsseldorf found it difficult even to keep up with the varied 
and rapidly changing demands in individual factories. 24 llorkers 
in Dortmund also left trade unionists behind; with demands and 
work stoppages they forced concessions on wages and hours from 
their employers.25 
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The transfer of activities from the political arena to the 
workt)lace did not mean that workers ceased to care about attempts 
to democratize the state apparatus. They were willing to show 
their support for revolutionary changes whenever their leade~s 
asked for it or when workers decided themselves that the gains 
of early November were threatened. Usually such actions took 
the form of a demonstration in favor of the local Workers' and 
Soldiers' Council. \fuere councils came under attack from more 
conservative parties or citizens, workers sometimes played a 
crucial role in preserving the power of the councils by 
demonstrating their support. In JUlich, many workers turned 
out for a public meeting called by the Center party, which was 
known to be highly critical of the Council. They interrupted 
the Social Democrat who defended the Council with frequent 
applause and hooted down the speaker who attacked the Council 
with riotous calls of "scoundrel!" and "counter-revolutionary!"26 
Although these expressions of class conflict in previously quiet 
Jlllich must have astonished the town fathers, it was this 
popular support that enabled the Council to continue its 
existence until the town was occupied by Belgian troops on 
December 2. In DUsseldorf workers turned out for three important 
demonstrations; each defused serious Opposition. Several thousand 
workers marched in support of the creation of the Council on 
November 10. Thousands responded to the Council's call to 
defend socialism and freedom against the Counterrevolution on 
December 11. The local newspaper reported that many SPD members 
took part, despite the fact that the SPD had officially left 
the Council . On January 13, many workers put down their tools 
in order to participate in a series of mass meetings sponsored 
by the Council, which was now controlled by the Spartacists.27 
In Erfurt, where moderate independents worked comfortably 
tagether with the SPD in the Council, workers went beyond the 
requests of the Council in order to defend the Revolution. On 
January 14 workers learned of the planned departure of troops 
from Erfurt for Berlin. Fearing these troops would be used 
against revolutionaries by _Ebert's 3overnment, they called a 
one-day general strike; twenty thousand marched in the streets 
and the Council agreed to prevent the departure of the troops. 23 
The evidence from worker demands and council pronouncements shows 
the revolutionary nature of workers' goals. Revolutionaries all 
across Germany consciously and consistently defended their 
radical policial demands, despite the fact that workers expended 
most of their energy in November and December on the improvement 
of their position in the workplace. But after the early days of 
the Revolution, they required either a specific request from 
their leaders or serious provocation be~ore acting on political 
issues. Having made clear in the first days of the Revolution 
the framework in which they expected their leaders to operate, 
most workers trusted their political parties to formulate and 
resolve questions concerning the state. Hore importantly, both 
rank-and-file workers and their socialist leaders assumed that 
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the Revolution was over in early i~ovember and that the transition 
to a democratized state and society could proceed without further 
battle. This assumption promoted the turn away from politics 
to the workplace and explains why a working class that genuinely 
desired revolution left the transformation of the state in the 
hands of its leaders. 
THE STRUGGLE FOR PmmR 
The seizure of power had not actually been completed on November 
3 or in the days following. The llilhelmine governmental rnachinery 
was still intact, under the control of bureaucrats loyal to the 
old order. Dur±ng the months of November and December, councils 
and local bureaucracies struggled over the extent to which working-
class demands for democratization would be satisfied. 
Councils had drastically different perceptions of their functions. 
Some, frequently those dorninated by the SPD, perceived 
themselves as caretal:er administrations, holdin3 power only 
provisionally. Because the SPD's policy was to await national 
elections before undertaking democratization, its representatives 
in the councils tried to follow a caretaker approach, regardless 
of demands expressed by workers. Those councils that did not 
act as revolutionary agents concentrated instead on maintaining 
order and the well-being of the population. The Soldiers' Council 
in JUlich announced it was only empowered to maintain calm and 
security in the town, and the committees set up by the Workers' 
and Soldiers' Council there were directed exclusively towards 
the temporary concerns of the population: security, housing for 
returning troops, and distribution of food and clothing. 29 In 
Cassel, the \lorkers' and Soldiers' Council sought to work with the 
existing City Council rather than to replace it. Two Council 
members became alderrnen of the Cit3 Council and were responsible 
for military and civilian affairs. 0 In G8ttingen two Council 
members joined the town government, but only in an advisory 
capacity, despite the previous agreement that all decisions of 
the local government had to be countersigned by a Council member. 
The Council's actions all concerned temporary problems--control 
of the black market and closing down dance halls in order to 
conserve light and heat.31 The mixed Council in Erfurt, composed 
of both USPD and SPD members, concentrated on a formal control 
of tne bureaucracy, securing of order, and providing food. It 
allowed the continued temporary employment of prisoners of war, 
and used its mm security force to guard the city's banks.32 
In Dortmund the Council acted only with the approval of the 
local government, completely disregarding its earlier radical 
resolutions.33 
Those councils that adopted a caretaker approach failed to begin 
the task of democratization. But this did not mean that such 
councils were useless or helpless. Not only did they aid the 
bureaucracy in the process of demobilization, but they also 
demonstrated their ability to override the bureaucracy when 
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they saw fit. GBttingen's Council authorized confiscation of 
food stuffs obtained illegally. 34 Although Frankfurt 1 s mixed 
Council was careful not to interfere with the internal 
administration of the city, it established committees that sought 
to control the operations of the police and the post office. 
Local officials were initially unable to dispute the Council's 
control of the regional railroad agency, while the Council worked 
towards the complete q·ansfer of the state railway into the 
hands of the workers.3) 
A~tivist councils considered themselves the rightful organs of 
governance and tried immediately to begin democratization at the 
local level. These councils were often strongly influenced by 
the USPD and were located in cities where a high concentration 
of armaments industries had restructured the local economy and 
attracted a large nurober of workers during the war. Activist 
councils pursued directly the goals expressed by workers in 
November. "Interference" (Eingriffe) in the government or the 
economy, as it came to be called by those who opposed it, was 
frequent and often successful in the early days of the Revolution. 
In the Thuringian towns of Gotha and Gera, the \lorkers' Councils 
dissolved the lViihelmine City Councils . In Leipzig the Workers' 
Council disbanded the City Council and threatened the local 
bureaucracy with a takeover of the Reichsbank if it refused to 
pay Council salaries with public funds. The Council in 
Braunschweig officially ended the Duke's power by declaring the 
property and estates of the ducal family tobe state property.36 
Some councils sought direct democratization in the economic and 
military s~heres. The Council in Hanau took over the management 
of a powder mill on November 9, at the same time hiring 
shoemakers and tailors to supply clothing to the population. On 
November 14 the Council forbade the firing of anyone in the 
city . 37 In Dllsseldorf, during the first few days of the 
Revolution, the Council deposed the police chief for his harsh 
behavior towards the Socialists during the war, announced its 
intention to establish its own system of justice, and dissolved 
the political section of the police force.38 
Even activist councils, however, reduced their direct action 
after the first days of victory. Few revolutionaries, leaders 
or rank-and-file, seemed to fear the ability or the will of the 
bureaucracy to thwart the Revolution, and nearly all council 
members shared the view of St~dtler in G8ttingen that local 
bureaucrats possessed expertise essential to the period of 
demobilization. The DUsseldorf Council, relying on its ability 
to control its former enem3~ invited the police chief to resume 
his position the next day. In Nurernberg the Council madc an 
agreement with the may<or that "municipal colleagues" would 
remain at their jobs "under the terms of the laws in force."40 
Councils in general contented themselves \vith supervising the 
city and county governmental apparatus. The typical pattern 
was for one or two revolutionaries to be placed in the office of 
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the mayor and county president and sometimes on the city 
council. Often council committees assigned to certain problems--
such as housing or clothing--coordinated their activities with 
the lnlhel:mine department also responsible for that area. In 
most towns, the councils or their delegates carried out the 
function of "overseer" in a remarkably casual fashion. 
It is apparent that the failure of the councils to satisfy 
working-class demands was in part the fault of the councils 
themselves. Especially in the first days of the Revolution, 
councils could wrest power from local governments, although the 
political composition of a council frequently determined whether 
it sought such power. Activist councils that moved rapidly were 
able to establish considerable authotity. Even councils that 
worked in cooperation with the local Wilhelmine government often 
succeeded in carving out their own sphere of control. Thus those 
council leaders who failed to take advantage of the revolutionary 
power given them by workers were to some extent responsible for 
the paucity of change. But this failure of leadership is not 
the whole story. ßoth caretaker and activist councils met 
significant resistance in their attempt to make changes. Local 
bureaucracies and the new national and provincial governments 
hindered the councils 1 ability to implement revolutionary demands. 
In virtually no case did local civilian authorities resist the 
Revolution at its inception. Host mayors, city councils, and 
county presidents announced not only their willingness to 
cooperate with the revolutionaries, but also their acceptance 
of the councils as the high es t local authori ty. They "stood on 
the ground of the Revolution," as the contemporary phrase had 
it. But this capitulation was a curious one. lfany Wilhelmine 
officials couched their acceptance of the new order in language 
similar to that of District Commissioner (Landrat) VUllers from 
Jillich: 
I explained to him /the head of the JUlich Council7 
that under the current conditions I would have to give 
way to coercion, and that I was ready to support the 
\lorkers 1 and Soldiers 1 Council, insofar as it concerned 
the maintenance of calm and order, and the securing of 
food for the people. But otherwise I would be true 
to my oath of office, sworn to my king, and would 
carry out my duties to the best of my knowledge and 
conscience •••• 41 
The district commissioner intended to limit his cooperation 
with the revolutionaries as much as possible; his suoport for 
the local Council, as he explicitly stated, had been obtained 
by force. For VUllers and the many bureaucrats who shared 
his attitudes capitulation was a tactical maneuver that allowed 
them to retain control of governmental machinery. They used 
the freedom of action afforded them by the councils 1 policy of 
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oversight to influence council policies in a moderate direction, 
to obstruct specific council plans, and to reassert their right 
to determine policy. 
Bureauerats were of .ten successful in persuading revolutionaries to 
follow certain policies, as in Jlllich where the Council members 
had few plans of their own. 4Z In lüesbaden the mayor convinced 
the Council to let him proof the list of potential members of 
the new security force in order to screen out a large number of 
Leftists.43 Even in more radical cities, councils were subject 
to persuasion. The Harnburg Council chose to re-establish the 
city legislature after representatives of banks and commercial 
firms convinced the Council head that the action was necessary 
to facilitate credit for the city.44 Where persuasion failed, 
local authorities sometimes tried to use their continued control 
over the governmental machinery to prevent council activities. 
In Erfurt and Leipzig, the city governments tried to prevent 
specific Council activities by withholding funds.45 Vllllers 
in Jlllich simply refused to sign regulations placed before him 
by Council members.46 The most common means of obstruction, 
however, was to argue with the council over each new policy 
decision, questioning whether the policy was correct and whether 
the council had the authority to implement the policy. The 
lViihelmine departmen ts in charge of DUsseldorf' s clothing and 
food distribution disputed at every step the Council's right to 
make decisions in these areas, and this considerably slowed 
the Council's actions.47 In Nurernberg a member of the Council 
described the problem: "If the l~orkets' Council wanted to da 
something, the officials always restrained it."48 
This gradual revival of the particular powers of the bureaucracy 
led to a reassertion of its primacy in the governing sphere. 
In Hanau the Council appointed one of its members, Dr. Wagner, 
as provisional district commissioner. Wa3ner constantly 
conflicted with the local county commissioner, Schmid, about the 
proper division of duties. \fuen the Council asked Schmid to 
resign, he refused, and at the end of December, he moved his 
office to Frankfurt in order to be able to carry out his duties 
without 1/agner's or the Council's interference.49 Schmid ceased 
altogether to acknowledge the authority of the Council. 
Councils reacted to the bureaucracy's reassertion of power in 
different ways. The Council in Jlllich did not tr0 to force the recalcitrant district commissioner to cooperate.5 But other 
councils fought back. Although responding to repeated attempts 
at obstruction took up an increasing amount of energy, councils 
were sometimes successful. The Dllsseldorfers took over the 
city's clothing and food supplies despite bureaucratic 
objections; the Council confiscated and redistributed black-
market goods found in house-to-house searches and at factories, 
in the face of bureaucratic insistence that s~ch actions should 
be reserved for the "legitimate" authorities. 1 In Gelnhausen, 
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SchlUchtern, and Biebrich-Wiesbaden in Hesse-Nassau, district 
commissioners lost their jobs due to council actions.S2 In 
Nuremberg , the mayor agreed to the early retirement of a police 
official who had made hirnself particularly unpopular with the 
working po~ulation.S3 
Councils also sought to prevail over their local adversaries 
by appealing to the new national government in Berlin. The 
Council in Erfurt complained to the Council of People's Commissars 
on December 30 that the local government refused to pay the sum 
previously agreed upon for the creation of the Volkswehr.54 The 
national government was particularly appropriate as an arbiter 
between councils and the Wilhelmine bureaucracies, because both 
parties recognized it as the highest national authority. 
Unfortunately for activist local councils, however, the new 
government, even when headed by a coalition of USPD and SPD 
members, was disinclined to countenance "interference" by 
councils in the affairs of local bureaucracies. When in 
December a BUrgerrat was founded in Elberfeld in explicit 
competi tion wi th the \vorker s' and Soldiers' Council, the la tter 
forbade all activities of the former. Members of the BUrgerrat 
complained to the Central Council in Berlin, which supported 
the BUrgerrat on all points. 55 The DUsseldorfers' attempt to 
create a special courtwas forbidden by the Council of People's 
Commissars. 56 
The attitudes of the new provincial governments, usually although 
not always dominated by the SPD, served as well to stiffen the 
resis tance of local bureaucracies. \vhen Dis trict Commissioner 
Schmid from l!anau complained to Berlin in December about Council 
encroachments on his duties, the Prussian Uinistry of the Interior 
responded that the Council was to "enable the District Commissioner 
Schmid to resume his duties again in their entirety." The needs 
of demobilization and food distribution required that the 
administration in l!anau remain in "trained hands."57 Wilhelmine 
school authorities in DUsseldorf fought the Council's attempt 
to end religious instruction; the Prussian Ministry of Education 
decided the Council was "not empowered to interfere in the 
educational system."S8 The provisional governments of Saxony and 
Baden promulgated regulations on November 16 and 13, respectively, 
restricting the functions of \vorkers' and Soldiers' Councils 
to those of control and advice. 59 The new Prussian government 
issued a series of rules in November that officially protected 
local \lilhelmine governments from changes initiated by councils. 60 
These regulations were welcomed by city governments, who wasted 
no time in bringing the weight of the provincial and national 
governments to bear in their struggle with local councils. On 
January 21, 1919, the Workers' and Soldiers' Council of Hannover, 
firmly controlled by the SPD, summed up the situation by 
complaining "that recent decrees of the Reich and Prussian 
governments in effect curtailed the activities of the councils 
and prevented their representatives from doing useful work."6l 
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Under cover of their capitulation to the revolutionaries, city 
governments were extremely effective in retaining power and 
limiting council activities. The determination and strength 
local bureaucracies demonstrated in November and December 
explains to a !arge extent the inability of councils to begin 
democratization. In the long run, USPD-dominated councils, which 
actively sought to restructure the local governments, were hardly 
more successful than the SPD-controlled councils. Instead of 
making good on activist statements and plans articulated in 
early November, councils found it necessary to expend their 
energies on battles with the bureaucrats. In these battles, 
however, the bureaucrats had powerful allies. The national and 
provincial governments used their influence repeatedly to defend 
the position of the local Wilhelmine governments. By January 
1919 the outcome of this struggle for power was apparent: The 
goals of democratization and limited socialization remained 
unfulfilled. 
ALIENATION 
In the winter and spring of 1919, increasing numbers of workers 
began to recognize that neither local councils nor the national 
government were implementing the goals expressed so strongly 
at the beginning of the Revolution. \Jorkers began to return 
to the political arena to protest the lack of progress and to 
reassert their demands. Ultimately, the fact that their 
leaders, particularly the SPD, ignored or repressed these renewed 
demands for democratization led to working- class alienation 
from those leaders and from the Republic that they had established. 
But this process was a gradual one. 
Most workers apparently still had faith in their traditional 
party on January 19, 1919, when they elected representatives to 
the Constitutional Assembly. Nationally, the SPD far outdistanced 
the USPD, although the latter party had been far more vocal and 
active in its support of democratization. As can be seen in 
Table 9.1, this was evident even in Ilamburg, where the local 
chapter of the SPD had openly opposed direct democratization. 
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Table 9.1 
Percentage of Vote Given to Socialist Parties, January 19, 1919 
(Selected Cities) 
City SPD USPD 
GBttingen 37 1 
Harnburg 51 7 
'Hanau 31 27 
Erfurt 21 37 
DUsseldorf 15 25 
All Germany 37.9 7.6 
Sources: Popplow, 234; Comfort, 55; Struck, 414; Gutsche, 195; 
Dllsseldorfer Volkszeitung, January 21, 1919; Morgan, 443. 
In the radical cities of Erfurt and Dllsseldorf, the SPD's showing 
was more respectable than might have been expected. Despite 
widespread worker support for democratization and for the 
councils, most workers had voted in traditional patterns. Since 
workers had never abandoned their original goals, it seems likely 
that they expegted their prewar leaders to recognize and implement 
their demands. 2 
Yet even as the SPD was celebrating its election victories, 
workers began to express their disappointment with the slow pace 
of change. Workers made their views known with widely varying 
methods: complaints, demonstrations, strikes, and putsches. 
In most cases, the goals behind these diverse actions were 
similar to those expressed in November. The more radical 
methods employed in the spring of 1919 were a response to the 
earlier failure of the Revolution to satisfy its supporters. 
In many towns, disappointment with the lack of democratization 
of the state and military were mildly expressed. In Gl:lttingen, 
workers demonstrated on lfarch 5 about the inequitable 
distribution of food; at the same time they demanded that "the 
officials should declare themselves for democracy, or resign; 
social reforms should not only be promised, but also realized. n 63 
In February, the Huremberg Soldiers' Council used the occasion 
of Kurt Eisner's assassination to issue a ten~point program 
which would "finally" secure the Revolution; the program included 
demands for the creation of socialist ministries, thorough 
scrutiny of officials, abolition of the privileges of the 
aristocracy and the wealthy, and immediate socialization of the 
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largest factories.64 In Badenastate conference of councils 
held in January announced that the councils would continue 
to exist until the success of the Revolution was guaranteed by 
the National Assembly; that is, until local elections could 
take place, the democratic republic and the eight-hour day 
were securely established, the people 1 s army created on a 
democratic basis, and the process of socialization begun in 
appropriate industries.65 These demands fairly sum up what 
Germany 1 s working-class revolutionaries had expected all along. 
Elsewhere workers 1 dissatisfaction \vith the results of the 
Revolution erupted in unorganized demonstrations and riots. In 
Hanau serious disturbances followed a meeting on February 17 in 
which the new national government was criticized. The next day 
the county court and police jail were stormed; ration cards were 
taken from the town hall, thrown in the street, and burned; 
food was stolen from the storage center. The following day the 
chateau be].onging to the Landraf, the district President, was 
plundered. 0 6 In Harnburg unrest broke out on several occasions. 
\lorkers demonstrated against the occupation of Bremen by 
Gustav Noske 1 s troops in February; in April a demonstration of 
the unemployed turned into a two-day riot; and in June workers 
rioted over the quality of food produced by local manufacturers. 
\fuen the first detachments of Noske 1 s troops arrived in June, 
they were disarmed by the workers.67 Although these spontaneous 
actions by enraged workers did not always have direct political 
aims, even demonstrations about food were directed against the 
moderate policies of the new government and against the 
unwillingness of the bureaucracies to respond to the needs of 
the workers. 
In a large number of cities, workers were alienated enough to 
progress to concerted action in the form of putsches and strikes. 
In DUsseldorf, the fifteen-hundred mansecurity force incited the 
radicals in the Council, both Spartaeist and independents, to 
reverse the slow decline of the Revolution by taking over the 
Council and the city government on January 7. Leaders of the 
putsch accused members of the bureaucracy of counterrevolutionary 
actions and the old Council of indecisiveness. "In order to 
secure the Revolution," the reconstituted Council took direct 
action: Hostages from the bourgeois±e were seized, the police 
disarmed, banks and the telegraph office occupied, and the 
police chief, mayor, and county president replaced by appointees 
of the Council. The new Council also took a more activist 
stance towards DUsseldorf 1 s material problems, overruling the 
bureaucrats on issues of foo~ distribution, relief work, and 
housing construction. Although the leade~s of the putsch used 
more radical and violent methods than the revolutionaries in 
November, their goals were not substantially different: 
democratization of the government and subsequent inteß"aention 
in the economy in the interests of the working class. 
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These strikes and putsches, the better-known revolts in Berlin 
and Hunich, plus the declarations of soldiers in Nurernberg 
and workers in GBttingen, show that rank-and-file revolutionary 
activity was not confined to November,69 Attempts to impose 
revolutionary changes extended into the spring of 1919, when 
workers reiterated their former demands with more forceful 
methods.70 Theinability of socialist leaders of all parties 
to secure those initial goals caused these actions against the 
new governmen t. 
The SPD-dominated national government responded to these renewed 
demands for democratization and socialization by ignoring or 
repressing them. Neither the provisional government in Berlin 
nor the elected government in Heimar ever implemented the 
Congress of Councils •· vote favoring democratization of the 
military; democratization of the bureaucracy never got off the 
ground. The recommendations of the Commission of Nine about 
socialization of coal mines in the Ruhr were ignored; in Halle 
concessions concerning factory councils made to coal miners in 
February 1919 were rescinded in May.71 The sweep of Noske's 
troops from Bremen through the Ruhr and into central Germany 
and Munich left rap,e and resentment against the government in 
its wake. Government troops occupied Gotha on February 13 
because of the strength of the radical workers' movement there; 
workers responded with a general strike that lasted until 
t1arch 8.72 In other places, such as the Ruhrand Munich, 
armed workers resisted the advance of government troops. The 
new national government directed soldiers to end strikes and to 
fire on stubborn workers if necessary. These actions proved 
conclusively to many workers that the SPD government did not 
represent their interests. The use of troops against workers 
was the last of many steps on the path from revolution to 
alienation. 
Many workers demonstrated their changed attitudes at the next 
national election in June 1920. The SPD's share of the vote 
in Harnburg dropped to 33 percent, while the USPD' s rose to 
15 percent.73 In DUsseldorf the SPD's votes declined to 7 percent, 
and the USPD's increased to 36 percent.74 All across the nation, 
the increase in the independents' share of votes (from 7.6 to 
18.3 percent) and membership (from approximately 100,000 in 
1913 to 900,000 in September 1920) reflected working-class 
disillusion with the SPD's stewardship of the Revolution. 75 
Indeed, it could be argued that the use of troops against the 
very supporters of the Revolu.tion had the effect of repressing 
radicalism only in the short run. !1any of the occupied cities 
later became centers of strong communist influence. Hanau, 
for example, became a "primary strong-point of the communist 
movement for a wide area in southwest Germany."76 The extent 
of workers' bitterness also became apparent in the aftermath of 
the Kapp Putsch in March 1920; workers in the Ruhr struck to 
save the Republic from the right-wing coup, but then used the 
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occasion to reestablish workers' councils and to reiterate 
demands for socialization and democratization, especially of 
the army. A portion of the Red Army formed to fight counter-
revolution turned against government troops. 77 The Weimar 
government continued the provisional government's policy of 
repressing revolutionary protests; as a result, it had to bear 
the hostility of a significant part of the working class. 
The fact that many members of the working class failed to value 
the Weimar Republic as crucial to the defense of their interests 
surely contributed to its instability. This alienation had its 
institutional reflection in the fact that approximately half of 
the members of the USPD, the party most supportive of the 
Revolution, joined the KPD, a party committed to the overthrow 
of the Republic. 73 \-leak working-class support may well have 
been part of \leimar' s inability to resist Nazism. As the 
strength of its right-wing enemies grew, the Republic could 111 
afford the alienation of November's revolutionaries. 
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The Failure of 
German Labor in 
the Weimar Republic 
RICHARD GEARY 
In talking of the "failure" of labor in the \veimar Republic, 
two points of clarification must first be nade. This discussion 
does not address itself to the question of the failure of the 
revolutionary Left to bring about a socialist revolution in 
Germany in the aftermath of the First World \var: for that is a 
question which is not peculiar to Germany but has relevance for 
the whole of Europe outside Russia and has been treated elsewhere.l 
Ilowever, t:wre is one way in which the upheavals in Germany 
between 1913 and 1923 do relate to subsequent develo?ments; 
namely, the failure of the revolutionary forces to purge the army, 
judiciary, and civil service of antidemocratic elements. It 
can be aruged that the German Social Democratic party (SPD) could 
have allied with popular democratic pressure from workers' and 
soldiers' councils to institute such a pur~;e. This it chose 
not to do, but rather threw in its lot '~ith the German General 
Staff against not only the threat of "bols:tevism" but against 
popular protest more generally. In so doing, the leadership of 
the SPD not only betrayed its socialist goals, but helped to 
undermine the prospects of successful democracy and can itself 
be held responsible for the creati.on of a mass conununist movement, 
alienated from the new Republic, in these early years. 2 For in 
Aus tria, where the Social Democrats relied on armed workers 
and did not employ Freikorps to smash the left, the political 
arm of the labor movement remained united.3 
A second qualification must also be made: In many respects 
labor did not fail in the \veimar Republic. For despite the 
survival of antidemocratic elites and capitalist property 
relations, the new Republic conferred substantial benefits on 
the German \vorkin3 class or at least on its representatives. At 
178 Towards the Holocaust 
the local level, many municipalities under Social Democratic 
control embarked upon housing schemes, the provision of adult 
education, and the building of parks, stadiums, and the like. 
At the national level, the law concerning factory councils 
recognized the role of the trade unions as official counselors 
and negotiators, freedom of assembly and coalition was 
constitutionally guaranteed, and a system of state arbitration 
in wage disputes leading to binding settlements upon both 
employer and unionwas established.4 In fact it was precisely 
this last system that gave rise to opposition from industry and 
led to a head-on confrontation with the state in the great 
lockout in the Ruhr iron and steel industry in 1923, when the 
employers sought not just a particular wage settlement but the 
destruction qf the whole apparatus of compulsory and binding 
arbitration.5 The \leimar Republic further guaranteed the right 
to work, instituted unemployment benefits, and even provided 
social securi ty payments for those lvorkers (about 250,000 
of them) locked out in the Ruhreisenstreit of 1928.6 The 
enormaus change that such legislation initiated, when compared 
to the harsher realities of industrial conflict in the Wilhelmine 
period, goes some way to explain the SPD's attachment to 
constitutional forms of struggle in the early 1930s. 
The central concern here is the failure of German labor to prevent 
the demise of the new Republic, from which it derives certain 
benefits, and to halt the Nazi seizure of power. On one point 
things are relatively clear: The Weimar Republic did not collapse 
because the German industrial working class deserted it for 
the National Socialist party (NSDAP). The Nazi industrial 
worker was atypical both as a wcrrker and as a Nazi. That this 
should have been so is at first sight perhaps surprising. The 
Party began as a workers' party in 11unich, called itself the 
National Socialist Horkers' party, and until the late 1920s 
addressed its propaganda largely to the working class of Germany's 
large industrial towns. 7 Its Left ~nng, around the Strass er 
brothers (and in the early days, Joseph Goebbels), stressed the 
anticapitalist elements of Hazi ideology and criticized the SPD 
for its "betrayal" of the working masses both after the First 
World Uar and in the early 1930s, when the SPD tolerated the 
government of Chancellor BrUning and failed to offer any 
alternative to his deflationary economic policies,3 As an 
alternative, the Nazis suggested a job-creation scheme of public 
works.9 They also established their own factory cell organization 
(NSBO-National Socialist Factory Cell Organization), which 
claimed only three thousand members in January 1931 but had 
three hundred thousand by December 1932.10 According to some 
aommentators, this effort reaped rich dividerids: Max Kele has 
claimed, for example, that by the beginning of 1933 the Nazi party 
was a party primarily of workers, be they blue- or white-collar. 11 
It is certainly true that there were places in which the NSDAP 
won a significant percentage of working class votes: in parts 
of the Ruhr (especially in t~e area araund Essen), in parts of 
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Berlin, parts of Thuringia (especially Chemnitz-Zwickau), 
Brunswick, Hanover, and Breslau.12 Claims have also been made 
that the Nazi paramilitary organization, the SA, recruited 
primarily from workers (63 percent of its memQership were 
workers according to Conan Fischer).l3 
All such calculations need to be treated with extreme caution. 
Even Kele admits that the Nazi party was not proletarian in 
its social composition for most of the 1920s and other commentators 
agree.l4 Secondly, the membership of the NSBO in the early 
1930s lagged way behind that of the trades unions, which had 
traditionally represented labor and most of which were closely 
associated with either the SPD or the Catholic Centre party,l5 
Furthermore, the NSBO enjoyed greater support among white-collar 
workers and public employees than among the industrial working 
class of areas such as the Ruhr. 16 Indeed, this points to a 
major problern of definition: Nazi membership lists do not 
differentiate between artisans and factory workers when they 
talk about workers; and there is evidence that it was to the 
former rather than the latter that Hazi propaganda was most 
appealing. 17 An independent nonparty source attempting to 
differentiate alone these lines in 1930 significantly came to 
the conclusion tnat, in the DUsseldorf branch of the NSDAP, 
artisans constituted 34 percent of the membership and "industrial 
workers" only 14 percent. 13 Furthermore, if one compares the 
social composition of the Nazi party with the structure of the 
German population at large in this period it becomes clear 
that, whereas white-collar workers and the self-employed were 
overrepresented, the industrial working class was underrepresented 
in its membership. 1 9 Even the apparently proletarian nature of 
the SA is open to question: It has been claimed that Fischer's 
statistics do not stand up to close scrutiny for they are collated 
from very different data and depend partly upon the composition 
of SA men arrested, when, of course, the lower-class elements 
within the organization might generally be expected to 
predominate among the ranks of violent militants. 20 In any 
case, even if it were true that the SA was predominantly working-
class in its social composition, we would still be left with 
the problern of identifying what "working-class" actually meant 
in this context. It should further be noticed that the ideology 
of the SA was markedly different to that of the more petty 
bourgeois party organization.21 
Analysis of voting returns throughout the Reich also suggests 
that the Nazis did not find their major support from the working 
class of the great industrial centers. Indeed, it was precisely 
for this reason that from 1927-23 the party's propagandawas 
turned away from the factory worker towards the peasant, small 
businessman, and shopkeeper. 22 The NSDAP was most successful 
at the polls in rural areas and small provincial towns, not in 
the large cities;23 and in areas that were Protestant, not 
Catholic.24 Thus the combined vote of the SPD and the German 
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Communist party (KPD) remained more or less constant at araund 
37 percent of the poll, despite the electoral triumphs of 
National Socialism. 25 l~hen industrial workers did desert 
social demo~racy, they gave their support to the KPD and not to 
the l'azis; 2o and the same · seems to have applied to Catholic 
workers who had previously voted for the Center Party.27 This 
further gives lie to the myth that it was the unemployed manual 
workers who flocked to the Nazi colors.28 Unemployment was 
concentrated in !arge industrial towns of over 100,000 
inhabitants; that is, in precisely the places where the NSDAP 
fared relatively badly at the polls. 
That some industrial workers supported the Nazis cannot be 
doubted; but they constituted a decided minotity of the factory 
proletariat. In fact, working,-class nazism took root only in 
those places that lacked strong traditions of trade union 
organization; among workers who had not voted before, often in 
small towns, among public employees who may have had an elevated 
view of their own status, and perhaps among some who had tried 
other political medicines to eure the ills of ileimar--even 
communism and anarcho-syndicalism--which had failed.29 
That this was so can itself be explained by the specifics of 
Nazi propaganda and the NSDAP's social composition. The fact 
that the movement was lower-middle class in composition and 
that it supported higher food prices tax cuts, as well as 
wage and social service reductions,3Ö can hardly have made it 
attractive to industrial workers. Against this background the 
ability of the combined left-wing vote (SPD plus KPD) to maintain 
itself is scarcely surprising. It should further be added 
that the manual working class employed in factories constituted 
a lower percentage of the total labor force than might be 
imagined. After the First World War, the industrial working 
class ceased to grow as a percentage of the active population,31 
while calculations of itz size vary from about 30 percent to 
about 40 percent of the total work force.32 On the other hand, 
white-collar workers, who were more highly organized than their 
blue-collar colleagues by the early 1930s,33 grew in number at 
a fairly rapid rate,34 and the number of independent artisans 
and small shopkeepers still stood at 3 million in 1925. Tagether 
with their helpers they constitued something like 13.6 percent 
of the population at large.35 Furthermore, one-third of the 
German population was still dependent upon agriculture for its 
living in one way or another in the 1920s.36 When, in addition 
to the above, it is realized that women voters outnumbered their 
male counterparts in the Weimar Republic and that their voting 
behavior was markedly more conservative, 37 then the ability of 
the Communists and Socialists combined to poll more than the 
Nazis in the second Reichstag election of 1932 is quite 
extraordinary. It is even more so in light of the fact that 
manual industrial factory workers actually declined in number 
as a result of intensive rationalization in the period of 
so-called stabilization (1924-1923) and continued to decline 
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because the depression hit industry disproportionately hard 
in the early 1930s.33 
Thus, when Hitler assumed the chancellor's mantle in late 
January 1933, the Nazis confronted what was in the main a hostile 
workinß class in Germany's industrial centers. As we have seen, 
the combined electoral strength of the SPD and the KPD was 
greater than that of the National Socialist party in late 1932, 
while the Leftist paramilitary organization, the Reichsbanner, 
recruited far more men than did the Nazi SA.39 There is also 
evidence of considerable rank-and-file pressure within the 
Reichsbanner to take up arms against the forces of reaction, 
especially at the time of Chancellor von Papen's dissolution 
of the Social Democratic government in Prussia in mid-1932.40 
\~e are therefore confronted with the question: Why did the 
apparently powerful labor movement fail to translate its 
numerical strength into potent anti-Nazi action in the early 
1930s? 
The classic answer to this question has been that the division of 
the labor movement into antagonistic socialist and communist 
wings destoyed its capacity for united action and that the prime 
responsibility for this sorry state of affairs must be laid at 
the feet of the KPD and its instructors in t1oscow. 41 It is true 
that Russian influence within the German Communist party became 
increasingly strong after ThHlmann assumed the leadership of 
the party in 1925;42 and further that instructions to abandon 
cooperation with Social Democratic elements and pursue an ultra-
Leftist line of open hostility to the SPD were crucial in the 
determination of communist policy in 1927-2843 and again in 
1932.44 It could also be argued that the Stalinization of 
German Communism in the mid-1920s45 removed internal party debate 
and thus made the party extraordinarily inflexible and insensitive, 
both to the needs of the moment and to the interests of the 
German working class, as distinct from the interests of Soviet 
Russia. In the wake of the disastraus destruction of the Chinese 
Communist party (1927) at the hands of the Kuomintang, with 
whom Stalin and the Garnintern had advocated close cooperation 
previously, and with a swing to the left in Soviet domestic 
policy associated with the first Five Year Plan and the drive 
against the Kulaks, the Garnintern declared a policy of "class 
against class," that cooperation with reformist and centrist 
elements was to cease and that an age of revolution was at hand. 
This swing to the left was then reinforced by the onset of the 
world economic depression, which Stalin and his cronies chose 
to see as the final crisis of capitalism.46 In this third 
period, fascism and social democracy were identified as twin 
pillars of the captialist establishment, as tools of the 
bourgeoisie, and thus social democracy became social fascism.47 
According to the Comintern, capitalism was about to collapse.43 
Uence fascism itself could not survive and thus was not to be 
overestimated, as ThHlmann was still saying in 1931.49 Only if 
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the SPD misled the working class away from the revolutionary 
goal, therefore, would the triumph of socialism be prevented; 
and thus the first task of the KPD 1vas to unmask Social Democracy 
and only then to fight fascism.50 The KPD, therefore, was to 
conquer the mass of the German working class against the SPD 
and, for that matter, the old trade union organizations.51 
It is obvious that such short-sightedness was to prove fatal. 
Clearly the KPD underestimated both the ability of capitalism to 
survive and the strength of the Nazi threat. Its open hostility 
to the SPD and its creation of a separate trade union organization 
for Communists (RGO) further served to divide the labor movement 
and undermine the \1eimar Republic. There were even occasions 
when Nazis and Communists cooperated, as in the referendum to 
remove the Social Democratic government in Prussia and in the 
strike of Berlin transport workers in the autumn of 1932. 52 
Furthermore, the KPD developed a kind of Lagermentalität, an 
obsession with defending its existing constituency, which 
weakened its appeal to other groups. 53 Havirtg said this, 
however, the blame for the tragic division of German labor and 
its failure to prevent the Nazi seizure of power cannot be laid 
exclusively on the shoulders of German Communism. In the first 
place it is simply untrue to say, as some have done, 54 that the 
Communists did not take up arms against the Nazis. In fact 
they bore the brunt of the street fighting of the early 1930s 
and continued to do so in the Ruhr, for example, way into the 
first half of 1933. 55 In 1932 the KPD became less committed 
to the social faseist line,56 though it did not abandon 
the line completely.57 In some parts of Germany Communist 
and Social Democratic organizations collaborated against the 
Nazis, while individual KPD members disapproved of the violent 
campaign of vituperation against the SPD. 5ß 
This apart, it is perhaps more important to realize that the size 
of support for the KPD grew enormously59 at precisely the time 
that the party adopted its Leftist stand; which would suggest 
that the social fascism line was not simply a foreign importation 
but made sense to a significant section of the German working 
class in the early 1930s. In fact the hostility of the KPD 
to the SPD had domestic origins and considerable historical 
foundation. As we have already seen, bet1veen 1918 and 1923 the 
SPD was responsible for the bloody Suppression of leftist 
insurrections, often in collaboration with reactionary elements. 
Furthermore, the SPD, often in the shape of social democratic 
police chiefs and local authorities, continued its anticommunist 
campaign into the last days of Weimar. In Prussia, Communists 
were dismissed from public office by the Social Democratic 
government,60 while members of the KPD in llamburg, who tried 
to initiate a strike when Hitler became chancellor, were 
arrested on the instructions of the local SPD authorities.61 
Host famously of all, the Berlin Chief of Police, Karl Ztlrgiebel, 
a Social Democrat, banned the Uay Day demonstration of 1929. The 
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Communists ignored the ban but suffered a !arge number of 
fatalities and arrests at the hands of police.6 2 In such 
circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the KPD was loathe 
to build bridges to the SPD. Furthermore, the Confederation of 
German Trade Unions (ADGB), which was closely affiliated to 
the SPD, also mounted an anticonnnunist campaign in the depression, 63 
and, it has been suggested, even entered consultations with 
General Schleicher, chancellor in late 1932, and the Left wing 
of the Nazis concerning plans for a corporate state.64 Thus 
the designation of social faseist seemed not wildly untrue to 
some workers, who actually greeted the overthrow of the social 
democratic government in Prussia in 1932 with applause.65 Such 
feelings were further reinforced by the .SPD's close association 
with a republic that seemed to offer no hope to the unemployed 
in the early 1930s, by its toleration of the government of 
Chancellor Brllning from 1930 to 1932 and of his deflationary 
policies, which entailed cuts in wages and unemployment benefits, 
and by the deepening of the depression. They were also 
strengthened by the ADGB's support for the economics of 
rationalization in the mid 1920s, which entailed permanent 
unemployment for some sections of the working class. Such support 
for rationalization even went to the extreme of enthusiasm for 
the wonders of American capitalism, as witnessed by Fritz 
Tarnow's visit to the United States to "see for himself." 66 
The above helps to explain why the split in the ranks of German 
labor was not easily healed in the \leimar Republic. It is 
also important to realize that the leadership of the SPD, 
although most firmly committed to democratic principles, was 
itself guilty of misreading the situation in the early 1930s 
and of a failure to take action against nazism. There is 
considerable evidence that both the ADGB and the Social Democratic 
party underestimated the Nazi threat.67 So, for that matter, 
did the institutions of the Catholic working class.68 Furthermore, 
the SPD inherited from its survival of Wilhelmine persecution 
an almost fatalistic belief in its own invincibility and ultimate 
victory.69 This fatalism was reflected in a number of ways. 
Otto Wels claimed that "we were overtaken by the force of 
circumstances,"70 while the SPD and especially its leading 
economists, Rudolf Hilferding, placed their faith in a revival 
of the capitalist economy and thus failed to offer an alternative 
to Brllning.71 In this context, the ADGB was rather more 
adventurous and developed an ambitious scheme of work creation 
and public spending to counter the recession.72 However, this 
the SPD refused to adopt;73 and it was this refusal that was in 
part responsible for the Free Trade Unions' willingness to 
enter discussions with the Right of German politics.74 A 
further reflection of the fatalism of the Social Democratic 
leadership can be seen in its response to Papen's coup against 
Severing's administration in Prussia: Rather than fight this 
outrage by extraparliamentary means, the SPD preferred to sit 
back and hope ,for victory in the forthcoming parliamentary 
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elections.75 This reflects two other aspects of SPD attitudes 
that constrained the party at this vital juncture: 
constitutionalism and organizational fetishism. The SPD was 
the party of the \~eimar Republic76 and was conunitted to its 
constitution, which it sought to defend against both left and 
right. In a sense, it simply lost sight of the possibility of 
unconstitutional action or was horrified by the prospect of it. 
Equally, again partly as a result of developments under the 
Second Empire, German Social Democracy had become increasingly 
introverted, possessing the same kind of Lagermentalität as 
the KPD, but perhaps in a more exaggerated form. Both the SPD 
and the ADGB were gripped by an obsession with the preservation 
of their organizations, an Organisationsfetischismus, as Rosa 
Luxemburg had dubbed i t before the First \~orld \~ar. Thus as 
late as January 1933, Theodor Leipart, the chairman of the 
Gonfederstion of Free Trade Unions, could say "organization, 
not demonstration, is the word of the hour"77 while the SPD 
and the ADGB rejected the Conununist party's proposal for a united 
front in t!1e aftermath of the Reichstag fire (February 27, 1933) 
preciselB because they were afraid of forfeiting their legal 
status.7 
The ability of German Social Democracy to respond to the Nazi 
threat was further constained by its humanism, its fear of 
bloodshed, arid its horror of the prospect of civil war.79 Such 
hostility to violent action was not purely a matter of principle, 
however; it was also tactical. For some members of the SPD 
believed that the prospects of victory were remote, given the 
way the police and army were likely to respond.30 Such fears 
were well-founded when one considers what transpired in Austria 
in the following year: In 1934 a united labor movement was 
destroyed in a bloody civil war by the combined forces of 
clerical conservatism, fascism, and the army. The SPD leadership 
was aniO loathe to aCt without the guaranteed SUpport of the 
ADGB, and this \vas simply not forthcoming. 32 It is true that 
the Free Trades Unions did develop a work-creation scheme as an 
alternative to the deflationary policies of Brllning. However, 
such economic initiatives were not matched on the political 
front. Obsessed by the need to preserve its organizations in 
the face of falling membership rolls and financial difficulties, 
the ADGB was even prepared to enter negotiations with General 
Schleicher and some members of the :.<ational Socialist party to 
discuss the possibility of establishing some kind of corporate 
state.33 
This last point, however, leads to the major explanation of the 
paralysis of German labor in the early 1930s and its fragmentation--
the depression itself. It is remarl~ble how two recent articles 
on the Left at the end of the Weimar Republic devote a great 
deal of attention to the immobilism and paralysis of the SPD, 
for example, yet fail to mention the economic constraints under 
which left-wing politics had to be conducted in the last days 
The Failure of German Labor in the Weimar Republic 185 
of Weimar. 34 As others have realized, however, the depression 
had a profound effect upon the ability of the German Left to 
resist fascism.35 As Stephen Salter remarks, "the reasons for 
this relative passivity on the part of the working class and 
its organizations are largely to be sought in the effects of 
the economic crisis of 1929-33 on the German labor movement. n86 
Germany was hit disproportionately heavily by the world economic 
crisis;87 and within Germany it was the industrial sector that 
suffered most.38 In February 1932 unemployment reached a peak 
of 6,128,000, an official figure of the registered unew~loyed, 
which therefore probably constitutes an underestimate. 0 In 
the iridustrial sector, something like ~0 percent of male workers 
were without jobs, while another 16 percent were employed part-
time.90 Such high levels of unemployment meant . that large numbers 
of workers were robbed of industrial muscle: they were simply 
unable to strike; while for many of those still working, it 
became increasingly risky to engage in industrial action with 
such a large reserve ar~y waiting to replace them. The 
paralyzing effect of such unemployment was magnified by the fact 
that unemployment was especially marked in sectors that had 
traditionally formed the backhone of labor militancy, for 
example, metalwork and the building indus try, 91 and because the 
trade unions saw 50 percent of their membership jobless.92 
Unemployment further increased the rate of fluctuation of Communist 
party membership,93 which increasingly recruited from the ranks 
of the dole queue. By 1924 the KPD had become the party of 
the unemployed, and by 1932 over 30 percent of its membership 
were without jobs.94 Undersuch circumstances, the KPD was weak 
in the factories95 and forced to develop a politics based upon 
the neighbourhood.96 Thus the Germanlabor movement had been 
robbed of its industrial muscle by 1932. Under such circumstances, 
there was no likelihood of a repetition of a general strike such 
as that of 1920, \lhich had defeated the reactionary Kapp Putsch. 
Employers resorted more frequently to the lockout and with higher 
rates of success,97 while the trade unions forsook strike 
action and resorted to arbitration.9G 
In addition to weakeriing labor, the depression had another 
profound consequence: It exacerbated divisions at the very base 
of the labor movement. To a certain extent, the gulf that 
separated the Communist party from the SPD increasingly 
corresponded to a hardening of their separate constituencies. 
The KPD had always possessed a higher percentage of unskilled 
workers in its ranks than had German Social Democracy,99 and 
there is evidence from Frankfurt that it was becoming increasingly 
dependent upon the support of the unskilled by the late 1920s.l00 
More importantly, however, the KPD, as we have seen, essentially 
became the party of the unemployed, whereas employed workers 
tended to cling to the SPD, only 30 percent of whose members were 
unemployed in 1932, compared to the üO percent of the KPD.101 
Now this division between employed and unemployed might not have 
had such serious consequences had there been prospects for 
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re-employing most workers in the foreseeable future. But in 
the early 1930s this simply was not the case. The factor that 
caused such a deep cleavage in the ranks of German labor 
was permanent unemployment. For those in jobs, the situation 
was not ideal, in so far as real wages declined by about 20 
percent during the depression, 102 but their interests were 
manifestly different, at least in the immediate future, to those 
of the workers who were permanently unemployed and had nothing 
to thank lleimar for and nothing to lose by its destruction. 
In a sense the intensity of the anger directed by Communists 
against the SPD reflected this situation of despair. As the 
Austro-Marxist Max Adler remarked with great insight at this 
very time: "The working class itself has been burst asunder. 
By. its loss of unity and striking power, its lack of direction 
and its weakness in its most powerful section, the German working 
class ••• has dug its own grave instead of being the gravedigger 
of capitalism. • • • /jhe source of thi§7 is the differentiation 
within the proletariat ••• which had existed for decades 
at the upper levels, but has also become especially marked at 
the lower levels since the world crisis and its long-term 
unemployment. "103 
To this might be added the consequences of the intensive 
rationalization of German industry in the period between 1924 and 
1928, a process which made the economy less flexible in the face 
of the world economic crisis.l04 This rationalization entailed 
the closure of inefficient units, the amalgamation of giant 
companies, as in the case of I. G. Farben and the Vereinigte 
Stahlwerke, and the use of new techniques of mass production, 
especially the conveyor belt.lOS It also entailed a restructuring 
of the German work force, creating a clear division between 
the interests of those laid off in the process of rationalization 
and those who remained em~loyed and benefited from the increased 
productivity that ensued. 06 Germany entered a period of high 
structural unemployment, especially in the metal industry;l07 
and significantly, employed metalworkers disappeared from the 
ranks of the KPD in Frankfurt.l03 
The hardening of divisions within the working class also 
correlated to certain developments outside the factory. To a 
certain extent, the antagonism of Socialists and Communists 
reflected a conflict between the generations, for the membership 
of German Social Demo.cracy was noticeably older than that of the 
Communist party.l09 This conflict extended even to different 
styles of leisure and different attitudes to criminality. 
Increasingly the SPD came to be associated with the respectable 
working class, housed now in different neighborhoods than their 
rougher brethren.llO Thus, for example, whereas patterns of 
illegitimacy within the working class had been fairly uniform 
in the \lilhelmine period, a clear difference between the 
behavior of skilled and unskilled workers emerged between the 
wars; and this difference also correlated with different 
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residences and even KPD membership. 111 Furthermore, youth's 
alienation from the \leimar Republic may relate not only to the 
fact that the unemployed were often the young but also to the 
extent to which the young unemployed w.ere increasingly subject 
to harassment on the part of the state authorities, not only at 
the hands of the police but also of welfare officers, distributors 
of unemployment benefits, and so on. 112 Once a3ain, therefore, 
hostility towards the Weimar Republic and the SPD, which was so 
closely associated with it--the authorities youth encountered 
in Prussia, for example, were soaial democratic forees--was 
not simply a consequence of admittedly misguided Communist 
instruction. 
It may well be that there is no perfect match between the two 
left-wing parties beaause of these divisions at the root of the 
labor movement. The point, however, is that the depression 
robbed the German working class of its industrial weapon and 
fragmented it at its very base. In this, as much as in the 
political divisions between Social Democracy and communism, 
lay the real origins of impotence. 
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N azism in the Eyes 
of German 
Social Democracy 
RICHARD BREITMAN 
A campaign poster used by the Social Democratic party of Germany 
(SPD) in 1932 displays a muscular worker with a hammer raised 
over his head. In front of him, as if mounted on an anvil, 
is a three-dimensional swastika, one segment of which has 
already split off. The intent expression on the worker's face 
and the posed haiiDTier make it plain that he intends to demolish 
the swastika beneath him. 1 This picture reflected the political 
self-image of the SPD in 1932, not its political behavior. For 
a variety of reasons, the SPD was unable to devise an effective 
strategy to combat nazism in 1932-1933. 
!lost scholars who have written on the SPD at the end of the 
\~eimar Republic take the view that the SPD' s long-te rm problems 
contributed substantially to its failure. The SPD and the 
socialist trade unians ·had accommodated themselves to the existing 
political, social, and economic order. Horeover, their leaders 
were suspicious of mass action. Left-winß critics argue that 
the Social nemocrats had diluted their socialism too much; many 
non-Marxists believe that the SPD's revolutionary and class-
conscious rhetoric frightened off nonsocialist parties and voters 
alike.2 But both sides agree that the SPD elite, protected in 
many ways frora internal and external challenßes, became too 
passive long before 1932. 
In one res~ect, at least, the analysis has been incomplete. 
Much of the literature is concerned with the strength of ti1e 
worker in that poster or with the hanmer in his clenched hand.3 
But did he know what to strike at? · If not, why not? Would not 
his image of the swastika influence his choice of hammer and his 
angle of attack? Although there is some research on socialist 
and communist intellectuals' conceptions of fascism,4 there is 
very little work on the views of the SPD and the socialist unions. 
The period before 1930 is usually overlooked, and there is room 
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for further analysis of Social Democratic imap,es of nazism even 
after that date. Such analysis may help to pinpoint lvhich of 
the weaknesses of the Social Democratic movement were salient 
in 1932-1933, for errors in perception are sometimes the direct 
result of psychological defects. :1y hope is that this chapter 
will stimulate further research and discussion in this area. 
Contrary to one recent claim that the SPD enp,aged in no real 
discussion, let alone analysis, of fascism during the 1920s and 
even into the 1930s,5 some party authorities saw a parallel 
between Italian Fascism and the extreme rip,ht in Germany as 
early as November 1922. Virulent nationalism and attacks 
against the democratic system, use of paramilitary forces for 
political purposes, and attempts to draw the working classes away 
from socialism established a pattern that the SPD could hardly 
ignore after Uussolini's successful march on Rome. Yet the 
Nazis were not the only German group to be labeled fascist. 
The Bavarian Social Democrats, for example, tended not to 
distinguish among the many folkisil groups, even when the latter 
were quarreling amonp, themselves.6 The most striking attribute 
of the Nazis seemed to be their description of themselves as a 
workers' party. Still, it is significant that on the occasion 
of the collapse of the \lirth government in November 1922, 
Rudolf Breitscheid warned the SPD Reichstag fraction that forcing 
new elections might lead to .a faseist takeover of power.7 Thus, 
at least one important SPD deputy regarded the new right as a 
serious threat. 
Earlier that month Bavarian party and union representatives had 
held a conference to discuss the danger of a l~azi putsch and the 
need for countermeasures. The delegates concluded that such a 
putsch would threaten not only Bavaria, but the entire Reich. 
However, they recommended against the establishment of a 
working-class security force unless it had government support. 
After the experience of early 1919, when left-wing radicals 
terrified many middle-class Bavarians and provoked a repression, 
SPD and General Federation of German Trade Union (ADGB) 
offleials wished to avoid measures that would drive the middle 
classes to the right. One suggestion was that the printers, 
railway workers, and postal workers might quietly prepare to 
seal off any area affected by a Nazi putsch. The conference 
urged the Reich p,overnment to take stron3er action against the 
Nazis, and Peter Grassmann, a member of the ADGB executive, 
sent the results of the meeting to SPD Cochairman Hermann 
UUller.3 
In early 1923 the ADGB executive asked local union organizations 
to supply information about the strength and composition of the 
Nazi movement, with particular attention to whether workers were 
joining the NSDAP. Host local respondents saw little evidence 
of workers deserting the socialist camp for the Hational 
Socialists. llowever, the returns indicated that the NSDAP 
was unusual in its ability to mobilize so ~ny diverse groups: 
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forrner officers, students, young people, artisans, commercial 
employees, teachers, and civil servants. (One may conjecture 
that Social Democratic officials reßarded this diverse 
constituency as a weakness, rather than as a source of strength.) 
The two cities where the Nazis were apparently attracting 
substantial numbers of workers (although not socialists) were 
l!unich (2, JOO) and K8nigsberg. In l1unich the union cerrespendent 
noted that some forrner left-win~ radicals from 1919 were now 
caught up in the Hazi movement. This comment was not the last 
Social Democratic observation that the Nazis and the Communists 
had overlapping support and a common cause. For both parties 
were opposed to the parliamentary-del!locratic system, to which 
the SPD had committed itself. 
For the most part, however, SPD authorities linked the Nazis 
with other groups on the right. In April 1923 Hermann 
~1Uller-Brandenburg (SPD), Regierungsrat in the Thuringian Ministry 
of the Interior, assessed the battle strength of the various 
counterrevolutionary organizations, placing the NSDAP at the top 
of the list with 24,000 troops in Bavaria, \lUrttemberg, and 
Thuringia. The total nurober of counterrevolutionary troops was 
estimated at 71,000, which out•1eighed the police forces of the 
reliably republican states. 11Uller-Brandenburg concluded that 
the position of the arrny would be decisive in any civil war 
and he urged further efforts to re~ublicanize the military. io 
Like the Bavarian Social Democrats !:Jreviously, !1Uller did not 
recommend direct Social Democratic action against a right-wing 
coup. The state itself bore primary responsibility. 
Despite the actions of the SPD-led Prussian government against 
the i~SDAP, the lVilhelm Cuno government in the Reich refused to 
override the Bavarian government's resistance to curbs on Clazi 
Storrn Troops. The Bavarian Social 0emocrats reluctantly responded 
by forrning their own centralized force, the Social Democratic 
Order Service (SOD), recruiting some six to seven thousand men 
to defend political meetings and conduct demonstrations. 
Initially, the force was unarrned, but it later acquired some 
weapons. The SPD's reservations about this force are well 
illustrated by the offer to dissolve it if the Reich government 
would bring about the dissolution of Hitler's SA. In September 
1923 the Gustav Kahr government in Bavaria banned the SOD without 
touching the SA.ll 
In the fall of 1~23 a three-man Social Democratic delegation 
from !1unich went to Berlin to warn the SPD ministers in the 
Stresemann government of the danger of a faseist coup in Bavaria. 
According to an account wri tten much la ter by ~lilhelm lloegner, . 
one of the delegates, Finance lfinis ter Rudolf llilferding, agreed 
with their assessment and favored Reich intervention to arrest 
lli t ler. Ilowever, Interior Minister llilhelrn Sollmann disagreed, 
for he was more concerned about the possibility of a coup in 
and areund Berlin.12 In any case, the SPD ministers were unable 
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to persuade the cabinet to intervene against the will of the 
Bavarian government. 
One consequence of the Reich's apparent inability to protect 
itself during 1923 was the decline of SPD opposition to a 
republican volunteer defense force. Otto l!Brsing's emergency 
force in !1agdeburg was expanded to 25,00::>, and in October 
l!Brsine (SPD) made plans to supplement the efforts of the 
Reichswehr and Prussian police against a right-wing putsch. 
By early 1924 the SPD executive collllilittee was willing to sanction 
the establishment of a new national organization along these 
lines.l3 Its hope was that a republican organization, as 
opposed to a Social Democratic one, would not alienate the middle 
class. Eventually, the Reichsbanner Black-Red-Gold attained a 
membership of three million, but it was more effective in 
political marches and demonstrations than useful as a defense 
force. 
In one respect, the :<azi Beer-l!all Putsch in Hunich in November 
1923 should have impelled the SPD to refine its view of nazism. 
The "reactionary" ßavarian government and police prevented the 
Nazis from achieving even the first step in their plan to 
seize ·control of Germany. Yet Social Democratic spokesmen 
continued to denounce the Bavarian government's lenient treatment 
of the Nazis before and after November 1923. SPD experts on 
nazism such as \Jilhelm Hoegner placed more emphasis on the ties 
between the Uazis and the Right than on the differences.l4 
Rudolf Hilferding predicted at the SPD congress in 1924 that 
"the /restoration of thg7 monarchy 1wuld come first after the 
supression of Social Democracy, of the republicans, and /It would 
be7 supported by the illegal bands and death organizatio;:;s, 
dripping blood and filth like Italian Fascism."rs Hilferding 
in effect turned nazism into an auxiliary force for the 
monarchists. Paul Kampffmeyer published a study in 1924 entitled 
"National Socialisu and its Patrons." 16 Although he accurately 
described clazi ideology as racist and antidemocratic, he too 
lumped many of the SPD's foes togetller and stressed the Nazis 
turn to the bourgeoisie and particularly to heavy industry for 
support. The NSDAP. had apparently failed as a working-class 
party and was seeking a new identity. 
The Beer-Hall Putsch, the NSDAP's poor showing in the Reichstag 
election of December 1924 (3 pe;rcent), and the economic 
stabilization caused many SPD officials to dismiss German 
Fascism during the mid-1920s. In a 1925 speech Otto l~els 
derided the Nazis as folkish clowns.l7 Rudolf Hilferding 
expressed some concern about fascism in his main address to 
the SPD congress in 1927, maintaining that the former struggle 
between the uonarchy and the republic had been transformed into 
one between fascism and democracy. Yet Hilferding really 
argued that the traditional right (DNVP) had changed its 
direction; he had little to say about fascism itself as a 
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separate movement. Ililferding merely used the Italian example 
to lecture left-wing critics about what would occur if the German 
working class pursued only its economiic interests and failed to 
defend democracy. Since fascism was a continuing threat, the 
SPD could not revert to its pre-1913 position of opposition to 
the political system.l3 
Ililferding also lauded the achievements of the SPD-led Prussian 
government in protecting the lleimar Republic.l9 Prussia's 
record of dealing with the Nazis had been tougher than the 
Reich' s. In late 1922 Prussian Interior tlinis ter Carl Severing 
had banned the NSDAP under the terms of the Law for the Protection 
of the Republic, but Nazi reorganization maneuvers and subsequent 
court decisions blunted the effectiveness of this measure. On 
November 3-9, 1923, Severing mobilized the Prussian police in 
the event that a llazi putsch succeeded in Uunich . 20 Nor did 
Prussia overlook the HSDAP thereafter. \.fuen Hitler gave a speech 
in Munich in 1925 in which he foresaw passing over the corpses 
of his euernies after he gained power, the Bavarian government 
imposed a ban on his speaking in public. Prussia quickly 
followed suit.21 An aaalysis of radical right-wing movements, 
written in early 1927 in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, 
emphasized the danr,er posed by the SA and urged further legal 
action against the NSDAP. Yet there were other voices within 
party ranks. SPD Reichstag deputy ;(urt Rosenfeld recommended 
in 1927 that the speaking ban imposed on Ilitler be lifted, and 
the SPD's central newspaper Vorw!irts stated overconfidently: "It 
would please us if Hitler • • • were allmved to rave against the 
Jews, as he loves to do. "22 
SPD criticism of restrictions on civil liberties, along with the 
poor showing of the NSDAP in the 1928 Reichstag election 
(2.6 percent) may have induced Prussian Interior Hinister Albert 
Grzesinski (SPD) to lift the speakiag ban on Hitler in September 
1928. The Interior Ministry actually issued a press release 
in which it stated that the Nazis no longer represented a ser~ous 
danger to the Republic. 23 l.fuether or not this s taterneut is 
taken as sincere, even those who continued to show concern about 
the ;;sDAP focused only on its capabilii:y to carry out a putsch. 24 
Despite lifting the speaking ban on Ilitler, Grzesinski urged 
Prussian llinister-President Otto Braun (SPD) and Reich Interior 
Ilinister Severing in December 1923 to ban both the Nazi and 
Communist paramilitary forces.25 
Few inside the Social Democratic ranks perceived the significance 
of Nazi efforts during the mid-1920s to construct a strong 
political organization, develop new techniques of propaganda, 
and recruit new social groups. ßut as the Nazis gained strength 
in state, looal, and student elections during . l929, and as the 
economy deteriorated, some SPD analysts took another look. 
Ilowever, Social Democratic disdain for nazism interfered with 
perception. One party brochure, for example, desctibed the 
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Nazis as the successors of tl1e anti-Semi tic parties and the 
Pan-Germans. The Ilitler movement was said to contain not a 
single new idea; it represented the hopes of social reactionaries 
and monarchists. Anti-Semitism was simply a reflection of Hazi 
economic stupidity.2D Although noting the NSDAP's ability to 
mobilize the rural and urban llittelstand, another SPD writer 
described the Nazis as the tool of heavy industry.27 In early 
1930 SPD Cochairman Otto Wels charged that capitalists and 
possibly foreign faseist nations were subsidizing the Nazis. 23 
Such historical analogies and cui bono reasoning were 
counterproductive, because they led SPD officials to underestimate 
the novelty and independence of the Hazi movement. 
Better information was available by 1930. A detailed analysis of 
the NSDAP's finances, apparently written in the Prussian !1inistry 
of the Interior, cliscounted the significance of !arge donations. 
After breaking down llSDAP income from dues, public assemblies, 
and the press, ti1e author observed: "It may be correct that 
various big businessmen such as rardorff, Ilutschrnann-Plauen 
/sic7, and also some !arge landowners give substantial 
contributions. Even if these should reach the ten thousand 
level in individual cases, this . would represent only a minor 
fraction of the total income of the party from its own sources."29 
A few SPD officials were also complaining .that the party as 
well as the Reich and Prussian governments were not active enough 
agains t corrosi ve ilazi propaganda. llowever, their proposed 
remedy, more vigorous use of the Law for the Proteerion of the 
Republic,30 was likely neither tobe effective nor sufficient. 
By r.üd-1930 some very nerceptive cotmnentators raised new concerns. 
In an article in the socialist journal Die Gesellschaft, Carl 
liierendorff pointed out that, with a truly national organization, 
the !lazis were making substantial inroads among the middle 
class (bUrgerliche l1ittelschichten): employees, small farmers, 
students, and in places, young workers. !1ierendorff emphasized 
that the HSDAP had greatest success with previous nonvoters, 
many of whom were either indifferent to ~olitics before or 
disgusted with it now, 'i'he colorful, emotional activities and 
language of the Nazis reached these alienated citizens, whereas 
the SPD' s agitation assumed too much knowledge and insight on 
the part of the voters. Mierendorff doubted that the Nazis 
would fade away lil~e the anti-Semitic parties of the Second Reich 
or collapse as the result of internal dissension; the SPD needed 
to campaign actively a~ainst them.31 Another report, again 
apparently from within the Prussian Interior Hinistry, projected 
that an increase in Nazi parliamentary strength night lead to 
paralysis of the Reichstag and the various Landtaße, which 
could only increase citizen disaffection for the political system. 
If the Nazis could gain access to the government, they might 
use their power to destroy the state and establish a dictatorship.32 
Despite these strikingly accurate forecasts, most Social 
Democratic observers took le~s alarmist views. i<azism was still 
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seen as a new form of conservatism supported by those social 
strata adversely affected by the Drocess of economic 
concentration. i:ioreover, the parallel between Germany and Italy 
was not exact, because Germany was far more industrialized. 
That meant that the working class '.VIlS stronger, the antimodern 
eleraents of the middle classes far lveaker. !1ussolini 1 s Italy 
actually bore more resemblance to late-nineteenth-century 
Germany.33 Hhereas Social Democrats had once feared nazism 
because of its efforts to recruit workers, the belief that its 
constituency was substantially petty bour3eois was reassuring. 
rlazism seemed to represent no lon3-term threat in Germany; it 
was the initial product of neculiar ßavarian conditions and was 
now spread by t:l~ economic ~risis. 34 
The Reichstag election results of September 14, 1930, thus came 
as a colassal shock to most Social Democratic officials.35 The 
NSDAP's 6,4 million votes (18.7 !)ercent) and 107 Reichstag 
seats not only established this party as the second largest 
bellind the SPD; they also abruptly altered tl1e SPD's conce;:>tion 
of the danger. Julius Leber described in his menoirs the 
depression and helplessness of Social Democratic deputies faced 
with both the threatening flags of nazism and Communist victory 
cries as well. Even weeks after Septembe:r- 14, he said, the most 
inflexible pacifists in the SPD fraction lvalked throu~h the 
halls of the Reichstag asking everyone whether the Reichswehr 
could be relied upon in case of a putsch.36 Carl Severing, once 
again Prussian interior minister, soon added to the gloom by 
telling the SPD executive committee that he doubted whether the 
Prussian police could maintain control in the event of a Nazi 
putsch and Communist O!Jposition to a united front against nazism.37 
Yet the possibility of a Nazi coup was no longer the only serious 
SPD concern. The problern now was not to recognize the danger; 
i t was to figure out a r.1e t\lod to deal wi th all of the dangers, 
including that of Nazi entrance into a coalition government in the 
Reich. Once again the SPD leaders looked first to the government 
itself for assistance. Lacking influence over President 
Hindenburg, the SPD's hest hope was working with Chancellor 
Heinrich BrUning, a leader of the Center narty. In October 
1930 party officials concluded that BrUning's government 
represented the lesser evil, and the SPD began its controversial 
policy of toleration of BrUning , 33 
This policy rested on a number of judgments, most of which were 
not within the SPD's power to validate. First, the SPD had to 
decide that the defense of democracy against fascism was its 
highest priority, Second, the alternative to JrUning had to be a 
governnent that included Hitler. (This may not have been the 
only alternative.) Third, the chancellor had tobe induced to 
cooperate with the SPD on some key issues; otherwise the party 
might lose too much support. Finally, the Prussian government 
had to maintain sufficient leverage to protect the Re!)ublic 
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against a Nazi putsch. Although thß SPD took the first step 
in October 1930, the other requisites of toleration were lacking. 
The deepening depression and BrUning's misguided social and 
economic policies alienated the trade unions, the left wing of 
the ~arty, and some others as well.39 The SPD's fear of losing 
mass support made it increasingly uncomfortable about tolerating 
BrUning. But to break with Brlining was to risk political 
isolation, not only in the Reich, but also in Prussia. The 
loss of its Prussian stranghold would have been a severe blow 
for the SPD. By the spring of 1931 the debate within the 9arty 
over toleration became qui te angry, and the death of Hermann 
Mliller at the end of Harch deprived the SPD of its most skillful 
conciliator. 
The party congress held in Leipzig at the end of May and in early 
June focused on fascism and the SPD's toleration policy. The 
party leadership tried to educate its critics about the nature 
and dangers of fascism, while defending the toleration policy. 
Left-wing spokesmen denounced the BrUning government and urged a 
more vigoraus SPD policy inside and outside the Reichstag. 
The speeches and discussions at the congress indicated that a 
number of misconceptions about nazism prevailed on both sides. 
After Otto llels announced at the outset that the Nazis intended 
to restore the monarchy through terror and force,40 Rudolf 
Breitscheid, cochairman of the Reichstag fraction and the best 
speaker in the party, analyzed nazism in his main address 
entitled "Overcoming Fascism."41 He pointed out that loose 
usage of the term "fascism," for example, describing BrUning' s 
emergency ordinances as "fascist," only made the struggle against 
real fascism more difficult. He could not resist the comment, 
however, that there \~ere many similarities bet\veen fascism and the 
political system in the Soviet Union. Perhaps this was a 
rejoinder to Communist attacks on the Social Democrats as "social 
fascists." Breitscheid's definition of fascism included 
overthrow of democracy, establishment of a dictatorship or 
privileged elite, and rejection of the demands of a class-
conscious working class. He said that consciously or not, 
fascism served the interests of capitalism. 
Breitscheid compared the development of fascism in Germany and 
Italy. The slower pace in Germany after the war he attributed 
to better organization of the rival parties (especially the 
working class) and greater public expectations of the new democratic 
system. Only after voters became disillusioned with the Weimar 
system and after the economic crises brought widespread suffering 
and resentment did fascism turn into a pmverful nass movement. 
Breitscheid related Hazi ideology to antirationalist and anti-
positivist currents, but he claimed that the lack of real theory 
and program in tlational Socialism represented a major weakness. 
\lhen one considered the high le.vel of industrialization in 
Germany, it seemed unlikely that fascism would endure there. But 
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the short-term threat at least was quite serious. Because of 
Nazi inroads on the nonsocialist parties, there was increasing 
danger of the Nazis gaining influence .over the government and 
administration throup,h legal political methods. 
\fuat is most striking about Breitscheid's presentaticn is what 
is missing: a detailed analysis of Nazi ideology, party structure, 
leadership, and methods. There were plenty of sources available, 
including Hitler's Mein Kampf. But Breitscheid did not use them, 
and his concept ·Of fascism was extremely general. His omissiqns 
are all the more worthy of note in that he wished to convince 
the congress that the danger of fascism justified the SPD' s 
toleration policy. Breitscheid's own uncertainties about the 
policy may account in part for his lack of forcefulness.4 2 But 
judging from his other remarks, o:1e may also conclude that he 
still underestimated the danger of nazism and felt that the 
SPD could outlast it. Even the title of his address, "Overcoming 
Fascism" (Die liberwindung des Faschismus) has a slightly passive 
sound. One wonders whether an im!)assioned warning that a Nazi 
government \vould mean another world war would have had greater 
impact. 
Yet Breitscheid's approach was sophisticated compared to that of 
Hax Seydewitz and Ernst Eckstein, two of the Left opposition 
spokesmen. They argued that monopoly capitalism, fearing that 
it would not be able to obtain its objectives throug:1 the 
democratic system, had created fascism to pursue them more 
effectiveli. The ßrllning government was also an instrument 
of capitalist interests. So the only •eal difference between 
fascism and ßrllning was one of method; Brllning's policies were 
already fascist.43 Advocates of such views could not abide the 
SPD's toleration policy, and a number of the left-wing diss~dents 
had already violated fraction disci!)line on votes in the 
Reichstag. They were soon expelled from the party, which led 
them to found the Socialist ~vorkers' Party of Germany.44 Although 
another schism certainly did the Social Democratic movement no 
good, the SAPD did not become a significant force. 
\lilhelm Sollmann also defended the ~eichstag fraction's stance 
against the left-wing critics. He tried to shmv that the SPD's 
policy resulted directly from its own democratic principles and 
from the danger of a legal takeover of pmver by the fascists. Yet 
Sollmann too had a tendency to deprecate the Nazis in such a way 
that his listeners might easily mis!Jerceive their intentions: 
Adolf Hitler may be a very modest political brain, but 
in the twelve years of his political activity his 
capitalist donors have at least taught him, through 
extra-help sessions (Nachhilfestunden) that storm 
troops ••• cannot overrun a modern state .••• The 
Hational Socialism which has grasped this appears to 
me to be a much greater danger than the ridiculous 
putschism of 1923.45 
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Even though Sollmann argued tha t ti1e SPD' s only choice was 
between ßrtlning and a faseist dictatorship a thousand times 
worse,46 his audience got little sense of precisely why nazism 
was so dangerous. To know that it was directed agairrst 
the working class and parliamentary democracy was enough reason 
to oppose it. 
Yet from within the Social Democratic camp Alexander Schifrin 
had already analyzed the autocratic, militaristic, demogogic, 
and neonationalist elements of nazism; he underestimated only 
anti-Semitism. Moreover, Schifrin !1ad corni!lented astutely on 
the authoritarianism of the movement and noted tliat its social 
composition did not determine its goals and policies. Nazism 
was neither simply a technique nor a congeries of social strata.47 
A number of socialist intellectuals to the left of the SPD also 
wrote perceptively about nazism in the early 1930s.43 Little 
of this analysis seems to have reached the party elite. 
Otto Landsberg's comments in.early 1931 were not aty~ical of 
the SPD's upper ranks. Landsberg saw a difference between the 
Nazis and reactionaries. The Nazis were more violent and would 
certainly repress their opponents more taoroughly if they gained 
power. ßut the reactionaries were in some ways more darigerous, 
because it was unlikely that the Nazis could maintain power. 49 
The tendency to compare its present enemies with its past enemies 
was strong in a movement that regarded itself as having history 
on its side. But lack of understanding of nazism's unique 
features and its psychological impact upon the public hindered 
the SPD from adopting proper countermeasures earlier, including 
effective political agitation • . Previous SPD concerns that nazism 
might become a rival working-class movement led to constant 
denunciations of the NSDAP as the tool of capitalism. Such 
attacks hardly sufficed to win middle-class voters away from 
nazism. ßy late 1932 ~Vilhelm Sollmann hirnself recognized one 
basic cause of the problem: "tle would have been spared many a 
surprise, the sudden onset of the brown flood of nazisrn being 
not the last, if our eyes and ears :1ad reached far enou~h outside 
the ranks of our organization and our loyal followers." 0 The 
Social Democratic movement's delayed reaction to nazism was 
linked directly to the former's insularity and the latter's 
willingness to exploit the resentments of diverse groups. 
Even after the danger had been perceived, the SPD worked 
primarily to keep the proletariat a'vay from Hazism. It was hard 
for the party to shift gears, particularly during the 
depression. l1any Social Democrats felt that the nonsocialist 
parties would have to do their part with the rest of the 
electorate, at least until the economic crisis abated. Otto 
Uels proclaimed at the SPD congress in 1931: "Part of the German 
middle class may, lil~e cowards, bow to fancy oratory; large 
landowners, heavy industrialists, bank and stock market kings 
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and all such royalty may turn to this workers' party !'the :~SDAP7; 
the German workers' party is and will be German Social Democracy, 
and it will prevail. n51 Rather than demean those who were 
attracted to nazism, Uels might have tried to recruit some of them. 
But the SPD's toleration policy placed it in a nosition where 
it could offer little in the way of alternatives. Even antifaseist 
activity was less than vigorous. 0nly at the end of 1931 did 
the party leadership reluctantly sanction the establishment 
of the Iron Front, an antifaseist umbrella organization of 
Social Democratic and Reichsbanner forces. Even .then the Iron 
Front, like the Reichsbanner, failed to develop a significant 
military capability, partly because of the SPD leadership's 
opposition. Nor were there specific plans to coordinate the 
work of the volunteer forces with t!1e Prussian police, although 
the idea had long been broached.5 2 All extraparliamentary 
efforts, particularly those involvine the use of force or the 
threat to use force, were rejected because they might drive 
BrUning and the nonsocialis t parties into the arms of the llazis. 
But with ßrUning excluding the Reichstag from decision making, 
the SPD could hardly make use of its parliamentary strength. 
Franz von Papen's Staatsstreich. against the Prussian government 
on July 20, 1932, left the SPD in a cul-de-sac. Deprived of its 
governmental stronghold, the SPD simply waited for an end to 
the depression and hoped for the best. 
Social Democratic passivity during 1932-1933 was not the product 
of bureaucratization and inadequate leadership alone. It was 
also the result of a ileltanschauung that forecast eventual 
victory over the foes of socialism and made it hard to distinguish 
among those foes. The SPD accurately considered nazism as one 
expression of a broader European current called fascism. But 
the party's concept of fascism neither explained nazism 
sufficiently nor provided a clear sense of the differences 
between fascists and reactionaries. Samething could be learned 
from a comparison of Hitler and Hussolini. ßut to compare Hitler 
with \lilhel!a n 53 was ridiculous. 
Given the difficult strategic situation of the 1~eimar Republic' s 
last year, 5!~ the SPD could not deal wi th all the dangers facing 
itself and the parliamentary democratic system. It chose to 
protect its working-class base and to avoid risky experiments, 
not realizing that inaction itself carried major risks. Such 
thinking allowed the Social Democrats to disclaim responsibility 
for the rise of nazism, but it did not prevent the Nazi triumph .• 
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Between the Ghetto 
and the Nation: 
Catholics 
in the 
Weimar Republic 
JAMES C. HUNT 
"For the Catholics in the Empire it is like Germany in its foreign 
policy, onl~' enviers and enemies, only scorn and ridicule," 
declared t1atthias Erzberger, the young hotspur of political 
Catholicism, in 1914.1 The dual perception of German isolation 
and Catholic isolation expressed the dileruna of German Catholics. 
To be a loyal German and a loyal Catholic--in whatever terms one 
defined these concepts- - was in a world of enemies both a goal 
and a burden. 
The !lOSt-l<apoleonic reorganization of Germany in 1314-15 left 
the bulk of Catholics as minorities under Protestant rulers. 
Catholics experienced discriminatory treatment and frequent 
conflicts between canonical and state l aw, especially in cases of 
religiously mixed marriage . The Prussian solution t o German 
unification excluded Austria and left the Catholics a permanent 
minority at around one-third of the population. The I~ulturkampf 
(struggle between Church and state) of the lß7Js was an a ttempt 
to break the power of the Catholic hierarchy and to loosen 
the ties between Germany and Rome . Chancellor Otto von Bismarck 
branded the members of the Catholic Center party Reichsfeinde, 
"enemies of the Reich, " lumping them with Poles and Socialists . 
The open f-ulturkampf backfired, actually solidifying Catholic 
unity, but Catholics continued to suffer the humiliations of 
the "little" or "silent Kulturkampf": legal restrictions on 
Catholic church services and processions; discriminatory state 
funding of schools, parishes, and ecclesiastical salaries; 
battles over cus todv and religious education in mixed marriages; 
the requirement in Saxony that school chilJren attend Protestant 
religious instruction if Catl1olic instruction were not available 
wit:1 the proviso t!tat~ if they did so until age twelve, they 
we re then Protestant ~ L 
Catholics used such expressions as via dolorosa, "exile," or 
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"ghetto"--the term most often used in German Catholic 
historiography--to characterize their situation. Yet Catholic 
spiritual and political leaders accepted the Catholic situation 
as the fate of a minority of believers in a hostile world; 
redress of ßrievances would come about only through legality: 
through slow arduous labors in the courts, the legislatures, 
and the press. Uonarcilical loyalty was always a powerful force 
among the Catholics, and national1st loyalty reenDorced it as 
the older dreams of a Habsburg-led Grassdeutschland faded and 
more and more young Catholics grew to adulthood within the 
Empire. Stung by accusations of :1alf or divided loyalty, they 
sougilt to demonsttl.ate their patriotism by supporting the 
government on the national (military and colonial) issues and 
by opposition to socialism. The outbreak of the First \~orld 
Uar seemed to sweep aside all barriers, to end Catholic 
isoiation at the !Jrice of almost complete Germanie isolation in the 
world. Catholic theologians and writers identified the war with 
the will of God and the scholastic conce~t of a just war. But 
Catholics continued to bear the stigma of belanging to an 
international church or to suffer the insinuation that Pope 
Benedic t XV favored Germany 1 s enemies and the insulting 
identification of Hartin Luther and the Reformation with German 
national destiny.3 In practical political terms, the Protestant 
suspicion was unjustified, yet in another sense it was justified: 
as long as they remained in an international cimrch and adhered 
to the rationalism inherent in canon law and scholasticism, 
German Catiwlics could not compete with Protestants in an 
ideological national1st fanaticism. 
Catholics did not expect nor want the end of the monarchy in 
the fall of 1913, but its collapse brougnt them relief. Under 
the Weimar Constitution, legal restrictions on religious activity 
fell away--the first Corpus Christi procession on Berlin's Unter 
den Linden created a sensation--but the church continued to 
enjoy s~ate funding, now administered more equitably. The 
Center party, as the party of the middle, became the indispensable 
coalition partner in the government of t!1e nation and the !arger 
Ulnder. Party members held the chancellorship in six of the 
fifteen cabinets between 1913 and 1933, while non-Centrist 
Catholics, llilhelm Cuno and Franz von Papen, headed two cabinets.4 
Anti-Catholicism continued, however, and took an increasingly 
right-wing orientation in reaction aßainst the Centrist role in 
the Re!Jublic. EneLlies of the Republic branded its controversial 
flag as the banner of the three Internationals: the Red 
(Socialist), the Gold (Jewish), and the Black (Catholic). 
Anti-Catholicism bad long since taken organizational form in 
various groups, particularly the Protestant League for the 
Protection of Geman-Protestant Interests, created in 1339. Witi1 
its 300,00J members the League embraced a high percentage of 
Protes.tant clergy, teachers, and officials; it flooded Germany 
with cheap anti-Catholic and anti-Socialist tracts.S 
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Protestants frequently justified their anti-Catholicism 
intellectually through discussions of Catholic inferiority. The 
modern world of freedom, science, scholarship, technology, and 
industry was identified with the Protestant nations. One 
Protestant pastor noted that the Protestant Horthern st!ates had 
defeated the "Southern Catholic states" in ·the American Civil 
\lar, freeing the slaves! 6 At around the turn of the century, 
Protestant writers had underscored the higher German Catholic 
rates of fertility, infant mortality, death, and criminality to 
show Catholic inferiority while Catholic writers countered 
with the higher German Protestant rates of divorce, suicide, and 
illegitimacy. By the 1920s the clash over "moral statis tics" 
was somewhat passe~ and the higher Catholic rates, for example, 
of fertility and infant mortality, were declining to close the 
differential. 7 
But the Catholic population continued to be disproportionately 
concentrated in rural areas and underrepresented, es~ecially 
in the larger cities. Catholics worl:ed in dis!Jroportionate 
numbers in farming and traditional handicrafts. They were 
underrepresented in banking, commerce, technical industry, and 
professional pursuits. Among bankers, brokers, army officers, 
university professors, and certain categories of engineers, 
Catholics had as much as 50 percent underrepresentation. On 
the other hand, several marginal and vulnerable pursuits such 
as vintners, agricultural laborers, seamstresses, and unskilled 
construction workers had as much as SO percent overrepresentation. 
In the crucial coal-mining and steel industries, Catholics 
dominated all levels of both white-collar and manual employment 
because these industries were located in Catholic areas (Silesia, 
Saarland,, the Rhine-Ruhr basin). Yet ownership and management 
rested predominately in Protestant hands. Further evidence 
indicates that Catholics paid less taxes than Protestants because 
they earned a lower average income, that within particular 
industries and crafts Catholics had a lesser degree of technical 
education and occupied less responsible positions, and that 
Catholic craftsmen and retailers were economically marginal, 
employinR little help and relying disproportionately on family 
members.u 
The origins of the Catholic deficits are beyond the scope of this 
chapter; their political effects, however, are of consequence 
here. The marginality and vulnerability of the Catholic 
occupational structure suggests a potential susceptibility to 
radical movements. Fascist, radical-Right, and anti-Semitic 
movements are widely supposed to have their social bases among 
the peasants and in the lower middle class (KleinbUrgertum) 
of retailers, craftsmen, and petty officials. Stauding in 
opposition both to big labor and big business, these social 
classes are assumed to become radica~ized out of a perception 
of relative or absolute deprivation. This analysis was based 
on the historical fact that German Protestant ~easants and 
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KleinbUrger deserted the liberal and conservative parties en 
masse, givinr; their votes by 1932 overwhelmingly to the Nazi 
party. Catholics, by contrast, continued to cast their ballots 
for the Catholic politiciü parties to the number of 5.5 million, 
although perhaps 6.5 million gave their votes to· all other 
parties combined. A populist anti-Semitism, based on resentment 
of Jewish wealth, was to be found in Catholic ranks especially 
among the southern agratian wing. The anti-Semitism might link 
up with anti-socialism or a general repudiation of modern culture, 
but it was by no means identical with antirepublicanism or 
sympathy with nazism.lO 
Occupational and class analysis from Aristotle on has appeared 
to provide the most pertinent explanations of political behavior. 
But we must continually place political behavior in its full 
social context and explore the ways in which family, school, 
ahurch, ideology, age, deference, association, and region may 
mediate, modify, or focus the demands of social class or 
economic interest. Why did German Catholics demonstrate a 
relative immunity to the appeals of fascism? On the other hand, 
why was this relative immunity not sufficient to allow them to 
develop an effective resistance? 
If we reinterpret economic marginality as attachment to 
traditional occupations and limited mobility, marginality may 
have screened Catholics from certain types of antirepublicanism. 
Proportionately few Catholics were the colleagues of conservative 
antirepublicans in the officer corps, the university professoriate, 
the higher bureaucracy, or the management of heavy industry; 
those that were, did not act very differently from their 
colleagues. Conversely, Catholic miners and steelworkers 
adhered to their labor unions, had job and class interests in 
common with their Socialist or Communist colleagues, and suspected 
the reactionary nature of Ilitler's movement. Catholic peasants 
appear to have specialized less than Protestant peasants, 
practicing a more traditional mixed agriculture. Thus despite 
relative poverty, their economic vulnerability may have been 
less.ll Priestsand a few substantial farmers still provided 
the social leadership of the villages. Even after 1933 in many 
Catholic villages, Nazi members were scarce, and Nazi organization 
weak. 12 
If Catholics were less susceptible than Protestants to the 
influence of new, radical movements, one major reason was that 
Catholics, like Socialists, had created their own social and 
cultural environment, which filtered the impact of general public 
op~n~on. Driven into the ghetto of political and social 
isolation by the l~ulturkampf, choosing an intellectual ghetto 
to maintain the purity of the faith from the cl1allenge of 
liberalism and the cult of science, Catholic notables had created 
Verbanrlskatholizismus_, "associational Catholicism." In the 1340s 
associations were formed to support Catholic journeymen, lending 
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libraries, and rnissions, and to hold annual national Catholic 
Rallies (Katholikentage). In the 1360s Catholic student 
fraternities were created. During the Kulturkarnpf, fearing 
permanent exclusion frorn the university professoriate, Catholic 
scholars founded the Gtlrres Society for the Cultivation of 
Schalarship in Catholic Germany. Frorn the 138Js on, Gatholic 
newspaper publishers, peasants, workers, schoolteachers, artists, 
and art dealers (the "Gerrnan Society for Christian Art"), 
white-collar ernployees, booksellers, and ferninists organized. 
Verbandskatholizismus was a creative response to the new 
opportunities provided by the liberal freedorns of speech and 
assernbly. It ensured that German Ca tholicisrn would rernain a 
Volkskirchel3 __ a "church of the people." Yet Verbandskatholizismus 
also linked tagether the Catholic nat.alUes ( the clergyrnen, 
nobles, lawyers, and publishers) through mutual association in 
the fraternities, GBrres Society, and Center party, an associatian 
further cernented by clase ldnship cannections especially along 
the Rhine-!ffiin axis of German Catholicisrn. Rallying and 
arganizing the braod rnasses of the laity, Verbandskatholizismus 
represented a use of liberal freedorns to create an antiliberal 
rnovernent on a basis that was sirnultaneously po~ulist and 
hierarchical--the nasses of the excluded rninority led by their 
"natural leaders." Anti-Sernitisrn rnight theoreticclly have been 
an ideological elernent of such a rnovernent, but, after sorne 
initial wavering during the Kulturkarnpf, Catholic leaders had 
the political wisdorn ta support the rights of all religious 
minorities.l4 
As the \leirnar Constitution gave new opportunities to the church, 
it also allowed the final rich unfolding of Verbandskatholizisrnus: 
arganizations for Catholic youth, high school students, housewives 
and rnothers, university graduates (Akademiker as opposed to 
scholars /Üissenschaftler7, officials, and even industrialists. 
Yet a subtle shift was occurring: whereas the older associatians 
worked for the econamic and social interests of their rnernbers, 
the newer ones generally cultivated liturgy, sociability, and 
the Catholic \leltanschauung. They rnay be regarded as a final 
massive atternpt to organize and to isolate the Catholic population. 
For the leaders of German Catholicism were alarrned. For 
decades rnore German Catholics had converted to Protestantisrn 
than vice versa. The net Catholic lass thraugh the "canversion 
balance" jurnped frorn 4,000 a year in araund 1900 to 7,000 a 
year in the years 1925-30.15 Hore alarrning still, of evecy 
100 Catholics rnarrying in 1901, 12 had selected a non-Catholic 
partner, while by 1925 the figure rase to 13. In the diaspora 
of the north German cities, as rnany as 70 out of 100 rnarrying 
Catholics taok vows with a non-Catholic.16 The negative conversion 
balanc~, the pattern of rnixed rnarriages (rnore Catholic man 
marrying Protestant warnen than the reverse), and the consistent 
Protestant rnajority (about 55 percent) of the baptized children 
in rnixed rnarriages showed that Catholicisrn lacked respectability. 
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Upward mobility could be fostered, especially in the diaspora, 
throup,h conversion or more commonly throup,lt marriage into a 
Protestant family. Hore p,enerally, growing numbers of Catholics 
were making their individual union ~lith the nation, ip,norinp, the 
religious split in disregard of t:1e teac:lings of church and 
school. 
For a large minority_ of Catholics, the Church now served 
essentially to mark the rites of passap,e: baptism, marriage, 
and burial. Of those counted in the census as Catholic (a 
measure based on birth and baptism), areund 60 percent partook 
of the oblip,atory Easter communion-..,-a figure t!-lat remained 
constant from 1915 through 193G and was greater than double the 
corresponding Protestant percentage.l7 The percentage of 
communicants remained at higi1er levels in solid Catholic areas 
but declined to much lower figures in the dias?ora. 
If three out of five baptized Catholics remained faithful to the 
church, onl~r three-quarters of these fai thful Catholics remained 
loyal to political Cati10licism. Durinp, the height of the 
Kulturkampf, over UO percent of Catlwlic voters supported the 
Center party, a fip,ure that declined to areund GG percent by the 
turn of the century. For the elections of 1919 through 1924 
an average of :i4 percent of Catholic men and women voted for the 
Center and the Bavarian People's parties; in the elections of 
193J-33, areund 45 percent.l3 The extent of the decline was 
masl~ed by the introduction of proportional representation, which 
brought out the Catholic vote in the diaspora and the religiously 
mixed regions, and especially by the introduction of women's 
suffrage--a meas.ure which the prewar Center had opposed. While 
the faithful Catholic women voted overwhelmingly Centrist or 
Bavarian, their husbands, if religiously indifferent, voted 
Socialist or, especially, Communist, and if religious, increasingly 
supported the German Nationalist party or the regional peasant 
parties.l9 
Thus, the ~-leimar Republic provided new oppoxtuni ties for German 
Catholics, but intensified the old temptations of assimilation 
to t:w Protestant najority. Common to tl1e opportunities and 
temptations was the possibility of escape from the ghetto and 
union with the nation. Conversion, intermarriap,e, or opposition 
to the Center party formed individual paths of union. But the 
Catholic notables had long been urging a collective path of 
union, a collective uplifting of ti1e Catholic population based 
upon cooperation \vith the national government and demonstr.ations 
of national loyalty.20 The generation of Center leaders who came 
to the fore in tl1e 1390s had continued to fip,ht to overcome the 
liabilities of the Kulturkampf. But they had also takan a hard 
lock at the deficiencies of German Catholics in education, 
income, and occupational status. They proclaimed to young 
Catholics that it was their "duty" (Pflicht) to study harder, to 
werk harder, and tobe more ambitious, while the nexus of 
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Verbandskatholizismus was to provide moral supC~ort, schalarship 
funds, and an old-boy network to advance the bright young 
Catholics. Center leaders documented discrimination in the 
civil service and the universities. They then lobbied with the 
Prussian and imperial governments to increase the numbers of 
Catholics appointed, emphasizing Catholic national and monarchical 
loyalty, and at least tacitly tradinß Center political support 
in return for appointments . 21 
\lhether such efforts bore fruit or \~hether Catholics profited from 
a general upsurge of educational and economic opportunities, 
progress could be charted between 1900 and 1930 in the growing 
nurnbers of Catholic secondary pupils, secondary schoolteachers, and 
university students, the Catholic "deficit" dwindling or even 
disa~pearing among these groups. During the Weimar Republic, the 
Socialist and Centrist coalition partners in the state of Prussia 
collaborated in political patronage, and the Catholic deficit 
arnong politically appointed officials disappeared.22 ßut fiscal 
restraints upon hiring as well as the seniority of Protestant 
officials perpetuated the Catholic deficit among tenured civil 
servants. 
The Catholic gains were also bougnt at a price. As limited as 
they were, they provoked a hostile reaction, wilich centered 
areund the Protestant League, Protestant civil servant associations, 
and the Hationalist and German People's parties.23 Protestant 
officials found in the Catholic gains yet another reason or 
pretext to drift away from t;1e Republic. 
And the Catholic nouveaux arrive~ assimilated themselves to the 
views of the conservative Protestant circles tlley entered·. For 
example, the Catholic historians Heinrich Finke, Aloys Schulte, 
and Hartin Spahn drifted further and further a\..Tay from the 
Center party with which they had been associated early in their 
careers. Finke supported the right-winp, proan;1.exationist 
Vaterlands"artei du ring \lorld \lar I, whilc Sl)ahn became a 
Nationalist Reichstag deputy and eventually joined the Nazi 
caucus. 24 To these men, t1at thias Erzherger, who had never 
at tended a uni versi ty, who had enginee red bhe Peace Resolution 
of 1917, signed the arrnistice, and led the Center into alliance 
with the Left, represented all that had gone wrong with political 
Catholicism. Uax \lallraf also hated the "disastrous" 
(Unheilvoll) Erzberger. A high official in the empire whose 
career owed much to the lobbying of Centrist politicians, .,.Jallraf 
became a Nationalist Reichstag deputy. He regarded the 
antirepublican Hationalist party as "Christian, social, and 
national," embracing all classes and both Christian 
denominations--but not Jews. 25 
ßy the 1920s several Catholic families were amone; the greatest 
industrialists in Gerrnany: the Thyssens and ral::lckners in steel, 
and the ten llompels in cement. \fuereas the older Thyssens, 
August and Joseph, had belonged to Catholic social and cultural 
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organizations, August's son Fritz would ')rovide Ilitler with 
money and contacts. The KH!ckners and ten Hompels remained 
loyal Centrists, but their presence in the Reichstag caucus 
created friction with the Catholic labor unions. The Reichstag 
deputy Rudolf ten Ilompel disliked the "Super democrat" Erzberger, 
even proposing, af ter Erzherger' s la•1 sui t agains t Karl Heinrich 
Ilelfferich, to exclude him from t:Je caucus. A vigorous critic 
of tbe Christian unions, ten Ilompel favored a right-wing 
coalition, ~yen a dictatorship, to lead Germany out of the 
depression. -b 
If the Spanns, ~lallrafs, or Thyssens represented individual cases 
of defection from political and associational Catholicism, signs 
of large-scale dissolution were present. t1embership in the 
worker-oriented People's Association for Catholic Germany 
(Volksverein fUr das katholische Deutschland) declined by 
perhaps 50 percent between 1922 and 1933. 27 The Christian unions 
likewise dwindled in numbers in ti1e later Ueimar years. The 
voting base for l)Olitical Catholicism slm1ly nhrank, while the 
Bavarian Catholics in 1920 created their own Bavarian People's 
party in opposition to the policies of fiscal centralization and 
alliance with the Left of the national Centrist leadership. The 
Bavarian Populis ts allowed t;1eir s tate to become a haven in the 
early ~leimar years for all varieties of antirepublican movements 
from the terroris t Organization Consul to the ;~azi party. In 
1925 they endorsed the Protestant Prussian General Paul von 
Hindenburg for president against the Catholic Rhinelander ~ilhelm 
Harx. After having created such havoc, the Bavarians drifted 
back toward the l)Olitical middle in the later ~leimar years. 
Few bishops were as outspokenly antirepublican as was l1ichael 
Cardinal Faulhaber, Archibishop of 11unich, at the 1922 Catholic 
Rally. Condemning the November Revolution as "perjury and high 
treason," he blamed Germany' s distress on the tleimar Constitution. 
The episcopacy in general, however, opposed the most extreme 
right-wing organizations. The Fulda Bishops' Conference, 
embracing the Prussian bishops, warned Catholics in 1924 against 
membership in the paramilitary organizations and forbade 
participation by the clergy. \lliile the warning applied in 
theory to the republican Reichsbanner as well as the right-wing 
groups, the Centrist press tended to ignore this, and public 
controversy centered around the unsuccessful attempt by Catholic 
nobles to have the ban on the Stahlhelm lifted. 2S The hierarchy 
likewise stood firm against another attempt of right-wing 
Catholics to assimilate themselves into the culture of German 
nationalism, refusing to lift the ban on duelling among university 
students. In 1930-31 all German bishops, including Faulhaber, 
issued warnings against National Socialism "as long and insofar 
as it adheres to a religious and cultural program which is 
irreconcilable with Catholic teaching," or with other qualifying 
provisos . 29 But the connection bet1veen episcopacy and Center 
party, always problematic, became more distant. The bishops, 
generally conservative monarchi.sts in seatiment, were mostly 
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elderly men from rural or small-town backgrounds who had studied 
and frequently taught theology or canon law (rather than secular 
subjects), sought to avoid offending the growinp, nurober of devout 
Catholics who had switched froB the Center to the parties of the 
Right. 
Thus, in tl1e \veimar Republic, Verbandskatholizisr.ms was already 
beginning to decline at the moment of its fullest unfolding, 
at the very moment when it had perfected the ghetto. All 
Catholic spokesmen and social strata were breaking out of the 
ghetto, seeking union with the nation by many paths. The gains 
made along these paths by Catholics did not suffice to convince 
Catholics that they were .. no longer stepchildren in the fatherland, 
yet they also provoked politically dangerous Protestant hostility. 
In several newspaper articles in 1924, the Catholic writer 
Peter Hust had proclaimed "The Return of German Catholicism out 
of Exile." Ile conder.med the "anxious and nervously cramped 
defensiveness," the "cramped and ashamed" Catholicism of tl1e 
Kulturkampf generation and its successor of the 139Cls. He 
declared that at around 1900 Catholic youth such as hirnself had 
thirsted after a "strengthening, refreshening spiritual drink" 
because they all vere "heirs" of Friedrich Nietzsche. German 
Catholicism for bim had gone over to a spiritual offensive 
based on its achievements in philosophy, literature, and 
politics.3J Wust's enthusiastic vagueness and his invocation 
of Nietzscite as well as the vociferous and confused controversy 
that he provoked suggest the turn to "vitalis111," the vague, 
enthusiastic Lebensphilosophie among many younger Catholics, 
a broad, but foggy path toward union with the nation. Catholics 
increasingly spoke of adhering to the Catholic 11eltanschauung 
rather than Catholic Lehre (teaching or doctrine), even their 
terminology reflecting their assimilation to the national norms. 
Yet the Catholic spiritual and political leadership remained in a 
limbo between ghetto and nation. In the death throes of the 
Republic, the Catholic leadership reverted to extreme parochialism. 
The perennial Centrist role in the governing coalitions had not 
sufficed to overcome the Catholic deficits. In April 1931 the 
Centrist caucus in the Prussian Landtag introduced a bill in 
support of--to use the current American term--"affirmative 
action": a favoring of Catholic candidates until the deficit in 
the civil service vTas overcome.31 The bill found no support from 
any other !:larty, yet provoked severe Protestant hostility. In 
Baden in 1932 the hierarchy and the Centrist leadership pushed 
through a concordat at the price of destroying the last democratic 
majority in the Landtag. The Reich Concordat of 1933 was a 
desperate attempt to salvage Catholic rights at the expense of 
abandoning political Catholicism and giving Ilitler his first 
foreigh-policy triumph. Severe social, geographic, and religious 
cleavages made Germany a congeries of unequal minorities, and 
most of them in 1932-33 pursued a policy of sauve qui peut; 
Catholics were no different. 
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But the leadership also desired union with the nation. The 
Centrist caucus in the Reichstag, after sharp internal debate, 
voted unanimously for the Enabling Act in 11arch 1933. The 
bishops only days later had withdrawn the warnin~s against 
llational Socialisn, while admonishin~ against illegal and 
subversive activity (that is, resistance). The trauma of 
having been .branded Reichsfeinde continued to work its pernicious 
effects. 
ßoth strengths (Verbandskatholizisrnus, group cohesion, the 
continuity and conscientiousness of leadership) and weaknesses 
(marginality, siege mentality) kept political Catholicism a 
major force to the end of the Republic--but a force crippled by 
minority consciousness and by a longing for acceptability, 
respec&ability, and union with the nation. In normal times--
before 1914 or during the mid-\leimar years--Catholics could work 
hard at overcoming their own deficits and at tasks for the 
common good, but in the years of crisis--1913 and 1933--they 
passively submitted to the force of events and to the initiatives 
of others. 
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The Double Exile: 
Weimar Culture and the 
East European Jews, 
1918-1923 
STEVEN E. ASCHHEIM 
\leimar society continues to fascinate us partly because of the 
ironic connection between cultural creativity and political 
brutalization.l As unwelcome "insiders" of an unwanted Republic, 
German Je1•s were located at the very center of this dialectic, 
the concrete link tying these polarities. Their real and symbolic 
role in the disposition of \leimar Germany has been am!Jly 
documented.2 lluch less attention :1as been given to the role of 
the :>ast European Jews (Ostjuden) in Germany during this period. 
This constitutes a serious gap. Ostjude;1 were the first and 
mos t vulnerable targets of the newl~r radicalized anti-Semi tism. 
As a highly visible foreign minority, they were obvious victims 
of the growing climate of political violence. At the same time 
they greatly complicated German Jewry's mm e~osed situation 
and, in many ways, conditioned its responses. llecause the 
Ostjudenfrage (~uestion of the Eastern European Jews) was 
portrayed as a German Schicksalfrase, it was transformed into a 
probler.1 of vital popular and national concern. No treatment of 
the relationship between \Jeimar culture, the Jews, and anti-
Semitism would be complete without it. 
To be sure, tl1e problern of East European Jews was not new to 
Germany. The geographical proximity of Po land to Germany was a 
special circumstance attending the course of German Jewish 
emancipation. German Jews were never able to forget that they 
shared a comnon border with the unemanci11ated Eastern ghetto 
masses. Throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth 
century, German Jewish historywas conditioned by this presence, 
both as myth anJ reality. Indeed, the articulation of a distinctive 
German Jewish identi ty 1-Tas inseparable from the j uxtaposition 
with the gi1etto Jew of Eastern Europe. If most nineteenth-
century IIestern Jevs looked asl:ance at their primitive ghetto 
cousins, German Jeus articulated the negative conce11tion of 
the Ostjude with special intensity because they felt the rift 
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mo$ t acutely. 3 This was true too for man~' non-Jews. Elsewhere 
in \Jestern Europe tlle Ostjude was regarded as an irritant--in 
Germany he became a major preoccupation, at times even an 
obsession.4 
This concern reached its height in the immediate post-\lorld Uar I 
period. The shock of defeat, the fear of revolution, and 
unparalleled economic hardship provided ne•1 credence to the old 
slogan "the Jews are our misfortune!" For the first time in 
twentieth-century Germany, anti-Semitis~ achieved political 
respectability and gained mass support. J lnlile the anti-Jewish 
onslaught •.o~as generalized and clearly included native Jewry, 
the alien and defenseless nature of the Ostjuden made them 
particularly salient victims of t:1e attack. Hothing, after all, 
concretized the Jewish danger more effectively than this 
s trange, repellent ghetto creature. Ili tler' s rmrported "discovery" 
of tiw Jewish problem, let us not forget, occurred when he 
encountered the dirty, smelly East EUJ;opean Jew, "an apparition in 
a black caftan and black hilir locks. nll Ostjudentum, as it 
filtered into German space and consciousness, kept alive the 
historical memory of the mysterious and brooding ghetto presence. 
This was a resonant tradition that became especially effective 
in a time of mass confusion, political chaos, and economic 
collapse. llo wonder tnat in the rhetoric and actions directed 
against the Ostjuden the post-\lar brutalization of the Jews 
was most acute and achieved its first real success. 
All myths, if they are to function, must have some basis, however 
tenuous, in social reality. Right-,•ing accusations of an invasion 
by ghetto Jews were made plausible by the fact that during the 
war, 70,000 Eastern Jews--workers, prisoners, internees--were 
added to the prewar population of ')1J,OOO. 7 In addition, 
thousands more sought refuge from the brutal pograms that 
rocked Eastern Europe after the war. Although by 1922 the 
majority of war-arrivals had left the country, their presence 
was still noticeable. Against the background of defeat and 
economic disintegration, it was easy to present this as a mass 
flood posing a fundamental threat to German morality, economy, 
sexuality, politics, and culture.3 Old accusations took on new 
significance. The Shylock myth was revitalized by constant 
accusations of ruthless Eastern Jewish enrichment at the expense 
of poor and honest pat:riotic folk. Radical right publications 
regularly enployed parasi tological language in their descriptions 
of Ostjuden. Thus in 1920 Theodor Fritsch's Die Hammer wrote: 
A horrible sight, these faces of animals of prey: in 
them there is nary a sign of hunan feeling • • • they stand 
before us as the embodiment of Jehova's promise: Thou 
shalt devour all other Hations! Yes, devour greedily, 
pitilessly. The myth t;1at J.ews were forced to become 
usurers and liars by their environment is exposed the 
minute these Ostjuden take their first step into our 
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land • • • they are the conscious products of 
Talmudic crininal schools.9 
These themes meshed effectively with the fear of radical 
political change. After the success of the Russian Revolution, 
bolshevism, that alien export, seemed palpably close to Germany. 
The nrominent role of Jews in the Russian Revolution and Bela 
Kun' ~ radical regime in HungarylO lent plausibility to the 
equation of bolshevism with Judaism. After all, since the 
beginning of the century Ostjuden such as Rosa Luxembourg, 
Israel llelphand-Parvus, Leo Jogiches, and Karl Radek had been 
in the forefront of radical activity in Gernany. !1oreover, in 
the postwar Berlin and !1unich revolutions, the figures of 
Luxembourg and Eugen Levine were notoriously prominent. Even 
radical figures who were clearly not Ostjuden were branded as 
such. Thus Kurt Eisner, the ßerlin-born leader of the Bavarian 
Socialist ;lepublic, became widely known as a "Galician Jew," 
symbol of the Jewish revolutionary, "a Shylock ••• with a 
dirty yarmulke covering his :1ead."ll 
l!ard-line anti-Semites were not bothered by the great distance 
that divided traditional Talmudic Jews fron professional 
revolutionaries who were radicaily disaffected from their origins. 
!1odern revolution, wrote Alfred Roth of the Deutsche Schutz 
und Trutz Bund, was merely tlte conspiratorial Jewish means to 
sew discontent among the nations, thereb'{-
1
guaranteeing the 
ultimate triumph of Talmudic \lOrld rule. ~ 
In the new polari~ed climate, even conservatives began increasingly 
to ignore the distinction between modern, assimilated German 
Jews and the Eastern ghetto masses. There were, however, 
exceptions to this rule. Thus Friedrich von Oppeln-Bronikowski 
attempted to deal \lith the Jewish problern by making a principled 
distinction between Eastern European and r~rman Jewry. The 
forner were "legitimate" targets of animosity, the latter were 
not. !Iotions of "international Jewry," he wrote, were palpably 
absurd. This distinction between cultured, assimilated German 
Jews and backward Ostjuden was obvious. llothing established the 
point better than German Jewry's own pronounced antipathy. Did 
they not support moves to keep the Ostjuden out of Germany 
(Grenzschluss)?l3 l!ere was an explicit attempt to deflect 
anti-Semitism onto the Ostjuden and away from the German Jews. 
Indeed, on the eve of Nazi accession to power, ßronikowski 
sharpened his attack on the Eastern Jews (and Zionists).l4 But 
the distinction had never been clear in the minds of the different 
anti-Semitic groups, and the conservative Deutsch national 
Volkspartei was split on the question. The majority probably 
linked the two Jewries and regarded Ostjudentum as a massive 
reservoir for the constant revi talization of IIestern Jewry .15 
For all that, the success of anti-Semitic propaganda against the 
Ostjuden was not a function of their alleged identity with 
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\les tern Jews. Rather its effectiveness derived from the ongoing 
resonance which the traditional stereotype of "the ghetto Jew" 
still evoked. Ti1e ghetto Jew symbolized an age-old cultural 
tension. Uoreover, Eastern Jews--alien, visible, vulnerable--
could be attacked with greater impunity than native, enfranchised 
German Jewry. Election posters in r,ermany and Austria constantly 
exploited these fir;ures in caricature. Thus in 1920, the Austrian 
Christian Socials portrayed a sna!~e with the head of a repulsive, 
side-locked Ostjude st~angling his victim to death. Similarly 
in 1919 a German Uational Democratic party drawing tapped 
ancient fears of the dar!~ ghetto. It pictured a priest, candle 
in hand, wall~ing in front of a sim01le German worl~er who is pulling 
a coffin through the streets. Beilind the coffin walks a gloating 
Ostjude. Th~ only escape from this danger was to vote National 
Democratic.lu 
Of course the anti-Semitic camp attacked the Eastern Jew with 
particular vehemence. But what of other sectors of 'leimar 
society? In a time of mass upheaval and a noticeable Eastern 
Jewish presence, how deeply had the stereotype of the ghetto Jew 
penetrated? \li t:1 conservati ves like Bronil~owski, the answer is 
clear. Among vl:llkisch acti vists like Hermann Popert, 17 founder 
of the Vortrupn youth movement and obsessed with reinvigorating 
a degenerating Germany through alcohol abstinence, there was a 
similar response. Popert--himself a half Jew--was deeply concerned 
with German racial hygiene. But his notion of race was territorial, 
not genetic. All Germans could be legitimate members of the Volk 
if t:1ey fulfilled national demands. His movement explicitly 
disavowed racial anti-Semitism and insisted that anti-Jewish 
activity not touch any German citizens. llut this was not 
applicable to Ostjuden, whom he portrayed in gross stereotypical 
forms. Ghetto Je\lS--wi th their filth and unclean sexual habits--
were fundamentally undesirable elements. They were the cause of 
German anti-Semitism.l3 Journals such as the Jesuit Hochland, also 
actively opposed to racial anti-Semitism, made clear distinctions 
between negative ghetto Jews and German Je1vs.19 
The strength of the anti-Jewish onslaught during this period enabled 
it to decisively influence ti1e nature of political discourse and 
to exert pressure on, and successfully penetrate, previously 
unaffected sectors. Even the bastions of opposition to anti-
Semitism, the liberal and Social Democratic parties, were 
affected. The German Democratic party maintained its public 
stance against all manifestations of anti-Semitism. Their 
decision to nominate fewer Jewish candiates was, however, a 
concession not only to the mood of the times but to the opinions 
of individual party members as well. liany conveniently attributed 
anti-Semitism to the presence and behavior of the Ostjuden.20 
Otto Fishbeck, ti1e party's Prussian minister of trade and commerce, 
publicly OCJposed the unsavory presence of Eastern Jews but 
insisted ti1at this did not make anti-Semites out of the Democrats, 
who deeply respected the law-abiding German Jews.21 In this 
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manner sorne of ti1e rnore dernocratically inclined political forces 
sought to concentrate the anirnus an Ostjuden and away frorn German 
Jews. This had always been a rnore respectable position and, 
under the new circurnstances, obviated the need for an exarnination 
of the dee::>er sources anirnating t:1e vTidespread racist agitation. 
The response of the Social Dernocratic party to the Ostjudenfrage 
illustrates the nature of the cornpeting forces at work. Both 
during the war and after, there were certain elernents in the 
party who expressed general anti-Serni tic convictions but t:1ese 
never becarne a dominant factor. Indeed, to the end, the Social 
Dernocratic party ~•as the German Jews' "wost irnportant source of 
organized support in German society. " 2~ llith regard to the 
Ostjudenfrage, however, the ::>icture is slightly nurkier, the 
arnbivalence more evident. Ta a large extent this was related 
to tne fact that in war-tarn Germany the presence of Ostjuden 
constituted a real social problem--yet another burden an an 
already overloaded economy. In the pre-war period, the party 
had defended t:te rig:tts of Jewis:1 aliens in Gerrnany and urged 
Eastern European Jews to actively ::>articipate in the class 
struggles that would bring about an age of universal socialist 
ernancipation. There can be no doubt about this human1st 
orientation. But, like other groups in Germany, it is equally 
true that the Left accepted the negative conce::>t of the ghetto 
and its products. 23 Thus l~arl I~autsky, although utterly O!Jposed 
to all racist conceptions and a proponent of East European Jewish 
ernancipation, regarded Judaism as a reactionary factor . Its 
natural home was the giletto, which I~autsky, fitting into a 
lang tradition, saw as the symbol for the distinction between 
progress and reaction, enlightenrnent and obscurantisrn.Z4 
The ~ostwar response of the Social Dernocrats to the Ostjudenfrage 
in Gerrnany rnust be seen in its overall historical context. The 
democratic parties were caught between the necessity to come to 
terms with popular opinion while at the sarne time maintaining a 
reasonable, cornpassionate policy. Certain individual rnernbers 
did indeed succumb to exploiting the stereotype as a justification 
for excluding Ostjuden from l~eimar Gerrnany. 25 But the dominant 
argument held that Gerrnany's problern had objective socioeconornic 
roots and that, apart from a few profiteers and black-rnarket 
operators, the small rninority of Ostjuden could not possibly be 
blamed for the country's woes. Anti-Sernitic assertions that 
they were Germany' s forernost danger v1ere disrnissed as absurd. 
The i~overnber 1919 edict concerning the Ostjuden, signed by 
Halfgang Ileine the Prussian rninis ter of the in terior, exernplified 
this approach. After extended consultations with Jewish 
organizations, t:1e Prussian government undertook to resolve 
Eas tern Jewish problerns in an orderly and cornpassionate fashion. 26 
llorking through the Jewish \Jorkers Helfare Organization, 
ernployrnent for ti1e Ostjuden would be procured--even where this 
could affect employment of local workers. Of course, this was 
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predicated upon the assumption that the Eastern Jews would move 
on as soon as possible. Those Ostjuden who had committed a 
crime or were deeiUed a threat to law and order were to be 
forthrightl~r expelled--although this too was to be done together 
with Jewish organizations who would protect the rights of the 
affected persons. !1oreover, the Je1•ish ~.Jorkers \lelfare Organization 
had ~riority in finding work for une~ployed aliens. This would 
then avert the legally required expulsion of unemployed aliens. 
Anti-Jewish forces quickly interpreted the edict as evidence of 
a plot to favor foreign Jewish workers over German workers. The 
pressures on the Social Democrats in this regard were obvious. 
The edict was remarkably free of anti-Jewish Sentiments, despite 
lleine's past, which was not.27 Yet, in other contexts, I!eine 
referred to the Ostjuden as "half-barbarian"23 and only one 
month after the :->ublic:ation of the edict !'lade his ambivalence 
a matter of public record. ~ile attempting to temper the 
political agitation against the Ostiuden, he conceded, in a 
speeclt to the Prussian Parliament, 29 tltat the ~roblem was getting 
worse and asserted that unsympathetic Jewish types could no longer 
be tolerated in German cities. 
These remarks epitomized an unresolved split in Social Democratic 
attitudes. The traditional .compassruon and humanity of the 
Left was pitted against the equally ingrained distaste for the 
"anachronistic" ghetto Jews. Kautsl~y's formulation rer.tained 
normative. It was only with Eduard ßernstein's postwar 
publications30 that there was any inclination at all to give the 
ghetto Jew a measure of intrinsic value. Indeed, the tlovember 
1919 edict was itself partly the product of German Jewish 
protests against previous anti-Eastern Jewish actions undertaken 
by the Social Democratic government. In a memorandum to the 
Foreign Office in April 1919, the Zionist Julius Berger--hirnself 
a Social Democrat--objected to widespread expulsions of Ostjuden 
from all areas of Germany and especially Prussia. These 
expulsions he wrote, were carried out wi th unprecedented brutality.~l The grounds for these expulsions (unemployment, 
black-marketeering) were flimsy excuses for what Berger considered 
to be a basically anti-Jewish policy that dominated all levels 
of Prussian bureaucracy. 
Expulsions were not the only actions perpetrated agatust the 
Ostjuden by SD officials. In early 1920, security forces, under 
the command of Social Democratic Police President Eugen Ernst, 
engaged in a full-scal:e raid on the Berlin ghetto. Under the 
pretext that it was m!cessary to ferret out black-marketeers 
and Bolshevist agents, the Berlin Eastern Jewish quarterwas 
cordoned off, and between seven hundred and one thousand people 
were arrested. Of these, three hundred were placed in a 
concentration camp at J.i"uensdorf. Ernst had inforrned I!eine that 
the Ostjuden were a cancerous sore on the national body, a real 
danger to Germany and, he warn:ed, unless they were moved to 
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intern camps, he would not be able to control the growing tide 
of anti-Semitism. Although all those arrested \lere eventually 
released and the SD journal VorwHrts condemned the incident 
(while simultaneously putting the blame on the army), this incident 
was firmly imprinted on Jewish--especially Eastern Jewish--
consciousness.32 
There were, to be sure, lawbreake rs among the Ostjuden. Not only 
anti-Semites praised the action. The liberal Berliner Tageblatt 
welcomed the initiative to rid the city of its "pests."33 
nut, as one sympathetic Jewish observer noted, the overall 
situation was conducive to economic lawlessness. German Jews, 
non-Jews and other foreigners were all implicated. To make 
the Ostjuden singularly responsible was shameful. 34 
This critique (of scape-goating powerless outsiders) also occupied 
nonparty social critics and dramatists on the far Left. 
Typically, these were German-Jewish intellectuals who had little 
sympathy for the inner world of t;1e Eastern ghetto Jew. The 
famous novelist Alfred Doeblin was one of the very few disaffected 
Left Jewish intellectuals to discover the world of Eastern Jewry 
on its own terms and to record his appreciation of its intrinsic 
merits. His Reise in Polen (1925) was, however, quite atypical. 
The Ostjude was most often used as a foil to uncover some of the 
major hypocrisies of post-\~ar German bourgeois morality and 
society. Thus l~urt Tucholsky--certainly no lover of the ghetto--
bitterly caricatured lleimar's system of judicial and social double-
standards by which Eastern ghetto Jews and native aristocrats 
were treated for the same offences in his caustic Avrumele 
Schabbesueckel Und Prinz Eitel-Friedrich Von Hohenzollern (1921).35 
At the same time he mocked the pathetic efforts of middle-class 
German Jews--as exemplified by the philistine Herr ilendriner--
to justify anti-Semitism when it was aimed at Ostjuden.36 
The most controversiial statement of this type was the expression1st 
\lalter Mehring' s play "The !1erchant of ßerlin" (1929), produced 
at the prestigious avant-garde Piscator theatre in ßerlin.37 
This tragicomic reconstruction of early ~leimar inflation propelled 
Eastern Jewish reality onto the stage with uncompromising force. 
Sirnon Chaim l~aftan (!) comes to ßerlin in the midst of the 1923 
inflation. He is a typical creature of the ghetto who, 
throughout the play, talks in his native Yiddish. In partnership 
with a German Gentile, l~aftan exploits the inflation and soon 
becomes a millionaire. Yet the stereotype is softened, 
humanized by the fact that in the end Kaftan is brought down--
like everyone else, a victim rather than creator of circumstance--
while the German remains victorious and maintains his sway at 
the expense of others. This conclusion3 of course, scandalized the national1st and anti-Semitic press. 3 
Poised between these Eastern Jewish outsiders and the broader 
society were Germany's Jews. Organized German Jewry had always 
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been ambivalent in their collective expressions and actions 
concerning Ostjuden. Protective and dissociative modes operated 
side by side in uneasy alliance. On the one hand they had always 
provided charity and aid to their distressed East European 
brethren (a fiact lvhich served usually to emphasize rather than 
diminish the distance between them), while on the other they 
sought the most efficacious ways in which to rid Germany of 
their unseemly presence. For liberal, middle-class German Jews 
the Ostjuden were suffused with symbolic significance. They 
constantly reminded German Jews of their own Jewishness. They 
also reinforced the reality of anti-Semitic stereotypes and 
were regarded as impeding the successful disposition of German 
Jewish assimilation.39 This dialectical tension--between 
responsibility and denial--was built into the normative German 
Jewish liberal a~proach to the Ostjuden. 
ßy and large, the same was true for the \leimar period. The 
war, however, had disillusioned many German Jews, who were now 
less able to attribute anti-Ser.litism merely to the East European 
presence. 4J Efforts on behalf of the Ostjuden lvere made with 
renewed vigor. To be sure, this was not a disinterested effort 
but was also an attempt to contain and defuse the animus ?imed 
against German Jews themselves. Still, for the first time, 
liberals and Zionists were able to lVOrk together on a common 
platform. A concerted effort was made by representatives of 
the major Jewish institutions to protect the rights of Eastern 
Jews and provide them with employment and housing.41 
The general perception of Jewish interdependence weighed heavily 
on German Jewish leaders. ßecause the radical right had succeeded 
in maldng the Ostjudenfrage into a burning national issue, 
German Jews had to define the balance betlVeen Jewish responsibility 
and German loyalty with added caution. Paul Hathan's formulation 
was typical of the leadership's ap~roach. It was clear, he 
wrote, that given Germany's desperate situation, the presence 
of foreign groups was undesirable. The agitation for expulsion, 
however, would be neither effective nor morally appropriate. 
Deportation would be an un-Germanic act and harm the country's 
international reputation.42 A speaker for the Centralverein, 
the liberal representative organization of German Jewry, scoffed 
at absurd anti-Semitic claims about Eastern Jews yet, almost as 
a matter of course, added: "That the German Jews do not encourage 
this immigration must be obvious to all reasonable people." 
Ostjuden would move on as soon as circumstances permitted.43 
Berlin's Reform community also accepted responsibility for 
Ostjuden already in Germany but, as one typical article put it, 
no one could deny the abundance of "dubious" elements in their 
ranks. The majority of Germans clearly did not desire their 
presence. Reform Jews had more in common with Christian Germans 
than the Ostjuden, whose spirit and character was so alien.44 
These positions reflected ti1e continuing unresolved ambivalence 
of most liberal German Jews toward the Ostjuden. There were, 
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to be sure, other positions on the continuum. Certain individuals--
unhampered by the constraints of official communal respönsibility--
voiced the historic distaste in a rnuch less ambivalent rnanner. 
Arnong the rnost prominent were the novelist Jacob \lasserrnann45 
and the philosopiler Constantin Brunner.46 For thern, Ostjuden 
were wholly alien, generative of anti-Sernitism and, because they 
constantly brougnt the ghetto and forgotten rnodes of Jewish 
exclusivism back to Germany, the prirne inhibitor of successful 
Gerrnan-Jewish integration. 
11ax i~aurnann' s srnall but vocal Deutschnationale Juden rnade such 
Sentiments its official policy. Founded in 1921, this group 
clearly reflected the postwar collaiJSe of liberal certainties. 
It atternpted to placate the fury of the right by appropriating 
sorne of its key values and advocating SU!1port of the conservative 
Deutschnational party. For Naurnann, as he constantly repeated, 
there was only one political criterion: the welfare of the 
German Fat!~erland. Ostjuden \vere clearly antithetical to that 
welfare. It was not, wrote ;laurnann, that he disregarded the 
responsibilities of Jewish solidarity: "But it would rnean the 
abandonrnent of Deutschturn if, out of syrnpathy for foreign Jews, 
we allowed the German Fatherland to corne to grief."47 
If rnany \leirnar JeHs believed that the Ostjuden \vere the real 
cause of the prevailing anti-Sernitism, they voiced this conviction 
privately. Naurnann' s group, however, rnade the East->lest Jewish 
distinction the critical pivot of its argurnents and atternpted 
to siphon anti-Jewish hostility ontö the Eastern Jews. At 
tirnes alrnost nothing distinguished their pronouncements an the 
issue from the anti-Sernitic press. Ostjuden, they wrote, were 
totally unassirnilable. They were swarrning into Germany, cheating 
and dernoralizing everyone in tlteir way. They were ruthless, 
noisy, and uncultured. Their rapid departure from Gerrnany was 
to be encouraged. 
Naurnann's group focused on yet another Jewish enerny: Zionisrn. 
For ~ationaldeutsch Jews, Zionists and Eastern Jews were 
practically synonyrnous. Both ernbodied the Jewish national 
sensibility and contradicted the prernises of Deutschtum. They 
represented alien, disloyal elernents. As the German Zionists 
had always been the rnain supporters of Eastern Jewish rights in 
Germany, this was a plausible association. Indeed, to the 
chagrin of liberal Jews generally, rnany young German Zionists 
had initiated a veritable cult of the Ostjuden. Martin Buber's 
prewar Hasidic writings ligitirnized this growing trend, In a 
radical inversion of irnages, Ostjuden were held to syrnbolize 
Jewish authenticity, comrnunity, and lost spiritual v.alues, while 
\lestern Jew.s were pictured as philistine, undignified and 
deracinated.49 
In between all these cornpeting forces were the Ostjuden 
thernselves. ßetween 1913 and 1923 it was they who felt the 
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full force of the lleimar crisis. Expillsions, violence, internment 
in special ooncentration camps,SO police raids: All these were 
apart of Eastern Jewish reality during these years. The attack 
on the Ostjuden reached its climax in 1923, when economic suffering 
also reached its height. Between ;~ovember 5 and 8, Germany's 
first twentieth century pogrom began. \lith over 10,000 people 
roaming the streets of the Eastern Jewish quarter, the 
Scheunenviertel, an orgy of looting and violence proceeded. 
Only with the insertion of massive police reinforcements was 
order restored.:.il The november pogrom merely culminated a whole 
series of anti-Jewish outbreaks which had occurred that year in 
Hunich, Beuthen, I~oenigsberg, Nuremberg, Saxony, and elsewhere. 
Almost always the Eastern Jews, visible and vulnerable, were the 
prime targets of attack. 
As one transplanted Eastern Jewish intellectual, Zalman 
Rubaschoff--later Shazar, president of the State of Israel--noted 
at the time, Ostjuden in Germany found themselves in a state 
of double exile. Far removed from the cultural world of the 
German workers, the Eastern Jewish proletariat had precious 
little in common with bourgeois German Jews (this even applied 
to their relations with German Zionists). The very presence of a 
Jewish proletariat in Germany was anomalous. 5Z !1inority life 
was rendered doubly difficult. 
This was reflected in the disunity, apathy, and fragmentation 
that hounded the only organization of Eastern Jews in Germany, 
the Verband der Ostjuden. Its leaders constantly oomplained 
that despite the concerted attacks upon them, Ostjuden refused 
to make a serious, unified response. Ilow, they asked, could 
German Jews be expected to defend them when they did not even 
bother to defend themselves?53 In the rnidst of the anti-Semitic 
agitation, their journal lamented: "We are a Galut (Exile) 
within Galut, pathetically dependent upon the goodwill of 
others.~The positionwas further weakened by the defection 
of leaders who, as soon as they could, escaped the stigma of 
the Berlin ghetto.SS These who remained, exhorted their 
brethren "to learn the basic principles of political and social 
life. \·le have to start at the beginning and learn the elementary 
ABCs. \Je hold ourselves to be very intelligent, children of 
the Bock, yet we are illiterate. 'le do not knmv how to deal with 
the most im~ortant, critical and dangeraus aspects of our 
existence."j6 
The constellation of forces at werk between 1913 and 1923, 
however, was well beyend the control of a transient, powerless 
community. It was only with the post-1923 econornic recovery that 
life for these East European Jews became more tolerable. m1en, 
however, the final storm arrived ten years later, it became 
obvious to all tnat, for the radical right, the attack on the 
Ostjude had been only the beginning of a massive onslaught against 
all Jews. 
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Class Struggle around 
the Hearth: 
Women and Domestic 
Service in the 
Weimar Republic 
RENATE BRIDENTHAL 
One aspect of fascisrn that has continued to puzzle historians 
is its relationship to warnen. Though fewer warnen than rnen voted 
for Hitler, the question rernains af what drew some warnen into 
protafascist and faseist political groups, when these appeared 
to be so overtly rnisogynist. One ~ossible answer rnay be the 
deterioratian of wornen's material condition during the Weimar 
Republic despite sorne constitutional gains. This cantradiction 
sponsored reactionary irnpulses, particularly among the rniddle 
class .1 This chapter ~>Ursues that hypothesis thraugh a study 
of the actions and ideology of a particular group, chosen 
because it represents a significant portion af the rniddle class: 
the organization of urban housewives. More importantly, their 
fight agairrst organized dornestic servants will be traced as a 
particular aspect of the class struggle of this period: the 
conflict over which warnen, that is, the warnen of which class, 
would do the work af social reproduction of the bourgeoisie. 
It is beyond the scope af this chapter to consider the variaus 
schernes for the socialized reproduction of all classes. Rather, 
I argue that the actual historical conflict over service was 
part of the overall class struggle and of the crisis of 
capitalisrn that debilitated the petit bourgeoisie and may have 
led ta National Socialism. 
The Housewives Union was one of the largest groups inside the 
Federation of Geman \lomen's Assaciations and, just by being 
there, pushed the umbrella group rightward in the palitical 
spectrurn.2 Since the ideology of the Housewives Union was 
traditional, holding that wornan's ~lace was primarily in the 
harne, its claim to the label "feminist" is doubtful. Ilowever, 
a sumrnary overview of the history of the r~rrnan wornen's rnovement 
indicates that, in concext, the claim is not entirely rnisplaced.3 
From its beginnings in the revolutions of lß4G ta the start of 
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~lorld War I, German feminism was weakened by division and diluted 
by oonservatism. It was divided mainly between bourgeois arid 
socialist fe@inists, despite occasional attempts at alliance.4 
The bourgeois wing was conservative, partly because of legal 
intimidation5 and partly because the German idea of feminism, 
like "the German idea of freedom,"6 suffered frorn the dependence 
of and constraints on the middle class that believed in it. The 
socialist wing, operating from within an originally revolutionary 
movement, also differed from and opposed the bourgeois 
individualism of Anglo-American feminism, though for different 
reasons.7 Thus, German feminism as a whole rarely surmounted 
the notion of women's duties on behalf of women's rights. At 
best, it argued for women's rights in order to better pursue 
those duties. Only a small proportion of the women's movement 
mobilized araund suffrage.3 
After the quasi-revolution of 1913 and during the ensuing 
smoldering civil lvar endemic to the ~Teimar Republic, the bourgeois 
and socialist women's movements becarne increasingly and overtly 
antagonistic. The socialist women's movement split into two 
major groups: those following the majority Social Democratic 
party and those following its former women's leader, Clara 
Zetkin, into the newly formed Communist party. The bourgeois 
women's movement continued its prewar trend toward increasing 
conservatism and the Federation of German \lomen' s Associations 
became almost paralyzed as a unified political pressure group.9 
Considerable activity thus devolved upon its component interest 
groups, of whom the Ilousewives Union lvas the largest. Hardly 
feminist at the start, it came to employ the rhetoric of women's 
rights to defend its particular interest, broadly construed 
as "housewifery," and used the German idea of feminism to put 
gender politics into the service of class politics. Its practical 
methods, borrowed from active feminists, and the dissemination 
of its ideology became an important ingredient of the Nazi 
solution to "the woman question." 
The Housewives Union defined itself as a professional organization, 
originating in several local housewives' associations of the 
llilhelmine Empire,lO These had formed araund several issues, 
not the least of which was the collective mobilization against 
newly forming unians of domestic servants, most of them under 
socialist auspices.ll llorld Har I enlarged the housewives' 
goals and led to centralization. On May 22, 1915, in a kind of 
feminist Burgfrieden, a disparate assortment of women gathered 
in the Lyceum Club in Berlin to create tne Housewives Union.12 
Iledwig Ileyl, daughter of the faunder of )!orth German Lloydl3 and 
herself a faunder of the oldest Berlin home economics courses 
dating back to 1835, became honorary head of the new group,l4 
but its first president was i'1artha Voss-Zietz, a suffragist and 
representative of the Federation of German Women's Associations, 
which seems to have taken the initiative for the centralization,l5 
Also present were Dr. Agnes von Zahn-llarnack, one of the first 
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historians of the r.erman women's movement and last oresident of 
the Federation,lG as well as Anna Blos, future Reichstag delegate 
for the Social Democratic party.l7 In the next two years, the 
I!ousewives Union also attracted leaders of the separately 
organized Rural ilousewives Associations, including aristocrats 
such as Countess Schwerin-LI:Iwitz and Countess Hargarete von 
Keyserlingk, representing agricultural producer interests 
whose presence brought an attack from the press and forced the 
I!ousewives Union to leave the \lar Commission for Consumer 
Interests.lß Fourteen associations entered the I!ousewives Union 
at its founding and fifty-one more joined in the first year, for 
a total of about forty-five thousand members.l9 
Uhat brought them all tagether at this time was, of course, the 
national emergency. Tiley saw their tasks to be advising 
housewives on wartime consumer problems, il!lproving the transport-
atton and distribution of foods, influencing the price structure, 
and "solving" the servant problem.20 The latter broke open with 
the end of the general Burgfrieden in 1917, when the Central Union 
of Domestic Employees petitioned the Reichstag to lift the semi-
feudal regulations, the Gesindeordnungen, which determined their 
work conditions, and demanded to be included instead in the 
Industrial Code applying to other workers.21 That action marked 
the resumption of an old struggle, around which domestic servants 
had first organized in Nlirnberg in 1906, led by the socialist 
I!elene Grlinberg, 22 and which was to persist throughout the ~leimar 
Republic. At issue was the legal status of hausehold employment 
relations, a protracted conflict conducted mainly by women, in 
which the Housewives Union represented t;le bourgeois household, 
an imperfectly commoditized sphere of class reproduction, 
characterized by patriarchal relations, and defended it and 
themselves from encroaching capitalist relations.23 
Before 1913, fifty-nine regulations that varied from region to 
region determined the rights and obligations of hausehold help, 
called Gesinde. Since the thirteenth century, Gesinde law had 
developed as a service contract between free persons, in which 
one party promised service and the other promised provision for 
a limited period. Socially, however, servants were Subordinate 
for that amount of time to the head of a household, who was 
also their legal guardian. With the development of central 
state institutions, the legal conditions of Gesinde worsened, 
especially in eastern Germany, where they were commonly employed 
as agricultural laborers on large estates. Stein's 1310 edicts, 
eliminating serfdom in Prussia, led to recodification of other 
dependency relations there, and other German states followed 
the model. Exception laws were drafted, however, extending work 
obligation indefinitely and allowing the withholding of wages, 
as well as physical punishment and police coercion .of recalcitrant 
servants. Virtual serfdom re-entered through the kitchen 
door. 21f 
The Civil Code of 1896 did little to alleviate the conditions of 
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Gesinde, leaving their specific regulation to individual states, 
historically the worst offenders. The Civil Code did make some 
aspects of its general codification of service contracts 
applicable to Gesinde, such as prohibition of physical punisl1ment; 
mandatory wage payment (though it mi~ht be in kind rather than 
in cash); the right to prime creditor status in case of the 
employer's bankruptcy; the right to room and board and to 
reasonable, but unspecified, rest ~eriods; protection against the 
garnishee of wages for property damage; care in case of illness 
for up to six weeks, to be paid by the nm< obligatory sickness 
insurance. However, these mitigations, impressive on paper, were 
virtually nullified by the still effective Prussian Gesinde law 
of 1310, which drastically, and with police enforcement, limited 
servants' rights to terrninate their contracts.2S Thus, when the 
Council of People's Re~resentatives decreed an end to all Gesinde 
laws on November 12, 191G, and on January 24, 1919, issued a 
temporary ~ecree putting agricultural labor under the Industrial 
Code, private household service alone remained unregulated. Here 
organized housewives, acting as legal deputies of the male lteads 
of households, fought organized domestics in a specifically female 
arena of class struggle. 
\lOHAL'I' S \lORI~ IS imVER DüNE: TUE PRJßLE!1 OF REGULATING D0!1ESTIC 
SERVICE 
From the statt, the opponents were unevenly matched. In 1919, 
the Central Union of Domestic Employees claimed about thirty-one 
thousand me~bers, a figure it never reached again, while the 
llousewives Union peaked at two hundred and fifty thousand 
members in 1922.26 In addition to numbers, the Housewives Union 
had far more resources at its command: money for travel to 
conferences, publicity, and social connections to facilitate 
their political work. Hot originally feminist, the Housewives 
Union nevertheless soon was manipulating newly accessible levers 
of power, such as the right to elect and be elected to public 
office, to serve as judges on labor courts, to lobby, and so on. 
They used access to the media to project their definition of 
woman's contribution to national life as one of unending service 
and sacrifice, regardless of class, pointing out that today's 
servants were tomorrow's working-class wives. Paradoxically, 
while the Central Union of Domestic Employees rarely used the 
language of gender, their atternpts to limit household work to 
certain hours, rather than have it absorb all available time, 
was potentially much more feminist. The confessional unions of 
domestics tended to parrot their mistresses in this regard. 
Long stretches of "work-readiness" (Arbeitsbereitschaft) versus 
a shorter and well-defined actual working period was the major 
item of contention between the housewives and the domestics 
and was also the key to distinguishing precapitalist notions of 
service, in which the servant rented out (literally for Uietgeld) 
his or her person, from capitalist relations of labor, in which 
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the worker contracted to give a specified amount of labor power. 
The old regional Gesinde laws and even the more enlightened 
national Civil Code did not specify any number of hours of work 
or rest due domestic workers. ilaturally, that became the first 
item on the agenda when the revolutionary Council' s decree made 
it negotiable. For domestics, chan3e was crucial. A 1917 survey 
showed titat ab out half of them served sixteen 'itours a day. 27 
At first, in the absence of formal legislation, "model" contracts 
were drawn up between local organizations of domestics and 
housewives, analogaus to the parity agreements between workers 
and employers in the industrial sector. The parameters of 
negotiation were immediately apparent. On February 12, 1919, 
the Uagdeburg local of the Central Union of Do!'lestic Enployees 
negotiated a contract with the local Housewives Union for a ten-
hour worh:da~' for urban domestics and, for rural domestics, nine 
to eleven hours, depending on the season.2Ü "Red Bavaria" even 
promulgated a state law fixing domestic service at ten hours.29 
By contrast, the llerlin city employment agency issued a model 
contract for thirteen hours of "worl~-readiness," inclusi ve of 
two interruptable hours formeals and rest.30 A similar one from 
Cassel, reflecting a local agreement, petitioned the Labor 
Hinistry for legal status.31 Between these two poles, the 
ultimately unresolved debate continued throughout the Heimar 
period. 
Twice, in 1921 and 1927, the government drafted legislation to 
regulate hausehold service. Ilopes for its passage wet'e highest 
the first time around, and considerable energy '"ent into the 
discussion of details. It got the most exhaustive consideration 
in ti1e Temporary Hational Economic Council, tlle politically tamed 
successor to the revolutionary councils and supposedly a forerunner 
to a permanent economic parliament, never actually established, 
to parallel the political parliament. Hodelled on the parity 
councils of employers and workers that emerged from the original 
revolutionary councils, the economic parliament added a third group 
of "consumers," who tended to split their votes between the two 
major contenders. This temporary institution lacked even 
effective advisory power, but its records bear witness to the heat 
of many battles and offer invaluable details of them. Here, in 
the Social Policy Committee, Luise IZ!ihler, representing the 
Central Union of Domestic Em:>loyees, fought steadfastly for a 
ten-hour day, while Charlotte HUhsam-\lerther, an "expert witness" 
to the Commi ttee, though not a formal member, represented t;1e 
Housewives Union and was equally adamant about thirteen hours of 
"work-readiness. "3~ Elisabeth Vurtll!'lann, representing the 
llational Union of Fernale Domestic Employees of Germany, the 
Christian orp,anization, kept .a low profile and rarely engaged 
in debate. 
The argument for ten hours, rather than eight as established by 
the new Industrial Code, included one concession, namely that 
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domestic service differed from industrial work in not being 
continuous labor and that two hours ~ight therefore be added as 
buffer. The- argument for thirteen Jwurs, potentially expandable 
to even more, came from the interpretation of hausehold work as 
limitless by definition because it 1~as geared to family needs. 
Domestic service, it was said, was fine training for a working-
class marriage.33 
But even before the debate over hours took place, the opponents 
engaged over the very definition of a domestic employee. The 
first paragraph of the government draft distinguished between 
two categories, "household assistant" (Hausgehilfin) who was in 
residence, and "household worl•er" (llaushaltsarbeiter) who was 
not, droppine; altogether the derogatory term "servant" 
(DienstmHdchen and Dienstbote).34 The distinction mattered for 
the do~estics, who, if they were not residents, might share 
in the somewhat better conditions already achieved by nonresidents, 
free of the Gesinde law in the first place.35 ßut the distinction 
also mattered to the housewives, w:1o wanted nonresidents included 
in ti1e legislation, since resiuential service was declining 
sharply.36 There were several reasons for this trend. In the 
main, domestic service shrank as tae industrial production of 
consumer goods narrowed hausehold chores primarily to maintenance. 
The same process of industrialization and urbanization also 
gradually dried up the rural source of domestic labor, though 
hausehold service still retained some of its historical function 
as a bridge for young country -.;.10men coming into the city. 37 
A historically more specific reason for the decline in residential 
service in C',ermany 1vas the impoverishment of parts of the middle 
class, who sometimes preferred to rent out the maid 1 s room and 
save on the expense of caring for i1er as the Civil Code required. 
Another was the increasing unwillingness of potential servants 
to live under onerous and degrading conditions liTith little 
personal freedom, when other options were open to them.3G In 
periods of high unemployment, with fewer choices, women might 
enter, but also soon leave domestic service, creating the 
paradoxical impression of both a servant shortage and a large 
pool of potential domestics whose very existence ham~ered effective 
collective bargaining. So embattled was the question of 
definition, that the Committee deferred voting on it,_ pendine; 
discussion of other parts of the draft legislation.3~ 
The prolonged debate was over hours of work. eiere the government 
draft proposed - tllirteen hours of "work-readiness," with designated 
Sundays off and other leisure time. l~hler moved to amend to 
ten hours for adults and eight for minors under eighteen. 11Uhsam 
supported the government draft, arguing that many housewives 
now also worked and needed more help in the hause. A spokes~an for 
the worl•ers 1 side pointed out broader ramifications: In commerce 
and transport, the term "work-readiness" was being used to 
prevent fixing hours; it was an assault on labor in general. The 
Labor llinistry 1 s representative defended the government draft 
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on the grounds that fixing hours for domestic labor would 
destroy the middle-class family, mainstay of German spiritual 
life. But feisty Luise I:.lihler retorted earthily that many 
housewives were already fixing hours for their servants to use 
the toilet. So much for spiri tuali ty. Still, she lost her 
amendment by eleven to ten votes.4J 
The issue of hours remairred embedded, however, in the definition 
of who was to be covered by this lalv, the vote on which had been 
deferred. So when it was raised again at the end of the first 
reading of the entire law, Klihler l)leaded fervently to have 
nonresidents excluded, on the ground that no one should expect 
thirteen hours of work from a person who also l1ad to travel 
to and from the workplace. Again she lost, fourteen to nine.41 
Still, she \Jould not give up. On second reading of the bill, she 
argued that hausehold workers, like laundresses and cleaning 
women, did exhausting work and should not be expected to do it 
langer than the eight hours, to which their current legal status 
entitled them. Again, her motion was first deferred and then 
defeated.42 On the major issues, then, of who was tobe covered 
and how long they were to work, the housewives and their allies 
on the Committee won. 
But the other issues of contention in this bill p,ive an even 
clearer indication of the level of struggle and its bitterness. 
In seven months of debate, long hours and many speeches went 
into justifying or denying demands for Sl)ace and furniture 
specifications for resident domestics and their access to a 
heated room during rest periods; wi1ether the meals to which they 
were entitled need only be healthy and sufficient or also of 
comparable quality to tlle employer's; the extent of sick care to 
be expected, including at childbirth; the inviolability of night 
rest and vacation time; the proportion of wages that might be 
garnished for property damage; conditions for and notice of 
termination; and finally, special identification of employees 
with photographs, a remirrder of the prerevolutionary work record 
(Dienstbuch) that had singled out servants from all other workers 
and was considered a humiliation by them. The score on all these 
other points, when the Committee had finished its deliberations, 
favored the domestics. Bilt when the bill came to a final vote on 
l~y 4, 1922, the dissatisfaction of all parties was registered in 
its defeat: Employers opposed it, the Catholic Union of Domestics 
supported it, and the Central Union of Domestic Eml)loyees abstained, 
I<lihler saying ti.1at ul tima tely she couldn 1 t supl)ort a bill for 
thirteen hours. 4 3 
Still, the bill was forwarded to plenary session of the Temporary 
National Economic Council, where it had three more readings, 
in which I<lihler and her allies tried again to restore the original 
government draft defining the category to be covered. Here, too, 
they failed. llorse still, at the very last reading of October 13, 
1922, the employers' group won back some earlier concessions and 
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gained even more in hours. Night rest was reduced from eleven 
to nine hours, leaving fifteen hours of "work-readiness," sick 
care was curtailed, vacations shortened, reasons for dismissal 
without notice extended, and the :1ated photo identification, 
symbol of servitude, was restored. Now the employers 1 group 
was ready to support the bill4 it passed by 103 to 97 votes. 
Disgusted, I:.lihler walked out. 4 
Organized domestics now put their hopes in the political 
legislature, where the bill was next headed, hoping worker 
interests would be better represented there than in the economic 
quasi-parliament with its parity structures in which worker 
interests could command only one-third of the votes. But it 
never got there. On December 22, 1922, the Reichsrat tabled it 
and it never reached the Reichstag. The reason given was the 
pressing economic crisis.45 
Five years later, a second attempt to legislate for hausehold 
service met the same fate. A modified version of the first 
billwas sent to the Reichstag at the end of 1927, but remairred 
in comrnittee until June 193~, when the Reichstag itself was 
dissolved. Debate araund the second bill was even more vituperous 
and politicized than araund the first. The Harnburg loeal of the 
Ilousewives Union, headed by dartha Voss-Zietz, one of the founders 
and now a member of the Fatherland Party, protested the bill at 
a plenary of the Temporary National Economic Council on 
September 19, 1923. Sl1e argued that state regulation would 
interfere unduly in the private hausehold and would materially 
darnage both the middle class and the servants it would consequently 
disemploy. Cosigners of the protest were the Stahlhelm 
Frauenbund of Greater Berlin, the National League of Large 
Families (Reichsbund der Kinderreichen), the Deutscher 
Frauenkampfbund, and the National Association of Ernployed 
Ilousewives (Reichsvereinigung gewerbetreibender Hausfrauen).46 
Concretely, the ilousewives Union was disappointed that the 
modified bill had dropped the photo identification, limited 
garnishee of wages for damages to only half a month's pay, and 
had assured some Sundays and vacations for domestics--especially 
troublesome to large families. In a strange distortion of a 
fernirrist argument, they opposed the protection of young domestics 
from employment by persans previously convicted on a morals 
charge, asserting that housewives, not husbands, should be 
considered the actual employers. aowever, after more revisions, 
they were relatively satisfied that there ·1o7ould be no hausehold 
inspections of work conditions, that employee references were 
mandatory (though not detailed enough), and, most importantly, 
that only nine hours of rest for adults and ten for minors were 
mandated, leaving fourteen to fifteen hours -of ''.10rk-readiness," 
inclusive of meals and rest periods. Overall, they voiced 
appreciation for the attempt to restore farnily-servent relations 
of old, and they regretted the bill's ultimate demise.47 
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By contrast, the Central Union of Domestic Employees, haviqg 
repeatedly pressed for the first bill's revival with the support 
of the Social Democratic party in the Reichstag, applauded the 
appearance of a new bill, still ho~ing for improved conditions.43 
A questionnaire ~olling over four thousand domestics showed that 
nearly half had only ten hours of night rest, nearly a third had 
only nine hours, and most had very few days off, including 
Sundays. 119 The union soon observed that the new bill would give 
little, if any, relief. lfuile it was being discussed, a 
sympathetic analyst compared its provisions to the status quo 
pertaining under !:lrescriptions of the Civil Code. On the positive 
side, he noted gains such as some legal determination of work 
hours, some guarantee of rig:1ts usable in law, protection against 
dismissal without notice, and some vacation allowance. On the 
negative side, he counted lasses such as the infamaus photo 
identification (ultimately dropped), fines for damages, sick 
care chargeable against the employee's earnings, and unclarity 
about reasons for dismissal.SO The worst--increase in work hours 
to fifteen--was yet to come. Small wonder the bill's demise 
was unmourned by the domestics. \fuile t;1ey had wished for 
regulation and the housewives had not, in the end the latter 
would have felt better served than the former, had the bill 
passed. 
OLD WINE IN NE\v BOTTLES: IIOUSEIIOLD APPRENTICESHIP 
The struggle sharpened further after the first _bill had failed. 
Runaway inflation in 1923 severely damaged working-class 
organizations and eroded the thin line separating already 
precarious parts of the middle class from the working class. Not 
only did middle-class daughters find themselves ruhhing elbows 
with working-class daughters in the new women's professions, 
sales and clerical work,Sl but the unwelcome leveling also 
occurred in the harne. For middle-class households, the thin line 
of social respectability was represented by nm• barely affordable 
servants, a situation which worsened in the Great Depression.S2 
For middle-class housewives, ever more was at stake: the work 
itself. 11odern technology affered some help--the pages of Die 
Deutsche llausfrau, organ of the Housewives Union, were liberally 
sprinkled with advertisements fo~;_ modern appliances--but it also 
foretold an unwelcome future: Housewives were about to reolace 
their servants with themselves. In Uarxist terms, the work of 
social reproduction of the middle class, hitherto assisted by 
members of the working c1ass and peasantry, was falling more 
directly onto the warnen of this middle class, at least of its 
lower strata, threatening to "proletarianize" them. 
Desperate, the llousewives Union beaame creative. It developed 
bhe idea of a hausehold year for all girls, with the quasi-feminist 
rationale that housewifery was a profession like other professions, 
requiring skill, training and an apprenticeship. The latter, not 
coincidentally, would enormously widen the pool from which 
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hausehold help could be drawn. The idea was not altogether new. 
In Stuart England, young pau~ers were fre~uently hire~ as 
"apprentices to housewifery" for only room and board.J3 In 
Germany, it appears to have originated in the 1390s with Ida von 
Kortzfleisch, a rural pioneer for hone economics. In 1912, 
organized Catholic women called for universal compulsory preparation 
for women 1 s domestic calling.54 But it was the war that finally 
swung the balance of the German women 1 s movement into supporting 
a National Service Year for women, complementing the male draft, 
though it was neither compulsory nor confined to domestic labor. 
Rather, under the leadership of the Faderation of German \lomen 1 s 
Associations, working closely with government, the National 
Service Year became a major home front auxiliary, providing 
social services for soldiers 1 families and coordinating women 1 s 
employment with war needs.55 
But there was a revolution simmering inside the German household. 
\lhen the demobilization office advised the Labor !Unis try in 
January 1913 that it had "a lively interest" in the demobilization 
of women from defense industry to domestic labor and wished to be 
consulted in any determinations of lvork conditions, the Labor 
Hinistry forvarded the letter in !1ay to three major housewives 1 
organizations, but not to the domestics 1 unians. I t asked them 
for materials on the urban and rural servant situation, employers 1 
needs, servants 1 potential demands, and how far housewives would 
be willing to meet those demands.56 Before the response was in, 
a revolution had occurred--or so it seemed. The "servant question" 
was suddenly altered by the abolition of the Gesinde laws and r. 
requests for guidelines started pouring in to the Labor Ministry.J 7 
A long-range solution was proposed by Anna Blos, a faunder of 
the Housewives Union and a future Social Democratic Reichstag 
deputy. She advocated half a year 1 s additional compulsory 
schooling in home economics for all female elementary school 
graduates, costs tobe cove·red by the state and communities. 58 
This was in keeping with the viewpoint of the Central Union of 
Domestic Employees, who saw schooling as a way of upgrading their 
profession. t1eanwhile, women unionists pointed out that 
qualifications alone would not guarantee good jobs and reminded 
domestics to organize also.59 
By June 1919, the political tide was turning. The Association 
for the Development of Horne Economics, a predecessor of the 
!Iouse1vives Union and one of the groups ~ueried by the Labor 
!1inistry over a year earlier, had its solution ready, It, too, 
advocated schooling, but supplemented that with a practicum to 
be carried out in an actual household. It appended a model 
apprentice contract.60 Domestics immediately recognized the 
"practicum" as a form of cheap labor, exploitinr; youth and 
endaugering adult employment. \Jhen the Central Union of Domestic 
Employees held its tenth anniversary meeting on September 21-25, 
1919, in Berlin, still hopeful about negotiating a better future, 
it warned against the signing of apprentice contracts.6 1 
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l1eanwhile, the !lousewives Union thoußht of a still eheaper 
and more controllable labor source: an exchange of daughters 
(IlaustBchter) amonß themselves. This notion, harking back to 
medieval aJJprenticeships, gave rise to some perplexing questions, 
of which t:1e most interesting regarded payment. In 1925, Die 
Deutsche Hausfrau asked its readers to suggest answers as ~ 
whether a girl's parents should pay for her training, or whether 
the hausehold apprenticing her should pay her an allowance like a 
daughter, or whether she should simply get room and board in 
exchange for her "education." The answers were cool-headed: She 
might get a little pocket money if she were over seventeen and 
had some special sl~ill; she should simply get room and board if 
freshly out of school but willing to commit herself for at least 
one year; and she might pay up to one hundred marks a month 
for specialized education including "social improvement."62 The 
exchange of daughters seems to have offered hoJJe for upward 
mobility and possibly marriage through apprenticeship to "higher 
circles"--for a price. But this feudally inspired idea did not 
take hold in the crisis-ridden 1920s, as Luise Kl:lhler, wise in 
the ways of domestic service, predicted.03 Not only did the 
young ladies complain, but they a!so fai1ed to meet the work 
expectations of their mistresses.ll4 The experimentwas soon 
dropped. 
Ilowever, apprenticeship of girls from the WO·liking class not only 
took hold, but became predominent. By 1921, it had spread 
alarmingly, helped by the fact that welfare relief legally could 
Supplement apprentice wages. 05 The terms were often brutal. A 
"model" apprentice contract proposed from l~Bnigsberg in Prussia 
for fourteen-year-old girls just out of school included 
thirteen-and-a-half hours of work, with half-hour breaks for 
meals, every other Sunday off, and ten marl~ a month in wages 
for the first year. Deference was expected: A ßirl could be 
dismissed for repeated disobedience, for tending to immorality, 
which included lying or nibbling between meals (naschen), or 
for speaking ill of the household. She could terminate the 
contract, but in that case her family had to pay compensation. 
It was all dangerously close to the old Gesinde 1aws, desEite 
some improvements, such as vacation and social insurance. 6 
By 1922, the economic crisis had developed to such a degree 
that regular domestics' wages were cut in half, making the 
stalled legislation moot, in any case, and making the apprentice 
year "popular." It became a revolving door for hausehold help 
drawn from a generationally inexhaustible supply.6 7 The Central 
Union bowed to the inevitable and began trying to improve rather 
than fight apprenticeship. On December 17, 1924, the Prussian 
Trade l1inistry gave legal recognition to an apprentice contract 
between the Ilousewives Union and various domestics' unians that 
allowed twelve-and-a-half hours of work for those over seventeen 
and orily eight for younger girls. ßut in the later recession 
of 1927, the llouse\7ives Union negotiated to have the latter group 
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also work twelve hours.6ß Actual conditions were even harsher. A 
1930 questionnaire distributed arnonß approxirnately three hundred 
students between the ages of fourteen and seventeen in a three-
year vocational school for dornestics showed that over half worked 
between thirteen and sixteen hours a day with nonresidents 
better off at closer to eleven hours. Nearly half the resident 
dornestics slept in attics, one-third of which were unheated. 
Srnall wonder that nearly half the students responding admitted 
to having changed jobs rnore than once.69 
Ueanwhile, the Ilousewives Union stepped up its carnpaign to 
elevate housewifery by elaborating on harne econornics training, 
cornplete with theoretical and practical preparation and degrees-
all the criteria for professionalization, including tracking 
by social class. The goal was ·not rnerely to raise the status 
of housewifery, though that provided the major rationale; the 
goalwas also to control the "profession," lest the unians control 
it. ßut econornic crisis weakened the latter in any case, 
without particularly irnproving the servant shortage, since needy 
warnen often chose public assistance over the notoriously onerous 
and hur.rlliating dornestic service. The housewives' rnain purpose, 
then, was still to enlarge the pool of donestic help by enforcing 
harne economics training and apprenticeship for the rnajority of 
warnen. 
At the tenth anniversary of the Housewives Union in 1925, 
its second president, Anna Gerhardt, spoke in the auditoriurn 
of ßreslau University on the organization's present and future 
work. ßeginning with a historical overview, she noted that 
housewives had learned the value of collective work through 
their war effort and tnat their rnovement owed a debt to the 
wornen's rnovement for bringing thern together. The first 
professional warnen who had banded tOßether had allowed housewives, 
whorn they helped to organize, to see themslev.es as professionals 
also. Gerhardt adapted the notion of Beruf to wornen's role in 
the harne, drawing on cultural-religious rneanings of the word 
"calling:" an inner voice for a holy rnission, demanding 
renunciation, self-sacrifice, discipline, education, and, above 
all, service. lHthout these, the indispensable energies of 
rnaternalisrn, Germany could not recover. l~ile stressing the 
spiritual, Gerhardt nevertheless acknowledged the material value 
of househol\l labor. The labor of housewives, she said, while 
often coerced and exploited, is not to be translated into "vile 
payrnent" (schnllde Bezahlung), but should be recognized as a 
contribution to the national well being. She then outlined 
the plan: first, a full year of harne economics in the now 
cornpulsory vocational schools (Berufsschulen) (but not the 
Gyrnnasia, attended by the daughters of the well-to-do); then, 
apprenticeship in a household, followed by an exarnination 
qualifyinß poor girls "frorn all social groups and educational 
backgrounds" for a newly elevated legally recognized profession 
of "household caretaker" (llaushaltspflegerin). This profession 
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could be exercised not only in private hornes, but also in 
institutions, an area of jurisdiction that had been hotly 
contested b~r unionized public service workers in 1919.70 
The plan was elaborated further in later y.ears. Professional 
wornen organized in confessional associations feared that horne 
econornics training, which they did not oppose in principle, would 
cut into time needed for other vocational training. llence, they 
requested the Reichstag in 1926 to rule that attendance in 
vocational schools be lengthened frorn three to four years, that 
hausehold apprenticeship irnrnediately follmv elernentary school and 
not be counted toward secondary school, and that secondary-
school horne econornics classes not rnix regular students with 
tiwse planning to becorne dornes tics. 71 l1eanwhile, the I!ousewi ves 
Union tried to get state grants-in-aid for apprentices, a bald 
request for public rnmlies to support private services, with the 
justification that the training of fut~2e working-class wives 
and rnothers was for the national good. Class conscious and rnore 
ferninist, Die Gewerksci1aftliche Frauenzeitung, organ of the wornen 
unionists in the general German labor federation, asserted that 
not every wornan airned to becorne a housewife and that the state 
should not be expected to train servants for big estates, whose 
owners didn't even pay their full share of taxes.73 
Still, the I!ousewives Union generated further plans. It develoned 
a hierarchy of training for two socially distinct groups of new 
professionals. "Simple, but excellently prepared personnel" for 
private households could rnove frorn dornestic assistant 
(Hausgehilfin) to hausehold caretaker (llaushaltspflegerin) and 
beyond that to licensed housekeeper (Hirtschafterin), the last 
also being open to experienced housewives. The other group rnoved 
toward degrees of Haster (Heister) and Horne Manager 
(\lirtschaftsrneis terin), which led to higher rnanagerial status. 
These required sorne secondary education, an additional year and a 
half of school, and a rninirnurn age of twenty-four on taking the 
exarnination, all of which effectively took these degrees out of 
the reach of rnost proletarian farnilies. By 1930, the Housewives 
Union could report 296 graduates with Masters in 26 cities.74 
The Central Union of Dornestic Ernployees, defeated in its 
legislative hopes and having had to capitulate to the apprenticing 
systern, was reduced to airning for representation on the exarnination 
cornrnittees and to securing prornotion to the higher titles.75 
And the worst was yet to corne. 
The Great Depression rnade hausehold help cheap again. In 
Breslau, the local I!ousewives Union organized "training workshops" 
for girls who, on pain of losing their unernployrnent or welfare 
checks, had to sew six hours a day for thirty-six days, rnending 
their own clothes one-third of the time and second-hand clothes 
for welfare recipients two-tilirds of the time. ltunich had a 
sirnilar system. 75 11\lorkfare" had arrived. Furtherrnore, 
disappointed that BrUning's emergency decree lowering wages did 
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not include the category of dornestics, the Housewives Union began 
urging reduction of social taxes on dornestics' paychecks, which, 
though norninally shared by ernployer and employee, were actually 
sent in by el'lployers after ne gotiating a "net" wage with 
ernployees.77 This wasdonein 1933. Jubilantly, Die Deutsche 
Hausfrau proclairned: " i'lothing is impossible in the new Gerrnany!"7<l 
The labor rnarket continued shifting in their favor. Hith 
unernployrnent soaring and relief rneasures cut, warnen again becarne 
willine to serve, even as resident dornestics, for roorn and board 
and no wages at all.79 Ilaust8chteren were again exchanged, drawn 
frorn the ailing sections of the rniddle class, but were now 
expected to offer rnore: languages, rnusical skills, even a 
driver's license, for the privilege of residing with a "better" 
farnily. 30 
~lhile the warnen unionists 1 newspaper ran increasingly alarrning 
headlines about the Uational Socialist party, the housewives' 
journal rernained steadfastly "unpolitical," even letting Hitler's 
accession to the chancellorsitip in January 1933 !JO unrernarked. 
But the llay issue celebrated Labor Day with a paean of praise to 
German reconstruction and published the notorious blueprint by 
l~gda Goebbels for the sexual division of labor in the new 
German state. It had. three ~arts: 
1. llork lvhich \vornen rnus t undertake, such as \Velfare, 
teaching, and other nurturant activities, specified by 
wornen's nature. 
2. ~lork which warnen ~ undertake, such as factory and 
office work and certain kinds of professions such as 
pediatrics, laboratory assistance, and other careers not 
alien to wornen's ternperarnent. 
3. ~lork which rnen alone should do, such as defense, law, and 
politics, which required a cold, clear objectivity alien 
to wornen's ~Varrn and sensitive nature.31 
In June, Haria Jecl:er, third and last president of the Housewives 
Union under the >leirnar Republic, brought her organization into 
the German llomen's Front. Expressins gratitude for Hitler's 
interest in a dornestic service year--"Ho earlier regirnes 
listened to us," she said--Jecker presented a rnodified plan, 
dropping formal schooling, now acknowledged to be too costly to 
the stateA and substituting the parental home as a place of 
training. u2 By August, the ilousewives Union stood corrected 
in its "narrow" definition of warnen '·s service to the liational 
Socialist state,33 The dornestic service year was to becorne a 
general service year (Dienstjahr), lvithin which hausehold service 
was rnerely one option of several. Gleichschaltung had arrived for 
the ilousewives IJnion. 
Still, it had won irnportant material and ideological gains. By 
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1933, there were 160,000 more domestics working in private homes 
than there had been in 1933 •. 34 And the ~.lazi regime sponsored as 
its own the Union' s view of women' s place, for wltich they had 
well prepared the German public.35 In most ways, they stood 
confirmed. 
CONCLUSIOH 
In conclusion, the official i~azi program for "the woman question"--
though pragmatically manipulated later to suit ~var needs--was 
not drawn out of an ideological hat alone, nor was it built solely 
on national nostalr;ia for lost "havens in a heartless world," 
but rested firmly on a long-standing public effort by an organized 
interes t group in the conservati ve IVing of the women' s movemen t. 
The Housewives Union was dedicated not only to enhancing the 
status of housewifery, in an adaptation of German feminism, but 
to securing a steady supply of cheap hausehold service. Their 
goal was not merely ideological; it had a material base. 
Due to the ~istorical feminization of hausehold service, it was 
warnen who fought out this particular battle in one of the last 
strongholds of patriarchy against capitalist social relations. 
The reactionary llousewives Union, by using gender rhetoric for 
its class interests, helped to prepare for fascism in Germany 
and felt itself confirmed by Hazi ideology. 
Some women, by virtue of their class interests, contributed to 
the rise and temporary success of fascism in Germany by using the 
bourgeois feminism of their day as an ideological tool. The 
notion of woman's unique mission and nature was easily co-opted 
and ultimately absorbed by the Nazi state, which muted class 
struggle, araund the hearth as elseiVhere, with force. 
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~~satisfaction Is 
Domestic Happiness": 
Mass Working-Class Sex 
Reform Organizations in 
the Weimar Republic 
ATINA GROSSMANN 
Girls! Is your fiance's income adequate for marriage? -
llo? So protect both of you so that you don't have any 
children before you can afford to feed them, 
\lomen! Are you willing to once again serve as voluntary 
birth machines providing the state with cannonfodder 
for a new war and industry with new unemployed who can 
lower wages even further? - No? So let yourself be 
counseled and avoid abortions that can destroy your bodies •••• 
Proletarians! The more you love your children, the more 
you should think about their welfare and your responsibility! 
Come to us! \le will help you prevent unhappiness! 
(leaflet distributed by Reichsleague for Birth Control and 
Sexual Hygiene, c. 1930.) 
Werking-class lay sex reform organizations in the \leimar Republic 
began as a capitalist scheme in the early 1920s--an advertising 
gimmick by clever birth control manufacturers seeking a 
guaranteed market for their mysterious, highly profitable, and 
often unreliable products. ßy 1932, shortly before their wholesale 
destruction by the National Socialists, the organizations had 
developed into a genuine mass movement for social change, 
claiming over 15·},000 membersl and espousing simultaneously 
neo-Halthusian and socialist politics. They fulfilled a 
manifest need for a proletariat reeling under the pressures of 
mass unemployment and drastic cutbacl~ in social welfare services--
a proletariat already relying on quack birth control remedies, 
coitus interruptus, and illegal abortions in its desperate 
attempts at family limitation. 
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The practical success of these lay organizations in ~roviding 
their membership with safe, inexpensive contraceptives and sexual 
and family counseling contrasted sharply with their ~olitical 
failure. They were unable to unite into a nationwide organization 
strong enough to overturn the \veimar Republic's repressive sex 
crimes code, which criminalized abortion and the publicizing of 
contraception. i~or were they able to withstand the Nazis's 
onslaught on sexual self-determination and family planning. 
The tortu:red twists and turns of their develo~ment reflect the 
history of lleimar working-class politics and culture as a whole. 
Their success reflects the strength of worldng-class social 
organization in Germany; their failure the fate of a working-
class movement that was fragmented into ~olitical impotence, 
Lay sex reform groups, with their illustrated journals filled 
with advice on sexual technique, contraception, eugenic hygiene, 
health, and the ;:>rotection of mothers; their centers for the 
distribution of contraceptives; and their many therapeutic 
question-and-answer lectures, were an integral and crucial part 
of the working-class subcul ture of the \leimar Republic. Relying 
on the trad±tions of self-help and folk mcdicine, the various 
leagues for birth control and sexual hygiene (or similar sounding 
names) provided material aid and psychological guidance for a 
societry in transition--a society dissolving the customary ties 
to church and extended families and slowly adjusting to professional 
medicalization and economic rationalization, 
\lorking-class groups attempted to apply the insights of "en-
lightened, nonjudgemental, modern" medical science and 
psychoanalysis to "modern" problems such as overly laree 
families and sexual dysfunction. Ironically, this was often 
done against the anxious protest of the very groups--doctors 
and ~opulationists--whose knowledge and techni~ues they were 
appropriating and popularizing. In the absence of a national 
health-care network that included family planninp, and mental 
health, working-class men and women began to demand such services 
at the same time as they generated lay self-help organizations 
to meet their immediate needs in an era of econolilic, political, 
social and population crisis. 
Proletarian sex reform must be considered in the context of the 
changed economic and political circumstances of the Republic. 
"Population crisis," the "new woman" and the "new family" were 
central and explosive themes in Weimar political discourse and 
activity. Although the birth rate in Germany had been declining 
since the middle of t;1e nineteenth century, the trend towards 
smaller families did not appear as a mass phenomenon among the 
p:coletariat until after the First lvorld 'lar. Only then did it 
begin to arouse public and governmental concem about the survival 
of the Volk and the labor and rnilitary potential of the coming 
generations.2 The traditional birti1 rate differential between 
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rich and poor had become ominously narrow.3 Although women were 
continuing zo get married--indeed in greater nroportion than 
ever before --and to bear children, families became distinctly 
and iutentionally smaller. According to the 1925 census, ~ 
working-class families averaged only 3.9 persans per household.J 
The "new woman" was not only the intellectual with Uaennerschnitt 
or the young white-collar worker in flap!)er outfit so familiar 
to us from the eroticized products of the \leimar mass media, but 
also the young married factory worker who now cut her hair short 
into a practical Bubikopf, no langer baked and canned, only 
cooked one warm meal a day,6 and tried by all .available means to 
keep her family small. This represented a rationalized 
reproductive strategy in a modernizing society faced with an 
acute housing shortage and a significant proportion of married 
women engaged in \vage labor. 3 By 1930, with all of these trends 
intensified by the depression, it was estimated that there were 
1 milÜon abortians with 10,000 to 12,000 fatalities annually. 
Abortions exceeded the number of live births and averaged out 
to at least two abortians over a lifetime for every woman in 
Germany.9 
In analyzin3 this situation, population experts differed according 
to their political orientations. Leftists were able to ~resent 
definite proposals for practical solutions, while government 
experts found themselves in a paralyzing double bind. The 
latter bemoaned the lack of three-children families considered 
necessary for maintaining adequate population levels, but 
simultaneously recognized that laree families, given the reality 
of female wage labor and decreasing social services, would 
probably only be poverty-stricken and "degenerate." Such 
families could not therefore provide the sturdy base required for 
an efficient technologized economy and a secure national defense.lO 
On the other hand, Communist "sex doctors" like l1ax Hodann and 
\lilhelm Reich called for mass response to the "sexual rnisery of 
the !)roletariat." \loridng-class sex reforrners, both doctors and 
lay people, insisted that proletarian sexuality was severely 
inhibi ted b~r social condi tions such as the lack of privacy, 
sanitary facilities, and leisure time. They painted a dismal 
picture of couples forced to make love half-clothed in constant 
fear of being disturbed, the need to share rooms and sometimes 
beds with relatives and boarders, the early exposure of children 
to quick and brutal sex, lack of access to medical care or sex 
education, the double burden of wa~e labor and housework for 
many women, and the constant tensions of worrying about material 
survival. In short, they asserted that ~sychic-sexual conflict 
and the living condttions endured by the proletariat \Vere 
inextricably connected. The supposedly "natural" working class 
was actually sexually more deprived than a bourgeoisie witn its 
access to medical contraception and safe abortions.ll 
Lay sex reform leagues therefore mobilized class hatred and 
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working-class resentment of its assigned role of carrying the 
burden of reproducing the next generation without the resources 
for a clecent stanuard of livine . T!te leagues aimed to hel') 
families manage the pressures of econornic need by providing 
affordable, easily available birt:<-control remedies that neither 
involved resorting to hazardous and/or costly abortions nor 
necessitated techniques such as withdrawal or douching irnrnediately 
after intercourse, with hindered sexual gratification. The 
subversive premise of working-class sex reform was t:1at sexual 
enjoyment without the punitive consequences of continual 
pregnancies, should no longer be a privilege of the bourgeoisie. 
The sex reforrn movement interverred on two levels to facilitate, 
channel, and control social developments that were occurring 
in any case. On a practical level, lay groups, often connected 
to business interests in the burgeoning birth control industry, 
offered the workinß class--and particularly the "new woman"--
quick solutions to its need for fertility control. And on a 
political level, organizations like the comnunist party and 
parts of the Social Democratic party attempted to discipline and 
unite the rnass lay mover.1ent. In association with medical sex 
reformers, they tried to add a social class analysis to the 
single-issue, lleo-tlalthusian focus of local groups and to 
introduce medical controls and exT>ertise. The >mrking-class 
parties provided one of the few arenas where socially cornrnitted 
physicians gath.ered. In a sense, tilerefore, the sex reform/ 
political organizations affiliated \/ith the KPD and SPD acted 
as mediators bet\veen medical and lay sex reform activists. 
The pre-llorld \lar I sex reform move1aent had been initiated by 
liberal and socialist intellectuals advocating reform of the sex 
crimes code and a new ethic of sexual morality.12 The first 
postwar birth-control leagues were established on an entirely 
different basis in 1922 by the Bund der Taetigen in Bavaria, 
Silesia, and Saxony. They were basically covers for business 
interests, but were already adorned with anticapitalist, neo-
llaltimsian rhetoric tha t a ttracted wcrrking-class people in areas 
where access to medical birth control was very difficult. :3y 
1923-24, cornnercial groups began to lose power' as the first 
independent workinp,-class organizations were established. 
Two groups based in Saxony (Chemnitz and Dresden) united to form 
an Association for Sexual Hygiene and Life-Style Reform (Vereine 
fllr Sexual-Hygiene und Lebensreform, VSL). They quickly gained a 
combined meabersilip of thirteen thousand. The Saxon union set 
the tone for future proletarian leagues by clearly distancing 
itself from the tactics of conunercial groups. In order to 
eliminate ')rofiteering, each local purchased birth control 
products t:tat were dis tributed at t:te membership at cos t. Activi ty 
was no langer lir<ited to distribution and sale of contraceptives 
but also encompassed political and sex education, sexual counselinp, 
for rnenbers, and the struggle for lep,al reforiTI. 
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llanufacturers continued to try to exploit the !jrowth of the 
movement by expropriating its names and styles. For example, a 
r.mnufacturer named Hofbauer also established a VSL. The 
phannacist: !Ieisser formed the Harke:cs Leagues for Birth Control 
(Arbeiter-Vereine fUr Geburtenregelung, AfG) in 1924-25 to sell 
his mvn special brand of contraceptive paste.l3 
By 1925, working-class groups, all at least vaguely col!lffiitted to 
socialism, solidly controlled sex reform. The Silesian groups in 
the Saxony based VSL split off in 1925 to form their own People's 
Association for the Protection of Hothers, (Volksbund fUr 
Hutterschutz), centered near Goerlitz and Leignitz.I4 They 
quickly produced their own journal, \leckru~ which served nineteen 
thousand subscribers. In 1927, Hofbauer' s association revolted 
against his profiteering and joined the original autonomaus 
VSL, bringing in ten thousand members.lS 
The lay working-class oreanizations were now numerically the 
strongest segment of a broad \leimar sex reform movement, which 
also included an elite scientific and medical wing with inter-
national connections, gathered tagether in organizations such 
as tl1e \~orld League for Sex Reform (\lLSR), Hi In addition, there 
were certain municipal health insurance s ~rstems and health 
departments in large cities, frequently staffed by Socialist 
and Communist doctors, including many women 17 and the social 
welfare associations of the SPD and Y~n.l3 Competing .and 
overlapping as the groups were, they shared a conEitment to 
reform of a bourgeois legal code that institutionalized the 
subordinatilion of warnen within marriage and criminalized abortion 
and sex education. The common slogan was "better to prevent 
than to abort," and they all asserted women's right to sexual 
enjoyment and the importance of the responsible conception of 
healthy offspring, 
The various groups continually fought among themselves about 
general political allegiances as well as about which devices 
were safest and cheapest. Medicall;r directed groups, aspiring to 
the latest in scientific correctness, tended to provide women 
with the approved mechanical/chemical combination of diaphragm 
plus spermicide. llore militant lay groups simply dis tributed 
suppositories or creams on the theory that couples would be more 
likely to use the least complicated method requirinß no medical 
intervention. Doctors and other exnerts associated with the 
\lLSR wanted to ensure that the entire complex of birth control, 
eugenics, and sexology remained in the hands of the trained and 
competent, safe from both unscrunulous businessmen and excessive 
politicization, I~D- and SPD-affiliated groups demanded both 
medical control and politicization--a difficult goal in a society 
with an extremely conservative medical establishment. 
The various wings of the movement, both lay and professional, 
joined, influenced, and pressured each other. Again and again, 
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the experts were shocked and inspired to fight for reform by their 
experiences in ti1e health centers located in working-class 
neigi1borhoods. The existence of such centers themselves was a 
response to the pressures of the lay movement. Doctors and 
social workers were daily witnesses to t;1e fierce determination 
of proletarian women to prevent preßnancies. Dr. Alice Vollnhals-
Goldmann, director of the l1aternal Care Program of the Berlin 
Hunicipal ilealth Insurance System, reported in 1927: 
On the basis of our experience, we must say, if a 
woman regards her pregnancy as unwanted and wants 
to be freed from it, she will lmow how to free 
herself of the preßnancy by all means, even at the 
cost of her life. All legal threats of punishment 
are illusory agairrst the terrible state of need and 
prevent no one from having an abortion.l9 
For their part, the mass lay organizations slowly abandoned their 
mistrust of science and academic medicine. \iorking-class 
parties began to preach the dangers of quack abortions and 
overpriced patent medicines. The idea of lay self-help became 
less a matter of principle than an unfortunate necessity blamed 
on the lack of social responsibility demonstrated by the vast 
majority of German physicians. The lay leagues were painfully 
aware of the damaße to their reputations due to association with 
cornmercial outfits and the disadvantage of not having access 
to the latest developments in contraceptive research. And some 
doctors were willing to establish closer links, partly in the 
hope of gaining influence over a grassroots movement that 
seemed to have grown dangerously large and out of control. 
The establishment of the Reichsleague for Birth Control and 
Sexual Hygiene (Reichsverband fllr Geburtenregelung und 
Sexualhygiene, RV) in 1923, the first truly nationwide umbrella 
sex reform organi2:ation was an example of this potentially 
frui tful symbiosis. Ti1e RV was founded by several smaller lay 
organizations trying to liberate ti1emselves completely from 
ties to birth-control manufacturers, in cooperation with the 
Society for Sexual Reform (Gesellschaft fllr Sexualreform, GESEX). 
The GESEX, with its predominantly medical membership, provided 
the RV with scientific information ahd credibilit~Ö also 
affording some protection from police harassment. The RV 
grew rapidly. From 136 locals in 1923, it expanded to 192 by 
1930, with 15,526 subscribers to the new central journal 
Sexualhygiene (Sil). 21 Edited by a former GESEX board member, 
it carried simply written and attractively laid out educational 
articles and was nationally distributed for free or for 20 
pfennigs. 
The journal also featured a regular advice column by the well-
known Communist sex reformer, Dr. Iiax llodann. It is indicative 
of the degree of cooperation between sex reform groups that a 
committed Communist doctor could write and agiLate for an 
"Satisfaction Is Domestic Happiness" 271 
organization loosely identified with the SPD. Indeed, one is 
struck again and again by the many Connections between sex-reform 
physicians of differing political persuasions, particularly at 
a time when Communists and Social Democrats were otherwise 
actively fighting each other. The circle of doctors willing 
to fight for birth control ·and abortion reform was so small that 
mutual respect and commitment to the cause overrode political 
differences. This tolcrance most. definitely did not apply to 
the lay functionaries, which raises interesting. questions about 
the relationshi~ between a doctor's professional and political 
identification. 2 
The RV/GESEX Counseling Center in a proletarian district in 
ßerlin was run on a volunteer basis by two GESEX doctors. A 
storefront, it was jointly financed by contributions from trade 
unions, leftist Social Democrats and anarcho-syndicalists. 
Donated samples of diaphragms and cervical caps were fitted and 
distributed. Both married and unmarried women 1vere treated, in 
accordance with what were perceived as socialist principles.23 
Ueanwhile, the Harnburg RV local reported in 1931 that it had 
organized fifteen hundred members in less than two years. They 
met every fourth Tuesday of the month for lectures on such themes 
as "Introduction to Population Politics"; "Anatomy and Physiology 
of the Sex Organs"; "Theory and Teclmique of Contraception"; 
"Race Theory, Eugenics and Sterilization"; and "The Extermination 
of Unfit Life."24 The stress on eugenics and racial hygienewas 
typical of sex-reform groups and suggests the complex ambivalent 
relationship between right-wing nationalist population policy 
and leftist sex reform . This relationship cannot be fully 
developed here, but it is certainly true that a belief in the 
necessity of establishing "scientific" norms for the healthy 
and the unfit, the wholesome and ti1e degenerate, was common to 
both groups. 
The lla!'lburg branch in a traditionally liberal and international 
port city, had good and close connections with the local SPD. Two 
SPD me111bers of the City Council sat on the RV's board, assuring 
police cooperation, and the medical director, Dr. Edward Elkan, 
was also a SPD member and committed Socialist. Dr. Elkan 
recalled that his insurance and welfare gynecological practice 
in a working-class housing settlement on the outskirts of 
Harnburg quickly developed into an official RV counseling center 
when the word spread that he was willing to provide condoms, 
diaphragms, and cervical caps. 
Unlike ßerlin, ti1e Harnburg RV had no clinic of its own. Dr. 
Elkan's office served as the medical center, and contraceptive 
distribution tooi~ place in a private apartl'lent. The RV's major 
activity encompassed lectures with blackboards, slides, and 
exh:lbitions of contraceptive t!evices. The use of birth control 
was explained in great detail by doctors at mass meetings; women 
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were given the address of the distribution center and invited to 
examine the exhibition samples. Thus, it was possible to reach 
many more people at one time than would have been feasible in a 
doctor's office. 
This mass approach was necessary because on the whole, the medical 
profession remained "opposed and apathetic." As Dr. Elkan recalled, 
"German doctors were no socialists; sex reform really did not come 
from the medical profession, it was a popular movement."25 
Indeed, physicians like Edward Elkan and 11ax Ilodann were very 
rare. Host established German doctors, while familiar with 
surgical abortion techniques, were blissfully i gnorant of 
birth control.26 
Even the RV, which attracted the most support from physicians, 
was forced to set up "flying counseling centers" (fliegende 
Beratungsstellen), where a single doctor accompanied by a 
traveling league functionary, visited outlying areas in Saxony 
and Thuring:.a at regular intervals. Franz Gampe, the former 
Nurernberg oarpenter who was the head of the RV, complilined in 
1931: 
It is a regrettable disadvantage for the proletarian 
class struggle that those leagues for birth control 
which have an undeniable class struggle character 
and are under scientific medical control in all 
questions relating to contraception, are still thrown 
into one pot with shady profiteering organizations 
by the broad massas.27 
That a worker such as Gampe was chief of the RV indicates that 
even medically influenced lay organizations retained their "lay" 
character insofar as medical personnel served as resources and 
performed a service, usually on a volunteer basis, but did not 
determine political or organizational policy . ßut many lay 
organizations were eager to establish their medical reliability 
by insisting that only medical doctors be allowed to examine 
warnen and fit contraceptive devices. ~lith the exception of in 
large cities, however, the "your doctor knows best" :oolicy was 
difficult to enforce, because of the shortage of trained doctors 
willing to engage in activities so noorly remunerated and so 
suspect to their colleagues. Medical services were still often 
provided by nonmedically trained folk healers and homeopaths. 
Althoup,h the lay and scientific factions were moving closer to 
each other, there were still strong separatist currents. In 
response to the continuing Opposition of the medical establishment 
and as a direct competitor to the socialist medical RV, the lay 
League for the P·llotection of 11others and Social Family Hygiene 
(Liga fUr Butterschutz und soziale Familienhygiene, Liga) was 
established in 1929, only one year after the successful unification 
of the RV. The Liga, which became the largest lay group in 
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Germany, was determinedly apolitical and insisted that all of 
its radical elements had been purged. 
The Liga captured the attention of rightist population groups 
and government experts in a way that the SPD-connected RV had 
not. Police monitared the Liga as being strengest in very poor 
industrialized reg:Lons like the Hansfeld area of Thuringia, 
but also in Catholic areas such as Bavaria, ~luertemberg, and 
Hhinelanu-lles tphalia. A report to the l1inis try of Real th 
(Reichseesundheitsamt, RGA) in 192J from a member of the League 
for Large Families (Bund der Kinderreichen, ßl~R), which encouraged 
the official state policy of increasing the birth rate, described 
the popular res!Jonse to a Liga/Bund Meeting in }Zlberfeld: 
l!undreds s igned up to j oin the organization .i us t to 
acquire the contraceptive offered, for the mass of 
oppressed women are clamoring for birth control remedies 
and one can only get them throup,h the Bund. You should 
have seen the faces of these working-class \Wmen, who 
hung on every ward of the lecture as if hypnotized •• 
What will we come to if these products are distributed 
in such a mass way? 2ß 
The Blm complained that the Liga contraceptives were harmful 
to health, manufactured in uncontrolled fashion according to 
secret formulas, and overpriced. The Ministry of the Interior, 
sharing the concern about sex reform's resonance among working-
class women, noteu that birth-control leagues could not be 
prosecuted under Paragraph 134.3 a law prohibiting ti1e public 
advertizing of contraceptives because the products were only 
affered to members, and admitted to frustration because it was 
so easy to gain membership by paying a minimal fee. 29 The RGA 
worried helpless ly: 
These groups which hide behind many different names 
have because of ti1eir extremely disturbing efforts 
against population policies and health regulations 
frequently come to the attention of police and also 
given cause for court investigations. l!owever, the 
latter have only in very exceptional cases led to 
convictions because those involved are highly skilled 
in getting araund legal regulations.30 
The Liga continued to function and finally set up its own medical 
clinic in Berlin in 1931. It retained its unsavory reputation, 
and the clinic's medical director, Siegfried Levy-Lenz, is 
remernbered unfavorably by his colleagues as an abortionist.31 
In contrast, however, to the avowedly socialist RV/GESEX clinics, 
where allwarnen were provided with birth control without personal 
questioning, the Liga required indications for contraception. 
The questions, interestingly, were phrased in such a way as to 
be aduressed to the husband and not the woman herself: 
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Can I without decidedly lowering my standard of living, 
bring up my children so that t;tey will have a certain 
chance of ge tting on in life? \lill the health of my 
wife suffer from pregnancy and confinement? \-/ill the 
future cltild be healthy?32 
The Elbersfeld meeting was probably more typical of the work of 
lay working-class, sex reform organizations than either the RV 
or Liga clinics. 
That the lines between public service, business, and politics were 
not always tightly drawn is illustrated by the following tr:tal 
transcript. A 1930 court case in Bochum, in the heavily 
industriali;:ed and Catnolic Ruhr region, offers us an unusual 
insigltt into the labyrinthirre and ambivalent worl~ings of a lay 
sex reform league caught between commercial considerations, the 
need to suoply political education and contraceptive services 
to its membership, and the pressures inflicted by state legal 
authorities. The three defendants were members of an organization 
functioning under the name of Verband fUr Sexualhygiene und 
Uutterschutz and numerous similar sounding titles, presumably 
designed to complicate police surveillanc·e. The organiaation 
was contractually obligated to distribute the products of the 
firm Dr. \lilling and Theves, which carried the peculiar name 
of Drei t1tlnclts (Three t1onks) Antispermin and had formerly been 
marketed as "Zufriedenheit ist h1:lusliches GlUck" (Satisfaction 
is domestic happiness)! 
According to tlte terms of the contract, the company sold the tubes 
to the league at the wholesale price of 1.25 mark to be resold 
to the organization middlemen for 1.50 mark who in turn sold to 
the members for 2 marks. This system affered particularly active 
members an opportunity to earn some extra income on commission 
and was undoubtedly also an attraction for proletarian and/or 
unemployed men. The regular sales price was supposedly 4 
marks, so tltat members received the tubes at half the drugstore 
price. 
TI1e defendant, t1r. F. was accused of holding a series of birth-
control meetings in the region for which he received travel 
expenses plus an honorarium of 3 to 5 marks for each lecture. 
The mechanics of birth control were explained and demonstrated 
with the aid of a slide show, and the speaker insisted that the 
blessings of many children should be reserved for the ruling 
class. lle also remernbered to add that Three t1onks affered 
excellent protection against venereal disease. The audience 
comprised about 30 to 100 people with free admission for members 
and a 20 to 40 pfennigs charge for guests. Two warnen members, 
including Mr. F's wife, also spoke. One slide demonstrated the 
insertion of the tube into the vagina, and in another, a pregnant 
woman was shown on her knees before a nurse (begging for an 
abortion?) while the nurse held a tube of Antispermin in her 
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hand, with a r.aption that read, "And why don' t you use Three 
tlonks?" 
The defendants all admitted that the facts as presented by the 
prosecution were correct but insisted that they were not in 
violation of Paragraph 184 . 3 because the visitors at the closed 
meeting had already become members of a ;:>rivate society by 
signing up and paying their dues, thereby obviating any claim of 
"public" advertizing. They furthermore claimed that their 
actions were legal under the provisions of the Law to Combat 
Venereal Disease, which allowed publicizing of products serving 
to prevent VD, a loophole commonly used by birth-control advocates. 
The court was not impressed, deciding that the defense arguments 
were invalid because Three Monks was not primarily intended to 
serve as an anti-VD product. llaving disposed of the VD-law 
defense, the court also ruled that the defendants had violated 
Paragraph 134.3 because the meeting had been publicly advertized 
and because admittedly, guests were allowed to withdraw from 
their "membership" after the lecture. 
The references to the unjustness of Paragraph 213 and the 
organization's orientation toward married couples (who presumably 
would have no cause to fear VD?) further indicated that the 
product was intended as a contraceptive. If the speaker had 
alluded to anti-VD properties, he had assuredly only done so to 
mislead the inevitable police spy. And finally, disregarding the 
previous argument about the appeal to married couples, the 
court judged the product as "useful for indecent purposes" 
because it could be used and acquired by unmarried as well as 
married people. In conclusion, it was noted that the manufacturer 
had furnished the league office space in his company headquarters, 
supplied leaflets, and that a firm employee handled the league's 
business matters--all the privilege of contracting to exclusively 
distribute Three l1onks Antispermin. Ur. F was judged guilty 
of violating Paragraph 134.3, and the two warnen were convicted 
of aiding and abetting the violation.33 ~uite ignored in the 
legal judgment was the interesting and for the residents of the 
Ruhr region particularly crucial revelation that the league's 
products had been certified safe and effective as birth control 
by a medical expert! 
By 1930, with the economic crisis starting to have a debilitating 
effect on the sex reform movement, the need for unity and 
consolidation became even more apparent. llembership and dues 
were suffering as people withdrew from organizational burdens in 
the financial crunch, while at the same time, the need for 
delayed marriages and family limitation become more urgent.34 
A preparatory unity conference was convened in ßerlin in January 
1930.35 Representatives from the RV, the Liga, and several 
smaller groups from all over the country, as well as from medical 
committees for birth control36 and the HLSR established a Warking 
Group of Sex Reform Leagues (Arbeitseemeinschaft der Verblinde 
fUr Sexualreform). They pledged to coordinate events, exchange 
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speakers and information, jointly pressure manufacturers to lower 
their prices and improve safety, fight against commercial 
competition, establish a common press office and journal, and 
provide aid to victims of sex laws. Uisely sensing the multiple 
problems attending sucn a centralization project, they also 
suggested setting up an arbitration court to regulate conflicts 
among the various squabbling groups. The RV clearly took the 
lead in demanding a supra-party-politics (Uberparteilich) 
organization based on "socialist principles." 
The actual unity congress originally scheduled for April was 
postponed numerous times until it was finally held in Berlin on 
June 20 and 21, 1931. Fifty-five delegates representing over 
55,000 members from the Liga, RV, and six other smaller groups 
were present. After one and a half days of continual haggling 
and frustration, it finally collapsed into what one of its most 
dedicated and disappointed participants termed a "fiasco." 
Althouth the central questions related to the complexities of 
joining the two big rivals, RV and Liga, the conr.;ress was 
dominated by the unexpected and disruptive appearance of an entirely 
new group--the Communist Unity League for ProletarianProtection 
of Hothers and Sex Reform (Einheits-Verband fUr proletarischer 
llutterschutz und Sexualreform, EpS). The EpS had been formillly 
established only one week before the conference precisely for 
the purpose of unifying all proletarian sex-reform organizations 
under disciplined class-conscious leadership. 
The EpS claimed to represent ten thousand members in the lower 
Rhine and Ruhr regions and was outraged that only three of their 
delegates were recognized. The other groups were furious that a 
brand-new upstart organization, which according to them had no more 
than three thousand members, could march into their conference 
and der·1and the dissolution of groups with over fifty thousand 
members into a ne\l organization dominated by Communists. The 
conference response offers a good example of the kind of anger 
and resentment l~D politicization tactics often nrovoked.37 
The EpS in turn asserted that only Communist leadership could 
guarantee a class-struggle perspective, firmly rejecting any 
connections with capitalist interests and petty bourgeois neo-
Malthusianism. EpS delegates comr>lained that the participants 
were too concerned with petty organizational rivalries and not 
enough with the needs of the proletarian masses. They charged 
that the congress failed because of "horsetrading" among the 
groups and that unity was impossible to achieve among the "petty-
bourgeois, reformist and anarcho-syndicalist leadership cli<jues." 
They denounced ti1e other groups for being willing to "sacrifice 
sex reform demands on the altar of coalition. politics with ßrUning's 
Catholic Center government."33 From the point of view of the 
other groups, the EpS was sabotaging years of hard, practical 
work, with which it had not been involved, for the sal~e of 
abstract political rhetoric.39 
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The Congress finally fell apart on the trivial issue of whether 
the local groups should pay dues of 10, 13, or 15 pfennigs monthly 
to the central organization--in reality of course, not merely a 
financial, but a local control issue. ~~en the congress decided 
on the higher levy, the RV walked out, leaving behind an impotent 
rump and an accusatory EpS. The GESEX continued to press for 
unity at least among the remaining smaller groups. It finally 
split from the RV in protest and joined with the smaller AfG, 
an outgrowth of the league established by !leiser in 1925. The 
conference thus resulted not only in the failure to unify, but 
in ti1e breakup of the RV /GESEX, w:üch had been the most organized 
and sophisticated of the national groups. 
The Communist party, rather than continuing the struggle for 
unity, cried "SPD betrayal" and charged the other groups with 
being nothing more than fronts for birth-control manufacturers 
and indiscriminate dispensers of contraceptives in a situation 
where "pills alone could not cure."40 In accordance with its 
general strategy, the iG'D withdrew from the mass base of the 
movement and created its own separate opposition organization, 
just as it was withdrawing from the SPD-dominated trade unions and 
establishing its own RGO. 
The KPD proceeded to attempt to build the small local EpS 
organization into a national grouping that would attract workers 
away from the oti1er reformist grou?s and towards the party 
according to the "United Front from below" tactic. In fact 
however, the immediate EpS demands, based on the Soviet model, 
were not so different from the RV program: 
1. decriminalization of abortion. 
2. procedure to be performed during the first trimester 
by a doctor, funded by health insurance. 
3. medical prescriptions for contraceptives to be paid for 
by health :tnsurance and municipal welfare. 
4. establishment of sex-counseling clinics by insurance 
systeMs and local authorities. 
5. doctors to be trained in the techniques of birth control 
and safe abortions. 
6. state control and production of contraceptives in the 
interests of working people's health and to eliminate 
commercial competition.41 
But the long-range program was indeed different and more far-
reaching. Explicitly class-struggle oriented, it posited sexuality 
as one of the few pleasures the working class could claim for 
itself and therefore supported the right to sexual expression. As 
stated in the EpS pamphlet Liebe Verboten, the demands furthermore 
included: 
fight pimps and sexual abuse, not prostitutes; abolish 
all bourgeois marriage and divorce laws; aid for 
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collective childrearing; abolish all punishment 
for sexual deviations ••• commissions of specialists to 
develop perspectives on how to avoid sexual neuroses and 
dysfunction; free treatment for sexual disturbances 
caused by capitalism and the bourgeois family(!)42 
This was indeed a radical vision for a transformed society--very 
much the vision of \lilhelm Reich' s Sex-Pol theories which 
attempted to make psychoanalysis palatable to orthodox Marxism. 
Nevertheless, by raising the demand for state control of the 
contraception industry, the Communist party had moved a long 
way from its position against state intervention into the lives 
of the proletariat, a position sharply articulated as recently 
as the 1927 Reichstag debates on ti1e passage of the VD Law. Then 
the KPD had argued that limiting the right to treatment of the 
sex argans to licensed medical doctors would paralyze the 
proletariat's possibilities for self-help and only extend the 
police powers of the state into workers' personal lives. By 
demanding state financing and Supervision of sex reform, by 
attacldng the other lay organizations as being not only 
insufficiently political but also dangerously unscientific, 
by positing the medical model of sexual deviance, and by insisting 
on medical control of their own EpS sponsored clinics, the 
Communist party was indicating a major step toward approving 
the medicalization of the human body, as well as condoning an 
abstract principle of state intervention.43 
It is impossible to determine the impact the ideological analysis 
had on the 1vomen who came to the clinics for immediate aid. 44 
Possibly there was a distinction made between the appeal to women 
who could be reached for further political education, and other 
clinic clients who might just be subjected to some waiting-room 
propaganda.45 There are, however, indications that most of the 
EpS clients were women 1vl10 were already members or closely 
connected to the party mass organizations.46 
The EpS was unquestionably organizationally successful in the 
heavily industrialized and Catholic Ruhr. In January 1932, the 
police counted 32 local groups with 3,35J.members. By April 15, 
there were already 6, 011) members. 47 The authorities concluded 
resignedly that "considering the bad economic situation of the 
worldng po;mlation, we must expect an :L.ncrease in membership. n43 
The Berlin EpS functioned as part of \Hlhelm Reich' s Sex-Pol 
activity, the only moment in the history of German working-class 
sex reform where Reich appears to have had much of an impact. 
Reich lectured on the politics of sexuality at the Marxist 
Evening School (HASCH), spoke at numerous meetings on "The 
Sexual Question in Bourgeois Society,"49 and ran the Berlin 
clinic. In general, Sex-Pol was more of a theoretical idea than 
an organization; the EpS was its or3anizational expression. 
Unlike his other sex reform colleagues, Reich applied psychoanalytic 
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principles and peer-counseling techniques oriented towards 
working-class youth in his clinic, Young workers, while 
expressly instructed to refer all questions about abortion and 
VD to the doctor hirnself, were free to advise clients about 
birth control and rnasturbation, handing out "rnountains" of 
free prophylactics and vaginal jellies,50 They reassured clients 
that everyone, even \Jilhelrn Reich hirnself, had rnasturbated and 
that it was nothing to worry about, provided it did not .rnake 
you lazy or becorne a substitute for "normal" sexual relations.Sl 
The Cornrnunist party and its rnass organizations like the ARSO and 
the IMI constantly debated the political contradictions of 
prov.iding alternative service networks for the working class 
while sirnultaneously dernanding that a state beset by econornic 
and political crisis take responsibility for publicly run and 
funded centers. They recognized the lirnitations of their 
pr.actical work and the relatively srnall nurnber of people who 
could be served in their storefronts. The best they could hope 
for was that warnen patients would assirnilate a little political 
education about the inhurnanity of capitalisrn, along with learning 
how to use a diaphragrn. 52 
The EpS had been established at a very late date in Weimar history, 
and the very necessity of its creation was an indication of the 
KPD's isolation frorn rnuch of the rnass base of the sex reforrn 
rnovernent. The EpS was an atternpt to capitalize on the general 
rnass strength of the lay organizations and to rnaintain the 
rnornenturn of a coalition established in the drarnatic winter 1931 
carnpaign against Paragraph 213 and for tl1e release of two 
doctors arrested for having perforrned illegal abortions,53 By 
!1ay of 1932, however, after the fall of the BrUning regirne, the 
police were breaking up and closing down .EpS rneetings at the 
very rnornenz that other lay groups were atternpting a unified 
corneback. 5 
Both the RV and the Liga joined rnedical sex reforrners in a central 
working cornrnittee for birth control on January 23, 1932,55 A 
last-ditch effort finally reunited the GESEX, RV, and AfG into 
an enlarged RV, based in Berlin-Brandenburg, in Uarch of 193z . 56 
At the very last rninute, in the shadow of rnounting ~ational 
Socialist strength, 1932 and the early rnonths of 1933 were 
filled with urgent frenzied activity, including joint rneetings 
of the Liga, IAH, andl Eps. 57 Dr. Hans Lehfeldt estirnated the 
1932 circulation of the three rnost irnportant lay organization 
journals at Liebe unJ Leben (Liga), sixty thousand; Weckruf 
(Volksbund fUr l1utterschutz und Sexualhygiene), thirty thousand; 
and Sexualhygiene (RV), twenty-one thousand. He added that, 
"these figures prove that the lay orp,aniaations had a rnernbership 
of way over one hundred thousand, especially when one considers 
that generally every hausehold only received one copy."53 
A unified sex reforrn rnovernent that brought tagether doctors, 
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intellectuals, and working-class lay members was just beginning 
to succeed at the heig:1t of the Depression and at the end of 
the Weimar Republic. Ue cannot knm.r how it might have developed. 
It was a painfully brief period of momentum and experimentation, 
abruptly and brutally cut off by the National Socialist seizure 
of power. The irony of the situation of course was that the 
various groups had much more in common than they were willing to 
admit. Doctors like Lehfeldt noted that the actual practice in an 
EpS or an RV center was hardly very different--they all distributed 
and fitted contraceptives, and offered sexual counseling.S9 As 
someone asked \lilhelm Reich at an EpS meeting in February 1932, 
"can you tell me the difference between a Social Democratic and 
a Communist uterus?"60 Certainly the Nazis made no such fine 
distinctions when they systematically dissolved all sex reform 
groups and arrested whatever leadership they could find in 
Hay of 1933. 
In conclusion, it seems that the members of the working-class 
sex-reform leagues were decidedly less interested in ideolo3ical 
or organizational struggle than they were attracted by being 
able to obtain inexpensive and convenient access to contraceptive 
information and products, with a minimal membership fee and 
journal subscription. It appears that regional variations may 
have been at least as important as political lines in determining 
the strength of the various groups. The EpS was very successful 
in the industrial, well-organized Ruhr; the RV in the eastern 
provinces of Saxony and Thuringia as well as in Harnburg and Bremen 
in the north; other smaller groups in Kassel and Hannover. 
The lay leagues were often most successful in small towns and 
rural areas, where direct medical aid was not easily available 
and women were forced to abort themselves or to rely on the 
often exploitative practices of local quack abortionists or on 
those few local medical practitioners who were willing to perform 
abortions. Indeed, doctors often preferred to continually 
subject women to D and Cs rather than offer them the possibility 
of controlling their own bodies by educating them in the use of 
contraceptives.61 Furthermore, the provisions of Paragraph 184.3 
outlawing advertising tended to be more rigidly enforced in 
smaller towns than in !arger cities. \n1ile the penal code did 
not expressly forbid the sale or use of contraceptives, it did 
create a situation in which anyone wanting to buy the expensive, 
commercially sold item had to go to the pharmacy, overcome all 
embarrassment, and demand by brand name precisely the specific 
product wanted--an even more demanding endeavor particularly, of 
course, for women in a small town or village where neighbors 
tended to know each other very well. 
It is also no accident that membership rose, and the sex reform 
movement flourished most dramatically during the depression years 
just before the i<azis came to power. The lay movement represented 
another side of trade unionism for many working-class families. It 
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ciffered them the possibility of de:>loying reproductive strategies 
to insure family survival at a time when collective struggle 
for employment and a decent living wage was becoming increasingly 
fragmented and difficult. With the Communists and the Social 
Democratic movements battling each other, unemployment causing 
a shift in the political arena of struggle from the workplace 
to the home ·and within the aommunity, and women fulfilling an 
even more critical role in assuring economic survival and family 
stability, the individual "reformist" solution to birth control 
became an important weapon in the class struggle. 
Dr. Elkan noted in Volksgesundheit, a proletarian people's health 
journal, that the "individual contemporary head of the family 
understands the limitation of his.family as an act of self-
defense against his environment."ll2 This notion of birth control 
as an act of self-defense in the context of a class struggle for 
economic survival may help to explain why men were so much in 
the forefront and leadership of these sex reform organizations, 
whose major reason for existence after all was to distribute 
contraceptive devices for women and to educate men in sexual 
techniques that were supposed to satisfy women. As the ostensible 
breadwinners for their families, men felt responsible to limit 
these families and therefore saw contraception in the first 
instance not as a sexual but as an economic problem. However, 
their main interest was to discover methods of achieving that 
goal without resorting to abstinence or other birth-control 
methods, such as withdrawal, which were considered particularly 
uncomfortable for the male. 
The lay organizations offered the ~ossibility of alleviating 
economic distress by limiting the nurober of mouths to feed, but 
they also helped to stabilize and harmonize male/female relations 
wi thin the working-class family. If sex reform aimed to reduce an 
economic burden, it also intended to increase the pleasure 
quotient in proletarian daily existence--in a responsible, 
rational fashion. Just as trade unionism and party organization 
imposed a certain political discipline on the working class, so 
the sex reform leagues also facilitated the internalization of 
"bourgeois" sexual self-discipline. In that sense, it is 
significant that much of the leadership of the leagues was 
composed of skilled, though often unemployed, workers. At least 
in terms of their oonsciousness, they were concerned not only 
with economic survival, but with the possibilities for upward 
mobility, education, and training for the limited nurober of 
children they would have. They themselves did not want to fit 
into the mold of the "degenerate kinderreiche" (rich in children) 
family; they wanted to share in the bourgeois privilege of small, 
healthy, and well-cared-for families. Perhaps that vision of 
respectability, domestic happiness, and stability is what prompted 
the Communist groups to criticize other lay organizations as 
being "petty-bour3eois." Certainly such consciousness would 
be the analogue to Lenin's definition of "trade-union reformism" 
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as opposed to revolutionary consciousness among the working class. 
The lay sex reform leagues primarily fulfilled a necessary service 
function in a society that despite the myth of the socially well-
provided-for German working class, could not meet the needs 
of its people. The lay organi?.ations also had an important 
education and therapeutic function. Lectures and meetings affered 
access to general health information and care for poorer families 
who did not have much contact with the medical profession. The 
lay movement not only provided birth-control information and 
remedies, but also supplied information on natural healing, 
common health problems such as whether or not an operation was 
advisable, sports, gymnastics, nutrition, and body care, as 
well as potential connections to sympathetic and inexpensive, even 
free, doctors. Communist physicians, for example, were well known 
for their willingness to perform illegal abortians safely and 
at a reasonable fee.63 
The sex reform leagues affered possibilities for serious 
experimentation with alternative life-styles. The term 
"Lebensreform" in some of the league titles implied a commitment 
to a people's health movement that included nudism, natural 
healing, organic diet, vegetarianism, and abstinence from tobacco 
and alcohol--simultaneously a radicalized life-style vision and 
a means of enforcing discipline and respectability. Some 
observers spoke of the lay movement as a kind of "ersatz religion," 
but it could also be termed "ersatz therapy."64 Some ·Of the 
meetings rather resembled modern encounter groups or group 
therapy--a place to share problems in a nonjudgmental atmosphere 
while receiving concrete hel!J. Indeed, the movement did serve 
to popularize the tenets of psychoanalysis; that repression is 
unhealthy and that better sex has the potential of creating 
better people, better families, and better children. 
The fact that birth control and sex-education were so clearly 
class and not "merely" women's issues represented the simultaneaus 
strength and weakness of the sex reform movement. The great 
advantage was that the class emphasis affered the possibility 
of unity with men within a mass and highly organized working-
class movement, with access to party apparatus, journals, 
propaganda, funds--an entire infrastructure. It was possible to 
locate sex reform with a general social analysis pointing towards 
the necessity of revolutionary change. The glaring disadvantage, 
of course, was the lack of an authentic powerful feminist 
perspective. 
It is extremcly difficult, indeed impossible, to determine 
women's quantitative and qualitative participation in the sex 
reform movernent. Lehfeldt's comprehensive 1932 survey of lay 
sex reform organizations spoke of a total membership of 113,000 
but noted: 
The actual number is considerably higher, first of 
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all because several splinter organizations have been 
overlooked but most importantly because in various 
leagues, the wives of the members who are often 
especially active in the movement have been 
overlooked.65 
The difficulties of uneavering women's quantitative role in the 
movement reflect the hierarchy of men's and women's participation. 
Men were visible in the movement; their names appeared as by-
lines in the journals, they were speakers at lectures and 
conferences; they were listedas directors and business managers 
of tl1e various organizations. Women' s work was once again more 
in the nature of "invisible housework." They may very well 
have attended the lectures, urged their men to join, avidly 
read the journals that were subscribed to under their husband's 
or father's name, but the documents rarely recorded that activity. 
It is clear that the discourse and activity araund sexual reform, 
about sexuality, and eugenics, about chosen mötherhood and 
population policy, about orgasm and its multiple functions as a 
stabilizing measure for family and state, were centered araund 
a male-defined and male-oriented heterosexuality. Ironically, 
given the preoccupation with female sexual function and enjoyment, 
it was directed more towards men than warnen. Women were assigned 
the major responsibility for contraception because it was still 
believed that men's commitment to birth control could not be 
trusted. The traditional belief prevailed that female sexual 
passivity assured that warnen would "maintain their head" 
during lovemaking, whereas the man might be earried away by 
passion and raging hormones. But on the other hand, the very 
fact that so many men were active, suggests how very central 
the questions of sex reform and contraception were to the daily 
lives of the working class; how much they were not merely a 
secondary soc.ial-welfare or women' s issue, but absolutely 
critical to the economic survival of the proletarian family. 
Indeed, one might say that family limitation was such an 
important issue that men were not only involved, but dominant. 
The medicalization and politicization characterizing the sex 
reform movement had contradictory effects for warnen. It surely 
represented an advance in health terms, but was in a certain 
sense a setback for women's autonomy in controlling fertility 
and sexual behavior. Warking-class women may well have feared 
the spread of contraception because it would deny them their one 
good reason for refusing sexual advances from brutal, drunken, 
or simply insensitive mates.66 The attempt to reduce quack or 
self-induced abortians by the introduction of more sophisticated 
contraception as the diaphragm, cervical cap, and in some cases 
even the lUD, meant that men were involved in the persans of 
doctors, lay functionaries, or salesmen. 
Fernale sexuality was recognized and encouraged by the sex reform 
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leagues, but on male heterosexual terms--in defense of the family. 
The contradictions are not simple. It does seem to be true that 
warnen did benefit from this new recognition of the need for 
female as well as male sexual satisfaction; that heterosexual 
couples' lives did improve with the availability of sex advice 
and contraceptives. But warnen were never really given the chance 
to try and begin to define, envision, and experience their own 
sexuality. Furthermore, the rationalization of sexuality by 
the sex reform movement, lay as well as medical, meant that the 
right to birth control, abortion, and sexual pleasure was not 
defined in terms of woman's individual right to control her own 
body and 11 fe, but rather in terms of general class, state, 
and social welfare. As noted earlier, eugenics questions were 
central to the entire movement. There was indeed a certain 
motherhood/Eugenics consensus that transcended customary left/right, 
progressive/conservative distinctions, It posited that motherhood 
was a natural desire for all warnen, simply repressed by economic 
necessity; and conversely also identified certain people, 
categorized by pseudoscientific norms of hereditary disease--
including TB, VD, alcoholism, epilepsy, schizophrenia--who 
should under no circumstances reproduce, and who were hence 
targets for sterilization. 
Therefore, the way was left open, ideologically if not 
organizationally, for an overlap and confusion between reproducti~e 
rights--never defined as such--and ~opulation control. While 
the National Socialists proclaimed the virtues of health, 
eugenics, and racial hygiene, birth control in Germany was forced 
to go underground and illegal abortians continued to be performed 
at even greater risk than before. The GESEX/RV was dissolved 
by police order in May 1933 as the works of sexologists and 
psychoanalysts were being burned on public pyres.67 As a 
Gestapo report from August 1933 noted: 
It is especially important to demonstrate the 
connections between the Jewish-!1arxist spirit and 
the signs of decay so present under the previous 
system in the areas of sexual science (sex reform 
such as campaigns against Paragraph 213, pornography, 
communist workers sexual journals plus modern art and 
pedagogy). 68 
And yet, even as the National Socialist terror brutally 
repressed sex reform groups, confiscating all sexual literature, 
arresting the leadership or forcing it to flee, persecuting 
with particular vengeance the many Jewish doctors involved in 
the socialist and sex reform movement,69 birth control counseling 
centers were retooled into racial hygiene clinics carrying out 
forced sterilizations and fulfilling in grotesquely distorted 
and horrific form, some of the sex reform movement's eugenic 
goals.70 
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Prefigurations of Nazi 
Culture in the 
Weimar Republic 
ROB BURNS 
Long before l!itler seized power in 1933, the National Socialists 
had declared their movement to be the spearhead of a revolution 
and in g:e.neral historians have not been notably reluctant to 
acce~t that designation.I It is as well tobe clear, however, 
in what sense the term is to be used, for--pace David Schoenbaum2 __ 
to speak of the c'iazi "social revolution" is to imply a thoroughness 
of transformation that is belied by the social structure of the 
Third Reich. The configuration of economic interests underpinning 
\leimar Germany was barely challenged, let alone transformed by 
the Hazi reeime, and to argue, as Sebastian l!affner has recently 
done,3 that the i'iSDAP was in essence a "socialist" party is 
merely to blunt the conceptual tools of ~olitical analysis. The 
real llational Socialist revolution was carried through on two 
fronts but in pursuit of a single goal, namely the total control 
of the individual. On the one hand, this entailed an 
administ.rative revolution that created a state within a state. 
National Socialisra did not smash the existing state apparatus as 
the Leninist orthodoxy of revolution would demand; rather it 
created another one, parallel to and ultirnately superseding the 
administrative machinery bequeathed to the regime by the now 
defunct Ueimar Republic. The SS state' s "revolution of nihilism," 
to use Hermann Rauschning's celebrated phrase, 1vas complemented 
by a cultural revolution, the goal of which was the total control 
of the individual through the systematic organization and mass 
dissemination of ideology. 
The essence of the Nazi cultural revolution lay in its manipulation 
of consciousness, a process whereby the status of various groups 
in society (such as male workers, married women, German youth, and 
the peasantry) was not actually chaneed but the attempt was made 
to transform their perception of that status. To this end the 
Nazis eenerated a broad set of innovative cultural organizations 
and practices, the aim of which was ~he restructuring of leisure 
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time and its transformation into a state-cöntrolled instrument 
of National Socialist ideology. The pervasiveness of such 
practices was epitomized by the "3trength through Joy" movement, 
which within two years of its inception had expanded in scope 
to such an extent that virtually no form of organized recreational 
activity lay outside its purview. The role of the various Hazi 
cultural organizations was complemented by what Halter Benjamin 
designated as fascism's "aestheticisation of politics,"4 that is, 
the attempt to legitimize political rule through the ritualization 
of public life and the integration of aesthetics and politics. 
In particular this was exemplified by the political liturgy of 
fascism that encompassed not only the mass rallies and party 
conferences of the NSDAP but also the creation of National 
Socialism'~ own calendar of specifically devised customs, 
ceremonies, and celebrations. The totalitarian character of 
the Nazi cultural revolution was thus revealed in its ultimate 
goal, that of abolishing the distinction between society and 
the state. That is to say, the massive reorganization of public 
life brought about hy tlle llazis in the Third lleich had but one 
aim: to politicize the everyday by eliminating the private life 
of the individual and substituting for it state controlled 
patterns of communal activity. As Robert Ley, the leader of the 
Labor Front, put it: "There are no private citizens any more 
•••• Only sleep is a private affair."5 
It is, then, a central premise of this ci1apter that an 
appreciation of the role of culture is essential for a full 
unders,tanding of fascism. 6 ~-lational Socialism must be seen as 
in part a cultural movement, that is to say, a movement that 
brought culture directly into the !JOlitical sphere, where it was 
made to serve the formation of mass consciousness. As the following 
analysis of certain aspects of \veimar culture seeks to demonstrate, 
however, the roots of that cultural movement extend back well 
beyond the seizure of power in 1933. For it was fuelled in part 
by a particular cultural tradition in Germany which, it could be 
argued, had helped prepare the ideological ground for fascism 
in the first instance. 
Indeed, in one sense the term "Nazi cultural revolution" might 
seem somewhat inappropriate if by that is meant an absolute break 
with the immediate past. Certainly, the innovative drive of 
National Socialisn was directed not towards the sttucture of 
ideology but towards the mode of its mediation, and Kurt 
Sontheimer hardly exaggerates in his claim that the Nazis did 
not make any original contribution to the antidemocratic thought 
of the time. 7 Tilis is attested not only by the paucity of 
National Socialism's ideological writings but also by the wholly 
derivative and eclectic nature of those works such as Uein !(ampf 
and Rosenberg's ver Mythos des 2J. Jahrhunderts, which comprised 
the ideological canon of the movement. As Hitler hirnself 
confirllled in his acknowledgment that Hazism "takes over the 
essential fundamental traits of a general vHlkisch world view,"3 
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the ideological foundations of National Socialism had been laid 
long before the NSDAP was officially formed. The status of 
vßlkisch thought--by which is meant the writings of nineteenth-
century cultural critics such as ~lilhelm Riehl, Paul de Lagarde, 
Houston Ste\vart Chamberlain, and Julius Langbehn--as the 
ideological precursor of National Socialis~ has been corroborated 
by much recent research and needs rio further elaboration here.9 
In essence vßlkisch ideology constructed a catalogue of enemies 
and scapegoats that was virtually indistinguishable from those 
identified by ;~ational Socialism. It was implacably opposed to 
liberalism and democracy, which were seen as corroding the very 
life-force of the Germanie Volk. It asserted the primacy of 
race among the determinants of history and national character, 
and as a consequence singled out .the Jews as Germany's ultimate 
racial antagonist. This anti-Semitism also encompassed a 
romantic anticapitalism, which saw the modernizing tendency of 
bourgeois materialism and industrialization as inimical to the 
main repository of vßlkisch values, the natural organic community. 
As an antidote to these destructive forces, both the Germanie 
and <'lational Socialist ideology prescribed a vßlkisch Reich, 
united and ruled by a charismatic leader and pursuing a vigorous 
policy of expansionist aggression. 
It was the achievement of National Socialism to wed this ideology 
to political organization and thus to make it the basis of a 
mass movement. The task of developing these ideas into a form 
appropriate to the circumstances of the '~eimar Republic, however, 
was fulfilled not so much by the Hazis themselves as by a group 
of writers residing under the collective rubric of "the 
conservative revolution." Their significance was, as Fritz Stern 
states, that "they served as cultural middlemen, transmitting 
old ideas in new combinations to later generations."lv The 
most influential of these writers was Arthur Moeller van den Bruck 
who, in his work Das Dritte Reich (1923), did much more than 
simply equip the Hazis with the name for their "Thousand Year 
Reich." Rather the book presented in modernized form many of 
the principal theaes of vßlkisch ideology. 
Central to 11oeller's tnollght is the notion of race. \fuile it is 
true that 11oeller conceived of race primarily in spiritual 
rather than biological terms, he nevertheless exhibited the 
typically vßlkisch tendency to psychologize the concept of the 
nation, presenting it as a living entity and imbuing it with 
specific characteristics. Accordingly, he differentiated between 
two types of peoples, the old and the young, arguing that the 
future of European civilization was dependent on the victory of 
vital emergent nations such as Germany over the culturally 
effete representatives of the old order, England and France. 
Although anti-Semitism played a minor role in Moeller's 
philosophy,ll this was more than offset by his assault on the 
other main object of vßlkish animosity--liberalism. Confronted 
in the \leimar Republic with the embodiment of everything these 
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thinkers rejected, Moeller railed in populistic vein against 
the democratic system and the repercussions of Versailles. Above 
all, he gave currency to what was undoubtedly the most corrosive 
antidemocratic slogan of the lleimar Republic, the "stab-in-the-
back-legend." To liberalism' s belief in man' s inherent humanity, 
l!oeller counterposed a crude Social Darwinism that conceived of 
historical development as a fight for survival "in which the 
victor is necessarily in the right. "12 This vie\-7 of struggle 
as ai1 ennobling process not surprisingly led Hoeller to see war 
as "the national expression of the struggle for survival,"l3 
and in the introduction to Das Dritte Reich he appended a somewhat 
prophetic footnote when speculating on the possible outcome of 
that struggle. The Third Reich, he conceded, could prove to be 
an illusion and, indeed, one which might \vell bring about the 
nation's destruction. i'levertheless, he insisted, it 1vas far 
better to strive for an illusionary goal and to be destroyed in 
the process than to remain in the r>resent state of national 
sterility and cultural decline. llhat better example of Fritz 
Stern's "politics of cultural despair," nanely the leap from 
cultural pessimism to agßression, from idealism to nihilism. 
It was, though, in his advocacy of imperialism that Hoeller 
formulated his most resonant contribution to the vl:!lkisch 
conceptual framework. Germany's social problems, he declared, 
derived in the main from its excess population, and a policy of 
expansionism, therefore, would satisfy the need for Lebensraum 
and at the same time unite a nation spirutually divided by the 
inherent discord of the party political system. For l1oeller 
this strateßy amounted to nothing less than a "National 
Socialism." Adopting Spengler' s sloßan, "every nation has its 
own socialism," he predicted that the new Germany would take the 
form of an hierarchical society in which class antagonisms would 
be harmonized within a Germanie "socialism of entrepreneurship." 
The sip,nificance for Nazism of Hoeller's reinterpretation of 
socialism as the Subordination of the individual' s interests to 
those of the community--a view already adumbrated in an earlier 
work, Der Preussische Stil (1916), and ~choed four years later 
in Oswald Spengler's Preussentum und Sozialismus (1920)--
scarcely needs any laboring. 
Despite the title of his book, Moeller was more concerned 
with a critique of the present than with providing a blueprint 
for some future society. \lhatever the metaphysical tenor of his 
writing, the same cannot be said of Ernst JUnßer's celebration 
of totalitarianism, Der Arbeiter (1932). In it JUnger rejected 
the belief that man is the architect of his own society, positing 
instead the primacy of irrational, elemental forces. Ile decried 
democracy and the institutions of liberalism as the pusillanimous 
efforts of an enfeebled bourgeoisie to contain these primordial 
powers and disguise them as rational intercourse. This attempt 
was a futile one, however, for it was the elemental forces 
unleashed by the First ~lorld llar that, according to JUnger, 
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were now in control. The precarious structures of bourgeois 
society, he predicted, would soon be swept away and replaced by 
a "work-state," founded on the twin physical manifestations of 
these elemental forces, the worker and technoloßy. Although 
in his terminology JUn3er took over the Uarxist idea of an 
unbridp,eable schism between two classes, the workers and the 
bourgeoisie, he did so only in order to defuse the terms of 
any concrete sociopolitical connotations. In JUnger's scheme, 
as was soon to be the case in the Third Reich, the status of 
the worl~er was defined not by property relations but by a state 
of mind. The future work-state would be a dictatorship .but 
not one in the conventional sense, for "the worl~er knows no 
dictatorship because for him freedom and obedience are identical. .. :4 
The actual organization of labor would follow the model of the 
Russian Five Year Plan, which JUnger praised for its imposition 
of a "strict and sober discipline" and for its denial to tne 
workers of even the most basic rights.lS Unlike the Soviet 
model, hm,.rever, it would be neither necessary nor desirable to 
abolisil private y>roperty, for as lone as industry subordinated 
itself to the state, andin particular to the work-state's 
ultimate aim, the "total mobilization" for war, private capital 
would be left intact. 
Apologists for JUnger have tended to see in Der Arbeiter a 
purely predictive as opposed to prescriptive piece of writing. 
The book's closing lines, however, reveal it tobe not simply 
the diagnosis of an age but an explicit program of action. \!ritten 
on the very eve of the Third Reich, it was JUnger's metaphysical 
justification for the strategy of war preparation outlined 
two years earlier in the essay "Die totale 11obilmachung" (1930). 
In his vision of an authoritarian society in which class 
contradictions are reconciled not on the basis of material equality 
but througi1 the ideolo3ically induced ex::>erience of uniformity 
and whose ethos and social goals are governed by the "total 
mobilization" for war, JUnger prefigured all too clearly the 
militaristic and pseudo-egalitarian corporate state of the J:'hird 
Reic;l. ilhatever his subsequent reservations about Hitler' s 
regime, it is nevertheless difficult to resist the conclusion 
that objectively a work such as Der Arbeiter was performing the 
ideological groundwork for t•ational Socialism. m1at both JUnger 
and 11oeller van den Brucl~ had in common, along with certain 
other conservative writers in the ~leimar Republic, was their 
particular conception of revolution: for them this was a passive 
process, a "Revolution sans :;>hrase,"l6 that would be effected 
by spiritual not political means and that would have as its 
final goal the inculcation of a specific state of mind. In 
short, what they advocated was essentially a cultural revolution. 
Both in theory and historical practice, such a revolution has 
been confronted by two related tasks: the selective appropriation 
of the nation's cultural heritage and the development of new 
forms of cultural expression as appropriate vehicles for an 
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ideology asp~r~ng to ascendancy. The Nazi revolution, however, 
was unusual in seeing these two tasks as representing distinct 
areas of cultural practice: while bouridless innovative energies 
were channelled into ti1e sphere of mass culture, in the realm of 
high culture the Hazis were content~and large merely to 
extend certain artistic traditions already prominent in the 
lleimar Republic,l7 In fact the lines of continuity between the 
lleimar Republic and the Third Reich are apparent in virtually 
all sectors of artistic activity. 
In no other branch of the arts except the cinema was that stranq 
of continuity more apparent than in literature. llaturally 1933 
marked a rupture in the German literary tradition in one sense--
as it did in all the arts--for the thorou3hgoing purge of the 
cultural institutions that followed the l~azi seizure of power 
had as its most üm.Jediate consequence the exodus from Germany 
of some two thousand writers, while numerous others sought 
political asylum either in literary silence or in the ideological 
opacity of "inner emigration." And yet there was one vibrant 
voice among the myriad literary utterances of the lleimar Republic 
that was anythin3 but muzzled by t;1e advent of llational Socialism, 
for the fictional form too proved an effective vehicle for 
vlllkisch ideas and the twenties yielded a rich harvest of such 
literature. Indeed, it is one indication of the literary 
continuity between the lleimar Republic and the Third Reich that 
of the twelve best-selling authors in 1932 seven (l~erner 
Deumelburg, Hans Grimm, Hermann Stehr, Hans Carossa, Edwin 
Erich Dwinger, Step,uweit, and Ina Seidl, all of whom can be 
legitimately assigned to the v!:llkisch tradition) were subsequently 
sponsored by the Hazis.lß 
The Nazi c11non of literature praised three types of writing, 
which were basically grouped around the themes of militarism, 
race, and the move~:~ent.l9 Only the last of these, which in the 
main consisted of functional literature dedicated to particular 
Nazi celebrities or special occasions in the r•ational Socialist 
calendar, was unique to the Third Reich; the other two had their 
roots in the tradition of vlllkisch thought. The most important 
was the theme of nationalistic militarism. The First llorld llar 
spawned a considerable body of literature in the lleimar Republic 
that testified to the centrality of the war e~erience for 
writers of radically differing persuasions. Alongside the 
pacifist portrayals of war as a dehumanizing exercise in 
des truction (exemplified mos t notably by Remar<Jue' s Im llesten 
nichts Neues), there developed another strain of literature 
that celebrated war as a force of spiritual and national 
regeneration. In the early 1920s this mystical idea of conflict 
was expressed in the works of writers such as Ilans Carossa, while 
the last four years of the :leimar Republic witnessed the emergence 
of a whole series of novels and dramas that derived their 
inspiration from the Great \lar (among them Edwin Erich Dwinger's 
trilogy Die deutsche Passion Ll929-J~7, ;~erner Beumelburg' s Die 
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Gruppe B8semtlller /l93Q7, Ernst von Salomon's nie Geächteten LI93Q7, 
and Hans Z8berlein Ts Der Glaube a:1 Deutschland /19317). However, 
the author whose work epitomizes the glorification of wat: is 
Ernst JUnger. Both his fiction and quasi-philosophical writings 
of the period are suffused with ima3es of war that attribute to 
combat a dynamic, life-giving force and acclaim physical struggle 
as "the masculine form of procreation."2J Since, as JUnger 
repeatedly avers, it is only in tne exhila~ation of battle that 
life can be experienced to the full, war must always remain 
outside the parameters of mere moral adjudication, for it "is 
as much a feature of human life as the sexual urge. It is a law 
of nature. • • • To live is to kill. ,.zl The antidemocratic war 
novels of the IJeimar Republic thus articulated many of the ideals 
propounded by National Socialist ideology: the idealization of 
physical struggle, the depiction of the enemy as an agent of 
national unity and a catalyst of aggression, and the veneration 
of the male collective at the battlefront which, by virtue of 
its authoritarian leadership structures, its socialist character 
(in the !lazi sense of uniting men from different social classes) 
and the selfless idealism of its individual members, prefigured 
the Volksgemeinschaft of the :lational Socialist community. It 
was hardly surprising, therefore, that after 1933 such novels 
were extolled as paradigms of Nazi literature. 
The other pillar of the Nazi literary edifice, so-called 
volkhafte Dichtunr,, was in effect a residual category in that it 
was broad enough to accommodate virtually any text that 
attracted the iml)rimatur of the custodians of 1\lazi culture. And 
yet, as with the war novels, the exemplars of this genre (such 
as the mystical, pseudo-metaphysical writing of the prolific 
Hermann Stehr, the romanticized outpourinr,s of Erwin Guido 
Kolbenheyer, or the historical and mythological novels of Hans 
Blunck) were mainly written prior to the founding of the Third 
Reich. IJithin this somewhat diffuse grouping, one particular 
area merits attention, namely what has become known in general 
as the literature of Blut und Boden (Blood and Soil). Its 
romantically stylized image of the rural community, exalting 
the simple, natural values of the ~easantry, and its mystical 
relationship to the fertile native soil, accorded perfectly with 
the antimodernist elements of Nazi ideoloßy. The antecedents 
of such literature go back to the !Jrovincial Heimatdichtung at 
the turn of the century, which yielded many popular novels 
similar to Der Blittnerbauer (1395) by IHlhelm von Polenz and 
Hiltfeber der Deutsche (1912), whose author, Hemann Burte, 
was upheld by Nazi liter<iry criticism as one of the very first 
National Socialist writers. Polenz's book--which Hitler claimed 
had profoundly influenced his political thinking--tells the story 
of a peasant whose mystical bonds with nature are severed by 
the encroachment of industrialization (represented here by a 
Jewish finance capitalist). Socially and spiritually uprooted, 
the peasant hangs himself, his eyes staring at the soil, "the 
soil to which he had dedicated his li fe, to which he had sold 
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his body and sau!. "22 The 1920s ~roduced a plethora of pastoral 
idylls from the pen of such writers as Friedrich Griese, Richard 
Billirrger, and I~arl Heinrich \Jaggerl. But by far the single mos t 
influential example of the entire genre was Hans Grinun 1 s Volk 
ohne Raum (192G) which, despite its twelve hundred pages, had 
sold over half a million copies by the mid-193Js. The almost 
biblical status bestowed on this most turgid of tomes is larßely 
attributable to the fact that its title furnished the Nazis 
with a legitimate slogan for their expansionist foreign policy, 
even though, paradoxically, Grimm's proposed solution to the 
problern of Lebensraum, namely colonization, was not in fact the 
policy Hitler pursued when in power. 23 
The culture of the \leimar Republic thus encompassed a rich vein 
of v!:llkisch literature that the National :>ocialists were only 
too grateful to exploit. Indeed, by com~arison the literary 
output of the Third Reich itself seems positively jejune. Two 
reasons suggest themselves for this imbalance: firstly, those 
authors who dominated the literary stage under Hational Socialism 
(Stellr, Blunck, D'~inger, Griese, Beumelburg, Grimm, and so on) 
had by 1933 apparently reached the end of their creative powers, 
a literary silence, one hastens to add, that in no way betokened 
disal)proval of the Nazi reßime. Typically Ilanns Johst, who as 
president of both the Reichsschriftumskalll!'ler and the Akademie 
der ;)ichtung occupied the two most prestigious positions that 
National Socialism conferred on · any single author, eschewed 
writing almost completely after 1933, preferring to assume the 
full-time role of state functionary. More importantly, perhaps, 
the meagerness of literary production after 1933 to a certain 
extent reflects the priorities of the overall cultural policy, 
which seemed al tagether more concerned to appropria te a pas t 
cultural tradition than to create a new one. 
This was certainly true of the thea ter, for although the typology 
of fiction outlined above had its equivalent in the sphere of 
drama, by and large it was t:1e classics that occupied pride of 
place in the theatriaal repertoire of t:1e Third Reich. The 
cultural heritage was plundered in order to construct a pantheon 
of dra!'la compatible with National Sodalist values. llhere these 
cultural excavations uneavered unassimilable works by otherwise 
estimable authors, then such plays "ere either ignored or 
dismissed as aberrations. Schiller and Kleist ,.,ere ;:Jarticularly 
revered, for the heroism and sense of national pride evoked in 
such plays as Hilhelm Tell and Die Hermannsschlacht could be 
readily acco!'lillodated within the ethos of the Third Reich. Hor 
were these efforts at stage management without success, for 
state intervention in the theater was not only of an ideoloßical 
nature. The regime provided an abundance of subsidies, 
commissions and, literary pri7.es and the lavish productions 
that these facilitated attracted both large audiences and critical 
acclaim. 
There was, however, one area in which it '~as claimed the i<azis 
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had made an original contribution to the dramatic att form and 
that was in their evolvement of t:1e ThingspieL This was theater 
in the broadest sense of the term, a grandiose fusion of 
agitprop, pageant, choral chant, connunal song, dance, 
gymnastics, circus, and military tattoo. Its overall character 
was essentially that of a cult, a modernized celebration of 
Germanie rites, the aim of which was the creation of a mass 
spectacle. One of the first such performances took place in 
llerlin in October 1933 before an audience of sixty thousand 
and with a cast of araund seventeen thousand, including entire 
battalions of the SA and l!itler Youth. The cult effect was 
further enhanced by the setting for these occasions: special 
ThingstMtten were constructed, open-air ampitheatres often sited 
on ground associated with ancient Germanie shrines. 
Despite its popular appeal, the Thingspiel was relatively short-
lived, having virtually disappeared from the cultural calendar 
by 1937. The reason commonly advanced for this evanescence is 
that since it came more and more to resemble a purely political 
event, the Thin&spiel gradually lost its distinct function and 
in effect merely duplicated the llazi parades, mass meetings, 
and party rallies.24 Stnce the prime mover behind the development 
of the Thingspiel had been no less an authority than Goebbels, 
who was convinced that it represented something uniquely National 
Socialist in character, it seems unlikely that the supposed 
functional redundancy of the Thingspiel was the sole cause of 
its demise. In fact, the Thingspiel _was by no means as original 
as it was claimed, and consideration of one of its antecedents 
suggests another reason why it eventually fell into disfavor. 
Althour;h it was the spectacle element that the ilazis particularly 
cultivated, the ideological backhone of the Thinfjspiel still 
remained the text, which more often than not was a chorus 
delivered in quasi-liturgical fashion by a speech choir. The 
development of the speech choir had been one of the signal 
achievements of the working-class cultural movement in the l~eimar 
Republic. There too it had often been incorporated, along with 
other art forms such as dance and song, into the spectacular 
enterprise of the l1assenspiel, where it served as a simple but 
effective medium of proletarian solidarity, a collective 
articulation of shared class experience and political aspirations. 
Wlile the ;lazis took over the outer form of the proletarian 
speech choir, they clearly intended it to fulfil a quite different 
function. It nml" became the vehicle of manipulation, an 
instrUMent for the inculcation of authoritarian consciousness 
as the following quote from the introduction to a collection of 
v8lkisch speech choirs shows: 
The speech choir group has always to deliver itself 
up comple tely, as it were, to the speech choir leader. 
Subjective feelings and views are to be dispensed with 
llere ••.• In speech choir training there lies an 
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excellent way of cultivating in men the spirit of 
loyal obedience and devotion to authority.25 
In short, the relationship of the speech choir to its leader 
was conceived of as re~licating at a cultural level that between 
the masses and their FUhrer. Clearly, however, the speech chcir 
was so inextricably bound up wi th the working-class cultural 
tradition of the lleimar Republic that this particular attempt 
at Gleichschaltung did not wholly succeed; a fact acknowledged by 
the Hazis themselves in 1936 when the speech choir was officially 
banned as a form of cultural expression.26 It is also significant 
that the subterranean anticapitalism of 3azi iueology was still 
resonant in many of the texts written for both the vHlkisch 
speech choir and the early ThingspieL 2 7 Uoreover, the SA, the 
main repository of anticapitalist sentiments within ~-ational 
Socialism as a wnole, was one of the principal actors in the 
Thingspiel movement. :3y the end of 1934, with the "revolution" 
officially declared by llitler tobe at .an end and the SA 
politically emasculated as a consequence of the RHhm purge, it 
was perhaps forseeable that the Hazis would temper their 
enthusiasm for a cultural form which, however residually, still 
bore the imprint of left-wing Uational Socialism and revived 
notions of an anticapitalism that even from an ideological point 
of view was now redundant. 
Unlike literature, the visual arts \vould appear to represent 
an area of German culture in whose historical trajectory the 
Third Reich can only be seen as marking a massive disruption. 
After all, the many and various forms of modernist art that 
emerged and blossomed in the supportive climate of the Heimar 
Republic--expressionism, dadaism, surrealism, the Bauhaus group, 
Neue Sachlichkeit, and even futurism which, paradoxically, in 
Fascist Italy enjoyed semiofficial standing~-were all summarily 
cropped by a llazi regime that branded anything remotely smacking 
of the avant-garde as "uegenerate" and a manifestation of "cultural 
Bolshevism." And yet antagonism to modern art existed long 
before the cultural watchdogs of the Third Reich elevated it to 
the status of an official aesthetic. Even in the ~Jeimar Republic, 
influential organizations such as the lfunich Artists' Association 
and the t1unich Guild of Visual Artists made little attempt to 
disguise their lack of sympathy for modernism, while elsewhere 
combat leagues of German culture were formed with the aim of 
countering modern art's allegedly pernicious influence. Chief 
among thesewas the FUhrer's Council of United German Art and 
Cultural Associations which, founded in 1~30, boasted a quarter 
of a million members and served as a cooruinating body for the 
multifarious cultural organizations of the vHlkisch movement. 
Painting had occupied a special place in the hierarchy of 
vHlkisch ideals ever since the appearance of Langbehn's Rembrandt 
als Erzieher (139•)). Although barely discussed in detail, 
Rembrandt is championed by the .rrol'het of the Germanie faith as 
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the embodiment of VolkstUmlichkeit, the simple organic artist 
who gives spontaneaus and intuitive expression to the unique 
character of his people and its traditions . It was the purported 
timeless quality of such painting that Hitler exhorted the 
artists of the Th±rd Reich to emulate, for they would thereby 
be laying "the foundations for a new and genuine German art. "2u 
Concretely this meant a revival of nineteenth-century genre 
painting. In place of modernism's preoccupation with style and 
technique, tlational Socialist art was to return to themes as 
its creative principle. These were drawn not from the potentially 
hazardous terrain of National Socialist reality but from the 
secluded domain of vßlkisch idylls: romanticized laridscapes and 
still-lifes, pastoral and domestic scenes of healthy rural 
simplicity, portraits effusing racial purity. In short, a form 
of painting was advocated which, although insistently representa-
tional, was, by virtue of its tendency to mythologize and 
dehistoricize, the very obverse of realisl'l. 
It is important to stress, however, that despite the impact of 
modernism in the 1920s, this was nevertheless a tradition to 
which many artists in the lleimar Republic still subscribed. For 
example, the prestigious German Art Exhibition of Uunich held 
in 1930 listed nearly 950 painters and sculptors, only a dozen 
or so of which could legitimately be catep,orized as modern. 
Horeover, roughly 250 of these artists subsequently appeared in 
the catalogues of the Nazi-sponsored Great German Art Exhibitions 
of 1937, 1938, and 1939. 29 Such statistics invite the conclusion 
that the supposedly "new" German art merely fed on existing 
traditions and continued certain trends established long before 
the founding of the Third Reich. As Berthold Hinz argues, "all 
it did was reactivate those artists who had been left behind by 
the development of modern art but who were still active after 
1933 and who seized the opportunity to move into the vacuum once 
modern art had been liquidated."30 That is to say, ~'lational 
Socialism did not create its own art, rather it created pictorial 
continuity. 
In the case of film, those lines of continuity would probably 
have been equally apparent even had the !lational Socialists 
chosen not to intervene in so direct a fashion in the worldngs 
of the German cinema. In view of the Ueimar Republic's 
reputation as a ~eriod of great cinel'latic distinction, this 
judgment might seel'\ somewhat surprising. The screen classics of 
this period, however, derive almost ~holly from the years 1919 
to 1926. Thereafter, as Latte Eisner points out,31 the number 
of quality films, let alone those of a stature comparable with 
The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (1919) or Metropolis (1926), was 
probably limited to four or five per year at the most. Certainly, 
as far as the structure of the film industry was concerned, 1933 
in no sense constituted a break, for des!Jite the National 
Socialists' rhetorical commitment to small business, the Third 
Reich witnessed merely a continuation of the trend, already 
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well established by the latter stages of the ~leimar Republic, 
whereby Ufa (Universum Film AG) cemented its monopoly position 
and small film companies went bankrupt. 32 Even the censorship 
law of 1934, which decreed that the screenplay for a film had to 
be submitted to Goebbels for approval before production could 
begin, was only a modification of the censorshi~ apparatus that 
had operated in the lleimar Republic since 1920. 3 As for the 
films themselves, we need only coasider Siegfried Kracauer's 
persuasive argument that the German film industry played a not 
insubstantial part in helping prepare the ~jround for !Ia tional 
Socialism. 34 
From 1Y25 onwards, and in particular durinß the last three years 
of the \leimar Republic, the German cinema was in part characterized 
by a ~jnoup of films which, broadly speaking, can be seen as 
supportive of nationalistic and authoritarian values. These 
films encompassed a wide range of ideological motifs exploited 
by the Nazis, but two themes gained particular prominence: those 
of charismatic leadership and nationalist rebellion. In the first 
category belong a nurober of films, which in their portrayal of 
the past, reduce the idea of historical ;.>rocess purely to the 
intuitive actions of exceptional individuals. By far the most 
popular subject of these hagiographical narratives was Frederick 
the Great, for between 1922 and 1933 there appeared no fewer 
than seven films devoted to his ex;.>loits, a series which was 
directly continued by the cinema of the Third Reich. The image 
of the Prussian monarch that emerges from these films is summed 
up by Kracauer in his analysis of Arsen von Cserepy's Fridericus 
Rex (1922): 
This screen Frederick is given two major virtues. He 
appears as the father of his people--a patriarchal 
ruler using his absolute power to mitigate legal hard-
ships, further general welfare and protect the poor 
from exploitation by the rich. Simultaneously, he 
appears as the national hero who through several success-
ful wars elevates little Prussia to the rank of a great 
power. The ~•hole construction overtly aims at 
convincing the audience that another Frederick might 
not only prove an effective antidote against the virus 
of socialism but also realize Germany's national 
aspirations.35 
In the Fridericus films of the Third Reich, such as Johannes 
Heyer's Fridericus (1936) or Veit llarlan's Der Grosse K1lnig (1942), 
the parallel is ~uite explicitly drawn between Frederick the 
Great and Adolf ilitler, the implication being that Germany's 
need of a charismatic leader has now been fulfilled,36 
A second ideologically coherent group <if films centered on the 
theme of rebellion. Uost of them drew on the :.<apoleonic wars 
in order to present Prussia as the agent of a national uprising 
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and the protagonist of a united Gennarr nation. This portrayal of 
nationalism as a revolutionary force is illustrated ::>erfectly 
by Luis Tren~er's Der Rebell (1932), a film which was to attract 
particular praise from Goebbels. Trenker hirnself plays the 
part of a Tyrolean nationalist who returns to his horneland to 
lead a peasant uprising agairrst Na::>oleon's anny of occupation. 
As J(racauer points out, the film constructs an obvious analogy 
between the Tyrol 's revolt and the :iational Socialis t movement, 
for Trenker "only reflects what the Ilazis themselves called a 
national uprising."37 Gustav Ucicky's York (1~31) draws an 
even more revealinp, parallel between the Ilapoleonic era and 
the Weimar Republic. General von York commands an anny corps 
assigned to Napoleon by Wilhelm III of Prussia. Under pressure 
from the young officers to renege on the tenns of the treaty and 
to attack the French, York at first remains loyal to his monarch's 
wishes, ohly finally to rebel when he learns of Napoleon's defeat 
in Russia, an act whicil thus initiates the \lar of Liberation. 
As K.racauer shows, the film differentiates between two types of 
mili tary rebel: York' s impetuous officers closely resemble the 
kind of soldier who after World War I provided the nucleus of 
the Freikorps and the Nazi movement, while York hirnself 
anticipates the response of the Reichswehr High Command, rebelling 
only "when it become a!Jparent that J<apoleon is on the decline 
and that therefore any further loyalty to him might prove 
disastraus to Prussia."3G The topicality of this film would 
scarcely have escaped a German audience by now fully accustomed 
to regarding the \leimar Republic as being in a state of perpetual 
crisis, and in 1932 there followed an additional five films on 
this same subject of national uprising. 
Another genre favored by the filmmakers of the Third Reich, the 
so-called Blood and Soil films, also had its forerunners in the 
\leimar Republic. In their celebration of the elemental power of 
nature, their romanticized view of a mountain world intrinsically 
superior to urban civilization, and their positing of a mystical 
bond between the peasant community and its natural surroundings, 
films such as Arnold Fanck's Stllnne Uber dem Montblanc (1930), 
Trenker's Berge im Flammen (1931), and above all, Leni 
Riefenstahl' s Das Blaue Licht (1932) gave lyrical expression to 
ideas that formed a central plank of National Socialist ideology. 
The idealized portrayal of the First World War experience that 
has already been identified in literature also had its counterpart 
in the cinema of the lleimar Republd.c. In addition we must note 
with Fritz l1arburg39 the undercurrent of anti-Semitism in certain 
films of the late-1920s and early 1930s, as exemplified by Peter 
Lorre' s caricature of a Jewish reporter in J(arl Hankl' s FPl 
antwortet nicht (1932). 
In no other art form, then, did 1933 constitute so little of a 
break as it did in the cinema. And yet, that continuity does 
not derive solely from the fact that the lleimar Republic produced 
a substantial body of films wi thin ~mich ~•ere insci:ibed some of 
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the central tenets of !~ational Socialis t ideology. It is also 
a reflection on the cinerna of the T!ürd Reich itself, which 
Goebbels adamantly refused to let become merely a form of 
"drarnatized party program." ltather the cinerna was to fulfill its 
ideological function in clandestine fashion and for the simple 
reason that, as he put it, "the moment propaganda is recognized 
as such it becomes ineffective."4:) The best propaganda in 
Goebbels 1 s view lvas that "which as it were works invisibly, 
penetrates the whole of life without the public having any 
knowledge at all of the propagandist initiative."41 This notion 
of covert propaganda seems, incidentally, to have been altogether 
too sophisticated even for Hitler hirnself since on more than 
one occasion he criticized Goebbels's film policy for its failure 
to produce "Hational Socialist films."42 In fact, Goebbels's 
attitude to the cinema was wholly consistent with his overall 
cultural policy: his concern was not primarily in the creation 
of a new and conspicuously National Socialist art but rather in 
the mode of its dissemination. Ile wrote: 
1-le are loaded down altogether too much with tradition 
and piety. lle hesitate to clothe our cultural 
heritage in a modern dress. It therefore rernains purely 
historical or rnuseum-like and is at best understood 
by groups within the party, the Hitler Youth or the 
Labor Service. The cultural heritage of our past 
can be rendered fruitful for the present on a large 
scale only if we present it with modern means.43 
His aim, then, was "to bring art to the people," to transform 
the cultural terrairr so that "art no langer stands aside from 
the people and the people aside from art."44 In this objective 
the i~azis attained no small measure of success. By 1942 cinema 
audiences had grown from the 1932 figure of 250 million to over 
a billion. Even allowing for the fact of a worldwide growth in 
film audiences at this time, such a boom, which by the early 
1940s made the cinerna the fourth largest industry in the Third 
Reich, was, to say the very least, spectacular. Similarly, 
the National Socialists provided much greater public access 
to the visual arts generally, while in the theater audiences 
were mobilized on an unprecedented scale. In short, high 
culture, formerly experienced as the preserve of the bourgeoisie, 
was now presented as the property of the masses. 
The ~lational Socialists, however, were not the first in Germany 
to recognize the political potential of cultural activity, för 
in the \leimar Republic the organized working class had likewise 
developed its own cultural movement, and this had generated 
modes of cultural practice which, in form at least, were not 
dissimilar to those evolved in the Third Reich. 45 T11e difference 
in impact between the two movements lies partly in the fact that 
since the working class never achieved state power in the ~.Jeimar 
Republic, their cultural activities always remairred at the level 
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of a counterculture. The Natd.onal Socialists, on the other 
hand, aithough they did little in the way of developing pre-
figurative models, were able after the seizure of power to 
throw the full weight of the state and party apparatuses behind 
their activities and were thus in a position to determine directly 
the shape of the dominant culture in the Third Reich. It almost 
goes without saying, however, that the high degree of popular 
support that the Nazi regime secured in the Third Reich cannot 
be attributed wholly--or even primarily--to its cultural policies. 
For to isolate the role of culture under llational Socialism 
from economic and political factors (such as the elimination of 
male unemployment and the spectacular successes of Hitler's 
foreign policy) would be to lapse into idealism of the most 
crass ldnd. Equally, an analysis that ignored or underplayed 
the totalitarian character of culture in the Third Reich would 
be untenable. This returns us to our opening re~rks on the 
dual nature of the National Socialist revolution, for the 
assimilation of all spheres of life, both public and private, 
within an all-inclusive culture, was predicated on the system of 
fear bred by the SS state. The two apparently distinct aspects 
of the revolution, the cultural and the administrative, were 
thus inextricably bound together. It was the function of terror 
to atomize German society by dissolving all existing social 
relations and the function of culture to weld the masses back 
into a collective form, that of the pseudo-egalitarian 
Volksgemeinschaft. Goebbels hirnself provided one of the clearest 
Statements on this relationship between culture and J:>Olitics 
under fascism when he boasted: 
Politics too is an art, perhaps the highest and 
most far reaching one of all, and we who shape 
modern German politics feel ourselves to be artistic 
people, entrusted with the great responsibility of 
forming out of the raw material of the masses the 
solid, well-lvrought structure of the Volk. 46 
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Music on the Eve 
of the Third Reich 
MICHAEL MEYER 
Das Husikleben ist kein Leben flir die Husik. 
Theodor \l, Adornol 
Ohne eine traßende Gemeinschaft, die dahintersteht, ist 
das musikalische Kunstwerk--im eigentlichen Sinne ein 
Gemeinschaftswerk--nicht lebensfähig. 
llilhelm Furt\vlinßler2 
In view of its probler.1s, tenuousness, and brevity, and its 
proximity and special relationship to the Third Reich, the 
Heimar Republic has commonly been called a crisis state. 
Humerous contemr>orary commentators and later historians have 
examined ti1e economics, politics, and culture of Germany between 
1919 and 1933 in terms of liberal, democratic, socialist, and 
conservative principles that were instituted to varying degrees 
in the period, only to then be abolished or channeled into the 
totalitarian dictatorship of Hational Socialism in 1933. The 
ideals reemerged and were reinstituted in the nost-Horld lvar II 
era, aßain in various combinations in both German successor 
states, and became the ideological framework for the historical 
analyses of conditions in the 1/eimar Republic. In sympathy wi th 
select lveimar ideals and horrified over the Third Reich, postwar 
and Holocaust historiaas have not been able to deal with the 
lleimar Republic discretely. Cultural achievement, tiwugh 
acbwwledged, consistently has been seen through the shadow 
of Auschwitz. Yet, the sense of dool'l, crisis, and failure is 
not the exclusive product of retrospection; it is contained in 
self-conscious lleinar commentary and introspection. 
A creature of nomentous historical forces and circumstance, the 
lleimar Republic :1ad i ts Vernunftrepublikaner who entertairred 
reservations ab out the new order but accepted it. Proßressive 
intellectuals shared with them a historical perspective, one of 
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comparison and contradiction; a vie~• of existence that stressed 
change, to some, even considered to be its essential feature. 
Same progressives responded affirmatively to the new order, 
others focused an its promise of a ßenuine republic. The '.o7ell-
known opposition from the Right, :mown to students of German 
history as the formulators of "the !'Olitics of cultural despair," 
the representatives of "the roots of the Hazi mind," or the 
vBlkisch-fascist or conservative revolution, :rejected the new 
order of outsiders altogether and entertained visions of permanence 
and a hidden true order, which i t was their duty to bring out 
into the OIJen and thus to realize. 3 
Those who cried "crisis" the loudest actually also rejected the 
historical view of the world; they joined those who studied change 
and felt it was for the worse. Against modern developments they 
undialectically upheld eternal values and prima! states: a 
world of unehauging phenomena and characteristics. t1usicians and 
nusic commentators shared in the response to an assumed cultural 
crisis at large and in music specifically; they supported 
ideological rhetoric through their expert analysis of an alleged 
nusical crisis, the result of the latter's alientltion from both 
the community and itself. \lhat follows will not be a survey of 
music an t:lC eve of the Third Reich but rather a focus an the 
perception of crisis in music, which reflected and reinforced 
the ideological formulation of crisis in Germany. 
Stripped of ideological jargon, the crisis in music is an 
expression of the inevitable tension between institutional and 
dynamic art and between differel1t generations of artists. Ilaving 
matured to Germany 1 s outstanding and internationally reoognized 
cultural institution, music suffered from its mvn success. From 
its lofty and seeMingly autonomaus position, official music 
reacted pompously to threats from within and naively to external 
threats. Ta l~nowledgeable composers, the happy reconciliation 
of music's objective materials and the musician's subjective 
imagination, as manifested in the celebrated musical creations 
of the tradition, as well as the fortunate harmony between the 
institutions and their sustaining creative activities, appeared 
to be fundamentally disturbed by profound changes in society and 
music's attendant social function and in response to radical 
developments in the art itself. Even the harmonious relationshi!l 
between the different musical elements, a precondition for the 
reconciliation of objective materials and subjective impulses, 
and between inherited structural forms and their transformation 
seemed to lead toward imminent destruction of the tradition. 
Although previous revolutions in music were knmm to have been 
assimilated into the mainstream and thus to have enriched the 
musical heritage, at t!üs moment of acute social crisis the 
apparently disrespectful and disintegrating imnulses of the 
avant-garde pointed in a little understood direction, and against 
established patterns of expression and Standards o:i' taste. 
Traditionalists feared for the existence of music and civilization. 
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At issue was the fundamental attitude toward reality alluded 
to above: Is c!1ange, indeed, the dialectic understanding of 
contradiction and development, the characteristic and necessary 
trait of \lestern music, or had music evolved toward im ideal 
state of aesthetic experience, as manifested in the reconciliation 
of the demands of the material and subjective imagination and 
between the elements themselves, and in the ultimate creative 
achievement of ti1e tonal order and rules of harmony which offer 
the comforts of structure as well as the flexibility to constantly 
challenge and satisfy innovative spirits? In numerous essays 
and letters to younger composers, Germany's celebrated conductor 
Hilhelm Furtwl!ngler urged them to write the music they felt 
they must, always stressing the human factor in relationship 
to the musical material.4 Husical progressives responded with 
reference to a develoment in style and technique, as well as an 
inner dynamic of music that compels generational adjustment. 
}iusicologists today still argue the same issue of free will and 
determinism. Peter Yates speaks of music as an unbroken series 
of events that determine another: during the seventeenth century, 
all roads led to Bach; during the nineteenth to Schßnberg. 
\lilliam Austin, on the other hand, challenges notions of a 
com~elling dialectic of the material by noting that major Composers 
like Strauss, Ravel, and Ralph Vaughn ;alliams do not fit into 
the stylistic and technical evolution from \lagner to Sch8nberg. 
Reminiscent of FurtwHngler, he suggests that composers choose 
to write the kind of music they wish to write, regardless of a 
place assigned them by determinists. Acknowledging major and 
representative milestones in the evolution of modern music, he 
nonetheless recognieeS. wide divergence from predetermined 
patterns.s 
The response to an alleged crisis of modern music in the Weimar 
period involved progressive and conservative formulations that 
overlapped and became confused with ideological categories and 
positions. llusicians themselves have contributed to this 
confusion. At least by the time of Carl }1aria von Heber they 
had become accustomed to explaining their artistic and technical 
principles in music criticism, music theory, and teaching, which 
readily ex~anded into general cultural criticism with ideological 
overtones. It has been argued that the need for explanation, as 
opposed to simply composing and musicmakine, might itself be 
regarded as a symptom of crisis. This is in large part due 
to the fact that 
in a oeriod of artistic upheaval, creative artists 
find themselves first of all sharply aware of their own 
relationship to their traditional inheritance and to 
the directions in which they feel impelled to axtend or 
even to reject it. Secondly, they find themselves in 
a period in lvhich the formulated notions regarding 
musical aesthetics, musical theory, and musical 
syntax have long lost the vitality they once possessed, 
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impelled or even obliged to arrive at what are at last 
working formulations of their own. If they are not to 
remain in relative solitude, they are also likely to 
communicate these formulations.G 
The assessment of music in the Weimar period was tied to general 
\leltanschauung and politics, as both the Republic and the autonomy 
of music were at stake. A book published by Erich Valentin in 
1939 on Hans Pfitzner, llerk und Gestalt eines Deutschen expressly 
tied music to politics and traced the origin of the cultural.:.. 
political parties of the Weimar period to \lagner' s time, when 
music began to disintegrate into its components and lost its 
communal links, and the individual was deprived of the security 
of community and tradition. 7 \lagner' s vl:llkisch notions of a 
revitalized national community, the communal function of art, and 
the reintegration of the discrete arts into the ritualistic 
Gesamtkunstwerk provided the inspiration for the Nazi author who 
th us introduced the tradi tionalis t-vl:llkisch _Pfi tzner as ~lagner' s 
heir in the 1920s. Yet, spokesmen of modern music also acclaimed 
the \lagnerian tradition for its contributions to the expansion 
of traditional harmony and other modernist innovations. 
The Weimar parties agreed on the significance of Wagner, 
particularly hisTristan-Vorspiel (1359), as the first clear 
expression of an alleged disintegration of harmony--of our 
\-lestern system of tonality. \:hat to musical }Jrogressives 
initiated progress, liberation, and the expansion of new tonal 
possibilities, to alarmed pessimists constituted the beginriing 
of a process of increasing decay at the end of lvhich appeared 
the formalized twelve-tone music to which man no langer related. 
A Schl:lnberg's student, llinfried Zillig, has analyzed this evolution 
of music in sympathetic terms in a 1966 publication, as an 
organic process of the dialectically evolving and constantly 
reintegrating musical materials. A system-immanent theory 
informs this his tory, which traces musical progress through 
focus on major composers since Wagner. Zillig identifies with 
those progressives who have interpreted ~olagner as a revolutionary 
and antibourgeois, who was kidnapped by reaction, the bourgeois, 
soldier organizations, and finally National Socialism. To 
him, \lagner's "honor your great German masters" has been 
distorted into serving the purpose of denouncing good German 
musicians and condemning the development ~Vhich had become possible 
and necessary through the revolutionary innovations in music 
since the disintegration of tonality. Like nuclear physics, 
which since Einstein's theories has upset a traditional and 
honored view of science, Wagner's musical development has 
fundamentally questioned the sanctified order of tonality to 
such an excent that Tristan can be called an atonal work.3 
Through the analysis of radical works of llagner, Debussy, Reger, 
Strauss, and others, Zillig is able to present German nationalists 
and racialists with a dilemma: Their national heroes, predominantly 
acceptable on national and racial grounds, have contributed to 
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the modern tradition, which for aesthetic-political reasons had 
become unacceptable in the Third :teich. 
RADICALIS!1 
Our understanding of the progressive interpretation of music in 
system-immanent,philosophical, and social terms is much enriched 
by the radical music sociology of Theodor \1. Adorno, formulated 
in large part in post-~veimar times. ') It is he who has examined 
the paradox of \lagner' s reactionary, anti-Semi tic, authoritarian 
personal behavior, writing, and political agitation relative 
to his revolutionary musical oeuvre, noting, with res!Ject to his 
strictly musical achievement, contradictory ideological impulses 
of ambiguous consequence.lü Sharing Nietzsche's and Themas 
!1ann's ambivalent attitude towards \lagner, he has clearly identified 
the musical wizzard as a Nazi forebear, who at the same time 
neßated faseist cultural policies through aspects of his life-
style and the revolutionary consequences of his work. Adorno's 
extended examination of \lagner is crucial for the study of pre-
Third Reich fascism and anti-Semitism, in view of the methodology 
and insights of the author and the significance of :lagner as 
perhaps the outstanding cultural hero of the Nazis, certainly of 
Ilitler. Yet, in some earlier \leimar-period essays, "On the 
Social Significance of Husic" 11 and "Reaction and Progress," 12 
Adorno already had captured the spirit of our topic and emerged 
a most perceptive apologist of the avant-garde, especially of 
the Schllnberg variety, and a critic of \leimar' s music culture 
at large in both system-immanent, that is strictly musical, as 
well as social terms. His critical analysis of music serves 
both as object and conceptual frame1vork of this study. Even 
though suffused with classical reductionist analysis of art 
as a reflection of social trends and anathema to traditional 
Ideengeschichte, that is, the study of ideas in a social vacuum, 
his thought rejects the "fetishization" of either material or 
cultural structure. The essence of his dialectically conceived 
reality rather lies in "force fields" bet1veen objective conditions 
and subjective imaßination. In order to free the arts, especially 
music, for a liberating and critical role--central to his concern--
he insisted on the integrity of music, its necessary autonomy, 
and the need for the composer to grasp its substance at the most 
recent and progressive level of historical development; thus he 
was able to illustrate through music the meaning of "Critical 
Theory," that negative and critical system of analysis that would 
be impossible without the positing of genuine di.alectic tension. 
!1usic had to transform itself, as well as "portray through its 
own structure the social antinomies responsible for its 
isolation."lJ Stressing autonomy with reference to the objective 
condi tion of the art, "negative dialectics, "11! and the application 
of this anti-affirmative philosophical premise to music, Adorno 
differed from both "vulgar" Marxian reductionists, the promoters 
of socialist realism, as well as traditionalists and reactionaries, 
who variously stressed the affirmative function, rationalization, 
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and administration of music, and thus ill-advisedly treated what 
to him was an abstract and critical expression as "reified"--
alienated, an object for consumption and manipulation. 
Central to Adorno's exposition of traditional bourgeois understand-
ing of music and the symbolic wort;l of muaic to the bourgeois 
ideology of individualism--regressive and status-quo-oriented in 
current social context as revealed by him and other critical 
theorists elsewhere--was the questioning of inherited notions 
of individual creativity . For one, he found the artistic subject 
to be not only individual but social as well, thus unintentionally 
expressing objective social tendencies. 11oreover, he insisted 
that not single works, but ·the develo~ment on the level of music's 
materials constitutes the level of progress in art as developed 
by generations of composers. Even though he warned composers 
against simply wishing "to meet the demands of the time," he 
insisted that the freedom of the composer is curtailed by 
historically evolved elements and that the meeting place of a 
material dialectic and freedom of tlte composer is the concrete 
work itself, the result of a Qrocess that sets each artistic 
creation a!Jart from another • 15 It 1vas this focus on the histori-
cally evolved material, the insistence on autonomy, and the 
disregard for the affirmative function of music within a 
concurrently formulated notion of a Volksgemeinschaft, that, for 
a variety of reasons, offended large segments of the bourgeois 
concert-going public, traditionalist nationalists, as well as 
"vulgar" !1arxists.l6 Adorno had moved from reductionist Marxian 
aesthetics, which characterized the earlier work of the Institute 
of Social Research, to the defense of music's autonomy, its 
utopian and even transeendental powers, because of his conception 
of music's crisis in this overly rationalized and administered 
world, no less represented in Zhdanov's socialist realism of the 
1930s than in the market-oriented music of the lleimar Republic 
or the artificial and manipulated folk music of the Third Reich's 
Blut und Boden cult. 
Adorno's relentless dialectic raised questions about all expressions 
of lleiiaar' s celebrated rausie culture, · including the modernist 
section, thus contributing to the sense of crisis that would 
otherwise perhaps be hidden by the richness of its achievement, 
its affirmative function, and the l_)ositive commentary that it 
attracted. Furtwlfngler, for one, called German music "the 
clearest, most joyful and profoundly characteristic manifestation 
of the German spirit, the most original and artistic accomplishment 
of allmodern peoples."l7 And Artur Sehnahle noted in an 
American lecture that "the German audiences in the medium-size 
towns •.• knew most of the music they went to hear at concerts 
• (and) there was probably not one in these audiences who 
was not involved, actively or passively, in home-made music."l3 
llaving inherited from nineteenth-ceatury political entities a 
cultural networl~ of excellent stages, orchestras, operas, and 
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choruses, the lleimar state fulfilled its responsibility to music, 
which was sheltered, organized, and well attended. Although 
underneath this prosperity existed the conflict between music's 
institutional and practical needs and the claims of the 
autonomaus artist, the resulting tension did not have only 
negative consequences, since it contributed to the radical music 
of the period which, in part, reacted against the cornmercial 
exploitation of the traditional idiom. Central to all musical 
controversy was Berlin, which had originally strengtherred its 
position with the abolution of the courts, while l1unich, 
Stuttgart, Dresden, and other cities had declined. noasting 
three opera houses which affered new works of Strauss, Korngold, 
D'Albert, Berg, and others, Berlin attracted great singers, 
chamber groups, performers, and conductors. llere the public 
witnessed experimentation in literature, art, film, theater, 
and music. An international elite flourished araund musical 
institutions and in the salons, especially the salons of Peter 
Landeaker, owner of ßerlin's Philharmonie Hall, and that of 
Louise llolff of the :lolff & Sachs concerll agency, attended 
by businessmen, politicians, and artists. The various musical 
factions were represented by great numbers of critics and 
journals, all contributing to the general excitement of the age. 19 
The general trends of twentieth-century music concentrated in 
Weimar Germany. Its many concert halls presented the afferings 
from the past--itself reassuring to traditionalist concert-goers 
but alarming to others, who deplored the increasing ~erformance 
of compositions of dead composers over those of live ones. 
tloreover, traditionalist impulses governed much of the contemporary 
afferings from neoromantic to neoclassic and new versions of 
nationalism--in toto, the kind of composition which, when 
integrated with the v!Hkisch cult of the German folk song, was 
to find favor in the Third Reich under direct sponsorship of 
the Reichsmusiklillmmer.20 In addition to this openly regressive 
music culture, Adorno added that of an avowedly progressive 
nature to his critical analysis, a more demanding task, which 
required more careful decoding. Expressionism, for instance, 
the avant-garde rage in all the arts already in Imperial days, 
aroused the dialectician for its elevation of subjectivity to 
authoritative ideology--a reference to system-immanent 
contradiction which, one might add, is an inevitable development 
of art. Yet, institutionally, too, the radical and oppositional 
impulse had been tamed. By Adorno's time expressionism could 
look back on a venerable tradition and had become celebrated 
and institutionalized; its leading spirits had entered the 
academy and assumed positions of pmver. Strauss, the future 
president of the Reichsmusikkammer, had introduced expressionism 
to opera with his shocking Salome a;<d Elektra, thus initiating 
a musical trend of subjectivism, which culminated in the dramatic 
works of Sch!:lnbeq~ and Berg, Throughout his life, even when 
as an artist he was hardly composing in the expressionist mode 
any langer, Sch!:lnberg continued to articulate the credo of the 
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movement: "To express hirnself," l1e declared to be the artist' s 
greatest goal. 21 Rooted in the c:uomaticism of Tristan, 
expressionist musicians utilized ultra-expressive harmonic 
language, wide leaps in melody, and the lügher registers of 
instruments. Distortion of language as of abstract musical forms 
of communication characterized an idiom that represented the 
critical features that Adorno demanded of art. The neurotic 
a tmosphere of Sci1Bnberg' s Pierrot Lunaire, for ins tance, was 
evoked through· the eerie vocal line and lack of formal bearing 
of ti1e entire work. Its medium and message were critical, yet 
Adorno, after expressions of appreciation, concluded that "absolute 
subjectivity is also subjectless ••• ; the more of the I of 
expressionism is thrown upon itself, the more like the excluded 
world of things it becomes."22 Recalling his views about 
attistic freedom and the general error of subjectivism, he found 
the aesthetic rationale of expressionism to be contradictory; 
the subjective impulse had become contained in SchBnberr,' s 
neoclassical, abstract twelve-tonal scheme, which the well-tempered 
and triad-conditioned public would continue to reject as 
"atonal." Yet, when tne objectified system beca!'le a rigid 
imperative of composition, devoid of its negative function, Adorno, 
in the 195Js, warned against the "hypostization" of the twelve-
tone row and the establishment of twelve-tone schools.23 In the 
1930s, however, Adorno identified Seiltinberg with all that was 
progressive in modern music.24 Other radical impulses that drew 
their shock effect from nonmusical or musical elements of traditions 
outside the concrete dialec.tic of llestern art mtisic were rejected 
more readily. The uses of folk or popular traditions, for instance, 
and especially jazz, which were external to the llestern musical 
experience, were simply dismissed for reasons of inauthenticity. 
Commercially exploited "exotic" music offers potential 
entertainment, relief, or introductions to other cultures, but 
not genuine criticism. The radical dialectician knows that 
"contradictions refer to those oppositions that are both necessary 
for, and yet destructive of, particular processes or entities."25 
l!owever, when he identified Stravinsky's primitivism and 
neoclassical objectivism witi1 the vBlkisch-fascist ideology of 
the times, knowledgeable musicologists have felt and continue 
to maintain that Adorno' s c .ritical analysis had also assumed a 
life of its own and had grmvn distant and too abstract. Adorno 
seriously and consistently had correlated the habit of adapting 
old forms and primitive rhythms that are external to the current 
level of tne musical material to new realities with fascism, 
thereby associating celebrated subjects of faseist defamation--
Stravinsky, Hindemith, and llanns Eisler-- with their later 
persecutors. 26 
During the lleimar Republic, the progressive music establis:1ment 
boasted of its avant-garde music festivals, of its celebrated 
composers of diverse persuasions who held positions at prestigious 
academies and other institutions, of its connections and 
interactions with radicals in the other arts, supportive critics, 
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musicologists, and a paying public--all in a culture that was 
accustomed to musical controversy. Reaction concentrated its 
attention on these "outsiders" as momentary "insiders," the 
symptom of cultural crisis. The radicals, on the other hand, 
realized that the avant-garde constituted but a small section of 
musical life and that its existence was ~recarious. Aware of 
economic, political, and social problems that foreshadowed the 
repression of the Third Reich, music 1 s avant-gardewas caught 
in the classical dileiDllla of radicalism--of either becoming further 
estranged from the unsympathetic public and institutional powers 
and crea ting and performing for o:J.ly their own shrinking circle, 
or of striking compromises in various guises, which would gain 
greater audiences and lead to assimilation and the tarning of 
the critical impulse. 
Adorno found musical radicalism sharing in all art's tendency 
to reification, compromise, and idolization, but expressionism 
represented negativity in as pure a form as possible; it lived 
up to Sclil:lnberg's strict coiDllland that "music shall not adorn, 
but speak truth,"27 lest it atrophy. Schl:lnberg's expressionism 
fulfilled the tenets of Adorno's negative dialectics in that it 
was firmly and consciously rooted in the historically evolved 
musical material, while refusing to compromise with the unresolved 
dissonances of contemporary society. Atonality challenged 
tradition, social order, and popular taste, while it opened up 
the infinite world of compositional possibilities, which was 
perpetuated in the objectified new musical order of the twelve-
tone row. A product of the radical dissonances of expressionism, 
Schl:lnberg's twelve-tone row consistently expressed musical 
development and autonomy and thus was worth protecting. The 
threat to music from tendencies within as from faseist 
dictatorship without, so understood, constituted the core of 
the radical's concern on the eve of the Third Reich. 
CONSZRVATISI1 
The historian studies phenomena, but we know, from the German 
idealist philosophers and critical tlieorists, of an active 
element in cognition. The objects of historical analysis are 
shaped by the historian, hirnself both a critical and historical 
subject. i1oreover, just as the object of this analysis, music, 
is af fec ted by ti1e cri tical an<.! his torical mind and is at the 
same time assumed to exist and develop through system-iiDlllanent 
processes, so critical theory as applied to the analysis of modern 
music is known to follm~ the norms intrinsic to itself. Indeed, 
it is one of the most refined objects of conservative concern over 
the state of modern music. In order to properly assess the 
thought of musical conservatives and nationalists about their 
art and its alle~ed crisis, we can therefore not rely exclusively 
on Theodor Adorno. \le must instead turn to the sources, that 
is, the conservative and nationalist thought as articulated 
during the \leimar Republic. 
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The great conductor, music director, and pre-eminent interpreter 
of German music, llilhelm FurtwHngler, ex;>ressed the tradi tional 
humanist concern for tne integrity of music both as an art form 
and institution~ for its autonom~, as well as its relationship 
to the public.2u Like the avant-garde, his reoresentative 
conservative res:,Jonse to modern developments of music also focused 
on the "eXhaustion of the inherited material" but then entertained 
px;os:,Jects of revitalization through the hUI!Ian spirit (Adorno' s 
subject). His focus recalls Thomas Uann's Dol•tor Faustus, a beok 
written in consultation with Adorno. The writer and the conductor 
agreed that music was linked to culture and politics, that it 
symbolized this particular historical situation of Germany, 
which was believed to be heading toward disintegration and chaos. 
Germany' s and music' s untimely materialism in the lleimar period 
was understood to be at the core of the problem; it had to be 
reversed, since it was leading society and art towards self-
destruction. Yet in the eyes of the traditional humanist, 
the human spirit will not concede an end to music. 'lhile the 
material may be exhausted, there is no end to the spirit.29 
This "faith in ti1e spirit" recalls Adorno's ironic "nature will 
take care of itself."3J 
FurtwHngler was director and conductor of !'lajor orchestras, 
was recognized already in the early lleimar period as one of 
two or three outstanding interpreters of German music, and was 
to emerge as the major authority of music on the eve of the Nazi 
assumption of power. rle was wooed by the Nazis, was vice-
president of the Reichsmusikkammer held other offices in 1933, 
and gradually identified his calling during the Third Reich as 
that of a ]>riest who stayed bellind to care for the needy with 
his music and to assert his representative authority in defense 
of music against totalitarian control.31 Unlike the critic 
Adorno, a radical outsider, FurtwHngler spoke and wrote with 
the authority of power and institutional representation. He 
was widely regarded as music's official custodian and 
representative, and as such, reflected generally held views 
on music, its tradition, and the problems of contemporary music. 
Already in 1915 he had written of crisis. His "Contemporary 
Observations of a l1usician" registered a plea for the human factor 
in composition, the active, integrated, and rooted musical 
experience against what he called a contemporary one-sided 
intellectualism and a frantic commitment to change at any price. 
These latter aberrations he identified with articulate spokesmen 
who, in his eyes, unfortunately controlled contemporary music.32 
Yet, this great interpreter of romantic music also rejected 
romantic programs as well as political slogans of nationalism and 
later Hazism in mtisic as inappropriate in the current context. 
Recognizing the impossibility of a return to romantic conditions 
due to an enormaus development of music and social consciousness 
since then, he found contemporary reactionary efforts in this 
direction tobe another symptom of music's crisis. Using dated 
materials and lacking musical compulsion, the contemporary 
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programmatic composer shares an estrangement from the recent 
level of music with naturalism, another expression of crisis. 
FurtwMngler believed the principles of naturalism to be realistic 
only in the case of rhythm because that element can copy a 
natural process, although both romanticism and naturalism may be 
realized when music is expressed in union with other arts (as 
in songs, opera, and so on) that aarry extramusical ~rogram. In 
the case of absolute music, however, it speaks its own, exclusive 
language. llarmony, for one, defies naturalistic principles. 
"One chord alone transfers us into a world of art" to which the 
other senses have no access.33 The precious art can exist only 
on its own terms, the conserMative agreed with the critical 
theorist, but he held the avant-garde responsible for modern 
music's alienation from the public due to its disregard for 
human needs, the denial of "natural materials" \vithin the 
tradition--ridiculed by Adorno as mere convention--and its 
exclusive concentration on the most recent level of the musical 
material, which in the consciousness of itself tends to become 
objectified and thus alienated from the col!linunity. Though a 
prerequisite for the creative process, alienated and exaggerated 
consciousness proJuces denatured and visionless music; the 
balance between the objective material and subjective imagination 
is destroyed. 
In his attempts to assume a posture of moderation and compromise 
between the extreme forms of the regressive program of romanticism 
and progressive materialism, he leaned to the former by 
demonstrating an affinity with \lagner which was not shown, for 
instance, in his relationship with SchHnberg. Although he 
acknowledged the revolutionary role of \Vagner in the development 
of music, he rejected the material consequences of that revolution 
while acce~ting its underlying ideological assumptions. Wagner 
was acceptable for his revolutionary role in his historical 
setting, not for the role he might play as inspiration for future 
revolutionaries. The conservative thus treats his heroes in 
historical isolation. Recalling llagner's intentions, FurtwMngler 
wrote: 
The step from \lagner to SchHnberg, which is 
traditionally explained and justified exclusively 
on the grounJs of historical development, is the 
first real nonhistoric step, the first real break 
with history.34 
In 1915, FurtwMngler the musician had commented on the breakup 
of the traditional relationship between vision, the concept of 
the whole, and the material, in conjunction with an emphasis 
upon the materialistic threat to music and the creative process 
in the arts. He had expanded his conception of crisis throughout 
the 1920s to include the grave danger inherent in the progressive 
isolation of modern music from · the community. He charged that 
serious rnusic in its contemporary form had become the domain of 
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an elite, not of the community. He deplored the wide gulf 
between traditional music, which continued to plav a socially 
functional role, anJ music as IIodern creative art f'on'l. In 
view of this social crisis of music, Wagner was attractive as 
one who bad appeared not as a destructive innovator, but as a 
constructive revolutionary, eager to involve the community in 
his new art form, the music drama, by means of lvhich he had tried 
to recapture those archaic communal impulses that had given 
rise to music originally and which bind rather than separate.35 
Although his innovations have contributed to the isolation and 
autonomy of the elements, \Jagner seduced conservatives with his 
intention to create an ar:t that was to recall primeval unity to 
a community frightfully conscious of disintegration, uprootedness, 
and alienation. The material was to serve music, and music 
was to further the poetic and political vision. The lJagnerian 
Volksgemeinschaft was projected in response to the self-
isolating ~endencies in music. Moreover, conservative acceptance 
of the \lagnerian regression in the twentieth century demonstrates 
the !_)ervasiveness and depth of llagner's impact on music because 
Wagner personified another conservative ideal in that he combined 
in his person both theory and practice. He lent hirnself to 
conservative reaction to the alleged preponderance of intellectual-
ism and materialism in lleimar Germany. Championing traditional 
music for its social utility, conservatives denounced complicated 
theory and abstraction, which could no langer be grasped by the 
community. The preeminence of theory in addition to the practice 
of an uprooted and abstract, intellectualized, and esoteric 
music was no langer justified socially. 
The dichotomy between music at its most recent level of material 
development and the community's understanding of its needs 
epitomized the crisis as observed by traditionalists. Indeed, 
art is destined to die if no langer relevant to the community. 
The central concern of v!:llkisch romantics ancl Richard \lagner 
especially was therewith restated by twentieth-century 
conservatives: It involved the existence of specialists who had 
become estranged from the community. Conservative criticism 
reflected the pervasive cultural criticism of other alienated 
intellectuals after llorld Har I who held onto visions of cultural 
unity and themes of continuity, in spite of the changes affected 
by the world war. Alarmed over the gulf that separated the 
musician from the audience, the mus1c1an ignored the social and 
political realities of his time. FurtwMngler, for one, was 
ignorant of the i~azis until they had the authority to command 
him.36 Critical of the esoteric nature of modernistic music, 
the conservative lvas unaware of his own profound isolation and 
ahistorical existence. 
\·lagner figures so prominently in these pages because he had 
helped establish a German pattern of cultural criticism, and 
his articulation of cultural crisis was original. Twentieth-
century conservatism in music in its specific German setting 
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was derivative, although it merits representation in its own 
right, being coeval with developments that reflected and 
reinforced the ideological forrnulation of National Socialism. 
Conservative musicians represented an esteemed music tradition, 
powerful institutions and competency in the eyes of a grateful 
public, yet, their much-praised activist music principles were 
frozen by respect for the past. Dead composers' works were 
perforrned in the formal ritual of official music life--nowhere 
illustrated as clearly and cornmented on as frequently as at 
Bayreuth37--where the conservative custodian of the tradition 
clung to traditional values, which could be upheld only in the 
exclusive realm of the arts while society was in turmoil. 
The alienated. artist nostalgically recalled the traditional 
relationship bet1veen hirnself and his patrons, mistaken now by 
him for the people. The theme of alleged security was thus 
distorted ideologically by means of a ruggedpose of individualism 
and expertise; in FurtwHngler's case, rooted in the study of 
Beethoven with whose struggle and sense of independence he 
identified. Beethoven had been able to simplify complexities 
while the modernists appeared to be uncomfortable wi th simple 
expression and consciously strove for complexity.3ß \lithin the 
framework of Beethovian individualism, the musician was said to 
have composed for his public, foug;<t against its resistance, 
but then helped shape its taste; while in the current context the 
emancipated, autonomous, and intellectually arrogant avant-garde 
imposed impossible dernands on the public, isolated itself, and 
thus underrnined public appreciation and support for all.39 
The progressive's atonality had begun as exciting experiment and 
stood for freedom from tonality. FurtwHngler recalled the 
rich afferings of Strauss, Pfitzner, Reger, Mahler, Sch8nberg, 
Debussy, Ravel, Honegger, Stravinsky, Bartok, the young 
I!indemith, and others at the beginning of the century. He 
praised the liberating impulses of the generation of SchBnberg's 
theory, the creativity of Bartok, the progressive works of 
Stravinsky, llindemith, and so on. Spellbound by the great 
tradition and accustomed to its revitalization through new 
directions, he looked for a new synthesis of the creative 
principle and the material dialectic. Yet, he found that 
experimentation and liberation had culminated in SchBnberg's 
twelve-tone music: systematized, stylized, theorized, and 
increasingly ideologized. The addiction to composing within 
the parameters of the new wave had resulted in the alienation of 
music from its tradition and especially its public, since the 
composers no langer had to face the public for confirrnation, 
but simply like-minded peers who, as a group, concentrated on 
the development of the material: harrnony, rhythl'l, and the methods 
and constructs of the musical elements. 
The conservative musician's indictment of the modern situation 
of .music moved him close to the official position of Third Reich 
cultural policy, 11hich was derived from vBlkisch forrnulation. The 
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proximity of an independent and sincere conservatism to the 
Uusikpolitik of National Socialism caused much soul-searching on 
the part of conservatives and allowed skillful manipulation by 
the ;<azi regime in the Third Reic:1. The ironic feature of Nazi 
control of culture in Germany · is demonstrated in this confusion, 
since this essentially anticonservative movement could pose as 
savior of traditional culture from the deplorable situation of 
which it was born. 
Already before 1933 the public had taken sides in matters of art 
by not supporting pro gressive music. Then and later the public 
favored the conservative and much more prestigious position that, 
in aesthetic formulation, sought to vindicate its inability to 
grasp modern developments. In the same way that it could not make 
sense of Einstein's insights, it failed to understand SchHnberg. 
llhile the progressive insists on the same exclusive rights for 
music that are granted nuclear physics, the conservative rejects 
this comparison as self-defeating. In 1949 FurtwMngler deplored 
tl1e liberation of the elements in all human endeavors. 
As the Germans have given rise to concentration camps, 
and the atom bomb was developed, both, to be sure, 
not in the interest of the human spirit, atonality, 
too, followed dictates of the material, without 
consideration of man ••• if this condition might 
possibly be excused in matters of material objects 
its consequences in the realm of man, i.e., in the arts 
and in ethics are terrible. This condition amounts to the 
surrender of oan • • • to the anonymous powers of a 
merciless world spirit.40 
These words of conservative humanism were composed after 
FurtwMngler had a chance to assess his relationship to vHlkisch 
Sentiments in the reality of the Third Reich, when the Nazis 
had rendered all purely musical debate meaningless. His legacy 
documents the plight of humanism and its political naivete' in 
our time.4 1 
VBlkisch and Racialist Thought 
Ilefore Furt~~Hngler was forced to compromise hirnself in the reality 
of the Third Reich, he already sympathized with various features 
of the vBlkisch tradition during the \Jeimar period. Hot yet 
subjected to political pressures and manipulation, he praised no 
other contemporary composer more highly than Hans Pfitzner, 
whose polemical conservatism differed from. his own in its 
radicalism, fervent advocacy of German cultural values, and 
national resentment.4 2 To the artistic avant-garde and the 
political left as well as the center, Pfitzner could not be 
accepted on those terms. His distinguished compositional 
record aside, his cultural-political poleMies brought him very 
close to the political and cultural fascisn of the l'leimar period, 
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which posed the severest threat to the autonomy of music on the 
eve of the Third Reich. If the intellectual finesse of an 
Adorno was required to decode the traditional. musical idiom 
and musical cornrnentary and even outstanding components of the 
avant-garde and exponents of socialist realism for faseist features 
and potential, no such dialectic prohing was necessary for an 
analysis of the vl:llkisch or faseist literature of the ~leimar 
period. The vl:llkisch-fascist approach to defining and resolving 
the crisis of modern music epitomized the threat to music's 
autonomy as understood by Adorno. Pfitzner and the musicalogist 
and SS UntersturmfUhrer Richard Eichenauer forrnulated the 
vl::llkisch and racist responses res;:>ectively to an assurned pre-1933 
crisis in music an~ German society in the terminology of later 
l~azi Husikryolitik. •3 
The vl:llkisch-racist ideology was to become official policy in 
Germany as a result of the Nazi assumption of power in January 
1933, and the subsequent Gleichschaltung of all culture. In 
the Third Reich, categories of race were applied to the under-
standing and classification of music and musicians. Husicological 
writing, guidelines for musical composition and performance, and 
personnel decisions at musical institutions were governed by 
principles associated with a German romantic-vl:llkisch tradition, 
which had secured scientific status in the eyes of its believers 
and practitioners through identification with the alleged 
determinism of irnrnutable racial laws. Husic and musleians 
were known and classified as arteigen (native) or artfremd 
(alien), and these categories were no longer exclusively 
understood in the rornantic-vl:llkisch sense of the arts and artists 
being rooted in a distinct Volksgemeinschaft of cornrnon culture 
but in terrns of a racial cornrnunity of cornrnon blood. Third 
Reich forrnulators and executors of 11usikoolitik looked to racial 
theory to identify and promote the German and purge the alien--
above all the Jewish component of music.44 
This situation of music in the Third Reich accords with a 
farniliar picture of Nazi totalitarianism and that of culture in 
general as well as other realms of the arts and the mind in the 
Third Reicll.45 Moreover, the intellectual frarnework and 
assurnptions of ;•ational Socialism are well lmown. 46 If hindsight 
seemed to guide rnany engaged analysts of the background to 
Auschwi tz, there is no doubt that ;,ational Socialism had roots 
and synthesized much in German history: It was not an inevitable 
product of German history, but the fulfillment of a set among 
countless other sets of potentiality.47 \lhat the empirieist 
thus is forced to docurnent and has indeed traced through careful 
recording of thought and action in time--always being vulnerable 
to the charge of drawing on selective data in support of 
retrospective knmvledge--theorists have explained, ordered in 
intelligible structures, and rendered as a negative program .in 
Opposition to and thus in confirmation of their own positive 
view of the world, A most compelling review and at the same 
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time encom~assing explanation of the evolving ideology is 
affered in George Lukacs's Die ZerstHrunP, ~er Ve~nunft, a 
work of theoretical constructs and certainties and, at the same 
time, of familiarity with all the nuances and detail of empirical 
research. This enormaus volume traces the evolution of the 
faseist doctrine, with its reactionary racialist potential, 
from an ideational and ideal conception of race--as in Gobineau's 
pessimistic assessment of history--to one of post-Darwinian 
scientific certainty, until its ultimate faseist synthesis in 
Foundations of ti1e Nineteenth Century of II. S. Chamberlain--
the blueprint of Rosenberg' s l1yth of the Twentieth Century. 
This learned Marxist synthesis and explanation, too, is familiar. 
\ihat has been relatively little ex?lored by historians is the 
relationship between the antitranscendental vHlkisch-fascist 
ideology43 and music, even though musicians have significantly 
contributed to its pre-Third Reich formulation, while holding 
a decidedly honored place in the writings of nonmusicians.49 
Wagner, as stated above, was central in every respect, but so 
were lesser known musicians. Ilaving begun to analyze their 
music and its place in society, the romantics introduced music 
to social and political issues. 50 Schumann in 1334 had founded 
the ;<eue Zeitschrift fUr Musik for musical, social, and poli tical 
cornmentary. The journal had developed a "national" perspective 
on art, so that by the time of Alfred Heuss's editorship from 
1921 to 1934, the official Gleichschaltung with National 
Socialism in 1933 required no particular coercion. Known then 
as the Zeitschrift fllr Uusik, this journal propagated Nazi 
Uusikpolitik and is an outstanding source for the students of 
the poli tics of music in the Third Reich. 51 
Continuity between the romantic nationalism of lieber and Schumann, 
the vHlkisch anti-Semitism and racism of liagner, and the official 
racism and totalitarianism of the Third Reich thus had an 
institutional foundation, which underscored the sense of crisis 
in the eyes of lleimar progressives. Nationalist and racist 
musicians joined the Lagardes, Langbehns, and Moellers in their 
quest for the regeneration of culture by political means and for 
a restoration of healthy politics through the spiritual 
regeneration of culture. 
Hans Pfitzner's musical-political writings reflect this two-fold 
dynamic of pre-Hazi musical-political polemies and confirm the 
continuity thesis of historians who have analyzed "the roots of 
the llazi mind" or the progressive "destruction of reason." In 
order to test Lukacs's sweeping synthesis in music, the musical 
counterpart to the post-Darwinian racial anthropology of a 
Gumplowicz, \loltmann, or Sc:mltze-~<aumburg has to be examined, 
and to that end the representative racial schalarship of Richard 
Eicherrauer appears most suggestive. A teacher, composer, 
musicologist, SS Untersturmfllhrer, and author of the 1932 
publication Husik und Rasse, Eicherrauer articulated the final 
response to crisis, while like all other participants in this 
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debate on the state of music on t:1e eve of the Third Reich, 
giving expression it it in the eyes of his opponents. 
Hans Pfitzner composed much music, affered rnaster classes of 
composition at prestigious music aaademies, was recognized by 
fellow musicians as a major composer of his day and like his 
idol \lagner, wrote political polemies on the situation of German 
music and culture in general, which he held to be in a critical 
state. Similar to FurtwMngler, he addressed an alleged crisis 
in music whose order of tonality, room for the "human spirit," 
and general sense of proportion and purpose were threatened. The 
alleged chaos in music mirrored condi tions in Germany, the \ves t 
and the world, and music symbolized that condition. Salvation 
would thus be possible through a rep,enerated rnnsic, while 
music, it appeared, could only be restored to its ennobling 
mission by a revitalized society--the classicr.~redicament of 
the vBlkisch politicians of cultural despair.J In differing with 
FurtwMngler's stand, Pfitzner asked for the intervention of 
politics in the aßfairs of the arts. 
Pfitzner addressed music and the world in his extensive writings. 
As a composer and writer about music, he was a traditionalist 
conservative who believed in a musical tradition worth preserving 
against "subversive" expressions in composition--materialistic 
atonality in the sophisticated and alien jazz in the porular 
realms--as well as the complementary music commentary.S3 He 
felt our Uestern art music to be unique in that it had evolved 
a perfect system of tonality, a balanced relationship between 
the musical material and the human spirit, and--totally from 
within itself--the miracle of harmony, a new and essential 
element not to be found in nature.54 Like all self-chosen 
defenders of civilization, he feared for its fraßile, artifiC:ially 
human, and thus ~recious nature, which is nonnature--an expression 
of his fundanental pessimism--and he wondered whether it would 
survive. Can this creature of the human spirit be preserved 
against the modernist (the machine) in music whose objectivism 
and materialism is striving toward the elimination of civilization, 
the disintegration of all national culture, and a return to 
chaotic nature?55 __ he asked as he turned from crisis in music 
to stating his alarm over the deficiencies of German culture.56 
His polemies strayed from musical discourse to politics and to 
"warfare of cosmic dimensions."57 The progressives in music 
and music criticism, anathema already for their understanding and 
randering of music~ were accused of participation in the anti-
German conspiracy.J3 Pfitzner's essays and musical works were 
placed in the context of national and universal conflict and 
crisis, ~•hich reached such an acute state in his mind that 
radical political solution had become necessary. His outburst 
in conversation with the writer Franz Werfe! that "Hitler will 
show you--Germany will yet win,"59 demonstrates his commitment 
at a time when Hitler's success was by no means a certainty. 
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The issues on all levels, personalities and subjects as well as 
national categories, were clearly established and the racial 
orthodoxy of the Third Reich was anticipated with the Jew 
ernerging as the embodiment of an opposite principle. 
Pfitzner also dealt with Jewry in relation to "The fate of our 
national art, specifically music." Since to him the national 
element constituted the basis of his discussion on music, he 
regarded internationalism as a "poison of the people" and the 
Jew as uprooted and international. He actually denied being 
anti-Semitic, stating that those Jews who agreed with him were 
acceptable, and that he, indeed, had "Jewish friends." Ilowever 
the Alljuden were active in international Bolshevik subversion,~J 
and he took exception to the existence of a "Je\Yish critic in 
a German national newspaper" who had accused him of being against 
Beethoven--such is the state of music and decency in Germany, 
he wrote. Although he allowed for good Jews, he clearly insisted 
on racial characteristics of all peoples, which were expressed 
in their art, the state of war, and "the weapons to be used in 
battle." The language of his defense against the enemy who 
ranges from "atonal chaos" to "primitive jazz," "international 
bolshevism" to "American materialism," and "political pacifism" 
to "international slush" in the arts,Cil moved him close to 
National Socialism, although his recognition of the adversary's 
strong points, for instance, the virtuosity, perfection, and 
creative originality manifest in j azz; 62 and his idealism, \vhich 
permitted Jewish contributions to German art, bring into question 
total identi ty of the "prophet" wi.th the reali ty of the Third 
Reich. 
In short, a reading of Pfitzner's extensive writings offers 
examples of continuity as well as discontinuity with the 
Husikpolitik of the Third Reich. His grouchiness and ill temper 
kept him from easy integration into Third-Reich musical 
organizations. ·:ne did not join the party, nor did he readily 
sign solidarity proclamations with the Third Reich.63 Even in 
strictly ideological terms, his racism was not clearly defined. 
For such a definition, Richard Eichenauer's Husik und Rasse was 
to play a central role. 
The study of racial determinants in cultural achievement had 
infiltrated German institutions of learninp, before the Third 
Reich. l1usic too had been studied relative to the racialist 
literature of Lud\Vig Ferdinand Clauss, Paul Schultze-Naumburg, 
Alfred Rosenberg, and Hans F. K. GUnther. Yet, when Richard 
Eichenauer published his Musik und Rasse in 1932, he acknowledged 
race to be a young science. Honetheless, he pointed out that 
explicit race theory had roots in the comparative study of 
music of different nations. \Thereas earlier superficial studies 
had simply referred to the distinct music of Europe as that of 
the wllite race, he now recommended the refinement of the 
scientific study of racial determinants of music, an endeavor 
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he felt to be consistent with the program of National Socialism. 
Committed to that ideology and equally rooted in a conservative-
romantic musical tradition, he had no problern rejecting modern 
trends as deviations from racial norms on the basis of 
scientific evidence. He assumed the "new racial science" to be 
generally known--especially that of GUnther--and proceeded to 
present a methodology,64 which served as a general reference for 
racialist musicology throughout the Third Reich. 
It is this positive formulation of racism that also served as 
reference tO critical theorists in their discovery of racism in 
the structures of art and letters even when not explicitly stated 
or admitted. Similarly, the reality of faseist totalitarianism 
positively instituted and formulated, served as a model for the 
various studies of authoritarianism and fascism by critical 
theorists. In retrospect, some of the pre-1933 analyses were 
indeed understood to be validated by post-1933 events. 
Steeped in Hational Socialism and the romantic-vlllkisch tradition, 
Eicherrauer wrote no less than a primer for .Third Reich racialist 
musicology. Music was to be studied as a product of the whole 
person, whose racial identity, in turn, was revealed by the music 
so understood. The biological basis of music and musicians thus 
established, Eicherrauer compiled a list of physical traits of 
musicians that served as clues for the racial identification of 
music. However, he held the features of what he called the 
"racial soul" as more important because it was not subject to 
the deviation encountered in physical traits, yet he held this 
soul to be as pronounced and distinct aS physical character-
istics.65 
As an antidote to cultural relativism, abstractionism, and the 
internationalism of music, the German racist sought recourse in 
absolute racial characteristics of human beings and their musical 
products, in timelese and characteristic values, in set 
definitions of good and evil as of friend and foe, and in the 
struggle between racially determined antagonists. Moreover, 
only members of a race can truly appreciate the musical products 
of their race and, as a German, he acknowledged his preference 
for German music in the full confidence of that being a superior 
music . Yet, even though his purpose and the end result were 
clearly stated and the history of music was understood in the 
same terms--by Eicherrauer as by maRy others, including 
internationally known musicologists66 __ the new race science 
admittedly had to be refined as racial norms had to be constantly 
verified by the classified material. Data and theory reinforced 
each other. The scholar simply had to acquaint hirnself with this 
racial law, the racial traits of the objects of his study, 
biographical detail for confirrnation of basic racial character-
istics as well as deviations, and the musical works themselves. 
Music thus contributed to the establishment of racial norms 
which, in turn, facilitated the classification of music.67 
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This musical-racial soul theory accorded with the classics of 
Nazi art theory, Schultze-Naumburg's much-cited Kunst und Rasse, 
for instance, in which the physical traits of artists, especially 
their faces, were classified relative to cultural and environmental 
factors.6G Similarly H.F.R. GUnther compiled comparative lists 
of literary and p.lastic art objects on the basis of racial traits 
of ti1e artists in his important book on Rasse und Stil. A ra<iial 
musical typology was thus rooted in the general Nazi approach to 
the study and classification of the arts and other products of 
the mind. Race defined prevailing styles--introduced as objective 
conditions--whereas differences within a style were attributed 
to the individuality of the artist (composer). Citing Karl Ludwig 
Schemann, Rasse in den Geisteswissenschaften, 1930, and 
Richard Ullller-Freienfels, Psychologie des deutschen Henschen und 
seiner Kultur, 1930, Eichenauer thus permitted musical 
individualism not in reference to the evolution of music 
understood to be the product of an object--(the musical materials 
and inherited structures)--subject dialectic in time, but as 
idiosyncratic deviation. Timeless racial Standards prevailed, 
even in the case of known musical masters whose stature was 
celebrated in their ability to reveal the racial soul of their 
people and whose racial identity was therefore of utmost concern 
to the Nazi musicologist.69 The rapid succession of modern styles 
was dismissed as irrelevant and inconsequential--a result of 
racial mixing--but not indicative of basic racial changes.70 
In the atmosphere of what Rosenberg had described as VBlkerchaos, 
the decadent phase of modern music had found its time and place to 
develop. To root out the latter and guide music back into its 
healthy path, the Third Reich would have to secure the regeneration 
of the race, a project of ruthless biological warfare, which 
would take centuries.71 
In the laboratory of music-biologism--to which thousands of books 
and articles bear witness72 __ Adorno found explicitly stated what 
he had discerned in the musical structures and librettos of 
bourgeois music culture and read in some romantic-vBlkisch 
music commentary--a racial community in Parsifal, the first storm 
trooper in the person of Siegfried, and the virulent anti-Semitism 
in lvagner' s essays, which was mirrored in some of the characters 
of his music dramas.73 A relationship is suggested between Nazi 
reality and the anathemas of the terrninology of Adorno's analysis 
of modern music. Time was to stand still in the thousand-year 
Third Reich, durins whose twelve-year span Adorno examined the 
spell-binding effects of Wagner's music: in the dream realities 
affected by the high-pitched violin tremalos of the Venusberg 
music or the reference to bourgeois values placed in a medieval 
setting in the Meistersinger--the suggestion that if those values 
existed then and now they will always exist. Love at first 
sight, primeval drives, basic natures, categorical enemies, 
pseudo-rebelliousness and pseudo~naturalness, raaring laughter 
of those in power (llotan) at the exnense of those who suffer 
(Alberich), good and evil embodied in racial opposites, a stage 
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on which the gods and men converse, class conscious, and 
representative individualism contrasted with idiosyncratic and 
counterrevolutionary rebels, and many other of Adorno's suggestive 
terms and interpretations of llagnerian characters and settings 
testify to familiarity with the realities of the Third Reich and 
its official music commentary. 
The fellow emigre.Thomas Mann discovered his own affinity to 
Adorno's ambivalence toward the genius Wagner in the 1940s, 
and Wilhelm FurtwMngler, whose own denazification took several 
years, praised the "heroic" Pfitzner shortly after the war, 
when such protestation did not help his own cause but no one 
spoke in behalf of Eichenauer. In normal times the Eichenauers 
have to be sought in the unspoken referential world of analysts 
who remernher the unmediated world of domination only too well. 
It is perhaps for this reason that a few old critical theorists 
became liberals. Though skeptical of liberalism as well, Adorno 
increasingly became estranged from the traditional Marxist 
concentration on the economy and focused instead on aesthetics 
and mass culture. If in the 1930s he offended nonfascists with 
references to fascistoid features of their work and lives, he 
revealed his sensitivity to the overwhelming threat of barbarism. 
The Gl:ltterdMmmerung had preceeded the Holocaust. His famous 
question whether after Auschwitz a lyric poem is still possible 
was formulated by him, in other words, already before Auschwitz. 
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J ewish Treason against 
the Laws of Life: 
Nazi Religiosity and 
Bourgeois Fantasy 
ROBERT A. POlS 
llver the years, puychohistorians have made increasing use of the 
concept of 11 grou;> fantasy. 11 Even if the term is not utilized 
explicitly, reference has been made to a putative state in which 
a given group of people, due to events of a physically singular 
or traumatic nature, cor.1es to share or participate in a fantasy, 
a recrudescence of accur.mlated myth-grounded responses to 
historical eilallenges .1 Haturally, psycholtistorians generally 
must believe that r,roup fantasies are the products of phylogenetic 
forces. Their various contents certainly are time-baund and, in 
some cases, quite singular. Even the most nonreductionist 
psychohistorian, however, must percieve general, underlying forms, 
which are representative of phylogenesis. In this chapter, the 
writer, while not concerned with ascertaininp, phylogenetic origins, 
has no intention of calling this assumption into question. Rather, 
assuming that the existence of group fantasies has been 
determined, we will be focusing upon one that he perceives as 
being of immense importance for lleimar Germany' s bourgeoisie~-
the fantasy of return to a natural order ir.nnune from the 
challenges presented by military defeat and by the social, 
economic, and political uncertainties posed by life in Weimar 
Germany. This orderwas one in which elements perceived as 
inimical, or at least alien, to Ger1Mn national life would 
either have no role to play or would exist as entities to be 
overcome. llational Socialism was ia large measure both a product 
of and response to this group fantasy. 
As indica ted above, especially for one sy1apathetic to psycho-
history, there exists the temptation to ground a given fantasy 
in more general ohylogenetic concerns. That kairotic 11 return of 
the repressed, 11 which has played so important a role in Freudian 
historical speculations, must come to mind whenever one focuses 
upon any variety of group fantasy.2 Ultimately, such an 
explanation might well be valid. llere, however, we will be 
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focusing upon the nature and contents of a particular fantasy, 
leaving phylogenetic concerns for others professionally better 
able to deal with them. 
For some time, it has been an article of faith that there were, 
from the point of view of politics and ideology, two bourgeois 
camps in \Jeimar Germany. One variety, at least at first, was 
willing to accept the Republic, was generally opposed to those 
various irrationalities that constituted the substratum of 
National Socialist beliefs, and, on the whole, displayed tolerance 
with regard to the Jewish question. The other group, however, 
conservative, racist, or bot!J, came more and more to srevail, its 
ranks being swollen by deserters from the first camp . In some 
respects, this interpretation is a valid one. Bourgeois 
organizations such as the Center party and the German Democratic 
party--an increasingly forlorn group--and, to an extent, the Left 
wing of the German People 1 s party, ~•ere generally more willing 
to taU: the language of political pluralism and were certainly 
more "tolerant" than right- wing members of the German People's 
party and the reactionary German National People's party, to 
say nothing of the National Socialists.4 Further, it is true 
that the decline of the Republic can be measured in direct 
proportion to the decline of, say, the German :Jemocratic party. 
Thus, the two-camps approach cannot be dismissed out of hand. 
At the same time, though, investigation into what must be seen 
as fundamental conscious emotional concerns of representatives 
of the bourgeois class as a whole reveals that there was a 
general, shared fautasy that cut across political lines; a 
fantasy which, to no small degree, became actualized in the most 
basic doctrines of National Socialism. 
One could make the argument, of course, that German liberals or, 
if one wis:1es, bourgeois moderates, even if they shared certain 
concerns with conservatives or representatives of the radical 
right, differed quantitatively to such a degree on such issues 
as the role of parliamentary government, racism, anti-Semitism, 
and so on, that to lump them together with their far more 
stridently intolerant and antipluralistic fellow burghers is 
unfair. Furthermore, another argument, most particularly with 
regard to the so-called liberals under consideration, could be 
made; namely, that, most particularly in a political situation 
characterized by a more-or-less steady bourgeois drift to the 
right, campaign rhetoric ought to be distinguished from genuine 
beliefs. In response to the first potential objection, the 
author is certainly willing to admit that there were meaningful 
differences between the radical right-wing and moderate sections 
of the German bourgeoisie. At the same time, though, the 
acceptance by both groups of certain fundamental attitudes, at 
times virtual superstitions, is of immense significance and 
points to the persistence and power of those elements, which 
were constitutive of the German bourgeois fantasy. The first 
objection raises few problems and can be answered with little 
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expenditure of time or energy. Consideration of so-called 
private remarks of various liberal bourgeois figures of importance 
in ~eimar Germany will reveal that ~ublic statements made in 
the supposed heat of political campaigns either were actually 
representative of these private remarks or soon came to be. 
Even if one does not totally accept the so-called Fischer Thesis 
in its entirety, there can be little doubt that Germany's 
bourgeoisie had an immense stake in victory in h'orld llar r.5 
Domestic tensions and sacrifices during the war, the anguish 
of defeat, and governmental chaos following this defeat took an 
immense psychic toll. To be sure, the German working class also 
suffered greatly physically and psychologically. It, however, 
had several advantages over the bourgeoisie. First of all, 
there was the comforting balm of a progressive ideology; the 
hope that, with the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment 
of a republic, the first steps in the direction of a more equitable 
society had been taken. For Social Democrats, this was of some 
comfort. Coimnunists, while eschewing republican forms, could 
derive satisfaction from more strident teleological expectations. 
Paradoxically, it was the ruling class that, from the point of 
view of hope in the future, was left high and dry. The so-called 
revolution of 1913 had turned out to be historical froth, which, 
nonetheless, had sufficed to drown the Spartacists. Economic 
power remained in bourgeois hands. llilitary shame and republican 
uncertainties, however, could not be fully assimilated . In 
mitigation, there was unbridled fantasy, and, both for those who 
as "republicans of reason" (Vernunftsrepublikaner) evidenced a 
grudging willingness to work within the framework of parliamentary 
republicanism and for those who rejected republican solutions 
outright, this was of ilmnense importance throughout the tenure 
of the ~eimar Republic. 
In 1::117, the then liberal Ernst Krieck, a leading voice in 
educational reform, published Die deutsche Staatsidee. This 
work, completed under the grinding pressures of total war and 
attendant horne-front scarcities, was written in tl1e idiom of 
German romantic speculation. Thus, when the author spoke of the 
state in organic terms, as being representative of a whole 
Volkstum, he was not exactly breaking new ground. Neither was 
he when he declared that the state had to be grounded in life, 
which, he suggested "embraced nature and spirit as it did two 
poles. "6 :n1at l~rieck--who joined the National Socialist party 
in 1928--expressed, however, was a concern for holistic immersion 
in life which, in one way or another, would characterize bourgeois 
fantasizing during the Heimar period. The results of llorld ~ar I 
were llideous and, even for liberals, hard to swallow. A heroic 
Germany had gone under and, to the liberal Friedrich !1einecke, 
it was obvious that "Ho state could rule for long on the basis 
provided by the protagonists of the Left, with their Jewish, 
sentimental-soft ideas."7 In this regard, it is of interest 
to note the solution to pos t-llorld ~lar I problems proffered 
by the realist, iieinec!<e--a sort of internal emmigration into 
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the infinite. This proposal appeared in liach der Revolution, 
and in this conte;ct Heinecke affered the pre-l~orld War I 
~andervogel youth movement as an example of how it could be done. 
In the hearts of happy, wandering youth, the feeling 
for tl1e horneland began to grow again. And the most 
German in our art and poetry was truly none other than 
the recapitulation of our landscape in the eyes of the 
artist--that ••• synthesis of idyllic Herzlichkeit 
.with ascending, overpowering feeling for the 
infinite •••• So, many of us today retain, even 
in our narrowness, a longing for the innermost 
recesses of our feeling, after the most German Germany 
in nature and spirit.3 
Heinecke had accepted the formation of a republic on realpolitical 
grouuds. In his eyes, in the realm of politics, Vernunft--
reason--had replaced Herz--heart. Yet, the dean of German liberal 
historiography always retained a certain antiurban and anti-
Semitic bias, at least in the social sense. Both conditioning 
and accompanying this was a tendency which we have seen in the 
case of Er.1st Krieck--an attempt to draw strength from or seek 
solace in an immersion of life forces, the infinite, or nature. 
Cancern for putative forces of this ilk was not new and was 
hardly confined to Germany, although it perhaps achieved its 
greatest resonance in so-called Lebensphilosophie. In l~eimar 
Germany, though, we can see this attaining unparalleled prominence 
as a fantasy dimension to political and spiritual considerations. 
As suggested in l1einecke' s statement in :;rach der Revolution, 
discouraged bourgeois intellectuals often sought out salvation 
in a sort of "reborn" German youth, one open to life forces of a 
profound cl1aracter. Krieck, who, by the early ileimar period was 
beginning his trek towards the radical right, declared that the 
most valid philosophy of education always had to bear in mind 
that "all knowledge, all experience is, first of all, a means in 
the service of life formation" and that the educational experience 
was of singular importance because, on the basis of individual 
experience, one could not arrive at a comprehensive "world picture" 
(Weltbild).9 The eventual goal of a "life forming" education 
would be to create the total man, a sort of updated version of 
Goethe' s lülhelm l!eister and concurrently, there would be an 
emphasis upon the strengthening of character rather than upon 
a perceived narrow intellectualism. llhile Krieck, at this 
point, did not subscribe to the notion, so dear to many on the 
German right, that immersion in life forces necessitated submission 
to nature, he exhibited an almost sentimental attitude towards 
those who, for one reason or another, remained outside the realm 
of education. "The human in the state of nature is amidst us 
and within us; in its purity, he is the new-born child in all 
its i1elplessness. nlO This empathy for t:1e children of nature, 
evidenced in l~eimar Germany, contributed to political decisions. 
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Ernst Krieck becarne a :~ational Socialist in 1923. In his 
romanticizing of youth, however, he was at one with many liberals 
of ti~e period. :le have considered Friedrich l1einecke. It is 
importtant to point out that many of lleinecke's fellow liberals, 
members of the ill-fated German Democratic party, regarded 
German youth as somehow embodying rationally inexpressible 
verities. To be sure, much of this stemmed from efforts to 
compete with the radical right in drawing young people to their 
particular political cause. Nevertheless, it is striking that 
the editors of Der Demokrat thought it perfectly in order that 
the January 5, 1923,issue of their journal be introduced by 
quotations from the anti-Semitic obscurantists Heinrich von 
Treitschke and Paul de Lagarde, quotations in which the writers 
extolled !fOuth's readiness to fight for concrete ideals.ll \lhen 
the German Democratic party essentially sacrificed its 
republicanism in the name of ill-defined vBlkisch concerns, this 
was accompanied by a plethora of articles defending that decision 
and calling upon all of democratic persuasion to recognize that 
the fusion with an anti-Semitic Jungdeutsche Orden to form the 
politically absurd Staatspartei was necessary in order to provide 
a nonauthoritarian outlet for youthful idealism. "The idea of 
German youth," I~urt Goepel proclaimed, "is simply Germany, 
Fatherland, homeland." Urban Germany had proved tobe too 
impersonal and mechanistic for Germany's young people. The 
state had a duty to provide "the expres~ion-form of the vBlkisch 
will to national community," this was necessazy to satisfy 
the spiritual needs of German youth.12 This iascination with 
youth went beyond melioristic political considerations and indeed 
was the expression of a fantasy that was of immense importance 
in the psychic makeup of bourgeois lleimar Germany. Somehow, 
youth embodied both historical and timeless virtues, elements 
that had been lost in an increasingly urbanized and industrialized 
Germany. Youth, in its ingenuous commitment tö ideals, was 
Germany and, most assuredly, not the Germany born of military 
disaster in 1913. It was in this fascination with youth and youth 
movements that the \leimar liberals were very closely tied to 
exponents of neo-conservatism and the radical right. 
The interest displayed by German youth for the radical right and 
vice-versa has been the subject of numerous studies.l3 For 
our purposes, it is of immense impo•tance that representatives 
of right-wing thinking perceived youth in somewhat the sarne 
fashion as did many German liberals. 
The German right, opposed to liberalism from the beginning, could 
be somewhat more consistent in its extolling of German youth, 
a youth which, in wmy ways, had been and would continue to be 
antiliberal. In a virulent attack on liberalism, Moeller van den 
Bruck, who already had established a name for hirnself as translator 
of Dostoevski and as an ardent foe of post-\lorld War I Germany, 
declared that, with regard to the newly-founded Relublic, "the 
youth in Germany feels the basis of the betrayal." 4 German 
youth, in its honesty and in its ingenuous commitment to principle, 
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was willing to declare its opposition to a spiritually dishonest 
republic and to "recognize the enemy as being liberals."l5 
Accoruing to Moeller van den Bruck, German youth, in many ways 
apolitical and naively idealistic, represented Germany. Both 
liberals and conservatives were thus united in their view of 
youth as representing a forthright, honest, and, almost because 
of its apolitical character, significant commentary upon Germany 's 
historical situation. For the right, however, this adulation 
of youth had a religious dimension. As Karl Bernhard Ritter saw 
it, youth, as the future of a Volk community (Volksgemeinschaft), 
was constrained to see that "religion is a matter of the comrnunity, 
and thus, in the first instance, a rnatter of concrete historical 
community, a matter of the Volk. Each truly living religion is 
a Volk religion."l6 Thus, youth was called upon to grasp the 
fundamental role that was being assigned to it--to be the bearers 
of a Christian religiosity that was, in essence, Germany itself. 
Frank Glatze!, editor of the mont:üy journal Jungdeutsche Stimmen, 
declared ti1at the society of 1922 lacked "the heart which beats 
for the whole body." For the youth movement of pre-';<;orld ~Jar 
Germany, the llandervogel, "the point of departure was • • • the 
degeneration and decomposition of society, as well as the natural 
Volk feelinp,."17 The llandervogel group, which could well serve 
as examples to a deracinated society, "had no program written 
on its banners," nothing but "life • • . and experience, u13 
In an interesting sequence of ideas, Glatze! first declared that 
the summer solstice ceremonial fire, which had been of great 
traditional importance in the llandervogel movement and which 
continued to be prominent in the activities of right-wing youth 
movements after the war, was part of a new, ')IOuthful religious 
experience, which had to be appreciated as such. The author 
then went on to concern hirnself with the antiparliamentary, 
antimonarchical, and antiparty nature of German youth. To be 
sure, he concluded, "we know that the social question is the 
core question of the Volksgemeinschaft; that socialism as idea 
is the necessary antidote to liberalism."19 This was not only, 
however, "a question of correct distribution of goods • • but 
just as mueh a question of condition of soul. u20 In one 
paragraph full of bromide-laced bourgeois fantasy, Glatze! 
captured the attitude of the radical right, as well as many 
liberals, towards German youth. Somehow, in its very lack of 
concreteness, in its longing for a new reli;iosity and a 
nonsocialistic socialism, and in its condemnation of day-to-day 
party politics, it was the real Germany. Naturally, for some 
liberals, ti1e antiliberal nature of right-wing German youth, 
was rather too much to endure. Like many of their ideological 
counterparts all over the world, however, many 11 eimar-period 
liberals felt distinctly uneasy about their social and ideational 
position--perhaps e:ven a bit guilty. Same of this can be 
observed in an article written by Gertrud Bäumer and published 
in the liberal journal Die Hilfe after the disastraus (for the 
Democrats) lfay 1923 elections. 
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BMumer, noted bourgeois fernirrist a~d literary critic, seemed 
to dcin right-wing sarments as she expressed interest in the 
Jungdeutsche Orden, plaaing particular emphasis upon its 
opposition to the "party essence." Besides paying greater 
attention to this "Order," BMumer maintained that the German 
Democratic party sltould recognize that lveiuar Democracy was 
rooted "not in the pompaus relativism of liberal big-city 
dwellers, but in many v!:llkisch and soil-bound strengths, ••• 
and is conservative-bourgeois in all questions of conscience."21 
The reaction of Germany's bourgeoisie to the introduction of 
parliamentary government is well ~nown and need not be further 
documented here. They were opposed to it, by and large, and even 
the German Democratic party, which out of a sense of Realpolitik 
declared itself in favor of parliamentary government, evidenced 
a certain degree of suspicion towards the new institution from 
the bep,inning, a suspicion which, over the years became traüslated 
into a rejection on the part of many of its members. 22 Grm,ring 
distrust of parliamentary government was a general phenomenon 
in bourgeois circles during the 1leimar period. Behind the 
objections to an h1posed parliamehtary system was something else--
the fantasy of return. 
If one examines the statements of Heinecke and BMumer, one is 
struck by tlte thought that, for these liberals, there was a real, 
somehow more valid, order beyond that of lleimar Germany. Fo_r __ 
lleinecke, there was the "most German Germany in nature and spirit." 
For BMumer, there were "v!:llkische and soil-bound strengths." 
Uhat these representatives of republican pluralism were stating 
was that postwar Germany, a foreign-imposed, big-city entity, 
was not real; that, somehow, behind all of the problems manifest 
in military defeat and parliamentary bickering, there was another 
Germany, the real Germany. This point of view was held by 
other German liberals. For Willy Hellpach, psychelogist and 
the Democratic party's presidential candidate in the first 
presidential election of 1925, the ultimate source for German 
democracy had to be Germany's farmers, a class indifferent to 
big-city cries for tolerance in political and religious 
matters.23 In a word, the most stolid, conservative--timeless, 
really--element of German social and political life was the source 
of all thinp,s positive, including that democracy to which, at 
least in its \leimar form, many liberals were only formally 
committed. Positive national strengths were rooted in a class 
that fantasy had endowed with well-nigh mystical powers. The 
real Germany was one that eluded rational political analysis. 
Nevertheless, there was a natural order, which not only provided 
foundations for whatever positive elements there were in 
German pu!Hic life, but served as a source of comfort for those 
increasingly alienated from Ueimar republicanism. This order, 
antirepublican to be sure, was nonetheless the basis for democratic 
republicanism. The implicit contradiction in all of this might 
well have .been obvious to German liberals on a certain level of 
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consciousness. As we have seen with regard to B!lumer's attitude 
towards German youth, however, there was a stubborn unwillingness 
to dispense with fantasizing about a real, more natural Germany. 
Interestingly enough, one of the most fantasy-obsessed of Weimar 
Germany' s beleagured democrats was :lalther Rathenau, at first 
minister of reconstruction and then foreign mirtister under Josef 
Wirth, chancellor between 1921 and 1923. Rathenau, the most 
prominent Jew in German political life, was assassinated on 
June 24, 1922, by right-wing terrorists wh6 might well have 
adhered to some of the same mystical ideals to which this 
spiritually crost confused individual clung throughout his life.24 
llalter Rathenau's father, Emil, faunder of the AEG electrical 
firm, had clone as much as anybody to bring "modemity" to 
Germany. ~lalther Rathenau hirnself, of course, was a businessmau 
of no mean acumen. Furthermore, as head of the Raw Materials 
Board during the First \lorld \lar, he had established a reputation 
for economic realism. The Treaty of Rapalle existed as proof 
of his ability to engage in level-headed, well-nigh cold, 
international diplomatic horse-trading. Yet, throughout his life, 
Rathenau had exhibited a romantic alter-ego. For this most 
rational of industrialists, the pursui t of transcendence was of 
immense importance. Individualistic spirituality was the means 
by which this spiritually perplexed capitalist sought to bind 
hirnself to timeless forces, acceptance of which, in his eyes, 
represented a rejection of his own Judaism . 25 
Rathenau served the lleimar Republic valiantly and well and, in 
large part, perished because of this service. In many ways, 
though, Rathenau, like so many. of lüs liberal colleagues, 
never completely adjusted to republican life and to a new state 
form born of defeat. Throughout his life, he had combated what 
he perceived to be grossly materialistic influences. As an 
example of this, we can consider a 1917 speech. In it he 
declared that he felt constrained to attempt to fulfill a 
mission that he thought nature had given him: to combat the 
"material, which had been tossed into this world like weeds 
from a strange continent."26 He had to "infuse this unspiritual 
with spirit."27 Part of this spiritwas a spiritual Germany from 
which he drew strength. "This spiritual Germany lives, it lives 
in you and it lives in several others and it appears completely 
different than the Germany of which one hears and of which one 
speaks."23 The Germany of warriors was certainly "strong and 
great" but, in the final analysis (a comforting thought in 1917 
and even more so in 1922 when the speech was reproduced in 
the Deutsche Rundschau), it was spiritual, Germany which mattered. 
Peace treaties mattered little, and Germany's future would not 
be decided on the "battlefield of Flanders" but would be upon 
"the battlefield of our hearts."29 
Rathenau's messagewas a gentle one and, unlike many of his 
countrymen, even some of his fellow liberals, he evidenced little 
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bitterness over the stalemated course of tlte war, .and cries for 
revanche were muted, to say the least. In this essay, however, 
the reader can observe that fantasy of another, more spiritual 
Germany, one implicitly "natural" in its spirituality. Material 
Germany might well have been stalemated on the battlefield, and 
starvation might well be prevailing on the home front; but, 
there was an ultimate reality behind all of this, the reality 
of the German spirit. This message was carried into the post-
llorld Uar I period. 
In 1920, Rathenau published a wor~ entitled Die neue Gesellschaft, 
a piece which offered a guarded prognosis for Germany 1 s future. 
In this rambling essay, he revealed a lack of enthusiasm for 
parliamentary republicanism that was characteristic of many 
German liberals.30 The solutions offered by Rathenau to the 
problems posed by defeat and disillusionment boiled down to 
one overriding one: fulfillment of a uniquely German "mission." 
"The way to the German mission, to German development /iiildung7, 
which shall no longer be the Jevelop!.lent of classes, but the-
development of the Voli~, stands open through equalization of 
labor. The whole land is the same as a team; each stands before 
the same passage. Physical labor is no longer retarded by 
the pressure of overexhaustion, spiritual labor no longer 
divorced from the Volk."31 Rathenau, in brief, was calling for 
that traditional V~gemeinschaft, which always had waxed large 
in the fantasy world of the German bourgeoisie. "He don 1 t need 
more rulers," he declared in a 1920 address before the Berlin 
Democratic club. "Uhat we need are stewardships, responsibilitie~, 
communities, self-governing, responsible communities."32 He saw 
an important role for his party in this process, particularly 
inasmuch as the German Democratic party was "no longer a party 
of big interests."33 A communal Germany .in which, without 
real societal.change, of course, each person had a role in the 
fulfillment of a spiritual mission--this was Rathenau 1 s fantastic 
(in the literal sense of the word) conception of how to deal 
with the seemingly numberless problems that tormented the Weimar 
Republic. 
For Rathenau, as for other liberals, there was a mysterious "other 
Germany"--one which existed above and beyond day-to-day political 
life. Inspite of, or perhaps because of, his alienationfrom much 
of German life due to his Jewishness, he seemed to have loved 
this Germany with an intensity that defies conventional historical 
analysis. In his diary, Harry Graf Kessler described an interview 
with Rathenau 1 s sister. "The war crushed him," she said, 
"because his 1 beloved 1 /Germany 7 had been overthrown." He had 
wanted to defend his "beloved,TI but, being a Jew, he had never 
been able to obtain an army commission, thus "his Jewishness 
hung like a millstone around his neck."34 
Right-wing writers and critics tended to be both more strident 
and more consistent in their various expressions of the great 
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bourgeois fantasy of lleirnar Gerrnany. For one thing, they obviously 
could attack liberalisrn with greater consistency than the liberals 
thernselves even though, as we have seen, liberals often seerned 
to be quite eager to shed their rnelioristic principles in favor 
of supposedly rnore heroic ones. In his previously-cited essay, 
"An Liberalismus gehen die V!llker zugrunde," Moeller van den 
Bruck declared that "liberalisrn is the freedorn to have no 
convictions, and at the sarne time rnaintain that this · precisely 
is conscience. n35 Liberalisrn appeared w:1en a comrnuni ty lost its 
cohesiveness, it was t:1e expression of a society which is no 
langer a cornrnunity.36 People who rernained part of nature, the 
"Naturv!llker," "do not know liberalisrn. For theml. the world is 
a unified experience which man shares wi th rnen. "3/ People who 
had been able to form thernselves into cohesive states also had 
the ability to keep liberalisrn under control. Deracinated 
"society peoples" ("Gessellschaftsv!llker"), however, had ceased 
to be a comrnunity, and it was here that liberalisrn was able to 
take hold. 33 Liberalisrn, in the eyes of probably one of the rnos t 
prominent right-wing spokesrnen in post-l~orld llar I Gerrnany, was 
a syrnptorn of cornrnunal disintegration. 
Right-wing thinkers often rnaintained that liberal or left-wing 
ideologies were unnatural and hence not worthy of serious 
consideration. In his 1920 article, "Biologie und Kommunismus," 
Hermann von TI.osen spoke of the necessity of understanding so-called 
laws of life through studying biology.39 Thus, "any revolution 
which is possible only throu.gh deviation frorn natural, 
evolutionary laws appears as an anornoly to us." Nature was "not 
cornrnunistic, above all, not dernocratic."40 Nature was 
individualistic and aristocratic, and comrnunisrn, in its appeal 
to human rights was incredibly naive. There were no rights in 
nature, only laws.41 Nations had to live according to the laws 
of life. All who defied these laws, and hence revealed thernselves 
as unnatural, were doorned. Von Rosen sounded alrnost positivistic 
in his rather cool appeal · to biological laws. Yet, throug:1out, 
there was also an irnplicit utopianisrn: if a people adheres to 
those natural laws that express thernselves politically in a 
"natural" aristocracy, this people 'dll have tapped into eternal 
forces. For von TI.osen, as for other representatives of bourgeois 
right-wing thought, his was an age in which outrnoded, transient 
values were being replaced by new beliefs grounded in tirneless 
values. During this time, Ernst Krieck declared that hurnankind 
had "to seek out a new attitude to the powers of life and of 
occurrences; a new Mythu4, as exponent of a new belief and life-
f eeling, is being born." 2 
ICrieck looked forward to a time in which the individual would 
attain fulfillrnent as a "valid rnernber of the cornrnunity of life 
with all its forrns, values, goals, knowledge, and skills."43 
llilhelrn Stapel, editor of the racist journal Deutsches Volksturn 
and later a strong supporter of llazisrn, pressed this point in 
an openly rnore v!llkisch direction, in his essay "Volk und 
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Volkstum," when he declared that "Volk is an irrepressible, 
natural community, differentiated from other forms."44 
Representatives of the German right, like n~ny liberals, were 
seeking out their nation's salvation in an immersion in nature, 
or in recourse to certain fundamental "laws of life," as Krieck 
was fond of putting it. Unlike the liberals, with the possible 
exception of full-blown romantics such as nHumer, they could be 
more consistent in their efforts since they felt no need to 
somehow reconcile their beliefs with republican principles 
and liberal meliorism. All of them were concerned with some sort 
of national rebirth or, in Krieck's case, with the birth of a new 
Mythus. A very specific means of helping to bring this about 
was provided by Heinz Brauweiler who, in a widely-publicized 
essay, suggested that Roman law be replaced in its entirety 
by traditional German law, which he thought was more socially 
conscious and hence sensitive to the needs of the whole 
community.45 "In place of the contemporary artificial and 
arbitrary division of the Volk, of the state body, through 
parties and economic organizations, which all are more or less 
filled with thoughts of class and class struggle, there will be 
a natural division, grown out of nature."46 German law, the 
product of a German spirit apparently rooted in nature, would 
assist in restoration of this natural order. 
Walther Rathenau, in his concern to infuse a materialistic 
world with spiritual values, came close to offering a religious 
solution to Germany's problems. In this, he differed somewhat 
from his liberal colleagues. Right-wing spokesmen, however, 
exhibited more of a willingness, indeed eagerness, to proffer 
what one would have to call religious answers to the problems 
of a deracinated Volk. Some of those who concerned themselves 
with this issue spoke the jargon of traditional romanticism. 
Will-Erich Peuckert, in his article "Gott-Natur," blamed the 
Enlightenment for separating God from Nature. Fortunately, the 
romantics of the late eighteenth and the nineteenth century served 
to restore the God/Nature synthesis.47 Peuckert saw the 
restoration of "Naturphilosphie" as being of fundamental concern. 
A new "unity of God/Nature" was needed in order to restore 
spiritual balance for the German people. This could best be 
accomplished if more attention were paid to "our farmers and 
the 'primitives' on the land."4ß These were the humble possessors 
of timeless, soil-bound truths.49 For individuals such as 
Peuckert, the search for some far-off fusion between God and 
nature was indicative of a more general concern, which we have 
seen expressed by both liberals and rightists; his was a concern 
for totalism, a complete immersion into nature or life forces. 
Such was ti1e goal of one of the most distinguished existentialist 
philosophers, l1artin Heidegger, who spent a lifetime attempting 
to pass beyond what he percieved to be linguistic errors and 
philosophical obscurantism and to embrace the ver~ ground of all 
speculation, nothingness, as it turned out to be. 0 The great 
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philosopher's genuine concern to penetrate into the very core 
of natural being, something which was first evident in his Sein und 
Zeit of 192 7, led him to er.1brace, if only for a brief period";"t:he 
I:e'bensphilosophie of National Socialism an<l to reject "academic 
freedom" as signifying "unconcern." Academic freedom had been 
"a capricious e~ercise of intentions and inclinations and was 
noncommitment."51 In these reruarks, the reader can sense an 
attitude to\<ards liberalism l!ather similar to that expressed 
by Uoeller van den Bruck--it was symptomatic of a lack of 
commitment to the natural, organic community. Some representatives 
of the right, despairing at what they perceived to be the gap 
between idealism and day-to-day political chicanery, saw the 
infusion of religiosity into politics--or, perhaps more 
accurately, the transformation of politics into a religion of 
the Volk--as being the only way out of national degradation. 
Rudolf Pechel, editor of the Deutsche Rundschau, in an essay 
which appeared in a 1920 edition of the journal, declared that 
many Germans were now willing to follow a dictator. All that 
was needed was the appearance of a "great idea imbued with 
transeendental strength, deep human love, and great righteousness 
and purity." Such an i<lea, or more precisely, one who embodied 
it, "will immediately find millians of supporters."52 In this 
hour of parliamentary degradation (coincidentally, bhe essay 
appeared around the time of the Kapp Putsch, but had been 
written sametime before this occurred), strong personalities 
were needed, personali ties that went beyond ma tters of s tate 
and, in fact, embodied the German spirit.53 Pechel, whose 
editorial independence would later get him in a great deal of 
trouble during the National Socialist regime's rule in Germany, 
appeared to be actually looking forward to a dictatorship--
one rooted, of course, in transeendental national truths. He 
was calling r.1ore for a religious transformation of values than 
for dictatorship in the traditional sense of the word. This 
became crystal clear in his 1922 essay, "Das Uort geht um," 
in which Pechel declared that "we Germans are now entering the 
timespan of our fulfillment."54 In words both hoary and eerily 
prophetic, Pechel went on: "The duty to Volkstum became a 
religious challenge. The path to this reli,gion, which is 
already itself a religion, can be traversed only by individuals."55 
What was needed here, Pechel declared--bringing up an issue 
considered in his 1920 essay--was a leader. Such a leader would 
correspond to the figure presented by Paul de Lagarde. This 
person was one "in which lives the most distinguished quintessence 
of the German spirit." The leader had tobe an individual 
characterized by "hate against the unnatural Unnatur." In the 
final analysis, Germany was being confronted by a choice between 
"God or Satan."56 Drastic measures were being suggested, but, 
"the voice of our blood releases us from time-bound laws."57 
This approach was perhaps apotheosized by Paul l(rannhals who, 
in his 1923 work, Das organische Heltbild, boldly declared that 
"for the future leaders of the German soul, politics will be, 
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simultaneously, religion, and they will have to cleanse the 
German house of those for whom religion has become politics."58 
For some on the German right, the fantasy of return had to be 
crowned by a spiritual revolution that was necessarily religious 
in character. Politics were conceived of as being corrupt, as 
degrading the existence of the German people. There was, as 
Pechel stated, aa "unnatural" aspect that had to be purged from 
Germau life. The future leaders of Germany would be men of deep 
and abiding faith, ones who could say, as l!artin Luther did, 
"Hier steche ich, ich kann nicht anders" (llere I stand, I can 
do no other). 59 
For bourgeois Germans, the Jews, at the very least, represented 
a troublesome element, a group whose role in German life was 
problematical. Even liberals, who could hardly be accused of 
racism or of harboring mindless prejudices, spoke of a "Jewish 
problem," some of them even after the massacres of World 1-lar 
II. 60 Meinecl;e declared that anti-Semitism was the first step 
to National Socialism and that things would have gone better 
if the "Jewish proLlem" had been confrontJed earlier. lleuss, 
during the course of an address, "Mut zur Liebe," given on 
December 7, 1949, before the Gesellschaft fUr christlich-jlldische 
Zusammenarbeit, spoke of a "Jewish-German and Jewish-Christian 
problem." lfuile lleuss was hardly anti-Semitic in any systematic 
sense and, after liorld liar II, went out of his way to lend 
support to those Jews who remained in Germany and to the state 
of Israel, his use of the above term points to the power of an 
idea; namely, that there was--or had been--a "Jewish Problem" of 
sorts. Friedrich lleinecke, as we shall see, tended to play down 
German responsibility for how this so-called "problem" was 
resolved. lleuss never rejected the idea that German responsibility 
had to be assumed. Both Meinecke and Heuss, however, seemed to 
be unable to see Jews as being an organic part of the German 
national community. .Few German liberals could be accused of 
systematic racism. Yet, a strong dose of at least social anti-
Semitism was part of the spiritual baggage which they carried 
into the chaotic 1/eimar period. In the post-\vorld 1-lar I 
fantasizing in which so many of them engaged, t:!e Jewish role, 
or better, purpose in German life, became problematic. 
On the surface, there was reason enough for liberals, not fully 
committed to republicanism, tobe suspicious of the Jews. Jews, 
by and large, supported the Republic and one of their number, 
Hugo Preuss, had played an important role in writing the \Jeimar 
constitution.61 The German Democratic party, which Heuss, 
l1einecke, and virtually all bourgeois supporters of republicanism 
either joiaed or voted for, derived a good deal of its support 
from the German Jewish community. The Je1vs appeared to have 
benefitted from republicanism and, as post-World \iar I Germany 
went from crisis to crisis, those who seemed to have advanced 
their posi tions through an apparently ineffectual form of 
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government had to have stood out in the minds of individuals 
who, liberal or not, always had retained a residue of suspicion 
with regard to parliamentary government. llowever, for many 
of the liberals, as for their rigi1t-winr, countrymen, the Jews 
becarne suspect primarily because they seemed to have no natural 
role in German life. Certainly, for both liberals and, for 
that matter, for many on the right, this did not necessitate 
that violent measures be undertaken to correct the situation. 
Nevertheless, such an attitudewas hardly conducive to 
sustaining meaniagful resistance against those willing to indulge 
in such unpalatable measures. 
As we have seen, Friedrich Heinecke and Gertrud Bliumer fantasized 
about a deep-rooted, more real Germany--something which lived in 
a timeless realm, far~removed from military disaster and 
cosmopolitan, big-city cynicism. For both of these individuals, 
German Jewry during the ileimar period proved to be troublinr,. 
Meinecke, originally contemptuous of the German left, with its 
"Jewis!t, sentimental, soft ideas," :i'ound it particularly 
difficult to deal with the Jewish, liberal press. Usually, he 
maintained in an essay of 1926, this press had served the national 
interests. It could not be denied though, that, from time to 
time, it bad manifested "a somewhat Jewish resentment."62 Of 
immense importance for !1einecke was that certain impiety towards 
the past which had been shown by the left-wing and liberal 
press. From the time in which it first emerged onto the national 
scene, Heinecke had attacked t;he National Socialist party as 
representing a demagogic and divisive danr,er to Germany. Indeed, 
it was in large measure because of these attacks that he was 
removed from the editorship of the Historische Zeitschrift in 
1935. llevertheless, while criticizing the Nazis for their 
demagogic style, he was willing to admit, in an essay of 
December 21, 193J, that he saw certain valuable elements in 
the National Socialist movement. Besides its concern for a 
"strong national will, the passionate feeling in regards to our 
poli tical dependency," there was its "etl1ical revolt against 
big-city dirt." 03 For !1einecke, hardly a systematic racist in 
any sense of the term, the liberal press, "big-city dirt," and 
that "somewhat Jewish resentment" were a sort of hardened 
underside of "Jewish, sentimental softness." As we have seen, 
in his post-ilorld \lar II work, The German Catastrophe, Meinecke 
did suggest that, as he saw it, there was a definite "Jewish 
Problem." In his eyes, the Jews themselves bore a large share 
of the responsibility .for it. As he stated: 
The Jews, who were inclined to enjoy indiscretely 
the favorable economic situation now smiling upon 
them, had since their full emancipation aroused 
resentment of various sorts. They contributed much 
to that gradual depreciation and discrediting of the 
liberal world of ideas that set in after the end 
of the nineteenth century. The fact that besides 
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their negative and disintegrating influence they 
also achieved a great deal that was positive in the 
cultural and economic life of Germany was forgotten 
by the mass of those who now attacked the darnage done 
by the Jewish character.64 
In t:lis statement we can see him drawing a sharp line between 
Germans and a "Jewish character" that often was destructive, 
frequently expressing itself in a "negative and disintegrating 
manner." (l1illions of those who presumably bare this odious 
character within them :1ad, of course, been just recently 
exterminated, something upon which 11einecke placed little real 
emphasis . ) One is compelled to ask just what it was that this 
Jewish character was "disintegrating." Heinecke was never too 
clear about this, but we can get a good idea, perhaps, if we 
pander a statement he made concerning those positive elements 
he saw in Hational Socialism. The emergence of liberalism, 
he said, besides providing for individual liberation "had 
left society too Nuch to itself and allowed the old ethical 
ties such as family, custom, and social stratification to relax 
while no energetic consideration was given to the creation of 
new ties. Society was in danger of becoming amorphous."65 
Hitler appeared to have been sensitive to this and particularly 
so with regards to the needs of German youth. 
For 11einecke, the yearning for that eternal Germany had 
caused him to fall back upon the Wandervogel experience after 
llorld llar I. After \lorld \iar II, there were the "Goethe Circles. "66 
Part and parcel of this fantasy was the notion that Jews were 
not really part of this Germany. They were different somehow 
and, in their "disintegrating" form, dangeraus to a sort of 
natural order that, for l!einecke, represented Germany in its 
most authentic form. 
Otto Gessler, a German democrat who was defense minister between 
1920 and 192ß, was not one of those relatively rare liberals 
who greeted the new-born Republic with enthusiasm. Indeed, 
throughout, he maintained a considerable degree of loyalty 
for not only the Hohenzollern but the llittelsbach dynasty of 
Bavaria, Gessler's harne Land.67 Hohenzollerns, the ~ittelsbachs, 
the pre-llorld llar I orderly society bequeathed Germany by 
Bismarckian genius--these became increasingly important to 
Gessler as his bitterness towards lleimar increased. It was 
partially because of his love of this Germany that he became 
associated with elements of the anti-Hitler underground in 
World \lar II and, after the July 20, 1944, assassination attempt, 
was arrested and tortured by the Gestapo. 
For Gessler, lveimar-period Jewry came to embody everything that 
was wrang with Germany. The big city was the source of that 
cynicism, cosmopolitanism, and pacifism that so annoyed him; 
"I considered it and still consider it today to be one of the 
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most serious weaknesses of the Weimar system that it, out of its 
liberal ideology, did not tear out this big-city degeneracy, root 
and branch."68 He furiously attacked the left-wing Jewish press 
and literary circles. "llith cold cynicism they tore down 
everything upon which i1ealthy German national feeling depended 
and treasured each phenomenon of decadence as a sign of the 
progress of civilization."69 For Gessler, that "upon which 
healthy German national feeling depended" was respect for time-
hallowed institutions such as the army, various forms of 
monarchism, and .the ingenuous wholesomeness of a presumed past 
age. Far more than Ueinecke, and possibly even ßäumer, Otto 
Gessler, for eight years holder of one of the most important 
of ministerial posts, perceived a singularly negative Jewish 
spirit, expressing itself in urban degeneracy and unnatural 
cynicism. 
Harry Graf l~essler, a man of extraordinary decency and intelligence, 
was a strong defender of the ll'eimar Republic--this, despite his 
noble background (he was known as "the Red Count")-~one of the 
most devoted of pacifists, and an admirer of Rathenau. He was 
an enemy of National Socialism from the beginning and, throughout 
his life, was totally opposed to political romanticism in any 
form. Nevertheless, on Tuesday, il'ovember 30, 1920, he recorded 
the following in his diary: 
Danzig is a little Babylon. Unbelievably international 
and cosmopolitan in the rnidst of its Gothic German 
gables. Profiteers, whores, and sailors. Americans, 
Poles, and Jews shading off into Germans. llany of the 
Poles with a veneer of Americanism. At night, drunk 
as swine, they demonstrate in the dance-halls a 
charrning combination of American and Polish facets of 
intoxication. Eastern Europe under the influence 
of llilson. 11oney flies; gold delirium. Such a 
circus hasn't been seen for years,7D 
Kessler, bitterly opposed to racism and anti-Semitism, 
cosmopolitan to his very roots, had his own memory of better 
times. A man of unusual self-knO\vledge, he had his defenses 
against such intrusions of fantasy-conditioned hatred (for such 
it was and, no doubt understandably so) into his cognitive 
processes. Others, however, had no such defenses and, indeed, 
might have condemned them as cowardly if they did. 
For many of the German right, the fantasy of a unified, 
Volk-cornrnunity, grounded in the past and embodying the noble 
principles of the real Germany, led them to view Judaism as a 
disruptive, alien, unuatural force. Liberals, as we have seen, 
displayed the same tendency from time to time; but; for the most 
part, cor.Jrnitments to republicanism and "tolerance," no matter 
how tenuous these might have . been, served an inhibiting function. 
No such inhibitions exited on the right. llere, one often heard 
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the call for a true, natural "German socialism." This variety of 
secialism, cerparate in nature, had been betrayed, Max Hildebert 
Boehm declared, by a new form of socialism--non-German Marxist 
socialism. The bearers of this form were not hard to find. "The 
Jew," Boehm maintained, "has German social history beginning 
anew in Paris in 1739."71 German socialism rooted in the German 
community, was natural; "Jewish socialism," for such it was in 
Boehm's eyes, was not, but was, rather, grounded in events and 
institutions foreign to Germany. For those concerned with a 
streng, deep-rooted state, Asiatic examples of a lack of 
state-consciousness served as warnings. "Politically, the Jews 
are typically Asiatic," Helmut G!lring stated in a 1922 essay. 
Their conception of state-life was limited in the extreme. Judah 
and Israel seldom were able to get tagether on anything of 
importance. "Beyond its law tablets, this indifferent people 
feels itself uncertain when oppos~d to the imponderabilities of 
state; it becomes · theoretical and fanciful!"72 
The fear of some sort of Asian incursion into Germany in 
particular and Europe in general was expressed by Charles E. 
liaylan in his 1930 essay, "Die psychoanalytische Hethode." The 
Hietzschean author was intensely disturbed by the threat posed 
to Europea~ cultural values by a form of psychology that appeared 
to appeal to the values of the "herd." While not opposed to 
some aspects of psychoanalysis, its general tone suggested non-
European, Aryan roots. Indeed, Freudian psychoanalysis was 
rep.resentative of a "growing Asiaticism" within Europe, the most 
prominent representatives of which were Lenin and Freud . 73 The 
bearers of the Asiatic influence utilized Christian terms such 
as "equality, freedom, and justice" in a totally disingenuous 
manner and \vere prima.rily concerned wi th tearing down others in 
order to elevate themselves, such efforts stemrning from a 
"deeply rooted inferiority complex."74 There were positive 
aspects to psychoanalysis, Haylan declared; a new means of 
"spiritual, creative love" (words which would have turned 
lüetzsche's stomach) had been made available. 75 However, Asiatic, 
foreign influences, so visible in Freud, had to be dispensed 
with before those liberating elements could be efficacious. In 
his article, Maylan did not use the ward "Jew"; but, to people 
whose intellectual perceptions had been honed on the whetstone 
of archetyping, the implication had to have been obvious. 
Contempt for and fear of "alien" influences was generally 
centered on the Jews. As might be expected, however, the French 
came in for their share of criticism. An article written by 
Y~rl Toth in 1921 was devoted to just such a critique. In large 
measure this piece placed emphasis upon the womanish nature of 
French culture as contrasted with the masculine German culture.76 
The weibliche character of the French culture was expressed in 
its shameful and shameless pursuit of luxury and the entirely 
artificial and theoretical nature of French freedom. German 
freedom, on the other hand, was concrete and manly, and this 
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could be seen in l~nt's categorical imperative.77 The French, 
Toth declared, were completely unnatural. In fact, they feared 
nature, and this could be seen in the unnatural aspect of their 
chateaux and in the shameful way in which defenseless animals 
were abused on the streets of Paris.73 Thus, on the one hand 
there was German culture--masculine, natural, dedicated to 
good, hard work. On the other one could ponder its French 
counterpart--feminine, unnatural, dedicated to the pursuit of 
luxury. In nmny ways, the accusations hurled at the Jews by 
Otto \leininger around the beginning of the twentieth century 
were now being expressed by Karl Toth with regard to the French. 79 
In any case, we can see that Toth's 1921 article fit the 
general fantasy pattern we have considered. 
Criticism of the Jewish religion as embodying the character of a 
soulless, mundane people was not new. In this regard, the 
writings of Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Richard \lagner come to 
mind. Weimar Germany saw no lack of such criticism. One critic, 
T. R. von Hoesslin, went so far as to declare that the Jews 
had had nothing to do with the emergence of monotheism; that 
this could not have originated out of "the psychic developmental 
materials of the Jewish people. "30 The distinctly inferior 
character of Judaism and the Jewish people was revealed in l1oses' 
obtaining the ten commandments; The Jews had to be told to 
obey. The ethical, good life could not come naturally out of 
this people.ül Furthermore, "the transeendental feeling which 
seeks out the divine in the innermost recesses of the world is 
foreign to Judaism."::12 Emphasis upon the transeendental 
experience came to the West only through Jesus Christ, who 
von lloesslin compared to Lao Tze. In view of the author's 
attitudes towards Judaism, it is legitimate to ask whether he 
was concerned with separating Christianity from previously 
assumed Old Testament roots, something that was hardly unprecedented 
in German cultural history. In any case, the Jews had been 
represented as being a mundane, unnatural people who, as to be 
expected, produced a religion congruent with its character.33 
\lhen the Nazis came to power, several of. the right-wing figures 
we have considered became ardent s.upporters of the new regime. 
Indeed, as we have seen, Ernst Krieck joined the party as early 
as 1920. Most, however, did not, and Rudolf Pechel, the outspoken 
editor of the Deutsche Rundschau, affered editorial and personal 
opposition to such an extent that he eventually was thrown into 
a concentration camp. There could be no questioning of his 
courage or commitment to what he perceived to be conservative 
principles. Pechel survived his experience and, after the war, 
was one of the first to come out with a history of the German 
resistance movements against llitler and to offer, along with 
Friedrich l1einec!ce, something of an explanation for the "German 
catastrophe." If one examines these writings, however, a 
strange, rather disturbing phenomenon becomes apparent: Hardly 
any time at all was expended on considering the Hazi solution 
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to the "Jewish problem."ß4 In this regard, Deutschenspiegel is 
particularly intriguing. On page 7 of the work, Feehel calls 
upon Germans to undergo a moral revolution in order to lift 
themselves out of the swamp of the Hazi period, a swamp which 
has become known through "names such as Auschwitz, Maidanek, 
Belsen and other concentration and extermination camps."ßS 
From this point on, however, the author makes no mention of the 
final solution and, instead, devotes hirnself to a crude sort 
of psychohistorical--at times, racist--explanation of why German 
history took the fated course it did. With great passion, Pechel 
attacked those elements of the German national character that 
he saw as being dangerous. Most prominent among them were 
"disunity, lack of external and inner discipline ••• constriction 
of feeling ••• lack of healthy human understanding as /ä7 
regulative of action." These unhealthy characteristics were 
responsible for the German people remaining spiritually rent 
asunder, characterized by wide swings between sentimentality 
and brutality. 86 
Throughout Deutschenspiegel, Peche! gives no indication that 
he was aware that he hirnself was utilizing a thorougiüy racist 
approach to attack a racist regime. Perhaps, though, this was 
due to the fact that, inspite of his supposed concern over the 
existence of concentration and extermination camps, Nazi racism 
was not really a pressing issue for him. llhat seemed to disturb 
him the most was the shame that had somehow been brought upon 
Germany. The role of the Jews in all of this did not seem to 
matter very much. For Pechel, as for the liberal Meinecke, 
World llar II, after all, had been a German catastrophe. If one 
examines the post-llorld llar II wri tings of some of those who both 
sustained and derived comfort from the great bourgeois fantasy 
of Weimar Germany--the pursuit of that timeless, nonpolitical, 
unified natural Germany that stood above and beyond military 
disaster and political confusion--one must be impressed by just 
how little the fate of Jews really mattered to these people. 
Certainly, what happened to them was unfortunate, and they never 
denied that the Holocaust had taken place. At the same time, 
however, their rather obvious lack of interest in the fate of 
European Jewry can only assist in illuminating further the 
prominence of an almost automatic, indeed "natural," anti-
Semitism during the lleimar period. Somehow, in the natural 
ordering of things, the Jews had no real positive role to play. 
Until now, we have been concerned with a general bourgeois 
fantasy, not, in a specific sense, with something that can be 
viewed as a religion. \le have noted, however, that several 
right-wing thinkers were interested in the restoration of a 
sort of religion of nature or thought, that politics itself had 
to be infused with a religious spirit. The National Socialists 
have been described as maintaining allegiance to no ideals, as 
being purely pragmatic in character. In one area, though, 
their allegiance to principle was obvious, and this was both due 
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to and rationalized by a religion of nature in large measure 
grounded in bourgeois fantasizing but, assuredly, much more 
consistent. 
Many commentators have emphasized the reli~ious or pseudo-
religious character of National Socialism.u7 Few, however, have 
described it for what it really was--a religion of nature. Why 
this has been the case is not easy to fathom. Perhaps, in 
their emphases upon the necessity of living in harmony with 
nature and in their extolling of the "natural man," the national 
Socialists appear to be too close for comfort to present-day, 
liberal environmentalism. In any case, those National Socialists 
who mattered--the ones in the upper and middle echelons--adhered 
to a weltanschauung that can only be described as being religious 
in character. 
For Hitler, the National Socialist movement drew its strength 
"from a complete and comprehensive recognition of the essential 
nature of life."ill3 National 3ocialist adherence to natural laws, 
the "laws of life," as many :~azis chose to put it, allowed for 
the emergence of a new human being. "The new man is among us!" 
Hitler declared. "He is here! I will tell you a secret. I 
have seen the vision of the new man--fearless and formidable. 
I shrank from him."39 For llitler, his role and that of the 
National Socialist movement was somewhat uncertain. At times, 
he seemed to think that he was the new man, at others he more 
modestly viewed hirnself and the movement, or only hims.El.lf, as 
representing an incubation stage in the emergence of the new man. 
One thing can be said for certain: llitler saw the movement as 
embodying laws of life. Thus, it took precedence over any given 
political or institutional forms, inchiding the state. If, 
he declared in a Statement of 1933, "the formal bureaucracy of 
the state should prove itself to be unsuitable to solve a 
problem, the German nationwill set in action its living 
organizations in order to assist in the breakthrough of its 
life's necessities."90 The state, that unit hallowed by German 
political and philosophical speculation, would take second place 
to the demands of a people's "life necessities," demands that 
could only be met by those acting in conscious fulfillment of 
the laws of life. 
The authentic grounding in life, which many National Socialists 
saw as the primary strength of their movement, allowed them 
to justify the intervention of ideology into all areas of 
public affairs. The notion of value-free objectivity in science, 
for example, was absurd. After all, according to Bernhard Rust, 
minister of education, The National Socialist weltanschauung 
emerged from life, and any true science was possible only on 
"the basis of a living weltanschauung."91 These views were 
echoed by the Nazi youth leader Heinz \lolff, who declared that 
the so-called objectivity characteristic of sicentific liberalism 
served to mal~e people forget that science was the creation of 
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living men, of men of flesh and blood.92 Throughout the Nazi 
writings that we have thus far considered, we can observe a 
fundamental assumption; namely, that there existed a permanent 
natural order of things upon which the National Socialists were 
able to draw. This, in reality, elevated them above politiaal 
parties and the state and, as Hitler hirnself often maintained, 
gave them a religious caste. "Man," Ilitler once proclaimed, 
"is God in the maldng. "93 This Statement has a curiously Hegelian 
quality about it. For Ilitler, however, this new man was not 
that being which emerged out of reflection upon the l.Jorld Spirit' s 
peregrinations through history but, rather, that authentic 
being who was grounded in nature, in laws of life. 
It was this emphasis upon immersion in life--a notion which, in 
many ways, had a pragmatic dimension that made everything done 
in the name of National Socialism ultimately self-justifying--
which had proved so attractive to Martin Ileidegger. Such was 
also the case with Ernst Krieck who, having joined the National 
Socialist party in 1923, really came into his own as one of the 
official pedagogues after Hitler came to power. "The age <if 
'pure reason,' of 'absolutes' and 'value-free' sciences has 
ended," he declared in a 1933 work.94 Science now had tobe seen 
as taking part "in the general shaping of life, the technical 
shaping of the external ordering of life as well as in the internal 
forming of human beings. "95 A new German humani ty had to be 
created, one in which all elements of life, including science, 
had to have roles to play.96 German efforts to carry out those 
tasks necessary in this process had been continuously threatened. 
"Rome, the French, Jews, Americans, to the point of niggerification, 
/Niggertum? have attempted again and again to overthrow German 
fulfillment."97 The answer to these threats was, of course, 
Hitler, a man who "has succeeded in tapping a subterranean 
vein of v1llkisch life and channeling the spring-source."9ß 
The new German human being who Krieck saw as ernerging in his 
time was what he called the gebundene Uensch--literally, the 
"linked man"--a person tied to the Volk-cc\mmunity through the 
National Socialist party. Total, natural harmony was his happy 
lot. The "gebundene Uensch sees hirnself suspended between 
mother earth and father heaven, between darkness and light ••• 
and is a living whole in which life and becoming, task and toil 
fulfill themselves .•.. The gebundene Mensch is the aristocratic 
man, the man of race, breeding, and honor."99 Tobe sure, the 
problems confronting such a person were immense--degeneration of 
family ties, decline in the number of children, and the unnatl.ural 
situation that had been created by the enfranchisement of 
women.lOO Yet, by 1936, it would appear that Krieck had become 
positively ecstatic over the role that National Socialism was 
playing in bringing tagether all aspects of life.101 
Immersion in life, in some sort of natural order that was timeless 
and yet German--a concern that had been so prominent in bourgeois 
364 Towards the Holocaust 
circles during the \veimar period--was enticing to all manner of 
folk. The cleric, Fricdrich Gogarten, who even in his efforts 
to reconcile religion with the new order did take pains to 
differentiate between Christianity and National Socialism, had 
to declare that the movement came "out of the core of human life" 
and thus embraced the totality of existence.l02 The person 
unwilling to accept the fact that true freedom came only with the 
rule of a state governed by the National Socialist movement was 
only an "abstract individual. nl03 Despite Go garten' s unwillingness 
to see Christianity and Volkstum as being exactly one and the 
same thing, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that he 
perceived National Socialism as somehow sanctifying national life. 
For the l<ational Socialist minister of agriculture, \Jalther 
Darre', there was no need to qualify an enthusiastic approval 
of blood-and-soil efforts to bind all Germans together in 
embracing Voll~stum. Past and present would become as one "when 
the farmer's plow again breaks soil over the graves of his 
ancestors."l04 A sense of community had been tarnished by 
liberals. In this . regard, Darre' attacked the liberal conception 
of marriage. Such a conception encouraged naked egotism, and 
racial needs often had been forgotten. The sole purpose of 
marriage, Darr~ declared, was the child. In fact, the child 
was sacred, and its nurturing was the "ethical demand of our 
time."l05 In this context, Darre', in his enthusiasm, went beyond 
German bourgeois taste in declaring that children were so 
important that circumstances of birth, that is, legitimacy or 
illegi timacy, were really of .no consequence .106 The role of 
the woman--presumably either within or out of wedlock--was 
crucial. Like a farmer, she had to bring things to frui tion. If 
her blood was not of the highest quality, the son would be sickly 
and not be able to attain the level of his father.l07 Darre', 
of course, represented an element of bucolic romanticism in the 
National Socialism movement which, in many respects, had to be 
dispensed with over time.l08 Nevertheless, in his concern for 
the maintenance and advancement of an assumed natural order, or a 
time-hallowed Volkstum rather beyond rational analysis, he 
shared several of the more prominent concerns of Germany's 
bourgeoisie. As a Nazi, he adhered to a religion of nature, 
rejecting Christianity which, he declared, had introduced an 
unnatural sense of shame with regard to the human body.l09 
It was, perhaps, in the realm of anti-Semitism that the National 
Socialists went well beyond the expectations of liberal and 
conservative \veimar-period bourgeois wri ters and p4blicists. 
Certainly, few of them could have anticipated anything quite 
like the final solution. In one crucial way, however, the Hazis 
shared--and admittedly elaborated upon--an attitude that was 
rather general among bourgeois circles in \leimar Germany--this 
was their view of the Jews as "unnatural," as somehow not belonging 
to an authentic order of being. 
"The Jew," Ilitler proclaimed, "is the antiman, the creature of 
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another god. He must have come from another root of the human 
race." Aryan and Jew were totally different beings. "The two 
are as widely separated as man and beast. Not that I would call 
the Jew a beast. He is much further from the beast than we 
Aryans. He is a creature outside nature and alien to nature."llO 
According to Hitler, the Jew was far ~emoved from that natural 
world of soil-bound men and ingenuous animal life, which was 
the life-sustaining habitate of the Aryan. The only conceivable 
way, as Hitler saw it, in which the Jews could influence the 
natural world was as a disease; the Jew was a virus, and "the 
discovery of the Jewish virus is one of the greatest revolutions 
that have taken place in the world •••• llow many diseases 
have their origin in the Jewish virus!"lll For Heinrich Himmler, 
"the Jew is a parasite which, like the parasites of the animal 
and plant world, lives from the strengths and productive labor 
of host peoples. The Jew is the blood-sucker of the world."112 
As Darre', the ingenuous agriculturalist·, saw it, even the best 
soil could s~stain weeds (Unkraut), and the hard-working farmer 
had to be on guard against them. The various decrees against 
the Jews served a valuable function because, "in the peasant 
sense," they served to "free us from the weeds of Jewish 
blood. ull3 These weeds--the Unkraut, which was perhaps 
materialism to Rathenau?--had been responsible for the unnatural 
shame that people had come to associate with their bodies, 
something that had come out of a decomposing Jewish influence. 
"Jewish desecration of German women corresponded to the witch-
persecution of the church; both have a common spiritual 
father--Jahwe!"ll4 
An interasting link between the National Socialist religion of 
nature and general bourgeois fantasizing about the natural 
community was provided by Wilhelm Stapel, the conservative 
thinker. Stapel had emphasized the natural character of the Volk-
community. As in the case of Krieck, his star rose when the 
Nazis came to power, and he produced a number of works on the 
"Jewish Question" and related topics. On November 21, 1936, he 
delivered an address entitled "Literarische Vorherrschaft der 
Juden in Deutschland 19lß bis 1933." In this speech, which was 
presented at the University of Munich, Stapel declared that the 
Jews, particularly during the Weimar period, did not want to 
become "artificial Germans," but rather "attemoted to make the 
Germans into artificial Jews. nll5 In this context, it did not 
matter whether a Jew was an assimilationist or a Zionist. 
"Assimilation and Zionism were two methods of constructing a 
domination. They were two ways of a secularized messianism."116 
Jews, he went on to say, produced only mediocre original work 
and functioned mainly in a negative sense, as critics. Stapel 
gave several reasons for this, the most important of which was 
that the German language could never be their language, even 
if they were raised to speak it from childhood. It was not 
something which "had come out of the Jewish substance, the Jewish 
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soul, and the Jewish bodily structure /T7." 117 Furthermore, 
Jews, living as they have been in the ncaluth," have had "a 
streng need for discussion and polemic. Through polemic, one 
attempts to make the other inwardly uncertain in order that he 
accepts whatever one brings him. ull3 Through polemic and through 
their hold on the publishing houses, the Jews had attempted to 
interfere with, if not stunt, the natural development of German 
literature. It was the Jews who were responsible for bringing 
in the degenerating influence of -psychology into the literary 
world, as well as "denatured" liberalism.ll9 In a most revealing 
~ttack on Jewish emancipation, Stapel declared that the greatest 
mistake had been to consider the Jews as a man when, in reality, 
he remairred the same Jew "which he was from the beginning."120 
There can be little doubt that, in its claim upon "laws of life," 
in its nature worship, and in its concern to bring about the age 
of the new man, National Socialism viewed itself in well-nigh 
religious terms, even though the movement often spoke in a 
positivistic idiom. Host assuredly, its primary mission--the 
destruction of a foe that was "an enemy to life"--was a sacred one. 
In these aspects, of course, national Socialism certainly went 
beyend the fantasizing of most Weimar-period bourgeois, whose 
dreams of a timeless, yet naturally German community did not 
involve the physical destruction of those who were not perceived 
as having a role in it. At the same time, though, one must 
appreciate the fact that for many liberals as well as conservative 
and radical right-wing thinkers of lleimar Germany, Jews were 
unnatural, deracinated beings who really did not have a positive 
role to play in German life. For liberals at least, toleration 
was the rule. This concept, however, had a rather vapid ring 
to it under the circumstances. 
To be sure, the notion of the Jews as being the unnatural bearer 
of a mechanistic, soulless civilization had a long pedigree in 
German cultural history. In the lleimar Republic, however, 
itself born of military disaster and international humiliation 
and beset by problems of pluralism to which most Germans were 
unaccustomed, fantasizing about a presumed natural order of 
things--and about those who were in one way or the other 
unnatural--did have more sharply defined political consequences 
than previously. llany of those who fantasized, of course, did 
not support Hitler, and a few even struggled agairrst him. For 
most bourgeois Germans, however, the fate of the Jews did not 
provide much of a rallying point. Indeed, as we have seen, even 
after the conscientiously carried out slaughters of World ~~ar II, 
it was not an issue which one pondered, except to the extent 
that the role of the Jews in bringing this disaster upon themselves 
had to be considered. Hazism attained victory in its most 
meaningful campaign not entirely because millians of people lent 
it unqualified support at all times. Of equal importance was 
the cold fact that in its putatively "life-grounded" religiosity, 
it represented a concretization of bourgeois fantasizing about 
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a natural, soil-bound order and a rejection of those who, at the 
very least, did not belang to.this order or at most threatened 
its emergence. Of course, most bourgeois Germans were incapab1e 
of performing those monstrous acts carried out by Einsatzgruppen 
(mobile killing units) and concentration camp functionaries. The 
removal of a people, however, which seemed to exist as an 
unassimilable entity within the body of the German Volk, was 
not a painfuL.thing to bear. In the end, the establishment of a 
natural order would assure that all would be set aright. 
In 1920, there appeared a booklet entitled Die Unbesiegten. The 
work was a collection of sayings and aphorisms gleaned from 
leading figures in German cultural and political history. It 
was meant to offer encouragement to a defeated and disheartened 
German public. As far as the great bourgeois fantasy of return 
was concerned, an anonymaus saying can perhaps be perceived as 
being of some significance: "Der konnnt am weitesten, der nicht 
weiss wohin er geht." "He goes furthest who knows not where 
he is going. "121 
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Failures of Thought in 
Holocaust Interpretation 
GEORGE KREN AND LEON RAPPOPORT 
11 
••• and now the only visions of the world that can be taken 
seriously are those that come through the irrevocably ash-darkened 
prisms of post-Holocaustsense and sensibility. 11 Mistakenly 
seen as mere rhetoric by some readers, this closing statement 
of our bookl was in fact meant to be understood quite literally 
as the thematic conclusion following from analyses of the 
failures of law, religion, and science--the three pillars of 
Western civilization--to prevent the Holocaust. This chapter 
is an elaboratio!l and extension of the theme in question, with 
the primary focus of inquiry being the impact of the Holocaust on 
meaning as such, especially in connection with the general failure 
of Holocaust schalarship to recognize this problern as the source 
of a painfully clearcut inability to offer meaningful interpreta-
tion. Despite its importance, and perhaps .because of it, we use 
the phrase 11meaningful interpretation11 here, in a very general 
fashion,as being composed of two elements: explanation and 
exegesis; the former involving the familiar what-leads-to-what 
type of causal analysis, and the latter involving less familiar 
questions of 11what has changed, 11 and 11how come? 11 It is especially 
on this point that Holocaust schalarship has been most inadequate. 
This is not to say that all scholars are totally blind to the 
problem. Friedlamler, for example, reviewing efforts to make 
teaching of the Holocaust an academic subject, suggested that any 
serious consideration of the Hazi mass murder, as well as other 
aspects of warfare and genocide in the twentieth century, forces 
re-examination of the J!:nlightment idea of progress, and he argues 
further that historians and social scientists have only 11made 
adjustments 11 while maintaining the ideal. 2 In another context, 
Feingold, after examining the question of responsibility of guilt 
for the Holocaust in admirable detail, concluded that the ultimate 
mistake of the Jews was their naive belief in the reality of 11a 
spirit of civilization, a sense of humanitarian concern in the 
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world, which could have been rnobilized to save Jewish lives. " 3 
These rernarl~s, like our own quoted above, point to a problern that 
has generally been ignored, avoided, or not perceived at all, 
narnely that the Holocaust contradicts or calls into question all 
forrns of knowledge suggesting that it could not occur. This we 
call "the problern of rneaning"; its unacknowledged presence so 
distorts and contarninates prevailing interpretations of the 
Holocaust as to warrant the critical indictrnent "failure of 
thought." 
THE !1EANING PROBLml 
If t:1e analysis to follow is approxirnately correct, then future 
scholars will probably say of the tlventieth-century intellect 
that its continuing failure in the face of the Holocaust was 
the first unrnistakable sign of its collapse. And they rnight 
further observe of that intellect or "rnentali ty" (wi th appropriate 
footnoting of i ts early cri tics: 3ietzche, !Zafka, Kierkegaard, 
Heidegger, Burckhardt, IJittgenstein, and others), that having 
ernerged during t:1e preceding two-hundred-year rise of the rnass 
industrial era, only to see that era ending in unprecedented rnass 
destruction, the cornplex of rnoral and material values and logic 
systerns defining the modern universe of rational thought, whereby 
intellect could interpret the human condition, was now either 
speechless or reduced to ernp ty .arp,umen ts over its own irnpotence. 
The problern of meaning to be exarnined here constitues an irnportant 
basis for the foregoing judgment and rnay be perceived in t:1e 
Holocaust literature in various forrns, ranging frorn concrete 
symptoms of scholarly frustration and distress, to confusions 
rooted in uncritical acceptance of established epistemology. 
The concrete symptoms are quite blatant, but they have for the 
most part been carefully ignored, perhaps because they lead too 
quickly to a threatening recognition of what rnight be terrned the 
paradox of Holocaust knowledge; narnely, that the more one comes 
to know ab out "the fac ts," the less one seerns able to conclude 
about their rneaning. Virtually no irnportant question that has 
been studied in factual detail had yielded answers on which 
there is a satisfactory consensus. Instead, just the opposite 
appears to be the case: After detailed study has been 
accomplished, the disagreernents over interpretation becorne rnore, 
rather than less severe. This condition is ubiquitous in the 
literature, as a few salient exarnples should dernonstrate. 
Increasing knowledge about. the Judenrat authorities and the Jewish 
police organizations associated with them has reduced rather than 
enhanced the possibility of reachin~ any general conclusion as to 
whether those involved should be condemned as collaborators or 
respected for their intention öf trying to "save what could be 
saved." The recently published lla:rsaw Diary of Adam Czerniakow, 
for example, nal~es a strong case supporting many of his actions 
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as head of the ghetto conununity. From his standpoint, some of the 
most contemptible Jews were those leaders who used their Connections 
to desert the conununity and escape to America. 4 
The role of anti-Semitism in the :Iolocaust grows ever-more debatable 
as knowledge accUI,mlates. Helen Fein' s recent quantitative 
analysis argues that the best predictor of Jewish destruction 
in the various Hazi-controlled territories was the degree of 
prewar anti-Semitism in those territories.~ But Poliakov suggests 
that such anti-Semitism is better understood to be merely 
symptomatic, not causal, 0 and our own review of this matter, 
including Fein's data and methods, led us to maintain that 
indigenous government autonomy under the Hazis was the best 
predictor of Jewish survival. 
The problem of Je1vish resistance also remains ambivalent. 11aterial 
ernerging over the past decade has shown that violent resistance 
was far more prevalent than previously had been known. But all 
the new information about extraordinary efforts toward armed 
resistance has only succeeded in undercutting the prior concensus 
tha t violent resis tance 1vas vi rtually impossible. No amoun t 
of new infor~ation, however, can alter the still-unresolved moral 
dilenunas posed by violent resistance. 
Another exemplary case involves the debates over presumed SS 
psychopathology. Our own interpretation, based partly on the 
excellent documentary studies of Boehnert and Segev7 as well as 
other sources, argues that t:1e vas t majority of SS, even those 
in the murder camps, were essentially normal and nuot be under-
stood as such. This raises serious questions about the prevailing 
psychiatric conception of normalcy per se, however. Insofar 
as psychiatric inferences of psychopathology depend less upon 
actions than circumstances, even extreme violence may 'not be 
judged "abnormal." 
There is aa almost endless supply of examples like these showing 
that as further knowledge accumulates, the important substantive 
and moral issues not only slip further away from direct analysis 
and interpretation, but often become transformed in the process, 
sometimes to emerge, like born-again Christians, as neat, law-
abiding vehicles for the display of methodological cliches. But 
concrete manifestations of the problern of meaning are not limited 
to instances in which additional evidence tends to obscure and 
deform the very questions it was supposed to resolve. In other 
cases, where the points in question are not open to empirical 
investigation, meaning can become lost in the labyrinths of 
scholarly discourse. 
A relatively pure example of the latter may be seen in the 
controversy over whether or not the Holocaust should properly 
be defined as a genocide of the Jews, in which they became 
his torical victims "like all the ot:1ers": the Albigensians, the 
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Armenians, the Japanese at Hiroshirna and Hagasaki, the Arnerican 
Indians, the Carnbodians, and so on. The advantages of doing this 
always seern quite obvious in the context of positivist social 
science, since it opens the way for cornparative studies which 
rnay then yield a general rnodel of genocide that can be applied to 
all cases. Indeed, there is already at least one such study 
that has received high praise for introducing an ahistorical 
descriptive theory of genocide developed for the case of the 
Armenians.3 
The disadvantage >Df portraying the Ilolocaust as genocide is 
that this conception robs the event of its uniqueness. As ßauer 
and others have argued, the policies leading to the destruction 
of the European Jews and the circurnstances under which it was 
carried out are profoundly different frorn all other cases of 
genocide, and even in terrns of nurnbers killed, the Holocaust is 
unique. 9 
The ques tion, therefore, rerna.ins: \las the Holocaust unique, or 
rather (rnerely?), a genocide like all bhe others? It is a very 
significant question because depending upon how it is answered, 
the general orientation of interpretative analysis will obviously 
vary a great deal. 
In a comprehensive review of relevant scholarly perspectives on 
this "enigrna of uniqueness," the Eckardts can reach no irnportan t 
conclusions.lO Leaving no apparent intellectual stone unturned, 
however, they proceed to discuss the philosophical, theological, 
and political ramifications of the enigrna in accord with eight 
different conceptual irnplications for its rneaning, and they end 
by rnoving alvay frorn the original question, suggesting that what 
it really signifies is a problernatic relationship between social 
ethics and sociology of knowledge. llhatever else is accornplished 
here, it seems clear that the rneaning of the original, difficult 
question under consideration eventually gets lost in the abstract 
discourse it has provoked. Moreover, it is exernplary for our 
present purposes to emphasize that the Eckard'ts never consider 
that if the Holocaust is in fact a uniquely new developrnent in 
the history of llestern-civilization, then its occurrence rnay 
(1) disconfirrn the idea of social ethics as a useful category 
of thought, and (2) demonstrate t:1e obsolescence of sociology of 
knowledge as a useful rnode of social inquiry. 
Up to now we have been concerned to point out sorne relatively 
conc.rete symptorns of the problern of rneaning and have noted a 
few salient exarnples. These ~xarnples and others like thern 
eventually create the necessity to look deeper. Given the 
manifest difficulties of interpretation cited, the focus of 
attention shifts quite naturally away frorn substantive questions 
and toward underlying conceptual structures by which they are 
formulated. The problern of rneaning then irnposes itself in terrns 
of abstract theory and/or episternology. Ilence there ernerges a 
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more basic, global question of meaning: Can it be that satis-
factory interpretation of the lloloaaust has been prevented not 
by confusion over subject matter (uncertain evidence, biased or 
ambivalent forms for its articulation) but by confusion about 
the conceptual tools applied to the subject matter? It is our 
contention that this is, in fact, the case, and that it 
ultimately arises from the inevitable failures of a post-Holocaust 
schalarship that has largely been conducted on the basis of a 
pre-Holocaust epistemology. 
The limitations of this epistemology generate problems of meaning 
at all levels of Holocaust scholarship. For the moment, however, 
it is sufficient to identify the rudimentary source of the problern 
as lying in the prevalent tendency to treat normative assumptions 
of historical explanation as if they were absolute. The specific 
aspects of epistemology in question here are commonly accepted 
psychosocial-historical logic systems that are based upon 
es.tablished definitions of, and distinctions between, facts, 
theories, and value Statements. Like all abstractions, these 
conceptual structures are essentially reifications, but as 
successful reifications supported by wide consensus, they remain 
above suspicion when phenomenal contradictions occur. Thus, to 
consider a simple illustration, it is possible to analyze the 
Holocaust by placing the facts of repression and then destruction 
of the Jews in a plausible historical sequence or chronology 
based on a theory of anti-Semitism. (That is, cause: Jews are 
conceived by their persecutors as evil deniers of Christ; 
effect: they deserve punishment.) normative explanation of 
the Holocaust as the consequence of anti-Semitism is thereby 
attained, and interpretation--the meaning of the Hoiocaust--
follows directly in terms of the issues associated with anti-
Sernitism; most generally, how to prevent it. Ilence the 
explanation appears to be virtually equivalent to the meaning. 
llhat is rnissed here, and alrnost entirely ignored in the 
literature as well, is the question of how the world, including 
anti-Semitism, rnust be seen differently after the Holocaust. 
In cases where this question of meaning is acknowledged, it is 
frequently by-passed via appeals to the lirnits of historiographic 
competency; as if by referring to imponderable issues of 
episternology posed by encounters with mind boggling horrors, 
one might properly be excused for terminating the work of 
analysis where it ought to begin. This position has the apparent 
virtue of maintaining the appearances of scholarly rnodesty, 
yet insofar as it denies the imperative to seek expansion of 
existing boundaries of scholarly effort cornmensurate with the 
magnitude of the problematic subject matter, it rnust be rejected 
as a retrograde, defensive orientation. In our view, it is 
precisely when the existing historical and psychosocial 
imagination becomes most profoundly stymied that the demand for 
creative analysis and interpretation should be most keenly felt 
and acted upon. 
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It also bears emphasis that the ~eaning problern we are concerned 
with is not just a matter of philosophical speculation. Existing 
interpretations of the Ilolocaust--or explanations masquerading 
as interpretations--da not provide an adequate social, emotional, 
or historical ground on which ordinary people may come to grips 
with it as a human event defining our culture in the same way 
as nuclear energy plants and Beethoven symphonies define our 
culture. ilineteenth-century slavery, for example, was understood 
to be a part of the culture that supported it, and was 
conceptualized with enough clarity for ordinary persans to see 
its moral, political, and socioeconomic -dimensions without much 
difficulty. It was not an intimidating ho;uror to be avoided, 
but a concrcte reality to be interrogated and resolved either 
in terr~s of the prevailing world vicw or via the construction 
of an alternative world view. 
The foregoing viewpoints are articulated in the remaining 
sections of this chapter, which is devoted to: (1) Contemporary 
approaches to Holocaust interpretation, (2) liarxian and Freudian 
morality, (3) failures before the Holocaust, and (4) a summary 
and prospectus. 
CONTE!1PORARY APPROACHES TO INTERPRETATION 
\lha t looks . . • like an interest in the nature of the 
object being studicd or the area being explored, may 
be primarily an effort by the organism to calm itself 
down and to lower the level of tension, vigilance, and 
apprehension. The unknown object is now primarily an 
anxiety producer, and the behavior of examination and 
prohing is first and foremost a detoxification of the 
object, making it into something that need not be 
feared (Abraham liaslow) .11 
The literature of Holocaust interpretation may be ordered into 
four readily identifiable and clearly different (if occasionally 
overlapping) catep,ories. Briefly, and by reference to the primary 
value orientations and assumptions each brings to the subject 
matter, these categories or approaches are: (1) the established 
liberal-eclectic, (2) the Freudian and neo-Freudian, (3) the 
tiarxian and neo-I1arxian, and (4) the metaphysical-religious. 
Although these approac~es obviously reflect opposing world views 
based upon very different theoretical-philosophical convictions, 
it is noteworthy that insofar as substantive Holocaust schalarship 
is concerned, there is no major disagreement between them over 
the large-scale historical evidence; they generally accept the 
same thematic formulation of the problem-to-be-solved (How could 
it happen? \fuat does it mean that it did?); and they similarly 
tend to submerge the problern of meaning in ·the problern of 
explanation. But the latter point will become clearer as we 
examine each approach in turn. 
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1. The Establis!1ed Libe:.:al-Eclectic Apnroach 
It is difficult to specify the established orientation to Holocaust 
schalarship and interpretation wit:10ut falling into tautological 
semantics. That 'mich is the established, dominant way of doing 
things is, mand.festly, "establishment" or "mainstream." And 
the character of such scholarly work in Western European and 
American society is typically liberal and eclectic. Ainong 
historians and philosophers of science, T. S. :zuhn' s description 
of "normal science" has become the accepted technical labe! for 
the liberal-eclectic and usually positivist-empiricist theories 
and methods of contemporary science. In Holocaust scholarship, 
the equivalent of the normal science paradigm is made up of 
narrative histories and empirical analyses grounded on the same 
underlying liberal eclectic and positivist rationality under-
pinning the hard sciences.12 
These works generally interpret the Holocaust as an aberration, 
a terribly dark, bizarre event growing out of the irrational Nazi 
racial ideology. In order to establish meaning, therefore, the 
task of analysis then becomes one of reconstruction: deterraining 
the sociohistorical sequence of what led to what and explaining 
the peculiar circumstances of Hitler's rise to power as well as 
the more specific details of the persecution of the Jews, 
beginning with conventional anti-Semitism and ending in their 
physical destruction. 
This general approach presents the Holocaust as a kind of 
historical morality play justifying the ideals of \Jestern liberal 
democracy by showing what can happen when madmen gain power and 
racism is allowed to prevail. Finer grain historical work is 
devoted to explaining specific aspects of how the madmen came 
to power and how they were able to impose their will (via the SS, 
for example) once they had it. This explanatory effort has been 
supported and enhanced by the qualitative case-history and 
theoretical studies of psychiatrists and psychologists concerned 
wi th the special psychodynamics of the Nazi leaders, their 
appeal to the masses, and the ~:~akeup of their more devoted 
followers. At a more general group level, quantitative empirical 
research by sociologists and social psychologists has provided 
abstract principles for the explanation of aberrant, destructive 
behavior. Some of the better known examples here include studies 
of authoritarianisra that have been applied to German national 
character; studies of conformity and obedience to authority 
indicating mechanisms whereby ordinary people might behave 
atrociously; and more recently, Helen Fein's multiple regression 
model of the l!olocaust, wherein the numbers of Jews killed in 
various parts of Europe serve as the statistical criterion for 
evaluating the weights assigned to such predictor variables as 
levels of prewar anti-Semi tism and degrees of ~-lazi control.l3 
All of the foregoing historical and psychological categories of 
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work demonstrate the established, conventional orientation towards 
the problern of interpretation, namely, that the meaning of the 
Holocaust must be sought via explanations of hmv it came to pass. 
And this tendency to equate meaning with explanation is frequently 
confirmed by statements to the effect that by developing detailed 
explanations, we will have the means of avoiding such terrible 
horrors in the future. Implied, if not stated, is the idea of 
the !Iolocaust as an aberration that can be prevented from ever 
happening again if enough knowledge can be gained to explain how 
it happened in the first place. The major thrust of this 
interpretation is to minimize the significance of the Holocaust. 
In contemporary textbooks, for example, it does not receive 
close attention but is subsumed under the rubric of German 
mistreatment of conquered populations. There is little room 
here, ~uite obviously, for considering what it may mean to us 
now as a factual event in the history of our civilization. 
Above all, there is no hint of any reason why we should now feel 
secure with explanatory interpretations of the Holocaust provided 
in accord with the same intellectual parauigms which, earlier 
on, failed to perceive its onset. 
2. The Freudian and neo-Freuuian Anuroach 
The essential basis for Freudian and other psychiatric inter-
pretations of the Holocaust is its blatant irrationality and 
unspeakable cruelty. It is virtually c truism that wherever 
gratuitously intense, "irrational" human· destructiveness has 
appeared in the modern 1vorld since Freud, his theory has 
invariable served as the main point of departure, if not the 
entire structure, for rational psychosocial interpretation. 
Freud hirnself set the pattern for this in his famous essays 
"Why \lar?" and "Reflections on \lar and Death." 
The Freudian formula, which .may be applied to irrational violence 
across the board from individuals to groups, masses and nations, 
holds that the more senseless the violence, the more obvious l y 
it must be rooted in some form of instinct repression of which 
the person, mass, or state is not consciously aware. Such 
repression creates a burden of tension (anxiety, hostility), 
which eventually Jaust be released (catharsis) either by turning 
it inward (self-destruction, psychoses and neuroses) or outward 
via creative redirection (sublimiation), or uestructive attack 
upon a convenient target (scapegoat). 
At both the individual and sociocultural levels, the specific 
dynamics of experience (personal, historical) leading to the 
conditions for violence will vary a great deal and be concealed 
by all sortG of socially approved and/or institutionalized defense 
mechanisms. Interpretation of violence, therefore, requires the 
informed, discerning eye of a theorist who can penetrate to its 
hidden sources. 
Where sociocultural and historical trends unuerlying the Hc:!>.locaust 
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are concerned, such writers as Erich Fromm and \lilhe1m Reich have 
maintained that its sources lie, respectively, in the disruptions 
of communal life produced by the industrial revolution and the 
suppression of sexuality. Other aaalysts, such as Bruno Bettelheim 
and Elie Cohen, who observed extraordinary behaviors among 
prisoners and guards in the concentration and death camps, have 
suggested that patterns of apparent violence and passivity may be 
traced to the breakdown of inhibiting superego- and ego-protective 
psychosocial mechanisms. And the !'lazi leadership, mainly Hitler, 
but a nurober of high and medi1JIII rank leaders as well, has been 
studied intensively via the method of psychobiography. Here too, 
one may choose from among different interpretations, but the 
general trend fits the basic model noted earlier, insofar as 
personal repression and politicized forms of catharsis emerge 
as prir.~ary sources of seemingly inexp licable moti ves. 
The many significant insights provided by Freudian and neo-
Freudian works on Holocaust problems are well known enough to 
be stipulated witlwut elalloration. It is not so obvious, 
however, timt this approach is perfectly complementary to the 
established historical and social science aberration interpretation. 
In this connection, it is clear that an implicit, mutually 
supportive division of labor prevails among conventional, 
established forms of Holocaust scholarship. Historians and others 
explain the aberrant circumstances opening the way for Nazi 
power, while psychiatrists and psychoanalysts explain the 
aberrant motives among the Nazis. 
Taken together, and vie\~ed in a larger perspective, these two 
approaches have obviously dominated Holocaust research, and their 
explanatory theories have generally been accepted as the only 
sensible interpretation. 
3. The Marxian Approach 
There are so many different forms and facets to l!arx's own 
writings, let alone those of his followers, imitators, and 
interpreters, that no brief summary can claim to present a 
comprehensive review of how Marxists (what kind? where? when?) 
approach aay important event. 
Concerning the Holocaust, however, the main :themes of virtually 
all seriously committed 11arxian discussions are not so difficult 
to identify because: (1) The destruction of the Jews per se has 
not been seen as a very important topic for analysis; it is 
usually subsumed and treated as .part of all the other ruthless 
destruction caused by the Nazis. (2) The Holocaust is typically 
portrayed as the final outcome of European anti-Semitism for 
which a sound, well-established, socioeconomic explanation was 
produced by llarx himself. And (3) HarKist scholars have avoided 
direct engagement with the Holocaust not only because anti-
Semitism can be a "sensitive" political issue in the Soviet Union 
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and many Third \/orld na tions, but also because it is difficul t 
to find explanations for extraordinary irrational violence in a 
very rational, economically-based social philosophy. Consequently, 
although the following discussion is relatively brief, it 
includes most if not all of the main themes of !1arxian Holocaust 
interpretation. 
In Harx's own theory of anti-Semitism, tile Jews were seen as 
being both the historical progenitors of capitalism and also 
among the chief victims of the industrial class society it 
produced. Hore specifically and apart from its origins in the 
early history of Christianity, Marx saw anti-Semitism nurtured 
and encouraged by the ruling class, especially during times of 
crises, because it served as a means of divertinp, the attention 
of the masses away from recognition of tileir true condition, 
and/or, away from awareness of the fact that the policies of the 
ruling class were responsible for the crisis. In this sense, 
anti-Semitism is a preeminent form of false consciousness. In 
the modern era, moreover, anti-Semitism has a clear economic 
function: ßy providing the Jews as a ready-made target for 
popular discontent, it enhances the ability of the ruling class 
(monopoly capitalism) to exploit its workers. The theory of 
anti-Semitism, therefore, is directly linl;ed to the general 
economic tbeory of capitalism. 
Applied to the Holocaust, such Marxian t:1eory offers useful 
guidelines for analysis of how the Hazis were able to exploit 
anti-Semitism during their drive for power in the IJeimar Republic. 
Once their control was established, however, and the Jews were 
reduced to second class legal status via the Nurernburg laws (1935) 
and the confiscatory forced emigration program, it would appear 
that llarx's theory of anti-Semitism was more or less fulfilled, 
although it is arguable that subsequent utilization of Jews 
for slave labor is also relevant. 
Uhy then kill Jews in wholesale lots when they could otherwise 
have been exploited economically, if only by working them to 
deat:1? llarxian theory has no real answer to t:üs question because 
it does not conceptualize situations in which a genetically based 
ideology of human destruction can take prolonged, systematic 
priority over the achievement of economic benefits. 
Some lfarxian theorists maintain that economic motives may be 
found for the mass killings insofar as they involved not only 
slave labor but also the collection from dead victims of their 
hair, clot11ing, gold tooth fillings, and other valuables. Yet 
such views do not stand up to close scrutiny; even the SS 
econonics bureau objected to the mass killings as being inefficient 
and uisruntive of important "'ar :>roduction activities. 
Other llarxian writers have argued t:1at tl1e socioeconomic benefits 
of Nazi anti-Semitism initially set the star.e for the Holocaust, 
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but then become secondary to the !JOlitical significance of I!itler's 
obsessive desire to eliminate the Jews. Thus, apart from his 
personal hatreds, another reason for the Holocaust was his 
realization that by killing so many people "for nothing," the 
remairring subject peoples including the Germans, would be so 
intimidated as to become willing servants to his policies. This 
ignores the fact that the subject peoples were already intimidated 
by methods other than the "final solution." Horeover, like so 
many other 11arxian arguments--that the German capitalist ruling 
class wanted the Jews got out of the way, or that this s!llme class 
had to allow Hitler to kill the Jews as a reward for his anti-
communist services in their behalf--this is quite strained and 
lacks even surface plausibility as well as any Substantive 
Support. 
It is noteworthy, finally, that an ir.1portant critique of Marxian 
efforts to apply the economic theory of anti-Semitism to the 
Holocaust has been developed by Konrad Kwiet.l4 After reviewing 
the work of East German (DDR) scholars, he observed that of 
all the Nazi leadership, it was Hjalmar Schacht who best 
represented the interests of German capitalism, yet it was Schacht 
who resigned as finance minister in 1937 in protest agairrst the 
excesses of ~-Holocaust Nazi anti-Semitism. 
4. The Hetaphysical-Religious Approach 
The ranee of perspectives here is represented in exemplary fashion 
by t:1e salient works of Emil Fackenheim, Elie iliesel, and Richard 
Rubenstein. These authors have all engaged the problems of 
explanation and meaning in explicit metaphysical terms, inclusive 
of, but extending well beyond the relatively commonplace issues 
of politico-religious theology. The latter have received attention 
from ecumenical Christian philosophers such as Franklin Littel 
but since their discussions have generally involved Christian 
responsibility for anti-Semitism, and whether or not Jews should 
still be held responsible for the death of Jesus and so forth, 
we will not be concerned with them here. 
The basic premise of Facl;:enheim' s extensive work is his assertion 
that the Holocaust is a form of Jewish "sacred history"; an 
epoch-making event comparable with the destruction of the Temple 
by the Romans or the emancipation of Europe's Jews in the 
eighteenth century. He explains the Holocaust as a culmination 
of centuries of anti-Semitism, a more or less inevitable 
catastrophe of Christian, not Jewish, civilization. In this 
connection, he differs sharply from some traditional Jewish 
theologians who see the mass destruction plainly as a punishment 
from God visited on the Jews for their disobedience; their 
assimilationist tendencies under the Enlightenment, and/or 
their subsequent ~ionist politics. Fackenheim argues that the 
destruction was too indiscriminate and cataclysmic to fit the 
theology of punitive judgment. 
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By the same token, he also rejects secularist views of the 
Holocaust as an aherration or accident of history, since the 
God of history would not permit such errors. Virtually hy a 
process of elimination, then,Fackenheim comes to interpret 
Ausc;lwitz as a manifestation of the will of God, a cornrnandment, 
in fact, for Jews to hold fast to Judaism even in the face of 
the most terrihle forces seeking to crush it. 
Contradietory as it may seem to secular reason, and here 
Fackenheim appeals to Hegelian dialectics for help against 
lesser logic sys ter.JS, the Holocaust comrnandment is put forward 
as a revelation insisting upon Jewish survival and rehirth, not 
death. The birth and persistence of the State of Israel is at 
least in part taken to he a realization of this cornrnandment. 
But he further insists that all Jews who retain their Jewish 
identity after t;l.e Holocaust when every claim to tationality 
would see~demand its denial, whether or not they live in 
Israel or practice their religion, are in this way hearing witness 
against Hitler and thus against the corruption of \lestern 
civilization that allowed him to flourish. 
The general explanation and meaning of the Holocaust, therefore, 
comes down to a form of dialogue hetween the disaster wrought 
hy secular Christianity and the manifest mission of the Jews 
to testify against it hy virtue of their continued existence. 
For Fackenheim, Auschwitz represents an epochal hreakpoint in 
Jewish history yet rernains metaphysically coterrninous with the 
core theological history of the Jews. 
Richard Ruhenstein takes a completely opposite position. Far 
from heing conceivahle as a new, tragically heroic episode in the 
on-going covenant hetween God and his chosen people, Ruhenstein 
sees the Holocaust as the end of the covenant. The historical 
Jewish God finis:1ed as another victim of Auschwitz. Having been 
nearly ohliterated hy unrestrained secular power operating in the 
service of traditional anti-Semitism allied with scientifically 
rationalized raciscr, Jews now have no other choice except to 
ahandon their God-Ideal and to seek to realize their values as 
unaided hurnans t;1rough construction of their own cornrnuni ty. And 
this cannot be accomplished if they continue in their traditional 
diasporic indifferences to secular power. 
Theologically and symholically, therefore, the meaning of the 
Holocaust is the death of God. It is especially noteworthy, 
however, that Ruhenstein argues this position not from the 
outside, as a rationalist skeptic, hut from the inside, working 
within the fundamental assurnptions of traditional Jewish faith. 
Thus, if the historical Jewish God is so cruel as to ordain a 
Holocaust or so impotent as to he unable to prevent it, that 
God must in either case he rejected; the contract must he 
ahrogated. 
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neing neither a philosopher nor a theologian per se, the authority 
of Elie lliesel 1 s writings on the rnetaphysical significance of the 
Holocaust derives frorn the dedic.ation of his art to his life 
experience, first as prisoner and later as survivor of Auschwitz. 
Unlike rnost survivors who have understandably rnade strenuous 
efforts to distance thernselves frorn the Holocaust, lliesel had 
devoted hirnself to staying in close tauch with it and has made 
it the central focus of a rernarkable body of literature. 
Apart frorn its literary value, however, this work demands 
consideration in the present context because it epitornizes the 
endless dialogue over rneaning between the living and dead victirns, 
as well as their living or dead ideas of God. In many respects 
that can hardly be enurnerated, 1Jiesel 1 s work has been to drarnatize 
the experiential irnplications of the conflict between those who, 
in one way or another, either take the position of Fackenheirn 
or of Ruhenstein or else waver between thern. The extraördinary 
tension of his work, therefore, follows frorn lliesel 1 s struggle 
with the unresolvable paradox: One cannot, after Auschwitz, 
accept that there is any immanent basis for rnorality either in 
God or humanity; yet there is no way to bear life without the 
presence of sornethinß in which to believe. 
Caught in this paradox, the protagonists of \liesel 1 s fiction 
rnay be seen as enacting a pilgrirn 1 s progress through all the 
farniliar seenarios of desperat~on--withdrawn apathy, warfare, 
rnurder, suicide, madness--only to find tllern ultirnately false 
and usele$S. 
In the end, the prototypical survivor rnakes a conditional peace 
with hirnself through realization that the paradox of rnorality 
is not a problern to be solved but to be lived with as a 
condition of human life. Confronted with this condition, it is 
the task of each individual to work out a pathway frorn despair 
to affirrnation. IJiesel thus rnoves toward an existential posture 
wherein doubts and dialogues concerning the Holocaust rernain 
painfully vivid, yet becorne livable when both the severe lirnits 
and redeerning possibilities of human thought and action are 
finally grasped. 
The similarities and conflicts between the three positions 
outlined above should be readily apparent. In all of thern, of 
course, arguments with and about God outweigh every other 
consideration. This hermeneutical orientation is very 
significant frorn our point of view, because unlike the other 
approaches described, here one may see an immediate, alrnost 
axiomatic rejection of pre-Holocaust civilization so far as 
irnportant values and beliefs are concerned. Consequently, 
distinctions between explanation and rneaning are all but wiped 
out, and the salient issue becornes salvation; either for Jews-in-
general or for their archetype in the person of the survivor. 
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The four general approaches to Holocaust interpretation provide 
in many ways a brief tour of the salient forms of culture 
analysis presently practiced in Hestern civilization. That is, 
regardless of whether the subject matter were somet(dng other 
than the Holocaust, such as art, science, or male-female 
relationships, one would still find that the gencral routes 
toward interpretation, the approaches or forms of social 
thought we have called liberal-eclectic, Freudian, Marxian, 
and metaphysical, remain quite the same because they are really 
all there is. l1oreover, although the dif ficul ties and limi ta tions 
noted within each of these approac:1es when they are applied to 
the :Iolocaust might easily show up in connection with other 
subject matter, the unequivocal intensity of what is at stake 
here cuts to the bone of every form of intcrpretation. 
llhen the majority of established scholars, for example, speak of 
the Holocaust as an extraordinary aberration, anu provide detaileu 
accounts of how this aberration occurred, to the astonishment 
of all concerned except for the handful of its central planners, 
does this not mean, in effect, that even "advanced" human 
societies can be so wildly unreliable that none of their pretentions 
to "civilized" values can be taken for granted? And since the 
very forms of throught and analysis employed to construct the 
aberration interpretation are themselves intimately rooted in 
and reflective of the civilized values and beliefs of the 
Enlightenment now revealed to be untrustworthy (actually falsified 
by evidence that they fail to prevent unspeakable destruction), 
does this not discredit the basis for the interpretation? In 
other worus, if one takes the aberration theme seriously enoup,h 
to pursue its implications, it ultimately turns back upon itself, 
calling into question the rationality it is based upon. 
At the metaphysical-religious end of the interpretation spectrum, 
a similar type of paradox also exists and causes very serious 
problems, but of a different sort from those we have identified 
for conventional scholars. Those who believe in a divine power 
called "god" face a dilemma. If an event of such terrible 
magnitude as the Holocaust could oecur by chance, as an 
aberration, then can there be any divine power worthy of the name? 
And if it was not a ra~dom event but actually ordained by a divine 
will or power, then how can one accept such a power to be an 
object of belief or worship? 
Unresolvable, this dilemma imposes itself as a huge, intimidating 
burden upon all Jewish theology and rnetaphysics. Like Sisy.phus 
with his heavy stone, Jewish moral philosophers seem condemned 
to be forever pushing this intolerable weight up the infinite 
mountainside of existential meaning. l~or:se yet, those few who 
honorably and knowingly acknowledge this burden (there are many 
who do not) anu struggle to grapple it forward, are further 
condemned to struggle with each other as well. Does the Holocaust 
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affirm the presence and will of God for Jews to reestablish their 
religion in its traditional horneland (Fackenheim)? Or does it 
terminate the historical Jewish God ideal (Rubenstein), leaving 
Jews only with the desperate necessity to maintain themselves in 
a garrison state? Or does it, finally, only convey massively 
irrefutable evidence of the existential emptiness within which 
Jews either may or may not choose, by their own act of will, to 
affirm a God ideal (\liesel)? 
Goropared with the consensus prevailing among most established 
secular scholars, who seem confortably at easc:. with the aberration 
interpretation, the disputes and cont:radictions among the 
metaphysical writers appear passionately arbitrary and perhaps 
childishly irrational. But if our analysis to this point is 
correct, t:1en the bitter epistemological struggles characteristic 
of the metaphysical approach may ultimately be _iudged as the 
r.wre appropriate line of interpretation because it at least 
keeps alive the fires of critical controversy and painful 
confrontation. The liberal secul3r approach, by contrast, goes 
on with explanatory business-as-usual, almost as if nothing had 
happened. 
The two remaining approaches to Holocaust interpretation, via 
Freudian and !1arxian .theory, have each, to a certain extent, been 
assimilated to ti1e es tablished aberration theme of secular 
scholarshi?. As we have seen, Freudian works explain the unusual 
motives of the Nazi leadership in terms of psychopathology 
(individual aberration), whereas !1arxian analyses of Hazi policies 
offer explanations in terms of the economic benefits of anti-
Semitism (a collective false consciousness). Liberal eclectic 
schalarship has no special difficulty joining these ideas 
tagether and adding various empirical findings to demonstrate how 
they combined in Germany to yield the preconditions for an 
aberration as large as the Holocaust. 
Freudian and liarxian thought can only be pasted tagether in this 
fashion, however, so lang as the profound antagonisms between 
them are put asiJe in favor of their technical explanatory points 
of convergence. Thus, for example, l!arx's structural-economic 
theory of anti-Seiui tism appears to blend easily into Freud' s 
relevant psychodynamic formulations of projection and scapegoating. 
Yet the two systems are not simply theories of social behavior 
susceptible to reconciliation at the hands of clever scholars; 
they are moral world views based on radically opposed fundamental 
assumptions. The antithesis here is so intense that each 
conceives the ot:1er to be symptomatic of the illnesses it aims to 
correct! (To the l1arxist, Freudian theory and nractice is a 
bourgeois self-indulgence diverting attention away from the real 
material sources of human suffering; to the Freudian, !1arxist 
theory and practice is a complex defensive rationalization and 
compensation for failures of psychosexual development.) 
Furthermore, it remains an unresolved :tarxian mystery how the 
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conventional historical-economic forces behind anti-Semitism 
could have gone amok to produce the Holocaust; and it remains 
similarly a Freudian mystery how ~ersons so dominated by 
pathological symptoms as Hitler and the other leading Nazis 
could have come to control and preside over the reorganization of 
a complex nation state. But there are problems with both systems 
of thought that must be addressed in depth because they suggest 
that the 11arxian and Freudian failures vis-a-vis the Holocaust 
are rooted in their conceptualizations of morality. 
UARXIAll AHD FREUDIAl< 110RALITY 
In both 11arxian and Freudian thought, morality as such is generally 
treated as an epiphenomenon; an artifact of the sociocultural 
framewerk rather than a defining quality of the human condition. 
There is no golden rule nor any other absolute standard 
prohibiting any of the various forms of human destructiveness 
to be found in either the Marxian or Freudian canons. Instead, 
both relegate traJitional ideas of right and wrong to the status 
of either primitive, religious Superstition,. and/or evolving 
social norms serving to maintain existing power structures: of 
the ruling class (for l:1arx), or t:1e patriarchal father (for Freud). 
The general thrust of both systems, therefore, is to eliminate 
or trivialize all conventional notions of ~oral responsibility by 
revealing their sources in the oppressive economic and psychosocial 
structures of society. 
This is not to say that the Marxian and Freudian systems have no 
moral dimension. llut their moral dimension is indirect; derivative 
from their fundamental commitments to human liberation from 
economic and psychosocial forms of oppression. The basic analysis 
of morality presented in both systems emphasized that unless 
special circumstances intervene, the ideas of rip,ht and wrong 
prevailing in society and within individuals will remain beyond 
the reach of deliberate, self-conscious control. Groups and 
individuals will rcmain dominated by the morality associated with 
their economic and psychosocial situation, unless they can reach 
a new level of self-awareness via revolutionary activity or 
psychoanalysis. Yet even in these exceptional Situations, the 
liberty that may be experienced contains no special ethic except 
group- and self-realization. To be liberated in these (Marxian 
or Freudian) terms, therefore, is to be freed from any absolute 
Standards of rigltt and wrong. 
Such freedom can also carry with it an imperative to violate the 
prior socially inculcated moral restraints against destructive 
aggression, especially insofar as t:10se restraints may now be 
perceived as instrumental to the prior state of oppression. 
According to the liarxian system, destructive violence may in 
fact be required in aid of the revolution; and according to some 
branchcs of Freudian tlteory, personal violence (acting out) may 
be construeJ as therapeutic catharsis in aid of ego development. 
In both systems, it appears that normative morality is a 
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disguised instrument of oppression that may be transcended; 
but once a liberating transcendence is attained, morality becomes 
quite problematic, something to be decided upon depending on 
circumstances. It is precisely at this point, however, that the 
locus of moral t :wught becomes external to the group or the 
individual, since determinations of right or wrong can only be 
made according to objective interpretations of circumstances. 
These interpretations, of course, are attained by following the 
guidelines of theory; either Harxian or Freudian as the case 
may be. This is a major epistemological move away from the 
traditions of religious metaphysics and liberal pragmatics. The 
end result, manifestly, is that right and wrong are no langer 
matters of internal conviction or reflexivity, but are, instead, 
remote constructions of circumstaaces mediated by theory. Once 
this epistemological quality of Marxian and Freudian thought is 
understood, it becomes painfully apparent that, at the level of 
daily moral praxis, they cannot provide any formal stipulations 
defining right aad wrong behavior. 
The many forr.~al similarities between Marxian a::1d Freudian 
conceptions of morality may seem to contradict the prior critique 
of eclectic schalarship by ignoring the antithesis between them. 
Yet this antithesis can only be fully appreciated once the points 
of formal similarity have been acknowledged, for it is in their 
mechanisms and procedures of moral interpretation--their "rules 
of the game"--that Marxian and Freudian thought stand in total 
opposition to one another. In abrief, necessarily oversimplified 
way, it may be said that the moral touchstone of Marxism is 
economics; other things being equal, any activity enhancing the 
extent to which workers can own and control their own productive 
labor, thereby avoiding alienation, will be liberating and thus 
morally goo•l. T;le touchstarre of Freudian morality is · effective 
psychosexual development; other things being equal, activities 
enhancing the individual's achievement of the psychosexual stage 
of genitality will be liberating and thus morally good. 
The antithesis here hardly requires elaboration, except to 
specify that when they are applied at the level of common praxis, 
the chief point of conflict between the two systems lies in their 
radically different assumptions about the sources of human 
motivation. Is it reducible to a matter of economics or 
psychosexual needs and instincts? Should external material 
circumstances be seen as the generative source of inner psycho-
sexual development or vice versa? There is no adequate answer 
to such questions, although compromise solutions have been 
attempted by stepping outside of both systems. This was ti:ied 
by critical theorists Adorno, Harcu3e, and others, but it leads 
inevitably to another dilemma: If liberal thoup,ht is rejected 
as being false in accord with llarxian and Freudian analyses, 
and if the global exclusivity claimed by the Marxian and Freudian 
systeras are both rejected in order to argue that both may be 
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correct when they are considered within some hip,her level system 
that neither one will accept, then what sort of thought system 
has one arrived at? lfuat are the "rules of the game" in this 
supra-llarxist-Freudian system that purports to embrace both of 
them? The critical theorists could not answer this question, 
except by attempting to convert the general strategy of 
relentless llarxian-Freudian criticism into a philosophical system. 
This was Adorno's aim in his final and most obscure work, 
Negative Dialectics. By all accounts, including those of the most 
devoted admirers of critical theory, it does not succeed in 
constituting a new system. 
FAlLURES BEFORE THE HOLOCAUST 
It is not clear whether the palpable failures of Harxian and 
Freudian t:1ought in tlle face of t:1e Holocaust should be conceived 
as demonstrating that the two systems are altogether false in 
their claims toward general interpretations of society or that they 
are simply much more limited in their applicability to htnnan 
affairs than their progenitors could possibly imagine. After 
all, neither Harx nor Freud nor any of t:1eir c:üef exponents 
could think that anything like the Holocaust might ever occur 
at the center of European civilization. It is clear, however, 
that neither l1arxian nor Freudian views of human motivation 
are adequate to interpret the behavior of the victims and 
perpetrators of thc Holocaust. 
11ore specifically, when examining such "perpetrator" issues as 
the evolution of the final-solution policy, the functioning of 
the SS organization which carried it out, or the behavior of 
individual SS commanders of death camps, there do not appear to 
be any important problems that can be resolved in accord with 
economic motives. If anything, the theory of motivation based 
on dialectical materialism suggests that a policy of the magnitude, 
ferocity, and counterproductivity of the final solution would 
never be adopted by rational men and could never be implemented 
effectively by irrational men. 
On the other hand, alt:10ugh Freudian psychosexual theory suggests 
that atrocious horrors may be committed by certain individuals 
(working out bizarre psychodynamics via ego defensive acts of 
aggression) and sometimes groups; namely, the Jim Jones cult 
murders and mass suicides, it also suggests that such horrors 
will be limited and relatively rare insofar as they depart from 
normative social values. If anything, psychosexual analyses 
of individual and group behavior processes implies that the 
conduct of mass killing, torture, and brutalization of defenseless 
men, women, and children as a matter oi' daily routine should be 
a social-emotional impossibility. There were in fact some cases 
of SS men, and many more among their victims, who did commit 
suicide or allow themselves to die 'juickly rat;1er than go on 
with life under such circumstances; had more of them done so, 
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Freudian theory would have a stronger claim to fit the ev.ents. 
In general, it may be acknowledged that such concepts as Marx's 
notion of alienation and Freud's notion of compartmenta~ization, 
projection, and other defense mechanisms can be usefully employed 
to help explain how ordinary men ~ay adapt themselves to 
extraordinary atrocities, but even in the hands of ti1e most adept 
scholars, these concepts merely offer tentative grounds for 
speculative discussions beyond the scope of their parent theories. 
It is noteworthy, in this context, that Freudian theorists, 
some of whom were themselves prisoners in death camps and 
concentration camps, have done much more work on Holocaust problems 
than lfarxian theorists. Almost without exception, these writers 
(for example, Bettelheim, Cohen, Fromm, Frankel, Lifton, E. A. 
Rappaport) try to show how the Holocaust experience requires basic 
modifications of important Freudian assumptions, as well as 
different forms of process interpretation. So far as SS behavior 
is concerned, one of the major points of contention has been 
the question or moral values: \lere the SS men with criminal 
superegos as some theorists claimed? lvere they banal, self-seeking 
mediocrities? Or were they instead, so very high in the qualities 
called authoritarianism that their morality was superceded and 
subordinated to their need for obedience to a charismatic leader? 
Other questions concerning the behavior of both victims and 
survivors of the camps have generated still more controversy, 
particularly when they involve matters of apparent victim 
passivity and reasons why some prisoners seemed better able to 
survive than others. The fact that vast uncertainty and conflict 
remains about such matters, even among the most credible and 
articulate of Freudians who have bad nearly forty years to sort 
out the evidence, is in itself very clear evidence that the 
theory is inadequate to interpret the events. 
This conclusion is also supported by A. E. Rappaport's little 
knowa but very significant professional analysis of how Freudian 
theory fails before the traumatic experiences of Holocaust 
survivors.l5 As both a survivor and a psychoanalyst consulted 
by other survivors, Rappapart brought unique credentials to bis 
scrutiny of theory. His conclusions that (a) it was wrong to 
apply the concept "traumatic neurosis" to the behavior problems 
of survivors, and (b) that a traumatized ego--contrary to the 
teaching of Freudian theory--could result from atrocious experiences 
in the absence of any predisposing childhood conflict or trauma, 
are developed in a way that gives a very practical and moving 
sense of the difficulties created by the fact that Freudian theory 
does not fit liolocaust trauma and, consequently, cannot offer 
much help to its survivor clients. 
SUMMARY A!ID PROSPECTUS 
Our main arguments have been that: (1) The various modes of 
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thought applied to the task of Holocaust interpretation have all 
been inadequate because they do not acknowledge the extent to 
which their epistemological assumptions, theoretical structures, 
and methodologies have been conpromised or falsified by the fact 
that the Holocaust happened. (2) The internal contradictions and 
confusion between explanation and meaning characterizing the 
eclectic empirieist and metaphysical approaches are evident. 
(3) The Harxian and Freudian approaches to the Holocaust fail 
for two reasons that have not been appreciated. As moral world 
views, the two systems share with liberal empiricism the idea that 
morality ~ay be conceptualized objectively and thus enable rational 
evaluations to be nade of right and wrong. ßy shifting the 
locus of morality to material and psychosexual circumstances, 
however, the end result is only a new form of complex subjectivity 
affering no assurances agairrst tendencies toward mass destruction. 
Furthermore, insofar as the two s~rstems provide theories of 
motivation, they both turn out to be largely irrelevant to the 
problematic behaviors of Holocaust victims, perpetrators, and 
survivors. In none of these groups, does one find significant 
evidence suggesting that either material gain/loss or psyc:1osexual 
gratification/frustration was anything more than a fringe motive 
for the majority. 
Based on the foregoing considerations, our general thesis is 
that all or uost of the important failures of thought before the 
Holocaust follow from a more basic and pervasive failure to 
recognize that the Holocaust has altered the boundaries of human 
possibilities: 3ecause of the Holocaust, we must recognize that 
reality has been changed. It now includes as actual happenings 
and plausible likelihoods, events that were heretofore simply 
not thought of, or else thought of but dismissed as bizarre 
fantasy. 3y relying upon philosophical assumptions, values, 
theories, and methods rooted in pre-llolocaust visions of reality 
and possibility, scholars have consistently and systematically 
either missed or misconstrued important problematic aspects of the 
Holocaust. 
Hhat occurs at the level of psychosocial theory seems directly 
expressive of Feyerabend's formal critique of science in general, 
namely, that insofar as new evidence is obtained, it will be 
assimilated into the preexisting expert consensus even if this 
requires a radical deformation of the evidence in order to 
maintain the credibility of the consensus. Feyerabend argues 
further that whatever evidence cannot be fit into the preexisting 
consensus will be ignored or devalued as subjectively biased, 
mystical, or otherwise flawed.l6 
It is noteworthy, moreover, that within their own specific 
histories both !1arxian and Freudian thought contain very dramatic 
instances of alternative viewpoints and critiques that were 
directed at the same general points of theoretical significance 
that we have identified in connection with the Holocaust. lhthin 
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the 11arxian tradition, the views of theorists such as Sore!, who 
emphasized the influence of myth over human behavior, and of 
Bakunin, who argued for the reflexive independence of small 
groups as against the intrinsically oppressive hierarchical 
organization of masses, both exemplify a concern with themes that 
were anathema to l~rx but now appear very cogent in relation 
to the Holocaust and subsequent events of this century. (Revival 
of interest in anarchist theory among contemporary intellectuals 
is no accident.) 
In the Freudian tradition, the major internal critiques came from 
Jung and Reich. Jung's ideas about racial archetypes, especially 
his Nietzchean ambivalence about the Germanie "blonde beast" 
were dismissed by Freud as evidence of his latent anti-Semitism; 
and Reich's work on the psychosexual basis of Nazism as a mass 
movement was also rejected. ßoth of these renegade Freudians 
were able to perceive some of .the darker aspects of European 
culture in ways that Freud's commitment to an outmoded scientific 
rationality apparently prevented. 
Mainly judged to be failures in their own time, these revision1st 
currents within the Marxian and Freudian traditions have in . one 
form or another made steady gains ever since the Holocaust. 
~fuen taken tagether with other dissident currents of modern 
thought, such as the critical theory of Adorno, llorkheimer, 
and Marcuse, and the existentialism of Sartre and Heidegger, 
there begins to be visible among the many overlaps and common 
predispositions between them a loosely linked body of thought--
full of contradictions, obscurities, and apparent dead ends, to 
be sure, that is strikingly relevant to the Holocaust experience. 
It is in these philosophical, psychosocial, and historical domains 
of the cranky, quirky critics of all that is held dear by the 
modern democratic or authoritarian industrial state, that the 
latent forms for an adequate post-Holocaust social epistemology 
may be perceived. 
Without claiming any special priority or making any pretense 
toward a fulfilled, programmatic vision, it is possible to 
suggest at least three key premises for such an epistemology. If, 
as we have tried to show, the facticity of the Holocaust defies 
interpretation via the main streams of pre-Holocaust social thought, 
it is because the events of the Holocaust reveal their central 
conceptual structures to be either false or inadequate. First 
among these conceptual structures is the Enlightenment ideal of 
material and moral progress via science and technology. It is 
now clear, however, that these enterprises are ruthlessly amoral 
and that their potential for human progress, (liberation from 
fear, want, and so forth) is matched or exceeded by their 
potential for human destruction--w~ether in the form of weapons, 
death camps, or disease~causing chemieals in the natural 
environment. Consequently, science and technology are not to 
be trusted; not to be taken at their face value, for they lead as 
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easily to Auschwitz as to Disney Horld. 
Furthermore, science and technology are not neutral 
instrumentalities of human will, as is so often claimed by those 
with the highest stakes in maintaining their present-day hegemony. 
On the contrary, the record of the twentieth century in general 
and the Holocaust in particular shmvs that the Promethean qualities 
of instrumental power conferred by science/technology have 
functioned in fact as irresistible seducers toward fundamentally 
antihuman thought and antihuman social policies. It is a 
familiar and credible argument, in this connection, that every 
advance of science/technology has been accompanied by a further 
decline in the ontological status of human beings from subjects 
to objects. 
A second and closely related conceptual structure supporting 
pre-Holocaust epistemology is the Cartesian splitting of the 
psyche leading to the normative view of rationality. The 
Cartesian split is more and more generally recognized to be the 
origin of the modern domination of abstract, analytical thought 
over reflexive human feelings. A post-Holocaust epistemology 
cannot accept such a split. In fact, from the Standpoint of 
the ilolocaust, it seems obvious that we must stand ·oescartes 
on his head and declare: -I am, t:1.erefore I think, feel, and 
so on. 
The thrust of this proposition is not to eliminate any or all 
forms of rationality, but to restore the balance between 
abstraction and reflexivity. This requires alteration of the 
subject-object relationship, both in terms of the presumed 
differences between subjectivity and objectivity, on the one 
hand, and on the other, of the now-conventional thought models 
allowing subjects to be converted into objects. 
Finally, a third and crucially important general premise of 
post-Holocaust epistemology must be recognition that the chief 
social instrument of human suffering in the twentieth century--
epitomized in the !Iolocaust--has been the modern state. Whatever 
else it may be or might have been, the bureaucratic, hierarchical, 
rationalized structure of the modern industrial state is a social 
invention that has evolved in this century into an historically 
unparalleled engine of efficient human destruction. It is the 
primary empirical means and co,nstitutes the technical-methodological 
framework whereby the sundry forces within society can be coordina-
ted to function against the immanent interests of sensate 
humanity. As Jules !Ienry suggested in the title of his psycho-
social analysis of American society, we may see "Culture Against 
!!an" revealed not only in warfare, but also in the daily, prosiac 
activities of the state. Furthermore, as we have argued elsewhere 
in detail, the failures of law, religion, and science revealed 
in the Holocaust are intimately associated with the fact that 
these three pillars of llestern civilizatibn have all come under 
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control of the modern state, beyi~d which there is no higher 
authority today anymore than in Europe circa 1939-45. 
It should be emphasized again, by way of conclusion, that once 
interpretations of the Holocaust as a species of insane anti-
Semitism and/or historical aberration are rejected for the reasons 
we have discussed, then it can only be perceived as on acute 
manifestation of the modern transformation of European civilization. 
Embodying many of the antihuman trends already glimpsed and 
occasionally prophesized by some pre-llolocaust thinkers who 
tried to warn against the terrible ontological consequences they 
saw latent in the growing dominance, above all, of science/ 
technology, rationality, and the structure of the modern state, 
the Holocaust forces deep critical reconsideration of the 
epistemological underpinnings of the European Enlightenment. 
In our view, the Holocaust is nothing less than a horrible 
monument to the confusion and failure of the modes of thought 
that have dominated twentiety-century \lestern civilization. 
Hazism jioned tagether the mythic, aggressively destructive 
elements of human culture with those of nationality, technology, 
and bureaucratic social control. We see this symbolized today 
when terrible new weapons systems are named after Greek or 
Hindu Gods. Unself-conscious efforts to interpret the Holocaust 
in accord with such modes of thought cannot succeed; if post-
Ilolocaust epistemoloßy does not yet exist, then it is necessary 
for us to begin to invent it. From this standpoint, Holocaust 
interpretation can ortly be accepted as valid insofar as it 
becomes the means of revealing the deep structural thought systems 
that made it possible and then exploring routes toward their 
alteration, guideu by ernerging new visions of the ideal of a 
unitary and indivisible humanity. 
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Epilogue 
HARVEY C. GREISMAN 
Because scientists look for continuities to explain things, and 
because it is widely assumed that as time passes it is easier 
to make dispassionate judgments about historical events, the job 
of explaining the Holocaust becomes barder with each passing 
year. Instead of clearing up, the contradictions just multiply 
as the scholar must reconcile one of the most brutal mass 
exterminations in human history with the artistic and scientific 
achievements of the \lest's most literate nation. It is to the 
credit of the editors of this volume and to its contributors, 
that they do not attempt grandiose metahistorical theories. 
The essays in this book treat discrete sections of the topic in 
modest portians and are informative without being overly technical. 
In the best spirit of social science research, these essays will 
help to pull tagether the many pieces of the puzzle so that 
someday one can come to understand why the years 1933-1945 
happened the way they did. 
Although explanation of the Holocaust: by some grand sweep of 
llegelian logic would be Quixotic to say the least, the data-rich 
articles in this book should be seen against a backdrop of 
human behavior, needs, and drives. One of the salient background 
elements of the Holocaust is tied to the question of its 
uniqueness. \Jas this the first such event of its kind, and if 
it was not, what is it about the Holocaust that makes us cringe 
forty years after the event? 
Long before the Roman senate passed its farnaus resolution, 
"Delende Est Carthago!" the desire of one people to totally 
obliterate another was an estab1ished part of human behavior. 
Subjugation and wholesale enslavement are closely related to 
warfare throughout ancient history, and fossil evidence indicates 
that the cruder ancestors of modern human beings behaved 
similarly. Complete annihilation of a tribe or the inhabitants 
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of a city or region also occupied many places in written history, 
myth, and the grey world that lies between them. Motivated by 
revenge or the more complex desire to ensure sameness and 
uniformity, attempts to eradicate whole peoples crop up from 
time to time. The Basques may represent the final remnant of 
the most enormous holocaust of prehistory, while, on somewhat 
less speculative ground, the Louisiana Acadians are all that 
remain of a community transported two thousand miles southward 
to remove the danger they posed as an eighteenth-century 
"security risk." 
The British engineered the diaspora of the Acadians, we well as 
a slaughter of Scottish clans which, after the disaster at 
Culloden, assumed genocidal proportions. Hhile considering the 
long list of England's assaults on ethnic minorities, the potato 
famines of the 1340s probably come as close to a holocaust as 
the nineteenth-century imagination would permit. As history 
moves away from the vendetta mentality of the localized 
traditional world and into the cost-benefit sentiment of raison 
d'etat, it takes on the characteristics of the industrial system. 
The question as to whether papal authorities would have used 
gas chambers and cremation mills to obliterate the Hussites, 
Albigensians, and Taborites if they had them handy may be 
intriguing, but it gets us nowhere. The point is that the 
machinery and organization required for the kind of h0.locaust that 
was leveled against the Jews in this century was simply unavailable 
in the past. It is only with the European imperium over Africa 
that one sees the first glinnner of the holocaust mentality 
wedded to the industrial model. Joseph Conrad's stygian imagery 
in Heart of Darkness really predicted more of the future than 
Jules Verne or H. G. llells: The IIestern imagination grasped the 
fact that the assembly line could be made to produce automobiles, 
to dismember cattle, and to eliminate great numbers of human 
beings. 
ßecause of twentieth-century events, the term "holocaust" has 
come to be applied strictly to the extermination of European Jews 
during the Third Reich. In effect, the twentieth century has 
witnessed any nurober of holocausts in which ethnic, religious, 
or racial groups have been systematically annihilated by legitimate 
government authorities. 11\Jho remembers the Armenians?" was 
Hitler's laconic answer when some moderate Nazis questioned the 
wisdom of the final solution. Few then recalled the massacre 
of three million Armenians by the Turks during llorld \lar I. Only 
professional historians and others '"'ho keep track of such things 
remernher them a t all. 
r•ew research into German policy in occupied nations had yielded 
some provocative material regarding the Nazi philosophy of human 
extermination. It is now acknowledged that several million 
ethnic Poles were killed by the Germans under the explicit command 
from Berlin to depopulate Poland for German settlement. The mass 
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murder of Ukranians has also been discovered. Although Poles 
and Ukranians may have cooperated with the German occupiers in 
seeking out and exterminating the Jews, it was in the end to no 
avail since they, too, were considered racial inferiors and 
allotted their own spot on the Nazi timetable of annihilation 
or enslavement. Xenophobie hysteria was not uncommon during the 
1940s, and the Allied nations were hardly immune to it. 
The technological advances of the twentieth century, especially 
in the areas of communication, inforn~tion retrieval, transport, 
and management have provided an impressive list of holocausts. 
What, then, makes the ordeal of the Jews in Europe so special? 
The answer lies partially in the style with which the Germans, 
"the most educated people in Europe," dispatched so many of their 
own citizens. Stauding small children against a walland 
shooting them forr no reason other than a flimsy accusation of 
racial inferiority evokes a certain repulsion. But disposing 
of them in !arge factories specifically designed for the purpese 
is really a quantum leap in the science of death. The Holocaust 
involved the active participation of the industrial, scientific, 
and business communities. The efficiency of the whole undertaking 
was calculated down to the last detail. Extracting gold fillings 
from teeth, employing body fat for soap manufacture, and using 
skin for lampshades are characteristic of the expertise associated 
with cost-effective business enterprise. The rationalized 
procedures and assembly-line methods that produced goods could 
also be utilized to destroy human beings for the manufacture 
of consumer goods. 
Modern industry proved itself extraordinarily versatile during 
the Third Reich, and one can only wonder to what lengths these 
techniques would have been improved had the war not turned against 
the Germans. Social research into bureaucracy and complex 
organizations can give us some clues: It is entirely possible 
that long after every Jew in Europe had been killed, the Holocaust 
machinery would have continued to function. Pressure to keep it 
going would have come from the industries that supplied the 
equipment, from the railroads that shipped the "raw material" to 
the camps, and from the functionaries who managed the administrative 
apparatus. As for victims, there is every indication that the Slav 
"race" would have been next and after them other candidates 
could be nominated for subhuman status as the need presented 
itself. 
There are several ideological villains in the Holocaust drama, 
but the essays in this volume amply demonstrate the prominent 
role played by biological nationalism. From the curious melange 
of opinion, fact, theory, and myth that constituted Victorian 
science, the idea of a master race emerged as one of the most 
powerful and compelling. Once the scientific community obliged 
by "proving" that some races were inferior to others and that it 
was perfectly reasonable to judge someone by his ancestors' 
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"blood," the door was open to the most fantastic abuses 
imaginable. Far from having been burnt up in the GBtterdHmmerung 
of 1945, biological nationalism and the doctrine of a master 
race are today enjoying something of a comeback. 
Dobkowski and llallimann have done us a genuine service in 
assembling this excellent collection. It is, sadly enough, 
most timely, because t~e intellectual forces that justified the 
Holocaust of the 1940s are as active today as they were then. 
Indians in ßrazil, Paraguay, and Argentina may not be openly 
brandedas "mongrel races," but t~ey are likely to be 
exterminated just the same, and with an ideological justification 
that bears a striking resemblance to that used Juring the Third 
Reich . Although objecti ve conditions in today' s world seem to 
cry out for a dissolution of national boundaries, pleas for 
reason are drowned out by the celebration of tribal fantasies. 
Threats of nuclear war, global famine, and energy scarcity seem 
unimportant to petty dictators and world leaders alike, who 
childishly beat the drum of nationalist ideology. 
After the Hazi takeover in Germany, all art and literature 
considered non-Aryan was destroyed. In Vienna, Freud learned 
that his books had been burned. r:1e faunder of psychoanalysis 
believed that this showed progress. He reasoned that in the Dark 
Ages he, as well as his books, would have been burned. Freud 
died in England before he could find out that his opinion was not 
justified. !lad he remained, he, too, would have been consumed 
by the Holocaust. Freud was not alone in his failure to imagine 
just how far llestern "civilization" could regress. The tribal 
fantasies of biological nationalism can create a world more akin 
to that of the prima! horde than the Dark Ages. Group fantasies 
about master races can only help to bring about the final 
holocaust which, if nothing else, will be considerably less 
sectarian than its predecessors. 
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